Cathcart v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed February 9, 2007—Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner

Robin Cathcart was convicted by a jury of first degree assault and false imprisonment after brutally beating his former girlfriend and thereafter precluding her from leaving her apartment to seek medical assistance. For the first degree assault, the court imposed a sentence of ten years. For the common law offense of false imprisonment, the court sentenced Cathcart to life imprisonment, consecutive to the ten year sentence for assault, with all but ten years suspended. No period of probation was imposed with respect to the suspended part of the life sentence.

Cathcart appealed arguing that, under the circumstances of the case, the imposition of a life sentence for the common law offense of false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate and therefore illegal. Noting that the maximum sentence in Maryland for kidnapping – an aggravated form of false imprisonment – was only thirty years and that the permissible sentence for false imprisonment in other States ranged from six months to ten years, he complained that holding the victim in her apartment for up to three hours was grossly disproportionate and therefore cruel and unusual.

The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the sentence was effectively one of ten years, rather than life, given the fact that no period of probation was imposed with respect to the suspended part of the life sentence and that Cathcart could therefore never serve more than ten years on that sentence. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment reasoning that, under the circumstances, a sentence of ten years for false imprisonment was not unconstitutionally disproportionate.

In his petition for certiorari, Cathcart maintained that a sentence of life imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended with no probation, constituted an illegal sentence, but the nature of his complaint differed. Carthcart argued that, in the absence of a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence, the effect of the sentence, as articulated and when considered together with the ten year sentence for assault, is to preclude any parole consideration for the entire duration of the twenty years. Because the term of confinement includes a life sentence, parole eligibility is calculated on each sentence separately and then aggregated. Because first degree assault is a crime of violence, he must serve five years before he becomes eligible for parole on that sentence (the greater of one-half of the sentence imposed for the violent crime or one-fourth of the aggregate sentence.) If the sentence imposed for false imprisonment is treated as a life sentence, even though all but ten years is suspended, he would have to serve at least 15 years before he becomes eligible for parole on that sentence. That alone would make the entire part of the false imprisonment sentence ordered executed by the court immune from parole. Further, when the 5 year minimum on the assault is aggregated with the 15 year minimum on the false imprisonment, under the structure of the Circuit Court, he would not be eligible for parole for 20 years and that, as a result, the entire 20 year aggregate sentence he received would be a non-parolable one. Cathcart argued that the sentence was illegal on two fronts, (1) it is cruel and unusual to impose a non-parolable sentence of 15 years for false imprisonment, and (2) by precluding the prospect of parole in the absence of any authorizing statute, the court has effectively intruded upon the discretion of the Parole Commission, thereby exercising an Executive function in violation of the separation of powers principle enunciated in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

As there was no challenge to the 10 year sentence imposed for first degree assault, the Court focused on the sentence for false imprisonment and set forth the options available in sentencing a defendant for a crime that carries a prison sentence. The court may

(1) impose a sentence up to the maximum term allowed and, by stating no contrary ruling, implicitly direct that the entire sentence be executed; (2) suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions that the court considers proper. This section provides two options: the court may defer the actual imposition of a sentence in favor of probation, or it may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of all of it in favor of the probation. In either event, so long as the probation is not revoked, the defendant will not be incarcerated at all. If the probation is revoked, the court may then proceed either to impose the sentence that it had deferred or direct execution of all or any part that it had previously imposed but suspended; (3) impose a sentence for a specified time and provide that a lesser time be served in confinement or suspend the remainder of the sentence and order probation for a time. If the court chooses the latter approach, it must impose the full sentence it intends to impose; and (4) impose a sentence of custodial confinement or imprisonment as a condition of probation. The split sentence option may be used in connection with a life sentence; however, there must be a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence.

Failure to impose a period of probation does not necessarily make the sentence illegal but simply precludes it from having the status of a split sentence under CP § 6-222. Because the effect of the omission is to limit the period of incarceration to the unsuspended part of the sentence, that becomes, in law, the effective sentence. If the court has chosen not to impose a period of probation and thereby limited the period of incarceration to the unsuspended portion of the sentence, the effect of remanding the case for it to do so would be tantamount to allowing it to increase the sentence from that fixed number of years to a life sentence, and our jurisdiction does not allow for that. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the Circuit Court to amend the sentence imposed on the false imprisonment conviction to imprisonment for 10 years, consecutive to the sentence imposed on the first degree assault conviction.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Poole v. Dotson (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Decided January 12, 2007--Opinion by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr.

This is a habeas corpus action. The petitioner had been convicted in August, 1997, of a one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. His sentence had been enhanced under §4B1.1 of the Uniform Sentencing Guidelines because, at the time of his sentencing, the court believed that he had been convicted of two prior felonies, one in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

In 1991, the petitioner had been convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of the felony of possession with intent to distribute narcotics. In April of 1997, the petitioner's 1991 conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor. Subsequently, however, for reasons that were not explained, in June of 1997, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County denied a previously filed motion for reconsideration of the 1991 conviction, essentially reviving it.

As part of this proceeding, the federal court sought clarification from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County as to which order (April, 1997, or June, 1997) was controlling. In response, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County vacated the entire 1991/1997 series of convictions and set the matter in for a new trial.

Under the circumstances, the District Court swept aside a host of procedural questions raised by the Government and held that the enhanced sentence was illegal because the petitioner had only one prior felony conviction. The petitioner's prior sentence was vacated and the matter set in for a re-sentencing.

A copy of the opinion is available in PDF. A copy of the order is here.

Anderson v. United States (Maryland U.S.D.C.)

Decided January 4, 2007—Opinion by Chief Judge Benson Everett Legg.

Rachelle Anderson was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to (i) sell and offer for sale drug paraphernalia in violation of 21 U.S.C. §863(a)(1), and to (ii) aid and abet the distribution of and possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine hydrochloride, and cocaine base. The 4th Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Just nine days before the expiration of the applicable one-year limitation, Anderson filed a Motion to Vacate, pro se. Her motion alleged that:

(i) her attorney was ineffective;

(ii) the Court erred when it refused to read the entire paraphernalia statute during its instructions to the jury;

(iii) her sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

(iv) the Court erred in determining drug quantity for purposes of sentencing; and

(v) because she did not play a managerial role in the conspiracy, her three-level increase under U.S.S.G. §3B1.1 was erroneous.

Several weeks after the government filed its opposition brief, and more than five months beyond the one-year limitations period, Anderson filed a reply brief in which she offered additional support for her original claims and asserted new claims. She later amended her motion again, raising even more claims not contained in her original motion.

The Court held that certain of Anderson's claims were time-barred because she could have but did not assert them in her original motion, while others had already been decided by the 4th Circuit on the previous appeal.

Considering and then rejecting all but one of Anderson's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court determined that the Government had not adequately responded to one of them, concerning the handling of one juror's misconduct and its affect on the other jurors. As to that issue only, the Court ordered supplemental briefing by the Government.

Finally, the Court rejected Anderson's claim that the trial court had violated her constitutional rights by increasing her offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines based on facts not considered by the jury or charged in the indictment. Though Anderson did not cite to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which extended Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines, the Court assumed that she also relied on Booker. Because the 4th Circuit has held that the rule announced in Booker is unavailable for post-conviction relief where convictions became final before it (or Blakely) was decided, the Court determined that the Booker rule did not apply retroactively to Anderson's sentence and thus it denied that claim.

The full opinion is available in PDF.