Filed: March 29, 2007--Opinion by Judge Sally Adkins
In a case arising from disputed use of a right-of-way, the Court of Special Appeals examined the nature of a nominal damages award, and whether there is a maximum limitation on the dollar amount that can be considered nominal damages.
Appellants, the Browns, were determined by the lower court to have been trespassing on property owned by the Smiths, by traveling over a farm lane to access a public road from the Browns’ property. The Browns appealed both the decision that they had no right to use the farm lane and an award of $8,350 in “nominal damages.”
The Court first determined that there was a final appealable judgment, even though no judgment had been entered on a third party complaint against a neighbor of both parties. Next the Court agreed that the common grantor of the original deeds in 1875 had not intended to create mutually reciprocal rights of way appurtenant to the Smith and Brown properties. The Court also held that the trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony or in denying injunctive relief. On the issue of damages, however, the Court concluded that an $8,350 damage award on the trespass count was too high to be a “nominal damages” award. Because the Court could not determine from the record whether there may or may not be justification for compensatory damages, it remanded for reconsideration of that issue.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label easement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label easement. Show all posts
Sunday, April 1, 2007
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Weems, et al. v. County Commissioners of Calvert County (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 16, 2007--Opinion by Judge Dale Cathell .
Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Calvert County against the County Commissioners, seeking a declaration as to the westerly terminus of a public easement, a declaration as to the ownership of an area known as Leitch's Wharf, and a declaration that § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code - as it pertains to Leitch's Wharf - is unconstitutional in that the statute constitutes a taking of Appellant's property without just compensation.
After an adverse decision, Appellants raised four questions to the Court of Special Appeals, which found, in an unreported opinion, the language of the easement at issue to be ambiguous. Further, the court found that the testimony at trial, by the nature in which it was given and the failure of trial counsel to clarify the issues by connecting the testimony to the exhibits in the record, did not contain a sufficient description of the easement, as presented in that record, to resolve the ambiguity. As a result, the court found it necessary to remand the case for further proceedings and, because of its determination regarding the easement, did not resolve any of the other issues. After the remand hearing, Appellants again appealed, and this Court granted a writ of certiorari for the following two questions:
1) Whether the trial court erred in arbitarily disregarding Appellants' expert's opinion and thereafter finding that the westerly terminal of the easement granted in the 1949 Deed was located within Appellants' property.
2) Whether the trial court erred when it did not find § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code unconstitutional as applied to Appellants' property at Leitch's Wharf.
The Court reviewed two key documents to reach their determination: (1) the easement at issue, and (2) § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code. The controversial language of the easement provides:
"2. The remaining of the above mentioned parties of the first part do hereby grant a parcel or strip of ground beginning for the same at the intersection of the present County road, and the land of Thomas I. Weems and Clifton Smith, and running in a westerly direction adjacent to and through the lands of the above mentioned parties of the first part, and running with the center of the said present county road, said 30 foot strip lying 15 feet on each side at the center line thereof, and having for its westerly terminal the lands of the grantor, Lydia Leitch."
Section 15-201 of the Calvert County Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) The public shall have an easement or right-of-way over any roads or ways in Calvert County leading to . . . Leitch's Wharf . . ..
(b) The purpose for this easement or right-of-way is solely for access to the wharves and landings and enjoyment of the wharves and landings by the public.
This Court found that the language at issue in the easement (the last phrase) is not ambiguous. While confusion may exist as to who was the party of the first part, the easement being granted had its westerly boundary clearly fixed. Therefore, as relevant to the present controversy, it makes no difference who "he" was. The term "westerly" did not refer to the westerly boundary of the Leitch property; it referred to the westerly boundary of the easement. The "lands of Lydia Leitch" was, in essence, a "call" -- it defined the western boundary, which is the easement's terminus. In the case at hand, the "call" set the boundary of that property being granted by referencing the boundary of another property beyond which the lands being granted did not go. There was no dispute as to the other boundaries of the easement relevant to the instant case. This case only concerned the western boundary of the public easement and the County has no rights, under this easement, beyond that point.
