Filed April 11, 2007—Opinion by Judge William Quarles
The District Court granted Home Depot’s motions for summary judgment of a suit by Charles Frank, a former employee, for breach of contract and defamation related to his termination and certain statements made by a Home Depot employee to Frank’s potential future employer.
Home Depot had terminated Frank because he falsely stated that he had been properly licensed to operate the forklift when his license had expired. Thereafter, Lowe’s allegedly failed to hire him because of defamatory statements made by a Home Depot employee to someone at Lowe’s.
This is the second suit brought by Frank against Home Depot. In the first, Frank sued pro se, alleging retaliatory and discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and wrongful discharge in violation of Maryland law. The Court had dismissed that suit for failure to state a claim.
The instant suit alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge was previously dismissed without prejudice and reinstated on an amended complaint that added the defamation claim. The Court determined that the first count was barred by res judicata, while the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations and, in any event, by a statutory and common law qualified privilege, citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423 and Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 56 (2001).
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
Showing posts with label wrongful discharge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wrongful discharge. Show all posts
Saturday, April 14, 2007
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Tarquini v. Superior Products, Inc. (U.S.D.C.)(Not Approved for Publication)
Filed March 12, 2007 – Memorandum Opinion by Judge James K. Bredar
Plaintiff Tarquini, a former sales representative for Defendant Superior Products, brought this suit for wrongful discharge and violation of federal, Maryland and Virginia equal pay acts, violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, breach of contract, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In response to Superior’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that Tarquini’s claims based on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act alleging gender-based wage discrimination were not time-barred to the extent that a jury could find the violations willful (which extends the limitations period to three years). Tarquini’s sexually hostile environment claim also was not time-barred because, under the “continuing violation” doctrine, a letter terminating Ms. Tarquini within the statutory time period could serve as an act contributing to the alleged hostile environment, thereby allowing acts outside the limitation period to be brought in to support the claim.
The Court also denied summary judgment for Superior as to Tarquini’s retaliatory discharge claim. Although the Judge considered it undisputed that Tarquini was an at-will employee, other terms of her employment could permit Tarquini's claims based on breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, so summary judgment on those issues also was dened.
The Court granted summary judgment as to Tarquini’s ADA claims after finding that she had not sufficiently demonstrated that she had a disability under the ADA. Finally, the Court granted summary judgment as to abusive discharge, since it is a judicial exception to create a remedy where none exists by statute and, in this case, Tarquini had statutory remedies available.
The full opinion is available in PDF as is the Order.
Plaintiff Tarquini, a former sales representative for Defendant Superior Products, brought this suit for wrongful discharge and violation of federal, Maryland and Virginia equal pay acts, violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, breach of contract, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In response to Superior’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that Tarquini’s claims based on Title VII and the Equal Pay Act alleging gender-based wage discrimination were not time-barred to the extent that a jury could find the violations willful (which extends the limitations period to three years). Tarquini’s sexually hostile environment claim also was not time-barred because, under the “continuing violation” doctrine, a letter terminating Ms. Tarquini within the statutory time period could serve as an act contributing to the alleged hostile environment, thereby allowing acts outside the limitation period to be brought in to support the claim.
The Court also denied summary judgment for Superior as to Tarquini’s retaliatory discharge claim. Although the Judge considered it undisputed that Tarquini was an at-will employee, other terms of her employment could permit Tarquini's claims based on breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act, so summary judgment on those issues also was dened.
The Court granted summary judgment as to Tarquini’s ADA claims after finding that she had not sufficiently demonstrated that she had a disability under the ADA. Finally, the Court granted summary judgment as to abusive discharge, since it is a judicial exception to create a remedy where none exists by statute and, in this case, Tarquini had statutory remedies available.
The full opinion is available in PDF as is the Order.
Tuesday, February 6, 2007
Andrew v. Clark (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Approved for Publication)
Issued February 5, 2007 -- Opinion of Judge Andre M. Davis. Approved for publication.
