Filed May 8, 2007. Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
Respondent ("Goff") was charged with violating Rules 1.1, Competence, 1.3, Diligence, 1.15, Safekeeping Property, 5.3, Responsibilities Regarding Non-lawyer Assistants, 8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters, and 8.4, Misconduct, and the petitioner (the "AGC") recommended an indefinite suspension, while Goff suggested no sanction was needed, or at the most a reprimand or 30 day suspension. After considering the report of the hearings judge, the Court agreed with the AGC, and ordered the indefinite suspension of Goff, with the right to apply for readmission after 60 days.
As an adjunct to a client's request to handle the sale of certain parcels of land owned by various members of the client's family, Goff agreed to open three estates for deceased family members who held record title to several parcels. After the sale, most of the proceeds were distributed without controversy, but the portion of proceeds held on behalf of one estate were not timely distributed, and Goff was not responsive to inquiries by family members and their counsel. Some time after a complaint had been filed with bar counsel, Goff distributed the remaining proceeds.
Goff was incompletely and less than timely responsive to bar counsel's repeated requests, and the subsequent investigation revealed many shortcomings in Goff's records and escrow account administration. When several overdraft notices were subsequently received by bar counsel, the investigation was widened to include several of Goff's other escrow accounts, and more errors and inappropriate practices were revealed. Computer crashes, and the failure to make timely and adequate backups, had added to the problem by destroying blocks of escrow account records. Throughout, Goff exhibited behavior that the hearing judge characterized as "lackadasical" and "unreliable", leading to the conclusion that Goff's representation was "incompetent".
The Court had little trouble finding no merit in Goff's multiple exceptions, including his claim that, because most of his professional activities were as a title insurance agent, he was exempt from liability under the Code of Professional Conduct. On that point, the Court found the conduct here was clearly legal representation, easily distinguishable from prior cases where the conduct in question was solely as a title agent.
By contrast, the Court upheld the AGC's exceptions, correcting a "technical" error in referring to the current rather than the then-existing statute, and finding an additional violation not confirmed by the hearing judge below.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Showing posts with label Attorney Discipline. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Attorney Discipline. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 8, 2007
Sunday, May 6, 2007
In the Matter of R.M.W. (U.S.D.C.)(Approved for Publication)
Signed May 1, 2007--Opinion by Judges Peter J. Messitte, Benson E. Legg, and Andre M. Davis. Approved for publication.
R.M.W., a former member of the Bar of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, was convicted of several felonies and as a result lost his bar membership. He petitioned for readmission to membership. Previously in this case, the U.S. District Court, en banc, had ruled that the standards applicable to the evaluation of application for membership in the Bar by individuals convicted of felonies should also apply to applications for readmission.
The case involving admissions to the Bar, In the Matter of S.G.P., 428 F.Supp. 2d 389 (D. Md. 2006) overruled In the Matter of G.L.S., 586 F.Supp. 375 (D. Md. 1984), and established new criteria for the evaluation of applications and reapplications for membership in the Bar by individuals convicted of felonies.
The factors to be considered are as follows:
1. The nature and character of the offense or offenses committed;
2. The number and duration of offenses and the sentence as to each;
3. The period of any probation or supervised release term and whether the petitioner's adjustment to same was satisfactory;
4. The age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were committed;
5. The grant or denial of a pardon for any offenses committed;
6. Whether the petitioner was disbarred by any other court;
7. The number of years that have elapsed since the last offense was committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct during that period;
8. Whether the petitioner has complied in all respects with the terms and conditions of prior disciplinary or remedial orders, including the payment of any costs ordered by the disbarring court;
9. Whether the petitioner has engaged or attempted or offered to engage in the unauthorized practice of law;
10. With regard to any incapacity or infirmity (including alcohol or drug abuse), whether it has ceased to exist and is not reasonably likely to recur in the future;
11. Whether the petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the professional misconduct for which discipline was imposed;
12. Whether the petitioner currently has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law;
13. The opinions of character witnesses about the applicant's moral fitness;
14. Whether the petitioner has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice law;
15. Any other re-admissions to the bar since the petitioner's disbarment;
16. Any other matter that the petitioner may deem relevant to the application or that may be specifically requested by the Court.
R.M.W. began to practice law in his home town, Frederick, Maryland, immediately after graduating law school and passing the bar in 1975. Having used marijuana and other drugs as early as his high school days, by the late 1970's he had become addicted to cocaine and alcohol. In his law practice, much of which involved representation of clients charged with drinking and driving offenses and family matters, he was often paid in cash which he intentionally failed to report as income. This unreported income was used to purchase cocaine for his own consumption such that, during the period of time before his arrest, he was spending between $30,000 and $40,000 a year on his drug habit.
In September 1982, a search warrant was executed on Respondent's residence, which ultimately led to felony convictions both in Maryland state courts (state tax offenses) and federal court (drug offenses) and his disbarment from membership in the Maryland U.S.D.C. He spent a little more than nine months in various federal and Maryland detention facilities.
R.M.W. was suspended from the practice of law by the Maryland Court of Appeals in April 1985 and disbarred on June 4, 1987. He was disbarred by the Maryland U.S.D.C. on July 10, 1984.
R.M.W. was reinstated to the Maryland Bar by Order dated January 7, 2000 signed by Chief Judge Bell for the Maryland Court of Appeals, "with a majority of the Court concurring." He was returned to the Registry of Attorneys on February 3, 2000. Since that time he has satisfied the conditions set forth in that Order in every respect.
The opinion relates in detail the story of R.M.W.'s rehabilitation. As noted in the opinion, the report of the special investigator appointed by the court found that "One Judge [in Frederick County] described Respondent as 'a poster child' for rehabilitation. All the Judges [in Frederick County] enthusiastically support [his] current petition for reinstatement."
