Filed April 13, 2007 – Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia
Derek Maurice Williamson sought review of the denial of a motion to suppress statements he made during the execution of a search warrant. During surveillance, police had observed him enter and leave the residence to be searched on numerous occasions. Based on their belief that Williamson was an occupant of the residence, after arriving to exercise a search warrant and seeing him leave the house, police stopped Williamson as he was about to enter his car. The police returned him to the house and detained him during the search. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court properly denied Williamson’s motion because the police had the authority to return Williamson to the house and detain him while the search was conducted.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label constitutional law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constitutional law. Show all posts
Friday, April 13, 2007
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Ward v. Hammond et al. (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not approved for publication)
Filed March 30, 2007 --Opinion by Judge Catherine Blake
Ward, an inmate at the Western Correctional Institution ("WCI"), alleged that medical personnel at WCI had denied him medical treatment and housing for his complaints regarding knee and lower back problems related to an old automobile accident. The court considered motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, granting all but those pertaining to Plaintiff's claims against defendants Hammond, Van Meter, and Tessema (respectively, a nurse practitioner, nurse, and physician at WCI) for his medical treatment prior to July 1, 2005, based on a delay in providing treatment prior to that date.
The count asserted against Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS") was dismissed because DPSCS is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Defendants CMS and PHS were dismissed because the doctrine of respondeat superior liability does not apply to § 1983 claims. The count asserted against those defendants stemmed from violations of prison directives, which the court held did not give rise to a § 1983 claim or a private right of action.
The court explained that a denial of medical care claim in violation of the Eighth Amendment required the plaintiff to prove an objectively serious medical condition and a subjective component of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials or health care personnel. The Court determined that there was no dispute that Ward had a medical problem involving his knees relating to injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident in the mid 1980's. The Court found a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the constitutionality of the level of care received by Ward for his orthopedic condition prior to July 1, 2005. Thus summary judgment was not granted for that time period as to the medical defendants.
The Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Ward, an inmate at the Western Correctional Institution ("WCI"), alleged that medical personnel at WCI had denied him medical treatment and housing for his complaints regarding knee and lower back problems related to an old automobile accident. The court considered motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, granting all but those pertaining to Plaintiff's claims against defendants Hammond, Van Meter, and Tessema (respectively, a nurse practitioner, nurse, and physician at WCI) for his medical treatment prior to July 1, 2005, based on a delay in providing treatment prior to that date.
The count asserted against Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS") was dismissed because DPSCS is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Defendants CMS and PHS were dismissed because the doctrine of respondeat superior liability does not apply to § 1983 claims. The count asserted against those defendants stemmed from violations of prison directives, which the court held did not give rise to a § 1983 claim or a private right of action.
The court explained that a denial of medical care claim in violation of the Eighth Amendment required the plaintiff to prove an objectively serious medical condition and a subjective component of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials or health care personnel. The Court determined that there was no dispute that Ward had a medical problem involving his knees relating to injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident in the mid 1980's. The Court found a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the constitutionality of the level of care received by Ward for his orthopedic condition prior to July 1, 2005. Thus summary judgment was not granted for that time period as to the medical defendants.
The Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Sykes v. Wicomico County (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not approved for publication)
Filed March 30, 2007 --Opinion by Judge Catherine Blake
Tyrone Sykes sued the defendants, Officers Phillips and Alessandrini for violations of federal and state law arising out of a scuffle during his arrest for criminal trespass in Salisbury, Maryland. In a Maryland district court trial, Sykes was found not guilty of the criminal trespass charge, after the judge found no probable cause for his arrest. The judge noted that under the common law one could resist reasonably in an unlawful arrest. In federal court Sykes alleged violations that included assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Sykes claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the defendants illegally searched his person after arresting him without a warrant. The court denied summary judgment on that claim because of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers had probable cause for the arrest. The court rejected summary judgment for the defendants based on qualified immunity because as stated by Syke’s version of the events, an arrest for trespass, and subsequent search, by the police without express authorization or prior agreement, and where the plaintiff articulates a plausibly legitimate reason for being on the premises, which has been acknowledged by the officer, is a constitutional violation.
Finding that the notice provisions of the Maryland Tort Claims Act do not implicate individual state employees, the court held that Sykes’s possible failure to comply with the MTCA would not bar his claim.