Plaintiff served as a Major in the Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) and was the Commanding Officer of the Eastern District of the BCPD at times relevant. After a barricade incident, Plaintiff prepared and distributed to his chain of command an "internal memorandum" criticizing the BCPD's handling of that incident. Receiving no response from his chain of command, Plaintiff released a copy of the internal memorandum to a Baltimore Sun reporter. Internal Affairs investigated the release and Plaintiff was subsequently fired.
Plaintiff filed and subsequently moved to amend a complaint in U.S. District Court alleging multiple state and federal counts against then Police Commissioner Kevin Clark and other parties. The complaint as amended alleged inter alia that Defendants' firing of Plaintiff:
1. violated the procedural due process requirements under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and 14 U.S. Sec. 1983 of the United States Code, as amended, due to the defendants' failure to provide either:
a. an adjudicatory hearing; or
b. a demotion to a civil service position at which a hearing would ostensibly apply under the Maryland Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"); and further
2. violated Plaintiff's right to freedom of speech with respect to the preparation and release of the internal memorandum.
Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all federal counts from the complaint.
The U.S. District Court held that Plaintiff acted in his capacity as a agent of the BCPD in preparing and distributing the internal memorandum, and accordingly had no such protected freedom of speech rights in that professional capacity under the First Amendment as would trump the BCPD's power to discipline or fire an employee. It held further that Defendant had not violated any of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights, as Plaintiff had no "property' right in his as an at-will employee under Maryland law, and thus no federal constitutional provision protected him from the deprivation of that "property". The Court also held that while state law may entertain a right of Plaintiff to be demoted to a protected, civil service rank as an intermediate discipline in lieu of termination, no constitutional principles commanded such a right.
Accordingly, the U.S District Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) all federal claims in the complaint with prejudice and all non-diversity of citizenship state law claims without prejudice.
The Memorandum Opinion may be read here in PDF.
Plaintiff served as a Major in the Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) and was the Commanding Officer of the Eastern District of the BCPD at times relevant. After a barricade incident, Plaintiff prepared and distributed to his chain of command an "internal memorandum" criticizing the BCPD's handling of that incident. Receiving no response from his chain of command, Plaintiff released a copy of the internal memorandum to a Baltimore Sun reporter. Internal Affairs investigated the release and Plaintiff was subsequently fired.
Plaintiff filed and subsequently moved to amend a complaint in U.S. District Court alleging multiple state and federal counts against then Police Commissioner Kevin Clark and other parties. The complaint as amended alleged inter alia that Defendants' firing of Plaintiff:
1. violated the procedural due process requirements under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and 14 U.S. Sec. 1983 of the United States Code, as amended, due to the defendants' failure to provide either:
a. an adjudicatory hearing; or
b. a demotion to a civil service position at which a hearing would ostensibly apply under the Maryland Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights ("LEOBR"); and further
2. violated Plaintiff's right to freedom of speech with respect to the preparation and release of the internal memorandum.
Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all federal counts from the complaint.
The U.S. District Court held that Plaintiff acted in his capacity as a agent of the BCPD in preparing and distributing the internal memorandum, and accordingly had no such protected freedom of speech rights in that professional capacity under the First Amendment as would trump the BCPD's power to discipline or fire an employee. It held further that Defendant had not violated any of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights, as Plaintiff had no "property' right in his as an at-will employee under Maryland law, and thus no federal constitutional provision protected him from the deprivation of that "property". The Court also held that while state law may entertain a right of Plaintiff to be demoted to a protected, civil service rank as an intermediate discipline in lieu of termination, no constitutional principles commanded such a right.
Accordingly, the U.S District Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) all federal claims in the complaint with prejudice and all non-diversity of citizenship state law claims without prejudice.
The Memorandum Opinion may be read here in PDF.
Monday, February 5, 2007
Reier v. SDAT (Ct of Appeals)
Issued February 5, 2007 -- Opinion of Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.
Petitioner David Reier, until his termination on 7 October 1996 for asserted misconduct and poor performance, was employed as an assessor in the Carroll County office of the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT). As an assessor, Reier was responsible for conducting assessments of individual property "accounts" to determine their fair market value for taxation purposes. Reier’s work, like that of all assessors, was subject to audit by supervisors upon its completion. Events leading up to the audit process in the final months of the 1996 assessment cycle lead to Reier’s eventual termination.