In concluding, the panel said as follows:
R.M.W., a former member of the Bar of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, was convicted of several felonies and as a result lost his bar membership. He petitioned for readmission to membership. Previously in this case, the U.S. District Court, en banc, had ruled that the standards applicable to the evaluation of application for membership in the Bar by individuals convicted of felonies should also apply to applications for readmission.
The case involving admissions to the Bar, In the Matter of S.G.P., 428 F.Supp. 2d 389 (D. Md. 2006) overruled In the Matter of G.L.S., 586 F.Supp. 375 (D. Md. 1984), and established new criteria for the evaluation of applications and reapplications for membership in the Bar by individuals convicted of felonies.
The factors to be considered are as follows:
1. The nature and character of the offense or offenses committed;
2. The number and duration of offenses and the sentence as to each;
3. The period of any probation or supervised release term and whether the petitioner's adjustment to same was satisfactory;
4. The age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were committed;
5. The grant or denial of a pardon for any offenses committed;
6. Whether the petitioner was disbarred by any other court;
7. The number of years that have elapsed since the last offense was committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct during that period;
8. Whether the petitioner has complied in all respects with the terms and conditions of prior disciplinary or remedial orders, including the payment of any costs ordered by the disbarring court;
9. Whether the petitioner has engaged or attempted or offered to engage in the unauthorized practice of law;
10. With regard to any incapacity or infirmity (including alcohol or drug abuse), whether it has ceased to exist and is not reasonably likely to recur in the future;
11. Whether the petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the professional misconduct for which discipline was imposed;
12. Whether the petitioner currently has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law;
13. The opinions of character witnesses about the applicant's moral fitness;
14. Whether the petitioner has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice law;
15. Any other re-admissions to the bar since the petitioner's disbarment;
16. Any other matter that the petitioner may deem relevant to the application or that may be specifically requested by the Court.
R.M.W. began to practice law in his home town, Frederick, Maryland, immediately after graduating law school and passing the bar in 1975. Having used marijuana and other drugs as early as his high school days, by the late 1970's he had become addicted to cocaine and alcohol. In his law practice, much of which involved representation of clients charged with drinking and driving offenses and family matters, he was often paid in cash which he intentionally failed to report as income. This unreported income was used to purchase cocaine for his own consumption such that, during the period of time before his arrest, he was spending between $30,000 and $40,000 a year on his drug habit.
In September 1982, a search warrant was executed on Respondent's residence, which ultimately led to felony convictions both in Maryland state courts (state tax offenses) and federal court (drug offenses) and his disbarment from membership in the Maryland U.S.D.C. He spent a little more than nine months in various federal and Maryland detention facilities.
R.M.W. was suspended from the practice of law by the Maryland Court of Appeals in April 1985 and disbarred on June 4, 1987. He was disbarred by the Maryland U.S.D.C. on July 10, 1984.
R.M.W. was reinstated to the Maryland Bar by Order dated January 7, 2000 signed by Chief Judge Bell for the Maryland Court of Appeals, "with a majority of the Court concurring." He was returned to the Registry of Attorneys on February 3, 2000. Since that time he has satisfied the conditions set forth in that Order in every respect.
The opinion relates in detail the story of R.M.W.'s rehabilitation. As noted in the opinion, the report of the special investigator appointed by the court found that "One Judge [in Frederick County] described Respondent as 'a poster child' for rehabilitation. All the Judges [in Frederick County] enthusiastically support [his] current petition for reinstatement."
In concluding, the panel said as follows:
This Court believes that dishonesty involved in evading income taxes and in not filing tax returns has always been a serious matter. Drug activity today has become a matter of prime concern in the criminal justice system. Indeed, were [R.M.W.'s] cases to have come before a federal court in 2007, it is clear that the punishment to be imposed would be considerably more severe than that which was imposed by the state and federal judges in the mid-1980's.
But whatever the courts of some jurisdictions may believe about the permanent disqualification to serve as an attorney of an individual who has been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, this Court, joining the majority of courts, takes a different view. The Court believes that, when sufficient time has passed since the criminal activity, when there is manifest indication of the individual’s rehabilitation and remorse as well as his skill to serve as an attorney, when all that is presented to the Court in a clear and convincing matter, there is still room for someone to rejoin (or indeed to join in the first instance) the ranks of the Bar of this Court.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that [R.M.W.'s] rehabilitation is genuine and that he does indeed represent a benchmark for attorneys similarly situated who would seek reinstatement in our Bar.
A copy of the opinion is available in PDF as is a copy of the order. Note: As of this posting, the link provided here is correct, while the link to the opinion on the Court's website is not.
Update: A memorandum in this case by the special investigator appointed by the Court as to the issue of whether there is criminal conduct so serious or heinous to preclude reinstatement has been posted here.The Court ordered that the memorandum be attached to the opinion and recommended it for publication because "the memorandum is extraordinarily thorough in its exposition of a very important issue not well illuminated by the case law which would almost certainly prove useful to other courts facing the issue."
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mahone (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed April 10, 2007. Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene, Jr.
From the official headnote:
Mahone filed exceptions on the grounds that the hearings judge failed to make findings of mitigation on the basis of his "Equitable Grounds Defense", in which he had suggested that the complaints had been filed as a product of judicial retaliation and resentment, and that the hearing judge erred in finding that one instance of lateness supported a finding of discourtesy, and in failing to find that one of the trial judges initiated a patter of interruptions, goaded him during the hearing, was discourteous to counsel, and lost control of the proceedings and created a hostile and oppressive court environment, and that Mahone's walking out was a "speech protest" rather than a substantial idsruption of the proceedings. Mahone also noted that neither judge had held him in contempt, and that one waited four months before filing a complaint.
The Court found that Mahone had had a full opportunity to be heard before the hearing judge on all matters raised in the exceptions, and found no basis for determining the factual findings below were clearly erroneous. The Court had little effort affirming the hearing judge's finding of law that Mahone had violated MRPC 8.4(d), finding that his patterns of disruption and walking out of court constituted a direct contempt, and that the exceptions proffered, even if taken at face value as true, did not excuse Mahone's conduct. Further, the restraint exercised by the judges did not serve to demonstrate that his conduct was not disruptive.
