Filed April 30, 2007--Opinion by Judge Patrick Woodward.
Consequent to various burglary and sex offense charges, Rankin entered into a plea agreement with the State in 1999. The agreement allowed Rankin to plead to the count charging conspiracy to commit a second degree sex offense and limited the sentencing to no more than three years. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years with all but three years suspended, followed by a period of probation of five years.
The filed Plea / Sentence Agreement provided "Defendant will plead guilty to:" and, handwritten on the form was "Conspiracy to Commit 2 Sex Offense (Amended count #7) (Alford plea)." The form recited "State will dismiss other charges/cases as follows:" with everything after charges crossed out. It also stated "Court will," (then in handwriting) "impose an active cap of no more than 3 years. Court may impose additional suspended time." On the next line was printed "There is no other sentencing limitation except that provided by law."
Approximately 13 months after Rankin was released from incarceration, the court was informed by the Department of Parole and Probation that Rankin committed a new offense. Rankin subsequently admitted violating probation and was sentenced to serve ten years of the suspended sentence consecutive to the new sentence imposed on the case forming the basis for Rankin's violation of probation. Rankin then filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, claiming that the plea agreement did not include any term of probation. The trial court denied his motion, stating that the agreement "made no comment about the length of terms of probation" and that the terms imposed "were within the limits provided for by statute."
In determining a defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement at the time he entered into it, the terms implied by the plea agreement as well as those expressly provided are considered. Relying on Md. Code, Article 27 Sec. 641A, effective at the time of Rankin's sentencing, the language of the statute indicated that when a trial court suspends a sentence, it will impose probation as a matter of course. On appeal, the Court reviewing de novo found it clear that a probationary period was implicit in the terms of the plea agreement. Although the prosecutor did not specifically discuss probation, he told the trial court that the only sentencing limitation was that the "active cap," i.e., the executed portion of the sentence, was three years. The written agreement recited that there could be additional suspended time and that there was "no other sentencing limitation except that provided by law." Thus, the agreement gave the trial court the authority to suspend part of the sentence and impose probation. Further, because a suspended sentence would be meaningless without probation, the Court held the right to impose a period of probation is included in any plea agreement that provides for a suspended sentence. Held that the sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement that Rankin entered into.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label sentencing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sentencing. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
Monday, March 19, 2007
Solorzano v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 19, 2007--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.
Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George's County for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure an individual in an unlawful manner. He agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining counts of the indictment and to recommend to the trial court that the sentence not be greater than the upper limit of the recommended range established by the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines, in this case twelve to twenty years.
At trial, the State provided a factual basis upon which to accept the plea, followed by a colloquy between the court and appellant stating, in essence, that if appellant's pre-sentencing investigation warranted a greater sentence than the parties anticipated, appellant could, in fact, receive a greater sentence than twenty years. Appellant stated he understood and entered a plea of guilty. At sentencing, dialogue between the court and appellant restated the terms of the negotiation, and the court inquired whether the appellant understood he could receive up to a term of life imprisonment reasoning that " . . . the State has agreed not to recommend more than twenty years in this case but the Court is not bound to that recommendation and could in fact sentence up to life in prison." The court subsequently sentenced appellant to life in prison with all but fifty years suspended. The Court of Special Appeals denied timely motions by appellant seeking specific performance of the plea agreement and a motion to vacate his guilty plea.
Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law to be reviewed de novo according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty. Because plea agreements are similar to contracts, "contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement." The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record if it is in open court, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 4-242(c).
Rule 4-243(c)(1) makes clear that a trial court is under no obligation to accept any particular sentence agreed upon by the State and a defendant. However, Rule 4-243(c)(3) makes equally clear that if the trial judge approves a plea agreement, the trial court is required to fulfill the terms of that agreement if the defendant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance. Although the trial court indicated that it could sentence appellant to a term of incarceration greater than twenty years if the sentencing guidelines were greater than the recommendation, the court never indicated that if the agreement was within the guidelines that the sentence could be greater. The obvious interpretation of the judge's remarks is that if the guidelines were greater than twenty years, then and only then, the defendant could receive a greater sentence.