In early August 1996, the Assistant Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, Lumen Norris, found a stack of 8 to 10 building permits on top of, or otherwise in close proximity to, a filing cabinet designated for the storage of such permits. Shortly after his discovery, Norris brought the misplaced permits to the attention of the Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, Larry White. White decided to use the permits as a sampling of Reier’s work for audit purposes. The timeline of the proceeding audit process became the subject of great dispute because of its significance to the determination of the date on which SDAT became aware of the extent of Reier’s poor performance and misconduct. The audit revealed excessive errors in Reier’s work and evidence that he had derogated his duties as an assessor. After the conclusion of the audit and a conference with Reier as to the audit results, White terminated Reier. Reier pursued an administrative appeal of his termination to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding over the first OAH hearing on the matter affirmed the timeliness of the termination, finding that Reier was given notice of his termination within 30 days of the commencement of the investigation in accord with Maryland Code (1993), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-106(b). Reier sought judicial review of the decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which remanded the case to the OAH for application of the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of § 11-106(b) then just announced in Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 130 Md. App. 562,747 A.2d 697 (2000) (Geiger I). Aggrieved by the Remand Decision rendered by a different ALJ, Reier again sought judicial review in the Circuit Court, which affirmed the ALJ. On appeal to the Court of Special A ppeals (Reier I), the intermediate appellate court remanded the case to the OAH to apply the yet newer judicial gloss giv en § 11-1 06(b) in the Court of Appeals’ Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 807 A.2d 32 (2000)(Geiger II).
The same ALJ undertook this case for a third time and, after rendering factual findings varying as to some key dates from her previous findings regarding when the SDAT was on notice of Reier’s misconduct, determined that more than 30 days had passed since the SDAT became aware of facts sufficient to prompt an investigation into Reier’s job performance. The ALJ ordered that Reier be reinstated and awarded back pay, consisting solely of lost monetary wages. The Circuit Court affirmed Reier’s reinstatement and awarded him benefits as part of his back pay. On appeal by the SDAT, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Reier’s reinstatement, concluding that the intermediate appellate court’s decision in Reier I and the opinion in Geiger II effectively vacated the factual findings made by the ALJ on the first remand. The appellate court panel, however, concluded that back pay was limited to monetary wages. Dep’t of Taxation v. Reier, 167 Md. App. 559, 893 A.2d 1195 (2006) (Reier II).
The Court of Appeals rejected the SDAT’s arguments that the findings of fact made by the ALJ on the first remand, and relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals in Reier I, could not be disturbed under the doctrine of the law of the case. The Court noted that the doctrine, which prevents par ties from re-litigating issues already decided by a higher tribunal, is generally invoked only for decided questions of law, rather than pure questions of fact. Thus, because the ALJ upon the second remand revised only her findings of fact, which had not been relied upon by the intermediate appellate court in any event, the doctrine of the law of the case did not apply here . Instead, the revised factual findings were determined to be within the ambit of the mandate and opinion of Reier I, which had requested a clarification of certain key facts made more significant in light of the new interpretation of the statutory 30-day notice standard interpreted in Geiger II.
The phrase "full back pay", as it is used in Maryland Code (1993), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-110(d)(1)(iii), does not explicitly include State-offered benefits.. The Court looked to the legislative history of the statute to determine its meaning, paying particular attention to Governor’s Task Force Report that indicated that the word "full" had significance apart from a deleted set-off provision in an earlier iteration of the bill before enactment.
Several factors led the Court to conclude that "full back pay" must embrace also State-offered benefits. First, Maryland courts previously conflated the provisions of § 11-110(d )(1)(ii) and (iii) to both reinstate and provide back pay with benefits to erroneously terminated employees. Second, the Court held that the entire State Personnel and Pension Article addresses the pay scheme in a manner that contemplates benefits, such as health care and leave, to be inextricably linked with pay. Third, the Task Force Report belies the notion that § 11-110(d)(1) was written in the disjunctive with respect to pay and benefits. Finally, the Court held it to be unreasonable for the General Assembly to permit recipients of lesser wrongful discipline to be made whole entirely, while simultaneously depriving wrongfully terminated employees of their accrued State benefits.