The Court did not agree with the suspension requested by Bar Counsel, noting that not every contempt of court deserves suspension or disbarment. Here, given that Mahone was, as noted by the hearing judge, a "zealous advocate" who had "[lost] his perspective", that neither client had been prejudiced by Mahone's misconduct, and that there had been no prior disciplinary proceedings against him, the Court held that the appropriate sanction was a reprimand, since that would be sufficient to "send a clear message" that such behavior will not be tolerated.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
From the official headnote:
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – Our goal in matters of attorney discipline is to protect the public and the public's confidence in the legal profession rather than to punish the attorney.In the course of representing two clients in three matters before two judges, Mahone was found by the hearings judge to have not shown up for a hearing in one matter, without notice to the court that he would be tardy or explaining or apologizing for his tardiness afterwards, and repeatedly interrupted the judges and acted in a condescending manner in two other matters, including leaving the courtroom and abandoning his client during the judge's rendering of his opinion in one of them. Consequently, the hearings judge found Mahone's conduct to have been prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the MRPC.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – We protect the public by imposing sanctions that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the attorneys’ violations and the intent with which they were committed. The severity of the sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, taking account of any particular aggravating or mitigating factors. Under the circumstances, the appropriate sanction is a reprimand where the attorney disrupted court proceedings in one instance; and, in another instance walked out during the court proceedings to show his disdain for the trial judge. The mitigating factors were that the attorney’s clients were not prejudiced as a result of his misconduct and that there were no prior disciplinary proceedings filed against the attorney. In addition, by imposing a reprimand in this case, we are able to send a clear message to the Bar that deliberately disruptive behavior by attorneys in court proceedings will not be tolerated.
Mahone filed exceptions on the grounds that the hearings judge failed to make findings of mitigation on the basis of his "Equitable Grounds Defense", in which he had suggested that the complaints had been filed as a product of judicial retaliation and resentment, and that the hearing judge erred in finding that one instance of lateness supported a finding of discourtesy, and in failing to find that one of the trial judges initiated a patter of interruptions, goaded him during the hearing, was discourteous to counsel, and lost control of the proceedings and created a hostile and oppressive court environment, and that Mahone's walking out was a "speech protest" rather than a substantial idsruption of the proceedings. Mahone also noted that neither judge had held him in contempt, and that one waited four months before filing a complaint.
The Court found that Mahone had had a full opportunity to be heard before the hearing judge on all matters raised in the exceptions, and found no basis for determining the factual findings below were clearly erroneous. The Court had little effort affirming the hearing judge's finding of law that Mahone had violated MRPC 8.4(d), finding that his patterns of disruption and walking out of court constituted a direct contempt, and that the exceptions proffered, even if taken at face value as true, did not excuse Mahone's conduct. Further, the restraint exercised by the judges did not serve to demonstrate that his conduct was not disruptive.
The Court did not agree with the suspension requested by Bar Counsel, noting that not every contempt of court deserves suspension or disbarment. Here, given that Mahone was, as noted by the hearing judge, a "zealous advocate" who had "[lost] his perspective", that neither client had been prejudiced by Mahone's misconduct, and that there had been no prior disciplinary proceedings against him, the Court held that the appropriate sanction was a reprimand, since that would be sufficient to "send a clear message" that such behavior will not be tolerated.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Long (Ct of Appeals)
Filed April 3, 2007. Opinion signed by Judge Irma S. Raker.
In its entirety:
In its entirety:
Upon consideration of the Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent filed herein pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-772, it is this 3rd day of April, 2007,The Order is available in PDF format.
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that DIMONE G. LONG, be, and is hereby, disbarred by consent from the further practice of law in the State of Maryland effective immediately; and it is further,
ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the name of Dimone G. Long from the register of attorneys, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-772(d) shall certify that fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this State.
Tuesday, March 27, 2007
AGC v. Wohltman (Ct. of Appeals)
Ordered March 22nd, 2007 -- Order of Judge Irma Raker
Upon a Joint Petition for Order Placing Respondent on Inactive Status, the Court of Appeals placed Respondent on inactive status indefinitely with the condition precedent to Maryland reinstatement that he must first be reinstated in the Commonwealth of Virginia. No additional factual or legal details were provided with the Order.
The one-page Order is available here in PDF format.
Upon a Joint Petition for Order Placing Respondent on Inactive Status, the Court of Appeals placed Respondent on inactive status indefinitely with the condition precedent to Maryland reinstatement that he must first be reinstated in the Commonwealth of Virginia. No additional factual or legal details were provided with the Order.
The one-page Order is available here in PDF format.
Wednesday, March 21, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mba-Jonas (Ct. of Appeals)
Decided March 20, 2007 -- Opinion of Chief Judge Robert M. Bell
Respondent had entered a Condition Diversion Agreement ("CDA") with Petitioner ("the Commission") after a client complaint to Petitioner, the specifics of which complaint were not identified. Respondent's monitor ("Monitor") under the CDA came to learn of escrow account irregularities in Respondent's account including three overdrafts, one of which post-dated the execution of the CDA, and that settlement funds pertaining to one client's accident case were used to satisfy other escrow payments for other clients and to third-party medical care providers who had not treated that client.
The Commission charged Respondent with violations of
The Commission filed four exceptions to the Maryland Court of Appeals, regarding the Circuit Court's failure to find violations of Rule 16-609, Code § 10-306 and Rules 8.1 and Rule 8.4(d). The Court of Appeals sustained the Commission's first three exceptions but overruled it on
the matter of Rule 8.4(d), noting that the Commission's reliance on the existence of contradictory testimony at the fact hearing was not a proper basis for a valid exception to the hearing judge's finding on that point.
