Filed April 11, 2007 --Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner
Nancy S. Forster, the Public Defender of Maryland, petitioned for a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, or other appropriate relief, vacating a directive and order issued by Judge Edward Hargadon, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Forster argued the directive and order were substantively unlawful and constituted an impermissible local rule. The order imposed certain procedural requirements on parties filing exceptions to the report of a master in juvenile cases and permits the court to dismiss the exceptions if those requirements are not met. The directive directed the court clerk to enter the order in each exceptions case, so that the order and its requirements would be case-specific.
A motion to stay the directive and order pending the Court's decision on the petition had been granted earlier. After considering the petition, however, the Court dismissed it and revoked the stay because the requested relief, if
warranted, was available in two pending cases in Court of Special Appeals.
The Opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label mandamus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mandamus. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
Sunday, April 1, 2007
City of Annapolis v. Bowen et al. (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided March 30, 2007—Opinion by Judge Peter Krauser
Retired firefighters and police officers sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the City of Annapolis (“City”) to increase their pension payments in tandem with reclassification of the positions of their active-duty counterparts. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County agreed that Annapolis City Code § 3.36.150A1 required that the retirees receive pension increases commensurate with wage increases received by active-duty personnel. The City appealed, contending that pension increases under ACC § 3.36.150A1 were limited to cost-of-living adjustments.
The retirees first argued that Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article barred the City’s appeal. Reasoning that circuit court had been exercising mandamus jurisdiction below, the Court of Special Appeals found that it had jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal.
On the merits, the retirees argued that their interpretation of ACC § 3.36.150A1 was supported by “similar legislation” in DC. The “similar” DC provision contains an explicit “equalization provision” granting retired police officers and firefighters increases in their pension when active-duty counterparts receive wage increases. The Court of Special Appeals held that the DC provision was not a cost-of-living provision like ACC § 3.36.150A1, and was in fact created to compensate for the absence of such a provision in DC. Thus the Court reversed the lower court’s decision.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Retired firefighters and police officers sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the City of Annapolis (“City”) to increase their pension payments in tandem with reclassification of the positions of their active-duty counterparts. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County agreed that Annapolis City Code § 3.36.150A1 required that the retirees receive pension increases commensurate with wage increases received by active-duty personnel. The City appealed, contending that pension increases under ACC § 3.36.150A1 were limited to cost-of-living adjustments.
The retirees first argued that Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article barred the City’s appeal. Reasoning that circuit court had been exercising mandamus jurisdiction below, the Court of Special Appeals found that it had jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal.
On the merits, the retirees argued that their interpretation of ACC § 3.36.150A1 was supported by “similar legislation” in DC. The “similar” DC provision contains an explicit “equalization provision” granting retired police officers and firefighters increases in their pension when active-duty counterparts receive wage increases. The Court of Special Appeals held that the DC provision was not a cost-of-living provision like ACC § 3.36.150A1, and was in fact created to compensate for the absence of such a provision in DC. Thus the Court reversed the lower court’s decision.
The opinion is available in PDF.
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