Filed April 11, 2007—Opinion by Judge William Quarles
The District Court granted Home Depot’s motions for summary judgment of a suit by Charles Frank, a former employee, for breach of contract and defamation related to his termination and certain statements made by a Home Depot employee to Frank’s potential future employer.
Home Depot had terminated Frank because he falsely stated that he had been properly licensed to operate the forklift when his license had expired. Thereafter, Lowe’s allegedly failed to hire him because of defamatory statements made by a Home Depot employee to someone at Lowe’s.
This is the second suit brought by Frank against Home Depot. In the first, Frank sued pro se, alleging retaliatory and discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and wrongful discharge in violation of Maryland law. The Court had dismissed that suit for failure to state a claim.
The instant suit alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge was previously dismissed without prejudice and reinstated on an amended complaint that added the defamation claim. The Court determined that the first count was barred by res judicata, while the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations and, in any event, by a statutory and common law qualified privilege, citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423 and Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 56 (2001).
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
Showing posts with label defamation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defamation. Show all posts
Saturday, April 14, 2007
Thursday, April 5, 2007
Lowery, et ux. v. Smithsburg Emergency Medical Service, et al. (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed April 5, 2007--Opinion by Judge Arrie Davis.
This case involves allegations of defamation and intentional interference with economic relations claims. At the close of the Lowery's case, Smithsburg moved for judgment on all counts and the trial court granted the motion pursuant to Rule 2-519 on the defamation and intentional interference with economic relations claims. The Lowery's posit the following issues for review:
1) Did the trial court err in granting [Smithsburg's] Motion in Limine and precluding any testimony whatsoever pertaining to lost wages and benefits for supposed discovery violations?
2) Did the trial court apply the wrong standard of proof with regard to [Smithsburg's] motion for judgment pertaining to forfeiture of the conditional privilege afforded employers for statements made about a former employee's job performance?
3) Did the trial court err in finding there was not sufficient evidence to prove that the conditional privilege afforded statements made about an individual's employment had been forfeited in this case for the matter to be submitted to the jury?
4) Did the trial court err in finding that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Myerly acted intentionally and wilfully for Mr. Lowery's intentional interference with economic relations claim to be submitted to the jury?
This Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County.
(synopsis to follow)
The full opinion is available in PDF.
This case involves allegations of defamation and intentional interference with economic relations claims. At the close of the Lowery's case, Smithsburg moved for judgment on all counts and the trial court granted the motion pursuant to Rule 2-519 on the defamation and intentional interference with economic relations claims. The Lowery's posit the following issues for review:
1) Did the trial court err in granting [Smithsburg's] Motion in Limine and precluding any testimony whatsoever pertaining to lost wages and benefits for supposed discovery violations?
2) Did the trial court apply the wrong standard of proof with regard to [Smithsburg's] motion for judgment pertaining to forfeiture of the conditional privilege afforded employers for statements made about a former employee's job performance?
3) Did the trial court err in finding there was not sufficient evidence to prove that the conditional privilege afforded statements made about an individual's employment had been forfeited in this case for the matter to be submitted to the jury?
4) Did the trial court err in finding that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Myerly acted intentionally and wilfully for Mr. Lowery's intentional interference with economic relations claim to be submitted to the jury?
This Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County.
(synopsis to follow)
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Montgomery Investigative Services, Ltd. v. Horne (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 12, 2007. Opinion by Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. (retired, specially assigned)
From the opinion's headnote:
Horne had been conditionally hired by Southern Services, pending receipt of a criminal background check requested from MIS. MIS erroneously reported to Southern Services that Horne had been convicted of theft and served 6 months in prison, and on the basis of that report, Horne was fired. Horne filed suit, and at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, judgment was granted in favor of Southern Services on the basis that Horne had failed to make out a prima facie case of actual malice against it. A similar motion was denied against MIS, both then and at the end of the trial, and the jury subsequently rendered a verdict in favor of Horne against MIS. MIS appealed, and Horne cross-appealed against Southern Services.
