Rankin v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed April 30, 2007--Opinion by Judge Patrick Woodward.

Consequent to various burglary and sex offense charges, Rankin entered into a plea agreement with the State in 1999. The agreement allowed Rankin to plead to the count charging conspiracy to commit a second degree sex offense and limited the sentencing to no more than three years. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years with all but three years suspended, followed by a period of probation of five years.

The filed Plea / Sentence Agreement provided "Defendant will plead guilty to:" and, handwritten on the form was "Conspiracy to Commit 2 Sex Offense (Amended count #7) (Alford plea)." The form recited "State will dismiss other charges/cases as follows:" with everything after charges crossed out. It also stated "Court will," (then in handwriting) "impose an active cap of no more than 3 years. Court may impose additional suspended time." On the next line was printed "There is no other sentencing limitation except that provided by law."

Approximately 13 months after Rankin was released from incarceration, the court was informed by the Department of Parole and Probation that Rankin committed a new offense. Rankin subsequently admitted violating probation and was sentenced to serve ten years of the suspended sentence consecutive to the new sentence imposed on the case forming the basis for Rankin's violation of probation. Rankin then filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, claiming that the plea agreement did not include any term of probation. The trial court denied his motion, stating that the agreement "made no comment about the length of terms of probation" and that the terms imposed "were within the limits provided for by statute."

In determining a defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement at the time he entered into it, the terms implied by the plea agreement as well as those expressly provided are considered. Relying on Md. Code, Article 27 Sec. 641A, effective at the time of Rankin's sentencing, the language of the statute indicated that when a trial court suspends a sentence, it will impose probation as a matter of course. On appeal, the Court reviewing de novo found it clear that a probationary period was implicit in the terms of the plea agreement. Although the prosecutor did not specifically discuss probation, he told the trial court that the only sentencing limitation was that the "active cap," i.e., the executed portion of the sentence, was three years. The written agreement recited that there could be additional suspended time and that there was "no other sentencing limitation except that provided by law." Thus, the agreement gave the trial court the authority to suspend part of the sentence and impose probation. Further, because a suspended sentence would be meaningless without probation, the Court held the right to impose a period of probation is included in any plea agreement that provides for a suspended sentence. Held that the sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement that Rankin entered into.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Chance v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed April 4, 2007--Opinion by Judge Patrick Woodward.

Appellant was injured during the course of her employment with WMATA. She filed a timely claim with the Worker's Compensation Commission, which WMATA did not contest. Due to a change in legal counsel and an incorrect date of injury on her claim, Appellant, through her new counsel, filed a second claim for the same injury with the Commission. When the error was discovered, Appellant moved to dismisse one of the claims. Because of another clerical error, however, her motion sought to dismiss the first claim rather than the second. The Commission granted her motion and dismissed her first claim.

Upon realizing the error, Appellant filed a motion to reinstate the first claim and dismiss the second, which the Commission also granted. WMATA then filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The circuit court vacated the Commission's order and remanded the matter for a new hearing on whether the Commission had the authority to reinstate the dismissed claim. The Commission held a hearing, found that it had the authorityto reinstate the claim and reinstated Appellant's first claim.

The Commission's order was filed and mailed to the parties. WMATA then filed a petition for judicial review. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that WMATA's petition was filed after the statutorily prescribed thirty-day appeal period. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, WMATA filed a motion for summary judgment and the circuit court granted that motion. Appellant, on appeal, presented two questions for review:

1) Did the circuit court err by denying her motion to dismiss WMATA's petition for judicial review as untimely filed?

2) Did the circuit court err as a matter of law by granting WMATA's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Held: Judgment of the circuit court for Montgomery County reversed; case remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss [WMATA's] petition for judicial review and remand the case to the Worker's Compensation Commission.

(synopsis to follow)

The opinion is available in PDF.

In Re: Ondrel M. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed March 12, 2007. Opinion by Judge Patrick L. Woodward.

Conviction on a charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in juvenile court was AFFIRMED.

This case resulted from a high-speed car chase, during which five police cruisers were damaged and all windows broken out before the car, in which Ondrel was a front seat passenger, was stopped. During the process of removing the keys, the arresting officer smelled an aroma of marijuana, and the subsequent search discovered and tests confirmed small quantities of the drug behind the driver's seat.

At trial, Ondrel was found to have been in possession of marijuana and thus was guilty of a delinquent act, and found to be a child in need of guidance, treatment or rehabilitation.

On appeal, Ondrel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, since there was no testimony that he was in direct possession of the drug. After reviewing the relevant cases, and in particular the Larocca case, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the court found the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision beyond a reasonable doubt, given Ondrel's proximity to the drugs, the fact that the drugs were not hidden, that he did not have ownership of the vehicle, and that there was evidence of the mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs by the occupants.

The court similarly dealt with Ondrel's challenge to the admission of testimony of the arresting police officer that he had smelled marijuana in the car, even though the officer was not qualified as a trained drug identification expert. Consistent with many prior cases, the court noted that "[a} witness need only to have encountered the smoking of marijuana in daily life to be able to recognize the odor." In this case the officer had been previously exposed to the smell of marijuana in training, and that exposure did not require him to qualify to testify as an expert but did allow him to properly testify as a layperson.

The opinion and order are available in PDF format.

Wilbon v. Hunsicker (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Decided December 29, 2006 – Opinion by Judge Patrick L. Woodward.

Plaintiff brought suit against two police officers alleging battery, false arrest and imprisonment, gross negligence, negligence, and violation of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss where they argued that plaintiff had not complied with the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"). Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code §5-304. The court denied this motion, as well as defendants' later attempts, by motions for summary judgment and a post-trial motion, to have the case dismissed for lack of compliance with the LGTCA. The jury awarded compensatory damages after which both sides appealed.

Held:

Plaintiff did not strictly or substantially comply with the notice requirement under the LGTCA and the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that plaintiff demonstrated good cause to justify a waiver of the notice requirement.

Complaint filed with the Civilian Review Board alleging misconduct of police officers does not meet the statutory requirement of LGTCA because the complaint was not a claim for damages or a notice of intent to file suit.

Notice of an intention to file suit to the Maryland State Treasurer, the Comptroller of the Treasury, and Commissioner of the Baltimore County Police Department, filed outside of the 180 day time requirement for the filing of the notice did not meet the statutory notice requirement of LGTCA.

Where plaintiff filed a complaint of alleged police misconduct with the CRB within four days of the alleged misconduct death, but failed to give notice to the City Solicitor of a tort claim arising out of that misconduct within 180 days and did not provide a sufficient explanation for such failure, the trial judge's finding of good cause under the LGTCA falls outside of the broad limits of a trial court’s discretion.

Full opinion available in Word Perfect and PDF.