The Court of Appeals noted the breadth of Rule violations in this case and the failure of Respondent to take the opportunity that the Commission afforded him under the CDA. Examining prior precedents involving conduct similar to Respondent's but also critically distinguished therefrom, the Court of Appeals suspended Respondent indefinitely with leave to reapply for reinstatement after 90 days.
The full opinion is available here in PDF format.
Respondent had entered a Condition Diversion Agreement ("CDA") with Petitioner ("the Commission") after a client complaint to Petitioner, the specifics of which complaint were not identified. Respondent's monitor ("Monitor") under the CDA came to learn of escrow account irregularities in Respondent's account including three overdrafts, one of which post-dated the execution of the CDA, and that settlement funds pertaining to one client's accident case were used to satisfy other escrow payments for other clients and to third-party medical care providers who had not treated that client.
The Commission charged Respondent with violations of
- MLRPC Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property
- MLRPC Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
- MLRPC Rule 8.4 (a) and (d) Misconduct, as adopted by Rule 16-812
- Rule 16-604
- Rule 16-607
- Rule 16-609
- Maryland Code, BP §§10-304,-306 and -307.
The Commission filed four exceptions to the Maryland Court of Appeals, regarding the Circuit Court's failure to find violations of Rule 16-609, Code § 10-306 and Rules 8.1 and Rule 8.4(d). The Court of Appeals sustained the Commission's first three exceptions but overruled it on
the matter of Rule 8.4(d), noting that the Commission's reliance on the existence of contradictory testimony at the fact hearing was not a proper basis for a valid exception to the hearing judge's finding on that point.
The Court of Appeals noted the breadth of Rule violations in this case and the failure of Respondent to take the opportunity that the Commission afforded him under the CDA. Examining prior precedents involving conduct similar to Respondent's but also critically distinguished therefrom, the Court of Appeals suspended Respondent indefinitely with leave to reapply for reinstatement after 90 days.
The full opinion is available here in PDF format.
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hill (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 21, 2007--Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
Respondent was retained by Edward Beier to prepare and obtain an Eligible Domestic Relations Order ("EDRO") necessary to enable him to obtain half of his ex-wife's State employee's retirement benefit. In his engagement letter, Respondent conditioned commencement of work on payment by Beier of a minimum fee of $500.00, of which $200.00 was paid on the date of retention and the balance more than three months later. Despite Beier's numerous requests, Respondent did not prepare the EDRO or cause it to be executed prior to Beier's remarriage and consequent ineligibility to share in his ex-wife's pension. After several letters and telephone calls over the course of four months from Bar Counsel, Respondent provided Bar Counsel with a written response and refunded Beier's entire fee, admitting he had done no work on Beier's case.
In the meanwhile, Respondent was retained to represent John Wilson in connection with a domestic relations case involving visitation and access issues relating to his daughter. Respondent was paid a $2,000.00 retainer, attended a pre-trial conference with his client, his client's ex-wife and her counsel, and, as a result of an agreement, agreed on the record to prepare and submit a written consent order within two weeks of that date. Despite calls from the Master's office, Respondent had not prepared the order for more than six months. In response to an Order from the Circuit Court for Respondent to appear in court and "explain the reason for his failure to submit the order and show cause why sanctions and costs should not be imposed," he prepared a consent order, sent it to opposing counsel and submitted it, signed by both counsel, to the court on the date scheduled for the show cause hearing. Respondent neither sent the consent order to his client for review, nor even inform his client that he had prepared one.
Based on the findings of fact, the hearing court concluded that Respondent, by failing to act expeditiously in both cases, by not timely preparing the EDRO in the Beier case and by his delay in preparing the consent order in the Wilson case, violated Rule 1.3. The inaction in the Beier case was, in addition, a violation of Rule 8.4(d). The hearing court further concluded that in each case, Respondent violated Rule 1.4.
Having found the rules violations charged, the hearing court also offered findings of mitigation. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent filed exceptions to the hearing court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. While both appeared at oral argument and offered their respective recommendations orally, only the Petitioner submitted a written recommendation, urging Respondent's suspension for a one year period.
The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the erring attorney but to protect the unsuspecting public. Respondent presented evidence, and the hearing court found the existence of, mitigating factors which, it concluded, were responsible, at least in part, for Respondent's misconduct. Additionally, Respondent expressed remorse and, consistently, there was testimony that such conduct was out of character for him. Taken together, it may be inferred that Respondent's misconduct is not likely to be repeated. Accordingly, the court found the public will be protected if a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law is imposed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Respondent was retained by Edward Beier to prepare and obtain an Eligible Domestic Relations Order ("EDRO") necessary to enable him to obtain half of his ex-wife's State employee's retirement benefit. In his engagement letter, Respondent conditioned commencement of work on payment by Beier of a minimum fee of $500.00, of which $200.00 was paid on the date of retention and the balance more than three months later. Despite Beier's numerous requests, Respondent did not prepare the EDRO or cause it to be executed prior to Beier's remarriage and consequent ineligibility to share in his ex-wife's pension. After several letters and telephone calls over the course of four months from Bar Counsel, Respondent provided Bar Counsel with a written response and refunded Beier's entire fee, admitting he had done no work on Beier's case.
In the meanwhile, Respondent was retained to represent John Wilson in connection with a domestic relations case involving visitation and access issues relating to his daughter. Respondent was paid a $2,000.00 retainer, attended a pre-trial conference with his client, his client's ex-wife and her counsel, and, as a result of an agreement, agreed on the record to prepare and submit a written consent order within two weeks of that date. Despite calls from the Master's office, Respondent had not prepared the order for more than six months. In response to an Order from the Circuit Court for Respondent to appear in court and "explain the reason for his failure to submit the order and show cause why sanctions and costs should not be imposed," he prepared a consent order, sent it to opposing counsel and submitted it, signed by both counsel, to the court on the date scheduled for the show cause hearing. Respondent neither sent the consent order to his client for review, nor even inform his client that he had prepared one.
