Showing posts with label Equal Pay Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Equal Pay Act. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Tarquini v. Superior Products, Inc. (U.S.D.C.)(Not Approved for Publication)
Filed March 12, 2007 – Memorandum Opinion by Judge James K. Bredar
Plaintiff Tarquini, a former sales representative for Defendant Superior Products, brought this suit for wrongful discharge and violation of federal, Maryland and Virginia equal pay acts, violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, breach of contract, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In response to Superior’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that Tarquini’s claims based on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act alleging gender-based wage discrimination were not time-barred to the extent that a jury could find the violations willful (which extends the limitations period to three years). Tarquini’s sexually hostile environment claim also was not time-barred because, under the “continuing violation” doctrine, a letter terminating Ms. Tarquini within the statutory time period could serve as an act contributing to the alleged hostile environment, thereby allowing acts outside the limitation period to be brought in to support the claim.
The Court also denied summary judgment for Superior as to Tarquini’s retaliatory discharge claim. Although the Judge considered it undisputed that Tarquini was an at-will employee, other terms of her employment could permit Tarquini's claims based on breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, so summary judgment on those issues also was dened.
The Court granted summary judgment as to Tarquini’s ADA claims after finding that she had not sufficiently demonstrated that she had a disability under the ADA. Finally, the Court granted summary judgment as to abusive discharge, since it is a judicial exception to create a remedy where none exists by statute and, in this case, Tarquini had statutory remedies available.
The full opinion is available in PDF as is the Order.
Plaintiff Tarquini, a former sales representative for Defendant Superior Products, brought this suit for wrongful discharge and violation of federal, Maryland and Virginia equal pay acts, violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, breach of contract, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In response to Superior’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that Tarquini’s claims based on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act alleging gender-based wage discrimination were not time-barred to the extent that a jury could find the violations willful (which extends the limitations period to three years). Tarquini’s sexually hostile environment claim also was not time-barred because, under the “continuing violation” doctrine, a letter terminating Ms. Tarquini within the statutory time period could serve as an act contributing to the alleged hostile environment, thereby allowing acts outside the limitation period to be brought in to support the claim.
The Court also denied summary judgment for Superior as to Tarquini’s retaliatory discharge claim. Although the Judge considered it undisputed that Tarquini was an at-will employee, other terms of her employment could permit Tarquini's claims based on breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, so summary judgment on those issues also was dened.
The Court granted summary judgment as to Tarquini’s ADA claims after finding that she had not sufficiently demonstrated that she had a disability under the ADA. Finally, the Court granted summary judgment as to abusive discharge, since it is a judicial exception to create a remedy where none exists by statute and, in this case, Tarquini had statutory remedies available.
The full opinion is available in PDF as is the Order.
Saturday, January 20, 2007
Toulan v. DAP Products, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Signed January 17, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Plaintiff Toulan brought suit against her employer, DAP Products, Inc. ("DAP"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Upon consideration of DAP's motion for summary judgment, the judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case.
Toulan had alleged discrimination based upon her race (Caucasian), national origin (American) and gender (female) while working under a male supervisor of Asian Indian descent. Toulan's problems began in 2004 during a reorganization of her workplace, when she was assigned to work under the supervisor by the Vice President of Technology, also an Asian Indian male. Her initial objections were because her supervisor had the same job title, Chemist II, but Toulan and her supervisor did not work well together, and after a month she was reassigned to another supervisor. Toulan subsequently received several disciplinary warnings and negative comments, and was temporarily reassigned to another location, returning a few months later. Toulin continued to receive pay raises, and was not demoted or otherwise penalized in spite of the disciplinary actions.
Upon consideration, the judge found no direct evidence of employment discrimination, nor had Toulan established a prima facie case (a showing that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 4) circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent) sufficient to shift the burden to DAP to prove a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged discrimination, in that no sufficient adverse employment action was alleged.
Toulan's wage discrimination claims under Title VII and EPA also fell short, since her evidence did not amount to a showing that she received lower pay than her male co-workers for performing work substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions, since there was little evidence to support the similarity of, and evidence of a number of key differences between, the compared positions, and the ranges of compensation for male and female co-workers were co-extensive.
Toulan was also found to have failed to establish retaliatory action by DAP (in temporarily reassigning her to a less desirable location, giving her warnings and negative evaluations, requiring her to use unpaid leave after her paid leave was exhausted, and creating a hostile work environment), either by again failing to establish adverse employment actions even under the more relaxed standards applied to claims of retaliatory action, or by failing to rebut DAP's proffered non-discriminatory basis for those actions when found.
In concluding, the judge acknowledged that Toulan may have been correct in claiming the terms, conditions and privileged of her employment differed from other co-workers, but found that that such differences arose from personality differences rather than discrimination, and declined to sit as a "super-personnel department", citing Beall v. Abbott Labs.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Plaintiff Toulan brought suit against her employer, DAP Products, Inc. ("DAP"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Upon consideration of DAP's motion for summary judgment, the judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case.
Toulan had alleged discrimination based upon her race (Caucasian), national origin (American) and gender (female) while working under a male supervisor of Asian Indian descent. Toulan's problems began in 2004 during a reorganization of her workplace, when she was assigned to work under the supervisor by the Vice President of Technology, also an Asian Indian male. Her initial objections were because her supervisor had the same job title, Chemist II, but Toulan and her supervisor did not work well together, and after a month she was reassigned to another supervisor. Toulan subsequently received several disciplinary warnings and negative comments, and was temporarily reassigned to another location, returning a few months later. Toulin continued to receive pay raises, and was not demoted or otherwise penalized in spite of the disciplinary actions.
Upon consideration, the judge found no direct evidence of employment discrimination, nor had Toulan established a prima facie case (a showing that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 4) circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent) sufficient to shift the burden to DAP to prove a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged discrimination, in that no sufficient adverse employment action was alleged.
Toulan's wage discrimination claims under Title VII and EPA also fell short, since her evidence did not amount to a showing that she received lower pay than her male co-workers for performing work substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions, since there was little evidence to support the similarity of, and evidence of a number of key differences between, the compared positions, and the ranges of compensation for male and female co-workers were co-extensive.
Toulan was also found to have failed to establish retaliatory action by DAP (in temporarily reassigning her to a less desirable location, giving her warnings and negative evaluations, requiring her to use unpaid leave after her paid leave was exhausted, and creating a hostile work environment), either by again failing to establish adverse employment actions even under the more relaxed standards applied to claims of retaliatory action, or by failing to rebut DAP's proffered non-discriminatory basis for those actions when found.
In concluding, the judge acknowledged that Toulan may have been correct in claiming the terms, conditions and privileged of her employment differed from other co-workers, but found that that such differences arose from personality differences rather than discrimination, and declined to sit as a "super-personnel department", citing Beall v. Abbott Labs.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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