In Re: Lakeshia M. (Ct of Appeals)

Filed April 16, 2007. Opinion by Judge Lawrence Rodowsky (retired, specially assigned).

From the official headnote:

Juveniles - Delinquency Proceedings - L. 2005 c. 580 requires the juvenile court to stay proceedings and to order an evaluation by a qualified expert of a child's mental condition, if there is reason to believe that the child may be incompetent to proceed with, inter alia, an adjudicatory hearing. Held: Facts sufficient to trigger "reason to believe" determination. Absent determination, error to adjudicate child delinquent.

On appeal from the decision in the trial court to determine delinquency of a minor ("Lakeshia M.") despite competency issues raised by defense counsel, the Court VACATED the judgment of the trial court and REMANDED to that court for further proceedings.

The opinion is available in PDF format.

Forster v. Hargadon (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed April 11, 2007 --Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner

Nancy S. Forster, the Public Defender of Maryland, petitioned for a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, or other appropriate relief, vacating a directive and order issued by Judge Edward Hargadon, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Forster argued the directive and order were substantively unlawful and constituted an impermissible local rule. The order imposed certain procedural requirements on parties filing exceptions to the report of a master in juvenile cases and permits the court to dismiss the exceptions if those requirements are not met. The directive directed the court clerk to enter the order in each exceptions case, so that the order and its requirements would be case-specific.

A motion to stay the directive and order pending the Court's decision on the petition had been granted earlier. After considering the petition, however, the Court dismissed it and revoked the stay because the requested relief, if
warranted, was available in two pending cases in Court of Special Appeals.


The Opinion is available in PDF.

In Re: Roneika S. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed April 3, 2007--Opinion by Judge Mary Ellen Barbera.

The issue is what a petition alleging juvenile delinquency must contain as a factual basis to support the allegation. The issue implicates the requirements of notice embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the specific dictates of Maryland Code § 3-8A-13 and Maryland Rule 11-103.

The State filed a juvenile delinquent petition alleging that Roneika made a false statement to a police officer, in response to which Roneika filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition did not sufficiently allege the facts supporting the charged delinquent act; specifically, the petition failed to include a "to wit" clause indicating the specific false statements.The Circuit Court for St. Mary's County decided that the brief description in the charging document was unsatisfactory. Roneika knew she was charged with making a false statement but did not know what statement the State claimed was false, preventing her from properly preparing for trial. Additionally, the lack of a specific statement did not protect Roneika from a future prosecution for the same offense because, again, the specific content of the statement was not set forth.

On appeal, Roneika interposed the preliminary argument that the State’s appeal should be dismissed because the State sought relief – reinstatement of the delinquency petition and an adjudicatory hearing – which would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy principles preclude, among other things, further trial proceedings after an acquittal or equivalent adjudication on the merits in favor of the accused. Roneika’s argument was based on the premise that the juvenile judge granted her motion to dismiss for reasons of legal insufficiency of the evidence. This Court held that argument failed because, based on discussion among the court and counsel that preceded the ruling, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it believed it to be legally inadequate on its face. Because the court’s dismissal was not substantively an acquittal, jeopardy did not attach to that decision.

In the matter of whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion when it dismissed the delinquency petition, this Court held that juveniles are entitled to fair notice under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The protections afforded a criminal defendant to be informed of the accusation against him must apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.

Finally, the Court held that the delinquency petition passed muster under the Due Process Clause, Article 21, C.J. § 3-8A-13, and Rule 11-103(c). Reasoning that the technical details required of common law pleading have been relaxed and little factual detail, beyond a statement of the essential elements of the offense, e.g., the precise manner and means of committing the offense, generally is required in the charging document. The offense of making a false statement to police contains no element that is cast in such generic terms as would embrace a variety of conduct. The petition not only set forth the elements of the charged offense but also set forth the date and place of the alleged act, the officer to whom Roneika made the statements, and the names of witnesses. The question of whether the petition could have been more factually particular is not the question. Rather, the question is whether the petition was legally sufficient and this Court reasoned that it was.

The opinion is available in PDF.

In Re: Ondrel M. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed March 12, 2007. Opinion by Judge Patrick L. Woodward.

Conviction on a charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in juvenile court was AFFIRMED.

This case resulted from a high-speed car chase, during which five police cruisers were damaged and all windows broken out before the car, in which Ondrel was a front seat passenger, was stopped. During the process of removing the keys, the arresting officer smelled an aroma of marijuana, and the subsequent search discovered and tests confirmed small quantities of the drug behind the driver's seat.

At trial, Ondrel was found to have been in possession of marijuana and thus was guilty of a delinquent act, and found to be a child in need of guidance, treatment or rehabilitation.

On appeal, Ondrel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, since there was no testimony that he was in direct possession of the drug. After reviewing the relevant cases, and in particular the Larocca case, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the court found the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision beyond a reasonable doubt, given Ondrel's proximity to the drugs, the fact that the drugs were not hidden, that he did not have ownership of the vehicle, and that there was evidence of the mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs by the occupants.

The court similarly dealt with Ondrel's challenge to the admission of testimony of the arresting police officer that he had smelled marijuana in the car, even though the officer was not qualified as a trained drug identification expert. Consistent with many prior cases, the court noted that "[a} witness need only to have encountered the smoking of marijuana in daily life to be able to recognize the odor." In this case the officer had been previously exposed to the smell of marijuana in training, and that exposure did not require him to qualify to testify as an expert but did allow him to properly testify as a layperson.

The opinion and order are available in PDF format.