Based on the findings of fact, the hearing court concluded that Respondent, by failing to act expeditiously in both cases, by not timely preparing the EDRO in the Beier case and by his delay in preparing the consent order in the Wilson case, violated Rule 1.3. The inaction in the Beier case was, in addition, a violation of Rule 8.4(d). The hearing court further concluded that in each case, Respondent violated Rule 1.4.
Having found the rules violations charged, the hearing court also offered findings of mitigation. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent filed exceptions to the hearing court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. While both appeared at oral argument and offered their respective recommendations orally, only the Petitioner submitted a written recommendation, urging Respondent's suspension for a one year period.
The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the erring attorney but to protect the unsuspecting public. Respondent presented evidence, and the hearing court found the existence of, mitigating factors which, it concluded, were responsible, at least in part, for Respondent's misconduct. Additionally, Respondent expressed remorse and, consistently, there was testimony that such conduct was out of character for him. Taken together, it may be inferred that Respondent's misconduct is not likely to be repeated. Accordingly, the court found the public will be protected if a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law is imposed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Monday, March 19, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCulloch (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 19, 2007. Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
This case arose out of the representation by McCulloch of a client in a pending divorce action, for which McCulloch asked and received a retainer of $2,500. The retainer, including the unearned portion thereof, was deposited by McCulloch into her operating account rather than an escrow account.
Beginning about two weeks thereafter, the client began a series of e-mail requests to McCulloch, urging her to "move forward" on the case, to which she did not respond until about a month later, stating that the documents "were in progress". By e-mail about three weeks later, the client "discharged" McCulloch, and asked for a complete refund within a week. McCulloch responded the same day, with a copy of the letter and pleadings she had prepared, and a bill showing a credit due of $1,474, but no check. Two days later, McCulloch e-mailed the client, urging him to reconsider his decision to discharge her. Other than a few inconclusive e-mails, there was no further communication from McCulloch about the case for almost three months.
The client filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission ("AGC"), and AGC forwarded a copy of the complaint on to McCulloch, requesting a response from her within 15 days, She did not respond to that or to two subsequent letters until more than four months later, by which time the client had written directly to McCulloch, seeking a refund of the $1,474 he had been advised was due. In the meantime, AGC had written again, this time seeking copies of her trust account and client cards. With her response, McCulloch included an amended bill, with a revised credit due of $880, which she had refunded to the client "directly from her trust account" after she had received a settlement on an unrelated matter in the amount of $960. Her operating account had had a negative balance during the time the refund was due to the client.
Referred for a hearing, the hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, the above facts, and violations of Rules 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 8.4(b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 16-604 and Sections 10-304 and 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, but rejected the argument that McCulloch had committed theft.
Neither party excepted to the hearing judge's findings, but AGC did file exception to the recommended sanction, requesting disbarment rather than indefinite suspension. It relied upon the Vanderlinde, Blum, Duvall and Roberts cases for the proposition that misappropriation of funds by an attorney will result in the disbarment of an attorney in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, and that no such circumstances are present here.
The court disagreed, noting that the circumstances in this case were much less egregious than in the other cases, that McCulloch had admitted to her wrong conduct without making excuses, had expressed remorse and that she expected consequences from that conduct, only requesting something short of disbarment. The court also noted that the finding below on the theft charge was at best ambiguous on the issue of the conduct being dishonest and deceitful, and was inclined not to impose disbarment on "such a finding". The court further noted that McCulloch had no prior grievance history, and from McCulloch's remorse the court noted that it could infer that the conduct was less likely to recur. Given that the purpose of attorney discipline was to protect the public and not to punish the erring attorney, the court was satisfied the appropriate sanction was to suspend McCulloch indefinitely, rather than disbarment.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
This case arose out of the representation by McCulloch of a client in a pending divorce action, for which McCulloch asked and received a retainer of $2,500. The retainer, including the unearned portion thereof, was deposited by McCulloch into her operating account rather than an escrow account.
Beginning about two weeks thereafter, the client began a series of e-mail requests to McCulloch, urging her to "move forward" on the case, to which she did not respond until about a month later, stating that the documents "were in progress". By e-mail about three weeks later, the client "discharged" McCulloch, and asked for a complete refund within a week. McCulloch responded the same day, with a copy of the letter and pleadings she had prepared, and a bill showing a credit due of $1,474, but no check. Two days later, McCulloch e-mailed the client, urging him to reconsider his decision to discharge her. Other than a few inconclusive e-mails, there was no further communication from McCulloch about the case for almost three months.
The client filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission ("AGC"), and AGC forwarded a copy of the complaint on to McCulloch, requesting a response from her within 15 days, She did not respond to that or to two subsequent letters until more than four months later, by which time the client had written directly to McCulloch, seeking a refund of the $1,474 he had been advised was due. In the meantime, AGC had written again, this time seeking copies of her trust account and client cards. With her response, McCulloch included an amended bill, with a revised credit due of $880, which she had refunded to the client "directly from her trust account" after she had received a settlement on an unrelated matter in the amount of $960. Her operating account had had a negative balance during the time the refund was due to the client.
Referred for a hearing, the hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, the above facts, and violations of Rules 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 8.4(b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 16-604 and Sections 10-304 and 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, but rejected the argument that McCulloch had committed theft.
Neither party excepted to the hearing judge's findings, but AGC did file exception to the recommended sanction, requesting disbarment rather than indefinite suspension. It relied upon the Vanderlinde, Blum, Duvall and Roberts cases for the proposition that misappropriation of funds by an attorney will result in the disbarment of an attorney in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, and that no such circumstances are present here.