Therefore, this Court held that the trial court accepted the terms of the plea agreement, that appellant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance, and that as such, defendant was entitled to specific performance of the terms of that agreement.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George's County for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure an individual in an unlawful manner. He agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining counts of the indictment and to recommend to the trial court that the sentence not be greater than the upper limit of the recommended range established by the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines, in this case twelve to twenty years.
At trial, the State provided a factual basis upon which to accept the plea, followed by a colloquy between the court and appellant stating, in essence, that if appellant's pre-sentencing investigation warranted a greater sentence than the parties anticipated, appellant could, in fact, receive a greater sentence than twenty years. Appellant stated he understood and entered a plea of guilty. At sentencing, dialogue between the court and appellant restated the terms of the negotiation, and the court inquired whether the appellant understood he could receive up to a term of life imprisonment reasoning that " . . . the State has agreed not to recommend more than twenty years in this case but the Court is not bound to that recommendation and could in fact sentence up to life in prison." The court subsequently sentenced appellant to life in prison with all but fifty years suspended. The Court of Special Appeals denied timely motions by appellant seeking specific performance of the plea agreement and a motion to vacate his guilty plea.
Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law to be reviewed de novo according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty. Because plea agreements are similar to contracts, "contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement." The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record if it is in open court, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 4-242(c).
Rule 4-243(c)(1) makes clear that a trial court is under no obligation to accept any particular sentence agreed upon by the State and a defendant. However, Rule 4-243(c)(3) makes equally clear that if the trial judge approves a plea agreement, the trial court is required to fulfill the terms of that agreement if the defendant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance. Although the trial court indicated that it could sentence appellant to a term of incarceration greater than twenty years if the sentencing guidelines were greater than the recommendation, the court never indicated that if the agreement was within the guidelines that the sentence could be greater. The obvious interpretation of the judge's remarks is that if the guidelines were greater than twenty years, then and only then, the defendant could receive a greater sentence.
Therefore, this Court held that the trial court accepted the terms of the plea agreement, that appellant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance, and that as such, defendant was entitled to specific performance of the terms of that agreement.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, February 2, 2007
State v. Garnett (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed February 2, 2007. Opinion by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.
From the official headnote of the case:
On consideration, the court concluded that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude raising the illegal sentence issue, since the Court of Appeals in Garnett I had noted the issue had not been before it. Further, the court rejected the State's claim that recent legislative changes to the Victim's Rights Act had effectively overruled the holding in Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264 (1983), finding that no sentence of restitution should have been imposed on Garnett, concluding that the illegal sentence of restitution was appropriately corrected, and affirming the judgment.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
From the official headnote of the case:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE; MOTION TO CORRECTThe procedural history of the case was set forth in the previous trip to the Court of Appeals (in Garnett I) and was not repeated in this opinion, other than to note that in Garnett I, the order of restitution entered against Garnett was a penal sanction to which she was subject, despite a finding of guilty but not criminally responsible. As such, it was not subject to discharge in bankruptcy, and the State's motion to allow garnishment should have been allowed. On remand, Garnett sought to dismiss the garnishment motion, claiming the restitution order was illegal because she was found guilty but not criminally responsible and could not be held to account for the crimes for which she was convicted. The circuit court granted Garnett's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
ILLEGAL SENTENCE: Although Md. Rule 4-345(a) does not entitle a defendant to relitigate an “illegal sentence” issue actually decided by the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals, that rule would be meaningless if the law of the case doctrine were extended to sentences that could have been -- but were not -- challenged as illegal at the time an appellant filed his or her first appellate brief. The law of the case doctrine therefore prohibits a defendant from attempting to once again present an “illegal sentence” argument that has been presented to and rejected by an appellate court.
