Filed March 27, 2007. Opinion by Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. (retired, specially assigned).
On appeal from the trial court's grant of the motion of the defendant ("Mason") to suppress the physical evidence of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the Court AFFIRMED the decision below.
This case arose from a narcotics investigation that resorted to a Whren -style traffic stop ruse to detain the suspect until drug-sniffing dogs could be brought to the scene of the traffic stop, and "alert" to the drugs later found in the vehicle. At trial, the judge granted Mason's motion to suppress the drugs on the basis of an unreasonable detention, which Mason had estimated at 25 minutes, and the State at 10 minutes. The State appealed the decision.
Preliminarily, the Court noted that, under Section 12-302(c) in the Code, the trial court ruling would become final, unless the matter were appealed and the appeals court rendered a decision within 120 days, though commenting that this limitation would be moot unless the appellate decision were to overturn the decision below.
The Court also noted that neither the traffic stop, nor the right to search the vehicle after the drug dog "alerted" to the presence of drugs were at issue, nor relevant to the questions presented. Rather, the sole issue was to assess whether the period between the initial stop and the K-9 alert was an unreasonable detention under the Fourth Amendment. Since the State had appealed the adverse ruling below, Mason's version of the length, 25 minutes, must be presumed.
The Court then turned to the reasonableness of that length of detention, rejecting the mere length of time as the critical factor in favor of the totality of the circumstances, a factual determination. Since the decision of the trial judge, as the trier of fact, is to be overturned only if clearly erroneous, the Court had little trouble, after reviewing the testimony below and the leading cases on the subject, in finding sufficient evidence to support the ruling below, noting that had the ruling gone the other way, there was also ample evidence to support that ruling as well, had it been made below by the trier of fact.
The Court also rejected the State's alternative Fourth Amendment theory, an effort to "unpoison the fruit of the poisonous tree" by advancing an alternative basis for the stop and the detention, namely, an anonymous phone call that had alerted the police that Mason would be transporting drugs in the van later subjected to the Whren stop. While expressing considerable regret that the State had not chosen to do so, the Court found that the State had not preserved the issue, since at no point below did the State advance that rationale as a justification for the stop and detention. This was in contrast to the situation in the Court of Appeals' recent Cox decision, where the issue had been advanced below.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Showing posts with label 4th Amendment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 4th Amendment. Show all posts
Friday, March 30, 2007
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Haley v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 21, 2007--Order by Judge Irma S. Raker, joined in all but Part III by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
Haley was convicted of robbery, second-degree assault, theft of property valued at $500 or more, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft of a motor vehicle.
The victim in this case ("Singer") testified at trial that, based on his belief that Haley was a woman in distress, stopped his car in the late night/early morning to help her. Once inside the car Haley propositioned him for sex, at which point Singer demanded Haley leave his car. Haley then threatened Singer with a knife demanding his money. Singer testified that he then ran from the car on noticing an approaching cab, and Haley drove off with Singer's car. Singer then called the police and, later that morning, identified Haley in a line up. Prior to that incident, Singer testified he had never met Haley.
Haley testified that he and Singer had been having a homosexual relationship off and on for over a year or so. On that particular evening, Haley began teasing Singer that he was going to tell Singer's son about their relationship. The conversation became serious because Haley stated he was tired of hiding in Singer's closet, literally, whenever his son and neighbors came by, and an argument ensued. Singer then stated he was going to catch a cab and ordered Haley to stop the car on noticing the approaching cab.
In an effort to demonstrate the ongoing relationship with Singer, Haley, during trial, described the outside of Singer's residence, the area surrounding the residence, items inside the residence, and Singer's dog. Over objection, the State was permitted to question Haley about when he relayed the information about his familiarity with Singer's house and dog to his defense counsel.
In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction holding that Haley's information was intended to be disclosed to third parties and, consequently, the attorney-client privilege was not breached. It seems that, prior to Haley discussing his defense with his counsel, he provided a report to "some lady." It is this testimony that this Court reviews for breach of attorney-client privilege.