The full opinion is available here in PDF.
Petitioner David Reier, until his termination on 7 October 1996 for asserted misconduct and poor performance, was employed as an assessor in the Carroll County office of the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT). As an assessor, Reier was responsible for conducting assessments of individual property "accounts" to determine their fair market value for taxation purposes. Reier’s work, like that of all assessors, was subject to audit by supervisors upon its completion. Events leading up to the audit process in the final months of the 1996 assessment cycle lead to Reier’s eventual termination.
In early August 1996, the Assistant Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, Lumen Norris, found a stack of 8 to 10 building permits on top of, or otherwise in close proximity to, a filing cabinet designated for the storage of such permits. Shortly after his discovery, Norris brought the misplaced permits to the attention of the Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, Larry White. White decided to use the permits as a sampling of Reier’s work for audit purposes. The timeline of the proceeding audit process became the subject of great dispute because of its significance to the determination of the date on which SDAT became aware of the extent of Reier’s poor performance and misconduct. The audit revealed excessive errors in Reier’s work and evidence that he had derogated his duties as an assessor. After the conclusion of the audit and a conference with Reier as to the audit results, White terminated Reier. Reier pursued an administrative appeal of his termination to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding over the first OAH hearing on the matter affirmed the timeliness of the termination, finding that Reier was given notice of his termination within 30 days of the commencement of the investigation in accord with Maryland Code (1993), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-106(b). Reier sought judicial review of the decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which remanded the case to the OAH for application of the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of § 11-106(b) then just announced in Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 130 Md. App. 562,747 A.2d 697 (2000) (Geiger I). Aggrieved by the Remand Decision rendered by a different ALJ, Reier again sought judicial review in the Circuit Court, which affirmed the ALJ. On appeal to the Court of Special A ppeals (Reier I), the intermediate appellate court remanded the case to the OAH to apply the yet newer judicial gloss giv en § 11-1 06(b) in the Court of Appeals’ Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 807 A.2d 32 (2000)(Geiger II).
The same ALJ undertook this case for a third time and, after rendering factual findings varying as to some key dates from her previous findings regarding when the SDAT was on notice of Reier’s misconduct, determined that more than 30 days had passed since the SDAT became aware of facts sufficient to prompt an investigation into Reier’s job performance. The ALJ ordered that Reier be reinstated and awarded back pay, consisting solely of lost monetary wages. The Circuit Court affirmed Reier’s reinstatement and awarded him benefits as part of his back pay. On appeal by the SDAT, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Reier’s reinstatement, concluding that the intermediate appellate court’s decision in Reier I and the opinion in Geiger II effectively vacated the factual findings made by the ALJ on the first remand. The appellate court panel, however, concluded that back pay was limited to monetary wages. Dep’t of Taxation v. Reier, 167 Md. App. 559, 893 A.2d 1195 (2006) (Reier II).
The Court of Appeals rejected the SDAT’s arguments that the findings of fact made by the ALJ on the first remand, and relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals in Reier I, could not be disturbed under the doctrine of the law of the case. The Court noted that the doctrine, which prevents par ties from re-litigating issues already decided by a higher tribunal, is generally invoked only for decided questions of law, rather than pure questions of fact. Thus, because the ALJ upon the second remand revised only her findings of fact, which had not been relied upon by the intermediate appellate court in any event, the doctrine of the law of the case did not apply here . Instead, the revised factual findings were determined to be within the ambit of the mandate and opinion of Reier I, which had requested a clarification of certain key facts made more significant in light of the new interpretation of the statutory 30-day notice standard interpreted in Geiger II.
The phrase "full back pay", as it is used in Maryland Code (1993), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-110(d)(1)(iii), does not explicitly include State-offered benefits.. The Court looked to the legislative history of the statute to determine its meaning, paying particular attention to Governor’s Task Force Report that indicated that the word "full" had significance apart from a deleted set-off provision in an earlier iteration of the bill before enactment.