The defendants claimed that they were entitled to statutory immunity for the state law claims but the court rejected that as a basis for summary judgment because on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Sykes there was evidence sufficient for a jury to find actual malice, which would preclude qualified immunity. Analyzing the claims of excessive force during an arrest under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard and again taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court found a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether defendants used excessive force.
With respect to the assault and battery claims, the court noted that police officials are not responsible in inflicting injury on a person being arrested, unless the officer acts with malice or gross negligence. Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the police officers lacked probable cause in arresting Sykes for trespass, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sykes, the judge denied summary judgment on that basis because a jury could find malice in the defendants’ actions. On a similar reasoning, the court found summary judgment inappropriate as to the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution allegations.
The Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Tyrone Sykes sued the defendants, Officers Phillips and Alessandrini for violations of federal and state law arising out of a scuffle during his arrest for criminal trespass in Salisbury, Maryland. In a Maryland district court trial, Sykes was found not guilty of the criminal trespass charge, after the judge found no probable cause for his arrest. The judge noted that under the common law one could resist reasonably in an unlawful arrest. In federal court Sykes alleged violations that included assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Sykes claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the defendants illegally searched his person after arresting him without a warrant. The court denied summary judgment on that claim because of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers had probable cause for the arrest. The court rejected summary judgment for the defendants based on qualified immunity because as stated by Syke’s version of the events, an arrest for trespass, and subsequent search, by the police without express authorization or prior agreement, and where the plaintiff articulates a plausibly legitimate reason for being on the premises, which has been acknowledged by the officer, is a constitutional violation.
Finding that the notice provisions of the Maryland Tort Claims Act do not implicate individual state employees, the court held that Sykes’s possible failure to comply with the MTCA would not bar his claim.
The defendants claimed that they were entitled to statutory immunity for the state law claims but the court rejected that as a basis for summary judgment because on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Sykes there was evidence sufficient for a jury to find actual malice, which would preclude qualified immunity. Analyzing the claims of excessive force during an arrest under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard and again taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court found a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether defendants used excessive force.
With respect to the assault and battery claims, the court noted that police officials are not responsible in inflicting injury on a person being arrested, unless the officer acts with malice or gross negligence. Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the police officers lacked probable cause in arresting Sykes for trespass, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sykes, the judge denied summary judgment on that basis because a jury could find malice in the defendants’ actions. On a similar reasoning, the court found summary judgment inappropriate as to the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution allegations.
The Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Weems, et al. v. County Commissioners of Calvert County (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 16, 2007--Opinion by Judge Dale Cathell .
Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Calvert County against the County Commissioners, seeking a declaration as to the westerly terminus of a public easement, a declaration as to the ownership of an area known as Leitch's Wharf, and a declaration that § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code - as it pertains to Leitch's Wharf - is unconstitutional in that the statute constitutes a taking of Appellant's property without just compensation.
After an adverse decision, Appellants raised four questions to the Court of Special Appeals, which found, in an unreported opinion, the language of the easement at issue to be ambiguous. Further, the court found that the testimony at trial, by the nature in which it was given and the failure of trial counsel to clarify the issues by connecting the testimony to the exhibits in the record, did not contain a sufficient description of the easement, as presented in that record, to resolve the ambiguity. As a result, the court found it necessary to remand the case for further proceedings and, because of its determination regarding the easement, did not resolve any of the other issues. After the remand hearing, Appellants again appealed, and this Court granted a writ of certiorari for the following two questions:
1) Whether the trial court erred in arbitarily disregarding Appellants' expert's opinion and thereafter finding that the westerly terminal of the easement granted in the 1949 Deed was located within Appellants' property.
2) Whether the trial court erred when it did not find § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code unconstitutional as applied to Appellants' property at Leitch's Wharf.
The Court reviewed two key documents to reach their determination: (1) the easement at issue, and (2) § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code. The controversial language of the easement provides:
"2. The remaining of the above mentioned parties of the first part do hereby grant a parcel or strip of ground beginning for the same at the intersection of the present County road, and the land of Thomas I. Weems and Clifton Smith, and running in a westerly direction adjacent to and through the lands of the above mentioned parties of the first part, and running with the center of the said present county road, said 30 foot strip lying 15 feet on each side at the center line thereof, and having for its westerly terminal the lands of the grantor, Lydia Leitch."