In deeds granting easements, ambiguity only exists when the particular location point at issue cannot be determined; not in instances where the location point is clear from the language of the deed. If there was any ambiguity in respect to language, then, in such event, other evidence might be considered to attempt to locate the right of way. The case sub judice, however, did not require the Court to look outside the four corners of the granting document. Consequently, the Court held the relevant language of the deed of easement was not ambiguous.
The Supreme Court has remained consistent in asserting that included amongst a property owner's bundle of rights is the right to exclude others. Consistent with that assertion, this Court found it constitutionally impermissible for the government to give the public the right to use the private property of a landowner without that landowner's permission, just as it would be unconstitutional for a governmental entity to enact a statute to give the public the right to go into and reside in the private home of a citizen. The government cannot grant a license to the public to go into a homeowner's bedroom or his backyard. The legal and constitutional principals are exactly the same whether applied to a bedroom or a field, and a governmental entity may not legislatively terminate, by enactment of a statute, an individual's "right to exclude" others from their private property without providing the landowner compensation for that "taking" or without the landowner's permission.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Calvert County against the County Commissioners, seeking a declaration as to the westerly terminus of a public easement, a declaration as to the ownership of an area known as Leitch's Wharf, and a declaration that § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code - as it pertains to Leitch's Wharf - is unconstitutional in that the statute constitutes a taking of Appellant's property without just compensation.
After an adverse decision, Appellants raised four questions to the Court of Special Appeals, which found, in an unreported opinion, the language of the easement at issue to be ambiguous. Further, the court found that the testimony at trial, by the nature in which it was given and the failure of trial counsel to clarify the issues by connecting the testimony to the exhibits in the record, did not contain a sufficient description of the easement, as presented in that record, to resolve the ambiguity. As a result, the court found it necessary to remand the case for further proceedings and, because of its determination regarding the easement, did not resolve any of the other issues. After the remand hearing, Appellants again appealed, and this Court granted a writ of certiorari for the following two questions:
1) Whether the trial court erred in arbitarily disregarding Appellants' expert's opinion and thereafter finding that the westerly terminal of the easement granted in the 1949 Deed was located within Appellants' property.
2) Whether the trial court erred when it did not find § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code unconstitutional as applied to Appellants' property at Leitch's Wharf.
The Court reviewed two key documents to reach their determination: (1) the easement at issue, and (2) § 15-201 of the Calvert County Code. The controversial language of the easement provides:
"2. The remaining of the above mentioned parties of the first part do hereby grant a parcel or strip of ground beginning for the same at the intersection of the present County road, and the land of Thomas I. Weems and Clifton Smith, and running in a westerly direction adjacent to and through the lands of the above mentioned parties of the first part, and running with the center of the said present county road, said 30 foot strip lying 15 feet on each side at the center line thereof, and having for its westerly terminal the lands of the grantor, Lydia Leitch."
Section 15-201 of the Calvert County Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) The public shall have an easement or right-of-way over any roads or ways in Calvert County leading to . . . Leitch's Wharf . . ..
(b) The purpose for this easement or right-of-way is solely for access to the wharves and landings and enjoyment of the wharves and landings by the public.
This Court found that the language at issue in the easement (the last phrase) is not ambiguous. While confusion may exist as to who was the party of the first part, the easement being granted had its westerly boundary clearly fixed. Therefore, as relevant to the present controversy, it makes no difference who "he" was. The term "westerly" did not refer to the westerly boundary of the Leitch property; it referred to the westerly boundary of the easement. The "lands of Lydia Leitch" was, in essence, a "call" -- it defined the western boundary, which is the easement's terminus. In the case at hand, the "call" set the boundary of that property being granted by referencing the boundary of another property beyond which the lands being granted did not go. There was no dispute as to the other boundaries of the easement relevant to the instant case. This case only concerned the western boundary of the public easement and the County has no rights, under this easement, beyond that point.
In deeds granting easements, ambiguity only exists when the particular location point at issue cannot be determined; not in instances where the location point is clear from the language of the deed. If there was any ambiguity in respect to language, then, in such event, other evidence might be considered to attempt to locate the right of way. The case sub judice, however, did not require the Court to look outside the four corners of the granting document. Consequently, the Court held the relevant language of the deed of easement was not ambiguous.