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider two questions:
1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to information provided by a criminal defendant to his defense attorney that would later form the basis of his defense at trial because such information was "intended to be disclosed to a third party?"
2) Where the only description of the suspect involved in a carjacking is a "black female with long hair" wearing a mult-colored shirt," did the officer in this case have probable cause to arrest the petitioner, a black male with short hair, several hours later based primarily on the fact that he was wearing the same shirt?
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment, an appellate court considers only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the record developed at trial. The attorney-client privilege is well established and understood to be a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. In its analysis of privilege, the Court set out the elements as follows: (1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal adviser, (8) except that the protection may be waived. There is no legal distinction between the disclosure of [the contents] of a communication as distinguished from the fact that no such communication was ever made between the client and the attorney. The fact that a defendant testifies in his own behalf does not waive the privilege. Consequently, this Court held that the timing and the substance of Haley's communications to his defense counsel was, in fact, privileged communication.
The second question goes to whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Haley given the description of the suspect as a "black female with long hair" wearing a "multi-colored shirt." In considering whether probable cause existed, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge, factoring in the variables of the information leading to police action, the environment, the police purpose, and the suspect's conduct. A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Even though Haley did not match the description, per se, the Court was pursuaded by the fact that the arresting officer, after getting confirmation that the car he was following was indeed the subject of the carjacking, personally observed Haley during the commission of the crime and then again when he executed the arrest. Thus, the particularity of the description of the offender was based on first-person observation. Consequently, this Court held there were sufficient facts on the record to justify reasonable grounds for belief by the officer that Haley was associated with the carjacking.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Haley was convicted of robbery, second-degree assault, theft of property valued at $500 or more, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft of a motor vehicle.
The victim in this case ("Singer") testified at trial that, based on his belief that Haley was a woman in distress, stopped his car in the late night/early morning to help her. Once inside the car Haley propositioned him for sex, at which point Singer demanded Haley leave his car. Haley then threatened Singer with a knife demanding his money. Singer testified that he then ran from the car on noticing an approaching cab, and Haley drove off with Singer's car. Singer then called the police and, later that morning, identified Haley in a line up. Prior to that incident, Singer testified he had never met Haley.
Haley testified that he and Singer had been having a homosexual relationship off and on for over a year or so. On that particular evening, Haley began teasing Singer that he was going to tell Singer's son about their relationship. The conversation became serious because Haley stated he was tired of hiding in Singer's closet, literally, whenever his son and neighbors came by, and an argument ensued. Singer then stated he was going to catch a cab and ordered Haley to stop the car on noticing the approaching cab.
In an effort to demonstrate the ongoing relationship with Singer, Haley, during trial, described the outside of Singer's residence, the area surrounding the residence, items inside the residence, and Singer's dog. Over objection, the State was permitted to question Haley about when he relayed the information about his familiarity with Singer's house and dog to his defense counsel.
In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction holding that Haley's information was intended to be disclosed to third parties and, consequently, the attorney-client privilege was not breached. It seems that, prior to Haley discussing his defense with his counsel, he provided a report to "some lady." It is this testimony that this Court reviews for breach of attorney-client privilege.
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider two questions:
1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to information provided by a criminal defendant to his defense attorney that would later form the basis of his defense at trial because such information was "intended to be disclosed to a third party?"
2) Where the only description of the suspect involved in a carjacking is a "black female with long hair" wearing a mult-colored shirt," did the officer in this case have probable cause to arrest the petitioner, a black male with short hair, several hours later based primarily on the fact that he was wearing the same shirt?
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment, an appellate court considers only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the record developed at trial. The attorney-client privilege is well established and understood to be a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. In its analysis of privilege, the Court set out the elements as follows: (1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal adviser, (8) except that the protection may be waived. There is no legal distinction between the disclosure of [the contents] of a communication as distinguished from the fact that no such communication was ever made between the client and the attorney. The fact that a defendant testifies in his own behalf does not waive the privilege. Consequently, this Court held that the timing and the substance of Haley's communications to his defense counsel was, in fact, privileged communication.