Section 15-201 of the Calvert County Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) The public shall have an easement or right-of-way over any roads or ways in Calvert County leading to . . . Leitch's Wharf . . ..
(b) The purpose for this easement or right-of-way is solely for access to the wharves and landings and enjoyment of the wharves and landings by the public.
This Court found that the language at issue in the easement (the last phrase) is not ambiguous. While confusion may exist as to who was the party of the first part, the easement being granted had its westerly boundary clearly fixed. Therefore, as relevant to the present controversy, it makes no difference who "he" was. The term "westerly" did not refer to the westerly boundary of the Leitch property; it referred to the westerly boundary of the easement. The "lands of Lydia Leitch" was, in essence, a "call" -- it defined the western boundary, which is the easement's terminus. In the case at hand, the "call" set the boundary of that property being granted by referencing the boundary of another property beyond which the lands being granted did not go. There was no dispute as to the other boundaries of the easement relevant to the instant case. This case only concerned the western boundary of the public easement and the County has no rights, under this easement, beyond that point.
In deeds granting easements, ambiguity only exists when the particular location point at issue cannot be determined; not in instances where the location point is clear from the language of the deed. If there was any ambiguity in respect to language, then, in such event, other evidence might be considered to attempt to locate the right of way. The case sub judice, however, did not require the Court to look outside the four corners of the granting document. Consequently, the Court held the relevant language of the deed of easement was not ambiguous.
The Supreme Court has remained consistent in asserting that included amongst a property owner's bundle of rights is the right to exclude others. Consistent with that assertion, this Court found it constitutionally impermissible for the government to give the public the right to use the private property of a landowner without that landowner's permission, just as it would be unconstitutional for a governmental entity to enact a statute to give the public the right to go into and reside in the private home of a citizen. The government cannot grant a license to the public to go into a homeowner's bedroom or his backyard. The legal and constitutional principals are exactly the same whether applied to a bedroom or a field, and a governmental entity may not legislatively terminate, by enactment of a statute, an individual's "right to exclude" others from their private property without providing the landowner compensation for that "taking" or without the landowner's permission.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Calvert County against the County Commissioners, seeking a declaration as to the westerly terminus of a public easement, a declaration as to the ownership of an area known as Leitch's Wharf, and a declaration that § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code - as it pertains to Leitch's Wharf - is unconstitutional in that the statute constitutes a taking of Appellant's property without just compensation.
After an adverse decision, Appellants raised four questions to the Court of Special Appeals, which found, in an unreported opinion, the language of the easement at issue to be ambiguous. Further, the court found that the testimony at trial, by the nature in which it was given and the failure of trial counsel to clarify the issues by connecting the testimony to the exhibits in the record, did not contain a sufficient description of the easement, as presented in that record, to resolve the ambiguity. As a result, the court found it necessary to remand the case for further proceedings and, because of its determination regarding the easement, did not resolve any of the other issues. After the remand hearing, Appellants again appealed, and this Court granted a writ of certiorari for the following two questions:
1) Whether the trial court erred in arbitarily disregarding Appellants' expert's opinion and thereafter finding that the westerly terminal of the easement granted in the 1949 Deed was located within Appellants' property.
2) Whether the trial court erred when it did not find § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code unconstitutional as applied to Appellants' property at Leitch's Wharf.
The Court reviewed two key documents to reach their determination: (1) the easement at issue, and (2) § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code. The controversial language of the easement provides:
"2. The remaining of the above mentioned parties of the first part do hereby grant a parcel or strip of ground beginning for the same at the intersection of the present County road, and the land of Thomas I. Weems and Clifton Smith, and running in a westerly direction adjacent to and through the lands of the above mentioned parties of the first part, and running with the center of the said present county road, said 30 foot strip lying 15 feet on each side at the center line thereof, and having for its westerly terminal the lands of the grantor, Lydia Leitch."
Section 15-201 of the Calvert County Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) The public shall have an easement or right-of-way over any roads or ways in Calvert County leading to . . . Leitch's Wharf . . ..
(b) The purpose for this easement or right-of-way is solely for access to the wharves and landings and enjoyment of the wharves and landings by the public.