The Supreme Court has remained consistent in asserting that included amongst a property owner's bundle of rights is the right to exclude others. Consistent with that assertion, this Court found it constitutionally impermissible for the government to give the public the right to use the private property of a landowner without that landowner's permission, just as it would be unconstitutional for a governmental entity to enact a statute to give the public the right to go into and reside in the private home of a citizen. The government cannot grant a license to the public to go into a homeowner's bedroom or his backyard. The legal and constitutional principals are exactly the same whether applied to a bedroom or a field, and a governmental entity may not legislatively terminate, by enactment of a statute, an individual's "right to exclude" others from their private property without providing the landowner compensation for that "taking" or without the landowner's permission.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, March 9, 2007
White v. The Pines Community Improvement (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 6, 2007. Opinion by Judge Arrie W. Davis.
In this case, the Court was asked to determine the rights of individual property owners as compared with the rights of a Community Improvement Association (Pines Community Improvement Association, Inc. ("PCIA")). PCIA does NOT qualify as a homeowners' association under Real Property 11B-101, et seq. Specifically at issue were piers and certain community property. The individual lot owners claimed an easement over the piers and claimed adverse possession over certain of the community property.
"'The Pines on the Severn' (hereinafter 'The Pines') is a residential community of approximately 250 single family lots located in Arnold, Maryland that binds on two branches of Chase
Creek, a tributary of the Severn River." The specific language of the relevant deeds is set forth in great detail in the Court's opinion. In 2003, the PCIA instituted a pier management system that imposed a fee on members, and a "wet storage fee" of $15.00 per day on boats belonging to non-members in slips. Certain individual owners sued the PCIA claiming that they had easements which permitted them to use the piers. They also claimed adverse possession over certain community land. Finally, they claimed that the PCIA was equitably estopped from preventing them from using the piers. The PCIA, in turn, counterclaimed for the wet storage fees.
Held:
The Court first reviewed the relevant standard of review. Factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
The Court then looked at the issues in this case. After reviewing the elements for a covenant running with the land, the Court determined that there was a covenant running with the land with respect to PCIA. There was also an express easement over community land in the PCIA's deed. Any attempts to change the individual property owners' rights vis-a-vis the PCIA were unenforceable because those deeds were recorded after the original plat. "...after the delivery of the mortgage, it is beyond the mortgagor to impair or modify the estate."
Prescriptive Easements Over the Piers: The constuction of a deed is ordinarily a question of law, and thus reviewed de novo. The Court gives effect to the intention of the parties as that intention can be gleaned from the four corners of the document. Extrinisic evidence is generally not considered. In addition, common schemes are permissible in Maryland, and the recordation of an appropriate deed affords "constructive notice to all persons dealing with the property..." In this case, the grants in the individual property owners' deeds did not restrict the community property; they granted access to the realty and riparian rights. Accordingly, they were easements that ran with the land. The individual lot owners have an express (not prescriptive) easement over the piers. The Court reviewed the elements for prescriptive easements and found that, because the easements in this case were express, they could not have been prescriptive.
Those who have riparian realty can build piers, wharves, etc. that extend out into the water. However, riparian rights does not equate to ownership of riparian land. The individual property owners had riparian rights based on their easements, but the riparian land was OWNED by the PCIA. Accordingly, the PCIA owned the piers at issue, and the individual lot owners had a contractual right to use them.
Adverse Possession of Certain Community Land The Court then faced the issue of whether the individual owners had acquired some of the community land by adverse possession. To constitute adverse possession, the "possession must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, under claim of ownership, and continuous or uninterrupted" (citations omitted) for the statutory period of 20 years. Successive owners can "tack" their possession to meet the statutory period, but generally, the deed from the first owner to the successor must include the property at issue. One exception to this rule is when the original owner actually turns over possession to the successor owner. The Court then applied this rule to the specifics of each individual owner's claim, noting along the way that trial judges are presumed to know the law and apply it properly.
Equitable Estoppel Equitable estoppel arises when a party is precluded from exercising his rights because another "has in good faith relied upon [his] conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right..." Because the individual land owners and the PCIA had equal access to the land records, any reliance on any conduct that was no in accord with the land records was insufficient to establish equitable estoppel.