The second question goes to whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Haley given the description of the suspect as a "black female with long hair" wearing a "multi-colored shirt." In considering whether probable cause existed, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge, factoring in the variables of the information leading to police action, the environment, the police purpose, and the suspect's conduct. A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Even though Haley did not match the description, per se, the Court was pursuaded by the fact that the arresting officer, after getting confirmation that the car he was following was indeed the subject of the carjacking, personally observed Haley during the commission of the crime and then again when he executed the arrest. Thus, the particularity of the description of the offender was based on first-person observation. Consequently, this Court held there were sufficient facts on the record to justify reasonable grounds for belief by the officer that Haley was associated with the carjacking.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Sunday, March 11, 2007
U.S. v. Srivastava (U.S.D.C.)(Approved for Publication)
Signed March 6, 2007--Memorandum Opinion and Order by Judge Roger W. Titus. (Approved for publication.)
Defendant is a cardiologist practicing medicine through a Subchapter S Corporation who became the subject of a health care fraud investigation. In the course of the investigation, SA Marrero of HHS-OIG submitted a single affidavit in support of applications for three search warrants, which were ultimately approved. Two of the warrants applied to Defendant's medical offices, and the third authorized a search of Defendant's residence. Each warrant contained identical substantive language that authorized the seizure of a list of enumerated "records including, but not limited to, financial business, patient and other records related to" the Defendant's "business . . . which may constitute evidence . . .." SA Marrero then forwarded copies of seized documents between Defendant and the Bank of India to the U.S. Attorney's office, which documents were then forwarded to IRS and ultimately led to a formal investigation regarding possible tax fraud committed by the Defendant. Defendant then filed a Motion to Suppress based on its conclusion that the evidence in question had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which motion was granted August 4, 2006.
The Government raised six main arguments in its Motion for Reconsideration: (1) The Court incorrectly interpreted the warrant; (2) the documents were not seized unlawfully; (3) more documents are related to Srivastava's business than the Court concluded because Srivasatava operates a Subchapter S corporation; (4) the evidence obtained in the IRS investigation was lawful; (5) the evidence should not have been suppressed under the independent source and the inevitable discovery doctrines; and (6) specifically, the Bank of India faxes should not have been suppressed.
The Court addressed all these arguments in the August 2006 opinion but repackaged some of its analysis with respect to the first and third arguments.
First, the Government suggested that the modifying clauses "related to the business" and "may constitute evidence of violations" should not be viewed as limits on the types of documents that could be seized. The Court, however, found these clauses must be read to limit the scope of the warrant in order to save it from what would otherwise be unconstitutional overbreadth. The Court determined that suppression was appropriate because of two additional and important factors. First, the quantity of the materials seized was significant. Many of the documents seized were not related to the investigation as the Government later returned many of them to the Defendant, although not until tax investigators had had an opportunity to review the contents. Further, SA Marrero specifically testified that he did not advise his agents on any limits regarding what they could collect and resulted in the seizure of many documents not authorized by the warrant, such as an invitation to a cultural event and a CVS "Extra Care" card. Thus, the Court's suppression order was rooted in the actions of the seizing agents who grossly exceeded the scope of the warrants and not simply the interpretation of the text of the warrants and accompanying affidavit.