This Court found that the language at issue in the easement (the last phrase) is not ambiguous. While confusion may exist as to who was the party of the first part, the easement being granted had its westerly boundary clearly fixed. Therefore, as relevant to the present controversy, it makes no difference who "he" was. The term "westerly" did not refer to the westerly boundary of the Leitch property; it referred to the westerly boundary of the easement. The "lands of Lydia Leitch" was, in essence, a "call" -- it defined the western boundary, which is the easement's terminus. In the case at hand, the "call" set the boundary of that property being granted by referencing the boundary of another property beyond which the lands being granted did not go. There was no dispute as to the other boundaries of the easement relevant to the instant case. This case only concerned the western boundary of the public easement and the County has no rights, under this easement, beyond that point.
In deeds granting easements, ambiguity only exists when the particular location point at issue cannot be determined; not in instances where the location point is clear from the language of the deed. If there was any ambiguity in respect to language, then, in such event, other evidence might be considered to attempt to locate the right of way. The case sub judice, however, did not require the Court to look outside the four corners of the granting document. Consequently, the Court held the relevant language of the deed of easement was not ambiguous.
The Supreme Court has remained consistent in asserting that included amongst a property owner's bundle of rights is the right to exclude others. Consistent with that assertion, this Court found it constitutionally impermissible for the government to give the public the right to use the private property of a landowner without that landowner's permission, just as it would be unconstitutional for a governmental entity to enact a statute to give the public the right to go into and reside in the private home of a citizen. The government cannot grant a license to the public to go into a homeowner's bedroom or his backyard. The legal and constitutional principals are exactly the same whether applied to a bedroom or a field, and a governmental entity may not legislatively terminate, by enactment of a statute, an individual's "right to exclude" others from their private property without providing the landowner compensation for that "taking" or without the landowner's permission.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Baltimore v. Valsamaki (Ct. of Appeals)
Issued Feburary 8, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Dale Cathell, joined as to the judgment only by Judge Irma Raker and Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.
The City of Baltimore instituted "quick-take" proceedings against a bar and package goods store ("Magnets") located on Charles Street in the Charles/North redevelopment district designated generally for urban revitalization. Defendant, the owner of Magnets, filed a response to the proceedings. At the fact hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held that the City failed to show sufficient grounds warranting a finding of immediate necessity for the immediate taking, and declined the City's petition, reaffirming that denial upon a motion for reconsideration. The City appealed directly to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Public Local Law Sec. 21-16 of Baltimore City provides that the City of Baltimore may institute proceedings for immediate possession of property for public use, upon a demonstration of "the reasons" for immediate possession and title towards a "public use." The Court upheld that it is the City, not the property holder, that has the burden of proof to show prima facie the reasons for the immediate taking of property for public use. In so holding, the Court distinguished the deference shown to a condemning authority in a non-quick-take regular condemnation as to the legitimacy of the condemnor's public use from the greater burden borne by the City under the quick-take proceedings, and noted the reduced due process and pre-trial procedures available to an owner of property sought for an immediate taking.
The Court upheld the Circuit Court's finding that the general needs of an urban renewal project did not meet the threshold for immediacy and necessity for a quick-take proceeding, emphasizing the specific facts of the testimony at the hearing and the City's failure to specify the factual grounds for heightened urgency justifying truncated proceedings. From the opinion:
A further clarification and augmentation of this preliminary synopsis will issue later today.
The City of Baltimore instituted "quick-take" proceedings against a bar and package goods store ("Magnets") located on Charles Street in the Charles/North redevelopment district designated generally for urban revitalization. Defendant, the owner of Magnets, filed a response to the proceedings. At the fact hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held that the City failed to show sufficient grounds warranting a finding of immediate necessity for the immediate taking, and declined the City's petition, reaffirming that denial upon a motion for reconsideration. The City appealed directly to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Public Local Law Sec. 21-16 of Baltimore City provides that the City of Baltimore may institute proceedings for immediate possession of property for public use, upon a demonstration of "the reasons" for immediate possession and title towards a "public use." The Court upheld that it is the City, not the property holder, that has the burden of proof to show prima facie the reasons for the immediate taking of property for public use. In so holding, the Court distinguished the deference shown to a condemning authority in a non-quick-take regular condemnation as to the legitimacy of the condemnor's public use from the greater burden borne by the City under the quick-take proceedings, and noted the reduced due process and pre-trial procedures available to an owner of property sought for an immediate taking.
