Livingston v. Naylor (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed March 30, 2007 Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith

Livingston appealed from an order denying his motion to dismiss a writ of garnishment of his wages. Naylor had obtained a money judgment against Livingston in North Carolina and then enrolled that judgment in Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. As a resident of North Carolina, Livingston argued that the Maryland court did not have an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. The Court of Special Appeals held that there were sufficient contacts for jurisdiction over Livingston and Maryland courts could garnish Livingston’s property in Maryland, including compensation he earned from Marriott for services Livingston rendered in Maryland. Due process, however, would not permit garnishment in Maryland of compensation Livingston earned for services rendered wholly outside of Maryland when the garnishment order was based solely on the fact that Livingston’s employer does business in Maryland.

Weistock v. Levin (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not approved for publication)

Signed March 13, 2007. Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication).

On consideration of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by the defendant ("Levin"), and the opposition to that motion by the plaintiff ("Weistock"), or in the alternative Weistock's motion to transfer the venue, the judge TRANSFERRED the case to the Northern District of Illinois.

This case arose from the allegedly negligent treatment received by Weistock's husband from Levin in the course of what proved to be fatal lung cancer. Weistock and her husband had been referred to Levin, who practiced in Illinois, for a second opinion. Opting to receive treatment form Levin, Weistock's husband traveled to and received all treatments in Illinois. Eventually, Weistock's husband succumbed to kidney failure, which Weistock claimed was a result of the cancer treatments administered by Levin without due and proper regard to the patient's preexisting condition.

Weistock brought suit in Maryland state court, and Levin had the case removed to federal court on diversity basis. On motion to add Weistock's children to the suit, Levin opposed for lack of personal jurisdiction in Maryland. Weistock claimed personal jurisdiction did exist in Maryland, or in the alternative requested that the venue be transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.

Noting that, when personal jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, grounds for jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction may exist where the claim is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the state, or general jurisdiction may exist when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are continuous and systematic. Weistock met the first test required under Maryland law, citing injury arising under a Maryland statute, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 6-103(b)(1). Weistock was unable to allege at least minimum contacts between Levin and Maryland to support constitutionally reasonable jurisdiction, though, since all activities took place in Illinois, Levin had made no effort to attract patients from Maryland, and the largely passive Web site and the national television ads run by Levin were not sufficient to support even the lower general jurisdiction standard.

Rather than dismiss, though, the judge found that interests of justice compelled transfer of the case to the proper venue, where all the allegedly tortious actions took place.

The Memorandum and Order are available in PDF format.

LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Reeves (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed Marc 2, 2007. Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Sharer.

From the opinion's headnote:

HEADNOTE: LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Reeves
No. 0268, September Term, 2005
Civil Procedure - Jurisdiction - Indian Tribes.
Civil Procedure - Statute of Limitations.
Civil Procedure - Equity- Laches.

After appellant, LaSalle Bank, N.A., sought reformation of a deed of trust which inaccurately described the property that secured said deed, circuit court granted appellee, Elizabeth A. Reeves’, motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. On appeal, appellant sought a determination of whether the court erred in applying the statute of limitations for civil actions rather than the equitable doctrine of laches.

Appellee raised the issue of jurisdiction and immunity because, prior to her default, she executed and recorded a quitclaim deed conveying any interest she held in the subject property to the Delaware Tribe. Although certain Indian tribes are immune from state court jurisdiction, at the time of the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, the Delaware Tribe was not a federally recognized tribe and had been subsumed into the Cherokee Nation. Thus, the Cherokee Nation was a necessary party to the instant declaratory judgment action and remand was required.

For the guidance of the circuit court on remand, we noted that because appellant’s amended complaint contained allegations sufficient to sustain an action for reformation, their prayer for relief could properly be construed as a request for equitable relief. Since appellee was sufficiently on notice of the cause of action, appellant’s complaint for declaratory relief did not limit the circuit court to the application of statutory limitations, to the exclusion of laches.

The opinion is available in PDF format.

Oxedine v. SLM Capital Corp. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed: January 30, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.

In the Supreme Court of the State of New York, SLM Capital Corporation, appellee, obtained a default judgment against Willie and Joan Oxendine, appellants, for $332,845.02. SLM recorded the foreign judgment against the Oxendines in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The Oxendines moved to vacate entry of the foreign judgment, and, in support of their motion, argued that the State of New York did not have sufficient contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.

The circuit court ruled that the Oxendines had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue in the New York proceedings. Relying on Dixon v. Keeneland Associates, Inc., 91 Md. App. 308, the lower court stated that, under Dixon, "the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes a party from attacking a decree on jurisdictional grounds [in] the courts of a sister state where the party was afforded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues."

The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. It contrasted Dixon, in which the Maryland resident had actually litigated the jurisdictional issues in the out-of-state court, with the present case, where the issue of personal jurisdiction over the Oxendines was not even brought up, much less "fully adjudicated" in the foreign court.

Overruling the lower court's finding that the issue of personal jurisdiction was waived by the Oxendines' failure to participate in the New York proceedings, the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to allow the circuit court to take evidence and inquire into whether the New York court had a sufficient basis to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the Oxendines, under the principles enunciated in International Shoe. It further instructed the circuit court that, if it finds that the State of New York did not have a sufficient basis to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the Oxendines, it must vacate the entry of the SLM judgment.

The full opinion is available in PDF here.