The court disagreed, noting that the circumstances in this case were much less egregious than in the other cases, that McCulloch had admitted to her wrong conduct without making excuses, had expressed remorse and that she expected consequences from that conduct, only requesting something short of disbarment. The court also noted that the finding below on the theft charge was at best ambiguous on the issue of the conduct being dishonest and deceitful, and was inclined not to impose disbarment on "such a finding". The court further noted that McCulloch had no prior grievance history, and from McCulloch's remorse the court noted that it could infer that the conduct was less likely to recur. Given that the purpose of attorney discipline was to protect the public and not to punish the erring attorney, the court was satisfied the appropriate sanction was to suspend McCulloch indefinitely, rather than disbarment.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commision of Maryland v. Tatelbaum (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 12, 2007. Per curium order signed by Judge Ira S. Raker.
In its entirety:
This per curium order is available in PDF format.
In its entirety:
ORDER
The Court having considered the petitioner for disciplinary action, the responses filed thereto and the oral argument of the parties in the above captioned case, it is this 12th day of March, 2007,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the petition for disciplinary or remedial action be, and it is hereby, granted, and CHARLES M. TATELBAUM, the respondent, shall be suspended, nunc pro tunc, from the practice of law in the State of Maryland for ninety (90) days, the period of suspension to coincide and run concurrent with the ninety (90) day suspension imposed by the Supreme Court of Florida dating from March 8, 2006 to June 6, 2006 , and it is further
ORDERED that the Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-71 5(C).
This per curium order is available in PDF format.
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pasierb (Ct. of Appeals)
Signed February 23, 2007 - Order by Judge Irma S. Raker.
Upon consideration of a Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the respondent be disbarred by consent from the further practice of law in Maryland, and that the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall strike him from the register of attorneys and certify same to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State.
The Order is available in PDF format.
Upon consideration of a Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the respondent be disbarred by consent from the further practice of law in Maryland, and that the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall strike him from the register of attorneys and certify same to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State.
The Order is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, December 20, 2006
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Rees (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 20, 2006--Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell
The Respondent was charged with violating a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found that the Respondent did not respond to Bar Counsel's request for information in a timely manner and had withdrawn fees from her escrow account before they were earned. The hearing court rejected allegations that the Respondent had failed to communicate with her clients, charged an unreasonable fee, or fabricated her billing statements and did not actually perform the services for which she billed. The Respondent did not file any exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law and, at argument, had expressly acknowledged her misconduct and made clear that she was not challenging that aspect of the case.
The Attorney Grievance Commission took exceptions to the hearing court's failure to find violations of Rules 1.15 (b) and 1.16 (d) because the Respondent had acknowledged that she failed to send copies of her billing statement to her clients in response to a letter from them and that she was aware of an error in billing her clients and owed them a refund of $257.00 that had not yet been made.
Because the lower court's findings also reflected that it found that a refund was in fact owed, the Court of Appeals sustained the exceptions. Finding that the misconduct that the Respondent had been found to have engaged in was quite serious but, also, that it was isolated and not likely to be repeated, the Court determined that a thirty-day suspension would protect the public interest and be appropriate.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
The Respondent was charged with violating a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found that the Respondent did not respond to Bar Counsel's request for information in a timely manner and had withdrawn fees from her escrow account before they were earned. The hearing court rejected allegations that the Respondent had failed to communicate with her clients, charged an unreasonable fee, or fabricated her billing statements and did not actually perform the services for which she billed. The Respondent did not file any exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law and, at argument, had expressly acknowledged her misconduct and made clear that she was not challenging that aspect of the case.
The Attorney Grievance Commission took exceptions to the hearing court's failure to find violations of Rules 1.15 (b) and 1.16 (d) because the Respondent had acknowledged that she failed to send copies of her billing statement to her clients in response to a letter from them and that she was aware of an error in billing her clients and owed them a refund of $257.00 that had not yet been made.
Because the lower court's findings also reflected that it found that a refund was in fact owed, the Court of Appeals sustained the exceptions. Finding that the misconduct that the Respondent had been found to have engaged in was quite serious but, also, that it was isolated and not likely to be repeated, the Court determined that a thirty-day suspension would protect the public interest and be appropriate.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Monday, December 18, 2006
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ward (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 18, 2006 - Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
Upon disciplinary referral from the Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the following facts to be true:
1. Respondent agreed to represent the complainant, an interested party in a unfiled decedent's estate, and took a retainer for such representation. The decedent had domiciled in Montgomery County, but Respondent agreed to pursue a claim of the decedent's estate in Anne Arundel County regarding decedent's real estate claims there involving a disputed debt and lien. Respondent failed to open an estate in Anne Arundel County, and ignored several notices from the Registrar of Wills and the Orphans' Court of that county including an adverse petition for judicial probate.
2. Respondent represented to the complainant that he was able to proceed in Maryland or the District of Columbia without assistance of other counsel. Respondent did proceed to file a civil action in the District of Columbia with an attorney barred in that jurisdiction, but Respondent was not a barred attorney in the District of Columbia at any time relevant.
3. Respondent made a further false representation on his pro hac vice motion to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, stating that he had no open disciplinary actions in Maryland when the Attorney Grievance Commission has opened and notified Respondent of a then-unresolved disciplinary proceeding approximately two months prior to his statement. Due to service of process issues, the civil action co-filed by Respondent was dismissed twice without prejudice, but Respondent falsely represented to the complainant on one such dismissal that the case had merely been continued, not dismissed.
4. The Orphans' Court for Anne Arundel County proceeded to transfer the related probate case to the Orphans' Court for Montgomery County, but Respondent failed to make many required estate filings in that court, prompting a threat of discharge of the complainant as personal representative of the decedent's estate and her discharge of Respondent as her counsel.
5. During the period of Respondent's failure to act, the size of a disputed debt claim against the decedent's estate rose from approximately $50,000,00 to $57,000.00 and continued to grow with interest thereafter.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found violations of Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence) (two such violations), 1.4 (a) (duty to keep client informed) and (b) (duty to explain for informed decision-making), 1.5(a) (fees commensurate with services) and 8.4 (misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.)