Second, the Government argues that the type of corporation, Subchapter S, operated by Defendant is significant with respect to the volumes of documents collected by the agents, including the Bank of India documents, since he declared his income from the corporation on his individual tax return. The Court reasoned that, regardless of the type of business operated by Defendant, the agents should not have seized personal financial records and tax returns, and they should not have seized business records unless they tended to show violations of 18 USC §1347. These were the two simple and basic restrictions contained in the warrant but disregarded by Marrero. It was clear from Marrero's testimony that it was not as if the agents became confused during the search as to whether the documents were business or personal -- they went on a wholesale fishing expedition and seized all documents and many other personal affects without regard as to whether the documents or items were business records or demonstrative of health care fraud. Further, the Government argued that "some of the documents demonstrating defendant's income from a lucrative occupation and the disposition of that income may constitute health evidence of fraud (sic)." While it is true that evidence of extreme wealth or extravagant spending is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such evidence cannot be said to be evidence of health care fraud in this case. Unlike a typical drug dealer who has no legitimate source of income that would support an affluent lifestyle, Defendant was engaged in a legitimate and lucrative profession. As such, the Court rejected the so-called "proceeds of the crime" argument. The rationale that the financial records and tax returns seized were related to the Section 1347 investigation is also negated by the fact that the Government returned approximately 80% of the seized documents to the Defendant.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Defendant is a cardiologist practicing medicine through a Subchapter S Corporation who became the subject of a health care fraud investigation. In the course of the investigation, SA Marrero of HHS-OIG submitted a single affidavit in support of applications for three search warrants, which were ultimately approved. Two of the warrants applied to Defendant's medical offices, and the third authorized a search of Defendant's residence. Each warrant contained identical substantive language that authorized the seizure of a list of enumerated "records including, but not limited to, financial business, patient and other records related to" the Defendant's "business . . . which may constitute evidence . . .." SA Marrero then forwarded copies of seized documents between Defendant and the Bank of India to the U.S. Attorney's office, which documents were then forwarded to IRS and ultimately led to a formal investigation regarding possible tax fraud committed by the Defendant. Defendant then filed a Motion to Suppress based on its conclusion that the evidence in question had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which motion was granted August 4, 2006.
The Government raised six main arguments in its Motion for Reconsideration: (1) The Court incorrectly interpreted the warrant; (2) the documents were not seized unlawfully; (3) more documents are related to Srivastava's business than the Court concluded because Srivasatava operates a Subchapter S corporation; (4) the evidence obtained in the IRS investigation was lawful; (5) the evidence should not have been suppressed under the independent source and the inevitable discovery doctrines; and (6) specifically, the Bank of India faxes should not have been suppressed.
The Court addressed all these arguments in the August 2006 opinion but repackaged some of its analysis with respect to the first and third arguments.
First, the Government suggested that the modifying clauses "related to the business" and "may constitute evidence of violations" should not be viewed as limits on the types of documents that could be seized. The Court, however, found these clauses must be read to limit the scope of the warrant in order to save it from what would otherwise be unconstitutional overbreadth. The Court determined that suppression was appropriate because of two additional and important factors. First, the quantity of the materials seized was significant. Many of the documents seized were not related to the investigation as the Government later returned many of them to the Defendant, although not until tax investigators had had an opportunity to review the contents. Further, SA Marrero specifically testified that he did not advise his agents on any limits regarding what they could collect and resulted in the seizure of many documents not authorized by the warrant, such as an invitation to a cultural event and a CVS "Extra Care" card. Thus, the Court's suppression order was rooted in the actions of the seizing agents who grossly exceeded the scope of the warrants and not simply the interpretation of the text of the warrants and accompanying affidavit.
Second, the Government argues that the type of corporation, Subchapter S, operated by Defendant is significant with respect to the volumes of documents collected by the agents, including the Bank of India documents, since he declared his income from the corporation on his individual tax return. The Court reasoned that, regardless of the type of business operated by Defendant, the agents should not have seized personal financial records and tax returns, and they should not have seized business records unless they tended to show violations of 18 USC §1347. These were the two simple and basic restrictions contained in the warrant but disregarded by Marrero. It was clear from Marrero's testimony that it was not as if the agents became confused during the search as to whether the documents were business or personal -- they went on a wholesale fishing expedition and seized all documents and many other personal affects without regard as to whether the documents or items were business records or demonstrative of health care fraud. Further, the Government argued that "some of the documents demonstrating defendant's income from a lucrative occupation and the disposition of that income may constitute health evidence of fraud (sic)." While it is true that evidence of extreme wealth or extravagant spending is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such evidence cannot be said to be evidence of health care fraud in this case. Unlike a typical drug dealer who has no legitimate source of income that would support an affluent lifestyle, Defendant was engaged in a legitimate and lucrative profession. As such, the Court rejected the so-called "proceeds of the crime" argument. The rationale that the financial records and tax returns seized were related to the Section 1347 investigation is also negated by the fact that the Government returned approximately 80% of the seized documents to the Defendant.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Cox v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed February 8, 2007–Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene.