On consideration, the court concluded that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude raising the illegal sentence issue, since the Court of Appeals in Garnett I had noted the issue had not been before it. Further, the court rejected the State's claim that recent legislative changes to the Victim's Rights Act had effectively overruled the holding in Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264 (1983), finding that no sentence of restitution should have been imposed on Garnett, concluding that the illegal sentence of restitution was appropriately corrected, and affirming the judgment.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
Thursday, January 25, 2007
Price v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided January 25, 2007--Opinion by Judge James R. Eyler
Price was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm under sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to a drug trafficking crime. The court sentenced Price to eight years imprisonment on the heroin possession, a consecutive eight years imprisonment on the cocaine possession, two years concurrent on the marijuana possession, and another twelve years imprisonment consecutive on the possession of a firearm conviction.
Four issues were raised on appeal:
1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Price's convictions;
2) Whether the court erred by refusing to ask an impaneled juror, who was later dismissed, whether he had discussed the reason for his dismissal with any of the other jurors;
3) Whether the court erred by doubling Price’s sentences for all three drug possession convictions pursuant to Maryland Code (2002 Repl. Vol.) §5-905 of the Criminal Law ("C.L.") Article;
4) Whether the court erred by allowing the jury to convict Price of possession of a handgun in connection with trafficking, and acquit him of all other drug trafficking charges.
Held:
1) To support a conviction for the offense of simple possession, the evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited drugs in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that the accused exercised some restraining or directing influence over it. Additionally, the accused, in order to be found guilty, must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance and referred to the following factors to determine the issue of possession:
(i) proximity between the Defendant and the contraband, (ii) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of Defendant, (iii) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or (iv) the presence or circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.
The evidence adduced at trial consisted mainly of testimony of the police officers who were conducting surveillance. From this testimony, the court found, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Price was in close proximity and had knowledge of the presence of the drugs, inferred that Price was participating in the sale and that the gun and money thrown by Price were instruments related to the sale of the drugs. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Price's possession convictions.
2) A note left by juror number 4 for the judge indicated concern by the juror of potential reprisal given that he resided within close proximity to the neighborhood where Price was arrested. Prior to dismissal of the juror, Defense argued that the juror should be questioned as to whether he explained his dismissal to other jurors, potentially tainting the jury. The court found that, on several occasions, the jurors had been admonished not to discuss the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the juror without further inquiry as to whether he had discussed with anyone his reasons for wanting to be dismissed.
3) The State contends that C.L. §5-905 authorized the court to double Price's sentences because of his status as a repeat offender. Price countered that doubling his sentences is explicitly limited to one count only. The court found the language of §5-905 ambiguous; that the language of the statute does not make clear whether an enhanced penalty can be imposed on each and every count arising out of a single course of conduct, or whether an enhanced penalty can only be imposed on one count of a multi-count charging document based on a single course of conduct. Relying on Diaz v. State, the rule of lenity applied and required vacating Price's sentences.
4) The court noted that although unexplained, inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge cannot stand, inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are generally tolerated under Maryland law. At the appellate level, the court will review such inconsistent verdicts where real prejudice is shown and the verdicts may be attributable to errors in the jury charge.
The jury, without finding Price guilty of one of the drug trafficking offenses, found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug trafficking. Price conceded that the jury instructions were correct and the court decided not to disturb the jury’s verdict.
A copy of the opinion is available in PDF.
Price was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm under sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to a drug trafficking crime. The court sentenced Price to eight years imprisonment on the heroin possession, a consecutive eight years imprisonment on the cocaine possession, two years concurrent on the marijuana possession, and another twelve years imprisonment consecutive on the possession of a firearm conviction.
Four issues were raised on appeal:
1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Price's convictions;
2) Whether the court erred by refusing to ask an impaneled juror, who was later dismissed, whether he had discussed the reason for his dismissal with any of the other jurors;
3) Whether the court erred by doubling Price’s sentences for all three drug possession convictions pursuant to Maryland Code (2002 Repl. Vol.) §5-905 of the Criminal Law ("C.L.") Article;
4) Whether the court erred by allowing the jury to convict Price of possession of a handgun in connection with trafficking, and acquit him of all other drug trafficking charges.
Held:
1) To support a conviction for the offense of simple possession, the evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited drugs in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that the accused exercised some restraining or directing influence over it. Additionally, the accused, in order to be found guilty, must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance and referred to the following factors to determine the issue of possession:
(i) proximity between the Defendant and the contraband, (ii) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of Defendant, (iii) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or (iv) the presence or circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.