Neither party took subsequent exception to these findings of fact or of Rule violations by the Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals accordingly accepted them as established for purposes of imposing a sanction. Respondent had already been suspended indefinitely by the Court of Appeals for the conduct giving rise to the disciplinary action identified in paragraph 3 above. In light of that aggravating factor and weighing the totality of Respondent's dishonest and unprofessional conduct in this matter, the Court of Appeals disbarred Respondent.
The full opinion is available in WPD and PDF.
Upon disciplinary referral from the Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the following facts to be true:
1. Respondent agreed to represent the complainant, an interested party in a unfiled decedent's estate, and took a retainer for such representation. The decedent had domiciled in Montgomery County, but Respondent agreed to pursue a claim of the decedent's estate in Anne Arundel County regarding decedent's real estate claims there involving a disputed debt and lien. Respondent failed to open an estate in Anne Arundel County, and ignored several notices from the Registrar of Wills and the Orphans' Court of that county including an adverse petition for judicial probate.
2. Respondent represented to the complainant that he was able to proceed in Maryland or the District of Columbia without assistance of other counsel. Respondent did proceed to file a civil action in the District of Columbia with an attorney barred in that jurisdiction, but Respondent was not a barred attorney in the District of Columbia at any time relevant.
3. Respondent made a further false representation on his pro hac vice motion to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, stating that he had no open disciplinary actions in Maryland when the Attorney Grievance Commission has opened and notified Respondent of a then-unresolved disciplinary proceeding approximately two months prior to his statement. Due to service of process issues, the civil action co-filed by Respondent was dismissed twice without prejudice, but Respondent falsely represented to the complainant on one such dismissal that the case had merely been continued, not dismissed.
4. The Orphans' Court for Anne Arundel County proceeded to transfer the related probate case to the Orphans' Court for Montgomery County, but Respondent failed to make many required estate filings in that court, prompting a threat of discharge of the complainant as personal representative of the decedent's estate and her discharge of Respondent as her counsel.
5. During the period of Respondent's failure to act, the size of a disputed debt claim against the decedent's estate rose from approximately $50,000,00 to $57,000.00 and continued to grow with interest thereafter.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found violations of Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence) (two such violations), 1.4 (a) (duty to keep client informed) and (b) (duty to explain for informed decision-making), 1.5(a) (fees commensurate with services) and 8.4 (misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.)
Neither party took subsequent exception to these findings of fact or of Rule violations by the Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals accordingly accepted them as established for purposes of imposing a sanction. Respondent had already been suspended indefinitely by the Court of Appeals for the conduct giving rise to the disciplinary action identified in paragraph 3 above. In light of that aggravating factor and weighing the totality of Respondent's dishonest and unprofessional conduct in this matter, the Court of Appeals disbarred Respondent.
The full opinion is available in WPD and PDF.
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Manger (Ct. of Appeals)
December 14, 2006--Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell
Respondent, who was 75 and in practice for 48 years in Maryland and for shorter times in D.C. and California, had very little civil trial experience and virtually no experience in family law and custody matters. Nonetheless, in 2002 he undertook the representation of the complainant in a custody dispute with her ex-husband, to set aside a consent custody order entered the previous year, which had been based in part on the diagnosis of complainant as suffering bipolar disorder with paranoid tendencies.
In early 2003, after meeting with the complainant over fifty times and spending many hours of general background research, but without consulting the relevant Maryland rules, statutes or case law, respondent filed a petition, supported by the complainant's affidavit, declarations of persons who knew the complainant, and a memorandum of law raising the theory that the diagnosis was false, the licensed psychologist who made the diagnosis was incompetent to do so, and that the psychiatric community was engaged in "pseudo science." For these services, respondent billed the complainant for $25,000, and later in 2003 filed suit against complainant for his unpaid fees.
Respondent had been the subject of earlier disciplinary proceedings, in California in 1990 and, as a result of the California proceedings, in Maryland in 1993.
Upon consideration of these matters, the hearing court found support for violation of Rules 1.1, Competence, 1.5(a), Fees, 3.1, Meritorius Claims and Contentions, and 8.4(d), Misconduct, but did not violate Rules 1.3, Diligence, or 1.4(b), Communication and found some mitigating circumstances.
Based on the hearing court's findings, the petitioner filed its recommendation for sanction, indefinite suspension, and noted its exception to the hearing court's failure to find that the respondent acted in bad faith and with intent to defraud the complainant, and was not in fact contrite. The respondent failed to formally file an exception, but did file to urge that a lesser sanction be applied due to the unique circumstances presented in this matter.
The Court of Appeals overruled petitioner's exception, finding ample evidence to support the findings of fact made by the hearing court, and the conclusions drawn from those findings of fact. Nonetheless, the sanction of indefinite suspension was upheld, since the conduct, while not rising to the level that would require disbarment, was quite serious and could not be condoned, and left the issue of the efficacy of proposed "safeguards" until consideration of whether to readmit the respondent is raised later.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect or PDF format.
Respondent, who was 75 and in practice for 48 years in Maryland and for shorter times in D.C. and California, had very little civil trial experience and virtually no experience in family law and custody matters. Nonetheless, in 2002 he undertook the representation of the complainant in a custody dispute with her ex-husband, to set aside a consent custody order entered the previous year, which had been based in part on the diagnosis of complainant as suffering bipolar disorder with paranoid tendencies.
In early 2003, after meeting with the complainant over fifty times and spending many hours of general background research, but without consulting the relevant Maryland rules, statutes or case law, respondent filed a petition, supported by the complainant's affidavit, declarations of persons who knew the complainant, and a memorandum of law raising the theory that the diagnosis was false, the licensed psychologist who made the diagnosis was incompetent to do so, and that the psychiatric community was engaged in "pseudo science." For these services, respondent billed the complainant for $25,000, and later in 2003 filed suit against complainant for his unpaid fees.