The court found, as Horne had conceded, that Southern Services had a qualified privilege, but no merit in Horne's contention that MIS did not have the qualified privilege found by the trial court, elevating dicta in the Court of Appeals' Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co. case to the status of a holding in this case, finding that Southern Services' obvious business-related interest was reciprocally extended to MIS as the "flip side" of the same coin.
In similar fashion, the court had little trouble finding actual malice on the part of MIS, overcoming its qualified privilege, after first confirming over Horne's challenge the jury instruction given on actual malice, since it was straight out of the Maryland pattern jury instruction book and otherwise comported with the Maryland cases. The court found more than sufficient evidence below that MIS had, with reckless disregard to the truth, disregarded or overlooked several obvious inconsistencies when its raw data was considered against information it had been given about Horne, which should have, at the least, advised caution or further checks before presenting the unqualified summary of its results, and affirmed the trial judge's decision to let the matter go to the jury.
Finally, the court agreed that it was error to grant judgment in favor of Southern Services, finding the evidence below as to the manner of Southern Services' discharge of Horne's discharge was so abusive as to abrogate the qualified privilege, and the matter deserved to have been submitted to the jury. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment in favor of Southern Services and remanded for a new trial.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
From the opinion's headnote:
HEADNOTEIn an appeal from a conviction below on defamation charges by an employee ("Horne") arising from his discharge by his employer ("Southern Services") based upon false information provided by an investigative service and its investigator (collectively, "MIS"), and a cross appeal taken by Horne against the dismissal below of such charges against Southern Services, the court AFFIRMED the judgments against MIS, and REVERSED the judgment in favor of Southern Services and REMANDED for a new trial against Southern Services.
DEFAMATION – QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE – ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE – THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND – THE INITIAL HIRING OF HORNE – THE CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK – THE BACKGROUND CHECK REPORT – THE AGE DISCREPANCY – CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALSE REPORT – QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AND THE PROOF OF MALICE – THE RECIPROCITY OF THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE – ACTUAL MALICE ON THE PART OF MIS AND TAMMY WHITE – JURY INSTRUCTION ON ACTUAL MALICE – THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OF TRUTH – ABUSE OF THE PRIVILEGE BY SOUTHERN SERVICES – HAPPY 40 V. MILLER – GENERAL MOTORS V. PISKOR – THE BEHAVIOR OF JAMES LAMBERT
Horne had been conditionally hired by Southern Services, pending receipt of a criminal background check requested from MIS. MIS erroneously reported to Southern Services that Horne had been convicted of theft and served 6 months in prison, and on the basis of that report, Horne was fired. Horne filed suit, and at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, judgment was granted in favor of Southern Services on the basis that Horne had failed to make out a prima facie case of actual malice against it. A similar motion was denied against MIS, both then and at the end of the trial, and the jury subsequently rendered a verdict in favor of Horne against MIS. MIS appealed, and Horne cross-appealed against Southern Services.
The court found, as Horne had conceded, that Southern Services had a qualified privilege, but no merit in Horne's contention that MIS did not have the qualified privilege found by the trial court, elevating dicta in the Court of Appeals' Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co. case to the status of a holding in this case, finding that Southern Services' obvious business-related interest was reciprocally extended to MIS as the "flip side" of the same coin.
In similar fashion, the court had little trouble finding actual malice on the part of MIS, overcoming its qualified privilege, after first confirming over Horne's challenge the jury instruction given on actual malice, since it was straight out of the Maryland pattern jury instruction book and otherwise comported with the Maryland cases. The court found more than sufficient evidence below that MIS had, with reckless disregard to the truth, disregarded or overlooked several obvious inconsistencies when its raw data was considered against information it had been given about Horne, which should have, at the least, advised caution or further checks before presenting the unqualified summary of its results, and affirmed the trial judge's decision to let the matter go to the jury.