Wet Storage Fees The scope of an easement is determined by the conveyance. Where the conveyance is silent as to the duty to repair, the expenses are proportionately those of the easement holder. Thus, each easement holder and the land owner should all pay, as nearly as possible, their share of the use of the easement. Because the $15.00 per day wet storage fee was not reasonably anticipated to be a proportionate share of the maintenance costs, it was not an appropriate fee.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
In this case, the Court was asked to determine the rights of individual property owners as compared with the rights of a Community Improvement Association (Pines Community Improvement Association, Inc. ("PCIA")). PCIA does NOT qualify as a homeowners' association under Real Property 11B-101, et seq. Specifically at issue were piers and certain community property. The individual lot owners claimed an easement over the piers and claimed adverse possession over certain of the community property.
"'The Pines on the Severn' (hereinafter 'The Pines') is a residential community of approximately 250 single family lots located in Arnold, Maryland that binds on two branches of Chase
Creek, a tributary of the Severn River." The specific language of the relevant deeds is set forth in great detail in the Court's opinion. In 2003, the PCIA instituted a pier management system that imposed a fee on members, and a "wet storage fee" of $15.00 per day on boats belonging to non-members in slips. Certain individual owners sued the PCIA claiming that they had easements which permitted them to use the piers. They also claimed adverse possession over certain community land. Finally, they claimed that the PCIA was equitably estopped from preventing them from using the piers. The PCIA, in turn, counterclaimed for the wet storage fees.
Held:
The Court first reviewed the relevant standard of review. Factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
The Court then looked at the issues in this case. After reviewing the elements for a covenant running with the land, the Court determined that there was a covenant running with the land with respect to PCIA. There was also an express easement over community land in the PCIA's deed. Any attempts to change the individual property owners' rights vis-a-vis the PCIA were unenforceable because those deeds were recorded after the original plat. "...after the delivery of the mortgage, it is beyond the mortgagor to impair or modify the estate."
Prescriptive Easements Over the Piers: The constuction of a deed is ordinarily a question of law, and thus reviewed de novo. The Court gives effect to the intention of the parties as that intention can be gleaned from the four corners of the document. Extrinisic evidence is generally not considered. In addition, common schemes are permissible in Maryland, and the recordation of an appropriate deed affords "constructive notice to all persons dealing with the property..." In this case, the grants in the individual property owners' deeds did not restrict the community property; they granted access to the realty and riparian rights. Accordingly, they were easements that ran with the land. The individual lot owners have an express (not prescriptive) easement over the piers. The Court reviewed the elements for prescriptive easements and found that, because the easements in this case were express, they could not have been prescriptive.
Those who have riparian realty can build piers, wharves, etc. that extend out into the water. However, riparian rights does not equate to ownership of riparian land. The individual property owners had riparian rights based on their easements, but the riparian land was OWNED by the PCIA. Accordingly, the PCIA owned the piers at issue, and the individual lot owners had a contractual right to use them.
Adverse Possession of Certain Community Land The Court then faced the issue of whether the individual owners had acquired some of the community land by adverse possession. To constitute adverse possession, the "possession must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, under claim of ownership, and continuous or uninterrupted" (citations omitted) for the statutory period of 20 years. Successive owners can "tack" their possession to meet the statutory period, but generally, the deed from the first owner to the successor must include the property at issue. One exception to this rule is when the original owner actually turns over possession to the successor owner. The Court then applied this rule to the specifics of each individual owner's claim, noting along the way that trial judges are presumed to know the law and apply it properly.
Equitable Estoppel Equitable estoppel arises when a party is precluded from exercising his rights because another "has in good faith relied upon [his] conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right..." Because the individual land owners and the PCIA had equal access to the land records, any reliance on any conduct that was no in accord with the land records was insufficient to establish equitable estoppel.
Wet Storage Fees The scope of an easement is determined by the conveyance. Where the conveyance is silent as to the duty to repair, the expenses are proportionately those of the easement holder. Thus, each easement holder and the land owner should all pay, as nearly as possible, their share of the use of the easement. Because the $15.00 per day wet storage fee was not reasonably anticipated to be a proportionate share of the maintenance costs, it was not an appropriate fee.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
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