The Court upheld the Circuit Court's finding that the general needs of an urban renewal project did not meet the threshold for immediacy and necessity for a quick-take proceeding, emphasizing the specific facts of the testimony at the hearing and the City's failure to specify the factual grounds for heightened urgency justifying truncated proceedings. From the opinion:
The purpose of the quick-take power is for it to be used when the need for the public use is immediate. It was not conferred for the purpose of allowing a condemning authority to run “roughshod” over the owners of private property. When that happens, or begins to happen, the property owner’s recourse is to the courts.In what arguably constituted dicta, the Court opined that the evidence presented by the City at the Circuit Court hearing would have been sparse even for a regular non-immediate condemnation proceeding, noting the lack of a comprehensive renewal plan demonstrating public use per the testimony of the City's witnesses. Judges Raker and Harrell indicated that they did not join in this portion of the Court's opinion.
A further clarification and augmentation of this preliminary synopsis will issue later today.
The full opinion is available here in PDF.
Monday, January 22, 2007
U.S. v. Atwell (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Decided January 5, 2007 --Opinion by Magistrate Judge Susan Gauvey
Defendant Atwell was charged with driving under the influence under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-902(a) and failing to drive right of center under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-301(a) and the Assimilative Crime Acts, 18 U.S.C. §§7 and 13. Here the Court considered Atwell’s motion to suppress all evidence and observations on the ground that he was stopped off of federal property.
Atwell argued two primary points: (1) when a police officer effectuates a stop outside of his territorial jurisdiction, all evidence obtained after the arrest must be suppressed as illegally obtained; and (2) a police officer outside of his jurisdiction may not stop an individual for a minor traffic offense. The government has acknowledged that the stop and arrest took place beyond the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. It argued that the arresting officer nonetheless had authority to arrest under Seip v. State of Maryland, 153 Md. App. 83 (Md. App. 2003).
In this 44-page opinion, the Court agreed with Atwell that Seip v. State does not authorize federal military officers to make an extra-territorial arrest. Further, the Court found that there is no authority under any federal or state statute or governing Maryland common law for the extra-territorial arrest. Nonetheless, the Court found that the arrest was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the Court refused to suppress the evidence derived as a result of the arrest and DENIED Atwell’s motion.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Defendant Atwell was charged with driving under the influence under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-902(a) and failing to drive right of center under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-301(a) and the Assimilative Crime Acts, 18 U.S.C. §§7 and 13. Here the Court considered Atwell’s motion to suppress all evidence and observations on the ground that he was stopped off of federal property.
Atwell argued two primary points: (1) when a police officer effectuates a stop outside of his territorial jurisdiction, all evidence obtained after the arrest must be suppressed as illegally obtained; and (2) a police officer outside of his jurisdiction may not stop an individual for a minor traffic offense. The government has acknowledged that the stop and arrest took place beyond the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. It argued that the arresting officer nonetheless had authority to arrest under Seip v. State of Maryland, 153 Md. App. 83 (Md. App. 2003).
In this 44-page opinion, the Court agreed with Atwell that Seip v. State does not authorize federal military officers to make an extra-territorial arrest. Further, the Court found that there is no authority under any federal or state statute or governing Maryland common law for the extra-territorial arrest. Nonetheless, the Court found that the arrest was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the Court refused to suppress the evidence derived as a result of the arrest and DENIED Atwell’s motion.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Monday, December 11, 2006
Roskelly v. Lamone (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 11, 2006--Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell
A submission containing more than one third, but less than all, of the full number of signatures necessary to complete a referendum petition, submitted to the Secretary of State before June 1 for the purpose of extending the time for filing the signatures to complete the referendum petition within the meaning and contemplation of the Election Law Article, is still a petition. Accordingly, the State Board Administrator is required to make a validity determination of that petition, and judicial review must be sought within ten days as outlined by statute.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
A submission containing more than one third, but less than all, of the full number of signatures necessary to complete a referendum petition, submitted to the Secretary of State before June 1 for the purpose of extending the time for filing the signatures to complete the referendum petition within the meaning and contemplation of the Election Law Article, is still a petition. Accordingly, the State Board Administrator is required to make a validity determination of that petition, and judicial review must be sought within ten days as outlined by statute.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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