Finally, the court agreed that it was error to grant judgment in favor of Southern Services, finding the evidence below as to the manner of Southern Services' discharge of Horne's discharge was so abusive as to abrogate the qualified privilege, and the matter deserved to have been submitted to the jury. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment in favor of Southern Services and remanded for a new trial.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, February 7, 2007
Bouie and Jones v. Rugged Wearhouse, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Memorandum and Order Issued February 5, 2007–Opinion by Judge Andre M. Davis
Bouie and Jones filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial discrimination and common law defamation claim from an accusation of attempted shoplifting while shopping in Rugged Wearhouse. Dismissal of the racial discrimination claim by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City left pending defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for the state law claim. Without hearing, their motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The case deals with allegedly defamatory speech involving two private parties in a matter of a private concern. The plaintiffs claim that, after being followed by store employees, they attempted to leave without making a purchase at which time the store manager spoke harshly to Bouie, essentially accusing Bouie and Jones of stealing or attempting to steal items and threatening to call police if they returned.
In Maryland, the elements of defamation with regard to private figures are:
(1) that the defendant made a defamatory communication, i.e., that he communicated a statement tending to expose the plaintiff to public scorn, hatred, contempt, or ridicule to a third person who reasonably recognized the statement as being defamatory; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that the defendant was at fault in communicating the statement; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm.
Defendant conceded that plaintiffs generated genuine disputes of fact on the issue of liability but contended plaintiffs’ damages must be limited. The court agreed in part based on Maryland’s distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, the manager’s speech constituted defamatory communication and injury is presumed. However, the record was wholly bereft of any evidence that plaintiffs suffered actual harm. "Harm" is not limited to monetary loss; in fact, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering. Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony showed conclusively that neither suffered actual damages, either personal or business, from the store manager’s defamatory statements. Plaintiffs did not allege mental anguish as an element of damages, and there was nothing in the record to support an award of damages for any such harm.
As a matter of law, plaintiffs failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of actual damages flowing from the defamatory statements made by the store manager. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to determination that any damages award shall be limited to "presumed damages" from the defamatory per se statements that plaintiffs were shoplifters. The issue of "actual malice," i.e., wether the store manager knew his allegations were false, thereby permitting an award of punitive damages, is for the jury. In a defamation action, punitive damages are not recoverable based on ill will, spite or an intent to injure; instead, to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory falsehood was made with actual knowledge that it was false.
The full memorandum is available in PDF.
Bouie and Jones filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial discrimination and common law defamation claim from an accusation of attempted shoplifting while shopping in Rugged Wearhouse. Dismissal of the racial discrimination claim by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City left pending defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for the state law claim. Without hearing, their motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The case deals with allegedly defamatory speech involving two private parties in a matter of a private concern. The plaintiffs claim that, after being followed by store employees, they attempted to leave without making a purchase at which time the store manager spoke harshly to Bouie, essentially accusing Bouie and Jones of stealing or attempting to steal items and threatening to call police if they returned.
In Maryland, the elements of defamation with regard to private figures are:
(1) that the defendant made a defamatory communication, i.e., that he communicated a statement tending to expose the plaintiff to public scorn, hatred, contempt, or ridicule to a third person who reasonably recognized the statement as being defamatory; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that the defendant was at fault in communicating the statement; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm.
Defendant conceded that plaintiffs generated genuine disputes of fact on the issue of liability but contended plaintiffs’ damages must be limited. The court agreed in part based on Maryland’s distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, the manager’s speech constituted defamatory communication and injury is presumed. However, the record was wholly bereft of any evidence that plaintiffs suffered actual harm. "Harm" is not limited to monetary loss; in fact, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering. Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony showed conclusively that neither suffered actual damages, either personal or business, from the store manager’s defamatory statements. Plaintiffs did not allege mental anguish as an element of damages, and there was nothing in the record to support an award of damages for any such harm.
As a matter of law, plaintiffs failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of actual damages flowing from the defamatory statements made by the store manager. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant is entitled to determination that any damages award shall be limited to "presumed damages" from the defamatory per se statements that plaintiffs were shoplifters. The issue of "actual malice," i.e., wether the store manager knew his allegations were false, thereby permitting an award of punitive damages, is for the jury. In a defamation action, punitive damages are not recoverable based on ill will, spite or an intent to injure; instead, to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory falsehood was made with actual knowledge that it was false.
The full memorandum is available in PDF.
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