Several factors led the Court to conclude that "full back pay" must embrace also State-offered benefits. First, Maryland courts previously conflated the provisions of § 11-110(d )(1)(ii) and (iii) to both reinstate and provide back pay with benefits to erroneously terminated employees. Second, the Court held that the entire State Personnel and Pension Article addresses the pay scheme in a manner that contemplates benefits, such as health care and leave, to be inextricably linked with pay. Third, the Task Force Report belies the notion that § 11-110(d)(1) was written in the disjunctive with respect to pay and benefits. Finally, the Court held it to be unreasonable for the General Assembly to permit recipients of lesser wrongful discipline to be made whole entirely, while simultaneously depriving wrongfully terminated employees of their accrued State benefits.
The full opinion is available here in PDF.
Thursday, January 11, 2007
Ehrlich v. Grove (Ct. of Appeals)
Decided January 11, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Dale Cathell.
In a case involving a suit by a senior official of the Maryland Department of the Environment for wrongful termination by Governor Robert Ehrlich upon the beginning of his term as Governor in January 2002, the Court of Appeals held that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under the extraordinary circumstance of a discovery order being directed to a Governor of Maryland when the collateral order doctrine’s four-part test is met, namely, when:
In a case involving a suit by a senior official of the Maryland Department of the Environment for wrongful termination by Governor Robert Ehrlich upon the beginning of his term as Governor in January 2002, the Court of Appeals held that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under the extraordinary circumstance of a discovery order being directed to a Governor of Maryland when the collateral order doctrine’s four-part test is met, namely, when:
the interlocutory order sought to be reviewed:The Court of Appeals further held that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City had abused its discretion when, in the course of resolving a complex and extended discovery dispute between the parties, it ordered expanded in camera review with the active participation of the attorney for the Plaintiff of documents protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and when it actively solicited by its draft of a solicitation letter the consent of 341 former executive-branch employees of the State of Maryland to the release of employment and other documents that the Circuit Court itself had held to be irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence in this case.
(1) conclusively determines the disputed question,
(2) resolves an important issue,
(3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and
(4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.
The full opinion is available here in PDF.
Sunday, December 24, 2006
Braxton v. Domino's Pizza, LLC (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Decided December 21, 2006--Opinion by Judge Richard D. Bennett (not approved for publication)
Employment discrimination case alleging, inter alia, numerous violations of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981, as well as breach of contract and tort claims based on the law of the State of Maryland. Among the claims were a count asserting a cause of action for negligent supervision and a count claiming wrongful discharge, i.e., that the plaintiff's discharge violated Maryland public policy. The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss as to these claims.
Employment discrimination case alleging, inter alia, numerous violations of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981, as well as breach of contract and tort claims based on the law of the State of Maryland. Among the claims were a count asserting a cause of action for negligent supervision and a count claiming wrongful discharge, i.e., that the plaintiff's discharge violated Maryland public policy. The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss as to these claims.
- In order to prove a cause of action for either negligent hiring, supervision or retention, a plaintiff must establish that her injury was caused by the tortious conduct of a coworker, that the employer knew or should have known by the exercise of diligence and reasonable care that the coworker was capable of inflicting harm of some type, that the employer failed to use proper care in selecting, supervising or retaining that employee, and that the employer's breach of its duty was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. Because negligent supervision claims "existed at common law" in Maryland, such claims therefore "may only be predicated on common law causes of action." Claims for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981 did not exist at common law. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for negligent supervision must fail.
- To sustain a claim for wrongful discharge, the employee must show that (1) he was discharged; (2) the basis for his discharge violates some clear mandate of public policy; and (3) there is a nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer's decision to fire the employee. See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 803 A.2d 482, 489 (Md. 2002). Whether public policy considerations constitute a clear mandate of public policy is a
question of law. Id. at 487 (citations omitted). Plaintiff's contention that she was improperly terminated for complaining that her supervisor failed to adequately address security concerns in connection with the conduct of a former employee does not jeopardize a clear mandate of public policy.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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