Respondent had been the subject of earlier disciplinary proceedings, in California in 1990 and, as a result of the California proceedings, in Maryland in 1993.
Upon consideration of these matters, the hearing court found support for violation of Rules 1.1, Competence, 1.5(a), Fees, 3.1, Meritorius Claims and Contentions, and 8.4(d), Misconduct, but did not violate Rules 1.3, Diligence, or 1.4(b), Communication and found some mitigating circumstances.
Based on the hearing court's findings, the petitioner filed its recommendation for sanction, indefinite suspension, and noted its exception to the hearing court's failure to find that the respondent acted in bad faith and with intent to defraud the complainant, and was not in fact contrite. The respondent failed to formally file an exception, but did file to urge that a lesser sanction be applied due to the unique circumstances presented in this matter.
The Court of Appeals overruled petitioner's exception, finding ample evidence to support the findings of fact made by the hearing court, and the conclusions drawn from those findings of fact. Nonetheless, the sanction of indefinite suspension was upheld, since the conduct, while not rising to the level that would require disbarment, was quite serious and could not be condoned, and left the issue of the efficacy of proposed "safeguards" until consideration of whether to readmit the respondent is raised later.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect or PDF format.
Monday, December 11, 2006
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Baker (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 11, 2006--Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland entered a monetary sanction against Respondent for his failure to comply with orders of discovery in a a civil case, said failures resulting in the entry of summary judgment against Respondent's client. Respondent failed to pay the monetary sanction or to explain that failure, was ordered to show cause for such failure and, upon his failure to appear, was held in contempt and subsequently arrested. A disciplinary action was instituted in the Disciplinary Committee of the U.S. District Court and Respondent was disbarred by the U.S. District Court.
Upon receiving notice of the federal disbarment, the Attorney Grievance Commission filed reciprocal disciplinary charges against Respondent for violating the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and those charges were consolidated with two unrelated disciplinary cases against Respondent in this State relating, respectively, to Respondent's failure to file or preserve a timely claim for professional negligence against a nursing home and Respondent's failure to proceed with the filing of an expungement petition, in both such cases failing to communicate with his clients as well. Respondent failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel regarding its investigation of these complaints.
The Court of Appeals upheld the findings and rulings of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County regarding Maryland's rules on reciprocal discipline and regarding the facts as proven, and found violations of Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.16 (Declining or terminating representation) and 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters). For these violations and for the aggravating factor of the federal disbarment, the Court of Appeals disbarred Respondent.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Friday, December 8, 2006
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hodgson (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 8, 2006--Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
The Respondent, after being engaged to provide legal services, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in carrying out that representation, thereby violating Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MPRC) 1.3. After filing the divorce complaint for the client, the Respondent failed to keep her client reasonably informed about the status of the representation and did not respond to reasonable requests for information, thereby violating MRPC 1.4(a). The Respondent also violated MRPC 1.4(b) by not explaining to her client the dismissal of her complaint to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Furthermore, the Respondent has clearly abandoned her law practice and her clients as she has been, and still currently is, decertified for her failure to pay her assessment to the Client Protection Fund and has not attempted to get reinstated.
The Respondent further violated MRPC 8.1(b) when she knowingly failed to respond to lawful demands for information from the office of Bar Counsel.
Taken in its totality, the Respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and therefore violated MRPC 8.4 (d).
The Respondent was disbarred.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
The Respondent, after being engaged to provide legal services, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in carrying out that representation, thereby violating Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MPRC) 1.3. After filing the divorce complaint for the client, the Respondent failed to keep her client reasonably informed about the status of the representation and did not respond to reasonable requests for information, thereby violating MRPC 1.4(a). The Respondent also violated MRPC 1.4(b) by not explaining to her client the dismissal of her complaint to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Furthermore, the Respondent has clearly abandoned her law practice and her clients as she has been, and still currently is, decertified for her failure to pay her assessment to the Client Protection Fund and has not attempted to get reinstated.
The Respondent further violated MRPC 8.1(b) when she knowingly failed to respond to lawful demands for information from the office of Bar Counsel.
Taken in its totality, the Respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and therefore violated MRPC 8.4 (d).
The Respondent was disbarred.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Thursday, December 7, 2006
Atty Grievance Comm. v. Midlen (Ct. of Appeals)
December 4, 2006--Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner.
This is a reciprocal discipline case governed by Maryland Rule 16-773. In April, 2006, Bar Counsel, having learned that, in November, 2005, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had found that respondent, John Midlen, Jr., violated certain D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct (DCRPC) and had suspended him from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months, filed a petition seeking reciprocal discipline in Maryland. The petition, filed pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-773(b), alleged that, based on the findings of the D.C. Court, Midlen had violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.15 (safekeeping property in which a client has an interest), 1.16 (requirements upon termination of representation), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (violating other MRPC; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that is prejudicial to administration of justice).
In accordance with Rule 16-773(c), the Court of Appeals issued an order directing the parties to show cause why, based on any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16-773(e), corresponding discipline should not be imposed.
Attorney was suspended for a period of eighteen months.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
This is a reciprocal discipline case governed by Maryland Rule 16-773. In April, 2006, Bar Counsel, having learned that, in November, 2005, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had found that respondent, John Midlen, Jr., violated certain D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct (DCRPC) and had suspended him from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months, filed a petition seeking reciprocal discipline in Maryland. The petition, filed pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-773(b), alleged that, based on the findings of the D.C. Court, Midlen had violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.15 (safekeeping property in which a client has an interest), 1.16 (requirements upon termination of representation), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (violating other MRPC; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that is prejudicial to administration of justice).
In accordance with Rule 16-773(c), the Court of Appeals issued an order directing the parties to show cause why, based on any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16-773(e), corresponding discipline should not be imposed.
Attorney was suspended for a period of eighteen months.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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