The evidence adduced at trial consisted mainly of testimony of the police officers who were conducting surveillance. From this testimony, the court found, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Price was in close proximity and had knowledge of the presence of the drugs, inferred that Price was participating in the sale and that the gun and money thrown by Price were instruments related to the sale of the drugs. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Price's possession convictions.
2) A note left by juror number 4 for the judge indicated concern by the juror of potential reprisal given that he resided within close proximity to the neighborhood where Price was arrested. Prior to dismissal of the juror, Defense argued that the juror should be questioned as to whether he explained his dismissal to other jurors, potentially tainting the jury. The court found that, on several occasions, the jurors had been admonished not to discuss the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the juror without further inquiry as to whether he had discussed with anyone his reasons for wanting to be dismissed.
3) The State contends that C.L. §5-905 authorized the court to double Price's sentences because of his status as a repeat offender. Price countered that doubling his sentences is explicitly limited to one count only. The court found the language of §5-905 ambiguous; that the language of the statute does not make clear whether an enhanced penalty can be imposed on each and every count arising out of a single course of conduct, or whether an enhanced penalty can only be imposed on one count of a multi-count charging document based on a single course of conduct. Relying on Diaz v. State, the rule of lenity applied and required vacating Price's sentences.
4) The court noted that although unexplained, inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge cannot stand, inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are generally tolerated under Maryland law. At the appellate level, the court will review such inconsistent verdicts where real prejudice is shown and the verdicts may be attributable to errors in the jury charge.
The jury, without finding Price guilty of one of the drug trafficking offenses, found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug trafficking. Price conceded that the jury instructions were correct and the court decided not to disturb the jury’s verdict.
A copy of the opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
Evans v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 19, 2006—Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner, joined as to Nos. 107 and 124 by Judge Clayton Greene, dissent by Chief Judge Robert Bell, in which Judge Greene joined as to Parts C and D only.
The Court considered four appeals – Nos. 107, 122, 123, and 124 – which it consolidated. In Nos. 107 and 124, two substantive issues were raised: (1) Whether Evans was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because his attorneys at the 1992 re-sentencing hearing failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence relating to his background, thereby rendering their service, under principles enunciated in Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard, constitutionally deficient and prejudicial; and (2) Whether, under Miller-El v. Dretke, he was entitled to a new trial as to guilt or innocence because the State, in selecting a jury at the 1984 trial, exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.
The issue in No. 123 was whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore County abused its discretion in denying, without affording discovery, Evans's third motion to reopen the 1995 post conviction proceeding in order to present the complaint that "selective prosecution by the Baltimore County State's Attorney's Office and systemic statewide racial and geographic discrimination rendered his sentence unconstitutional."
Appeal No. 122 arose from an action for injunctive relief filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Maryland Code, §3-905 of the Correctional Services Article requires that the manner of executing a sentence of death be by lethal injection. The Division of Correction (DOC) has adopted a comprehensive set of execution protocols, including a detailed description of the manner in which the lethal drugs are to be administered. Joined by three co-plaintiffs – the NAACP, the ACLU, and Maryland Citizens Against State Executions (CASE) – Evans contended that those aspects of the execution protocol were (1) inconsistent with the statutory requirements, and (2) in the nature of a regulation that was promulgated without compliance with the State Administrative Procedure Act. The appeal was from the Circuit Court's denial of a temporary injunction that would have restrained DOC from using its protocol.
The majority affirmed the Circuit Court on Appeal Nos. 107, 123, and 124, but found merit in the second aspect of Evans's complaint in No. 122, holding that Evans was not entitled to a new sentencing proceeding or to a new trial, but that the part of the DOC protocol that directs the manner of administering the lethal injection is ineffective until either (1) it is adopted as a regulation in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, or (2) the Legislature exempts it from the requirements of that Act.