Petitioner sought to suppress a baggie of marijuana seized after police had obtained information about Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant subsequent to an arguably illegal stop. The two issues to review were (1) whether a police encounter, in which a uniformed officer approached Petitioner on the street claiming that he "loosely fit" the description of the perpetrator of a recent string of robberies, asked Petitioner for identification, and ran a check on his identification, constituted an illegal stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether a police officer’s subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant represented an intervening circumstance, such that if the stop were illegal the arrest on the warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop.
The Court focused on three factors: (1) the Temporal Proximity Factor, (2) the Intervening Event Factor, and (3) the Flagrancy of the Police Conduct Factor.
The Temporal Proximity Factor suggests that the greater the time lapse between the illegality and discovery of evidence, the greater the chance that the taint has been purged. In this case, there existed a mere two minutes between the illegal stop and the discovery of the marijuana. However, since the temporal proximity factor has been labeled ambiguous and the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, the court focused on the other two factors.
An Intervening Circumstance is an event that breaks the causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence. In this case, the officers discovered the baggie of marijuana after the police learned of Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant, stood Petitioner up from the curb and arrested him pursuant to that warrant. The police did not ask Petitioner to sit on the ground until after the radio alert of the outstanding warrant. Although Petitioner may have discarded the baggie while he was seated on the ground, that fact is not dispositive to the Court’s analysis or holding.
The final factor is the Flagrancy of the Police Misconduct. The Court found nothing in the record indicating the police acted in bad faith. Once the officer discovered the outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, he "gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search [Petitioner]." Furthermore, merely because the officer’s stop of Petitioner was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.
Holding:
Assuming arguendo that the police encounter constituted an illegal stop, the ultimate question is more appropriate: whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence. The police officer’s discovery of an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest pursuant thereto represents an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of what appears to be an illegal stop.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Petitioner sought to suppress a baggie of marijuana seized after police had obtained information about Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant subsequent to an arguably illegal stop. The two issues to review were (1) whether a police encounter, in which a uniformed officer approached Petitioner on the street claiming that he "loosely fit" the description of the perpetrator of a recent string of robberies, asked Petitioner for identification, and ran a check on his identification, constituted an illegal stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether a police officer’s subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant represented an intervening circumstance, such that if the stop were illegal the arrest on the warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop.
The Court focused on three factors: (1) the Temporal Proximity Factor, (2) the Intervening Event Factor, and (3) the Flagrancy of the Police Conduct Factor.
The Temporal Proximity Factor suggests that the greater the time lapse between the illegality and discovery of evidence, the greater the chance that the taint has been purged. In this case, there existed a mere two minutes between the illegal stop and the discovery of the marijuana. However, since the temporal proximity factor has been labeled ambiguous and the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, the court focused on the other two factors.
An Intervening Circumstance is an event that breaks the causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence. In this case, the officers discovered the baggie of marijuana after the police learned of Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant, stood Petitioner up from the curb and arrested him pursuant to that warrant. The police did not ask Petitioner to sit on the ground until after the radio alert of the outstanding warrant. Although Petitioner may have discarded the baggie while he was seated on the ground, that fact is not dispositive to the Court’s analysis or holding.
The final factor is the Flagrancy of the Police Misconduct. The Court found nothing in the record indicating the police acted in bad faith. Once the officer discovered the outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, he "gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search [Petitioner]." Furthermore, merely because the officer’s stop of Petitioner was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.