Thus the majority held that those aspects of the EOM that direct the manner of executing the death sentence – the Lethal Injection Checklist – constitute regulations under SG §10-101(g) and, because they were not adopted in conformance with the requirements of the APA, are ineffective and may not be used until such time as they are properly adopted. The majority reversed the ruling of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, remanding so that a final injunction could issue.
In dissent, Chief Judge Robert Bell did not disagree with the majority’s resolution of the "regulation" issue, but took strong exception to the majority's other holdings. In Part C, Judge Bell wrote that the merits of the selective prosecution claim were not yet on the table; but that Evans had satisfied the threshold inquiry into whether discovery on that issue was warranted. In Part D, Judge Bell agreed with the majority’s disposition of the "regulation" issue, but further concluded that the DOC procedure does not comport with, and is in fact violative of the statute. Judge Greene joined in Parts C and D only of the dissent.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Web Commentary: Crablaw, Sentencing Law & Policy, Ohio Death Penalty Information, Underdog Blog, Capital Defense Weekly, Lethal Injection, Maryland Moment, Baltimore Crime, Crime and Consequences, Andrew Cohen in the Washington Post.
The Court considered four appeals – Nos. 107, 122, 123, and 124 – which it consolidated. In Nos. 107 and 124, two substantive issues were raised: (1) Whether Evans was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because his attorneys at the 1992 re-sentencing hearing failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence relating to his background, thereby rendering their service, under principles enunciated in Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard, constitutionally deficient and prejudicial; and (2) Whether, under Miller-El v. Dretke, he was entitled to a new trial as to guilt or innocence because the State, in selecting a jury at the 1984 trial, exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.
The issue in No. 123 was whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore County abused its discretion in denying, without affording discovery, Evans's third motion to reopen the 1995 post conviction proceeding in order to present the complaint that "selective prosecution by the Baltimore County State's Attorney's Office and systemic statewide racial and geographic discrimination rendered his sentence unconstitutional."
Appeal No. 122 arose from an action for injunctive relief filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Maryland Code, §3-905 of the Correctional Services Article requires that the manner of executing a sentence of death be by lethal injection. The Division of Correction (DOC) has adopted a comprehensive set of execution protocols, including a detailed description of the manner in which the lethal drugs are to be administered. Joined by three co-plaintiffs – the NAACP, the ACLU, and Maryland Citizens Against State Executions (CASE) – Evans contended that those aspects of the execution protocol were (1) inconsistent with the statutory requirements, and (2) in the nature of a regulation that was promulgated without compliance with the State Administrative Procedure Act. The appeal was from the Circuit Court's denial of a temporary injunction that would have restrained DOC from using its protocol.
The majority affirmed the Circuit Court on Appeal Nos. 107, 123, and 124, but found merit in the second aspect of Evans's complaint in No. 122, holding that Evans was not entitled to a new sentencing proceeding or to a new trial, but that the part of the DOC protocol that directs the manner of administering the lethal injection is ineffective until either (1) it is adopted as a regulation in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, or (2) the Legislature exempts it from the requirements of that Act.
Thus the majority held that those aspects of the EOM that direct the manner of executing the death sentence – the Lethal Injection Checklist – constitute regulations under SG §10-101(g) and, because they were not adopted in conformance with the requirements of the APA, are ineffective and may not be used until such time as they are properly adopted. The majority reversed the ruling of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, remanding so that a final injunction could issue.
In dissent, Chief Judge Robert Bell did not disagree with the majority’s resolution of the "regulation" issue, but took strong exception to the majority's other holdings. In Part C, Judge Bell wrote that the merits of the selective prosecution claim were not yet on the table; but that Evans had satisfied the threshold inquiry into whether discovery on that issue was warranted. In Part D, Judge Bell agreed with the majority’s disposition of the "regulation" issue, but further concluded that the DOC procedure does not comport with, and is in fact violative of the statute. Judge Greene joined in Parts C and D only of the dissent.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Web Commentary: Crablaw, Sentencing Law & Policy, Ohio Death Penalty Information, Underdog Blog, Capital Defense Weekly, Lethal Injection, Maryland Moment, Baltimore Crime, Crime and Consequences, Andrew Cohen in the Washington Post.
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