Holding:
Assuming arguendo that the police encounter constituted an illegal stop, the ultimate question is more appropriate: whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence. The police officer’s discovery of an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest pursuant thereto represents an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of what appears to be an illegal stop.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Monday, January 22, 2007
U.S. v. Atwell (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Decided January 5, 2007 --Opinion by Magistrate Judge Susan Gauvey
Defendant Atwell was charged with driving under the influence under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-902(a) and failing to drive right of center under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-301(a) and the Assimilative Crime Acts, 18 U.S.C. §§7 and 13. Here the Court considered Atwell’s motion to suppress all evidence and observations on the ground that he was stopped off of federal property.
Atwell argued two primary points: (1) when a police officer effectuates a stop outside of his territorial jurisdiction, all evidence obtained after the arrest must be suppressed as illegally obtained; and (2) a police officer outside of his jurisdiction may not stop an individual for a minor traffic offense. The government has acknowledged that the stop and arrest took place beyond the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. It argued that the arresting officer nonetheless had authority to arrest under Seip v. State of Maryland, 153 Md. App. 83 (Md. App. 2003).
In this 44-page opinion, the Court agreed with Atwell that Seip v. State does not authorize federal military officers to make an extra-territorial arrest. Further, the Court found that there is no authority under any federal or state statute or governing Maryland common law for the extra-territorial arrest. Nonetheless, the Court found that the arrest was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the Court refused to suppress the evidence derived as a result of the arrest and DENIED Atwell’s motion.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Defendant Atwell was charged with driving under the influence under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-902(a) and failing to drive right of center under Md. Code Ann. Transportation §21-301(a) and the Assimilative Crime Acts, 18 U.S.C. §§7 and 13. Here the Court considered Atwell’s motion to suppress all evidence and observations on the ground that he was stopped off of federal property.
Atwell argued two primary points: (1) when a police officer effectuates a stop outside of his territorial jurisdiction, all evidence obtained after the arrest must be suppressed as illegally obtained; and (2) a police officer outside of his jurisdiction may not stop an individual for a minor traffic offense. The government has acknowledged that the stop and arrest took place beyond the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. It argued that the arresting officer nonetheless had authority to arrest under Seip v. State of Maryland, 153 Md. App. 83 (Md. App. 2003).
In this 44-page opinion, the Court agreed with Atwell that Seip v. State does not authorize federal military officers to make an extra-territorial arrest. Further, the Court found that there is no authority under any federal or state statute or governing Maryland common law for the extra-territorial arrest. Nonetheless, the Court found that the arrest was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the Court refused to suppress the evidence derived as a result of the arrest and DENIED Atwell’s motion.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Saturday, January 6, 2007
Jones v. Murphy (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Signed January 4, 2007 -- Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake.
This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.
The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.
For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.
By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.
The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.
For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.
By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, January 2, 2007
Christian v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided January 2, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.
A police officer conducting covert narcotics surveillance observed the Appellant hide a bag between the screen and entry doors of a Baltimore City rowhouse, and engage in other suspicious behavior which seemed to suggest that illicit drugs were being sold. The police officer opened the screen door, searched the bag, discovered it contained heroin, and promptly arrested the Appellant.
While arrest was in progress, a second man arrived on the scene who identified himself as the Appellant's brother, and indicated that the Appellant lived with him. According to the police officer, this second man gave him permission to search the house, at which time other drugs were discovered in plain view. In the circuit court, the Appellant's motion to suppress the seized drugs was denied, the case proceeded on a not guilty/agreed statement of facts. The Appellant was found guilty and appealed.
On appeal, the Appellant raised two issues: first, that the circuit court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; and second, that the circuit court failed to determine that the Appellant's jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court's guilty verdict was affirmed.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found behind the screen door, because it found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area, as opposed to any area behind the entry door. In affirming the circuit court on this point, the Court of Special Appeals characterized this ruling as a finding of fact which was not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found in the house, because (a) it resolved in favor of the police officer a conflict in testimony between the police officer and the Appellant's brother regarding the circumstances under which consent was given; and (b) it found that the brother did have authority to consent to search house, because Appellant and his brother had mutual use of the area searched. Again the Court of Special Appeals affirmed because the circuit court was in the best position to resolve conflicts in testimony, and it was correct as a matter of law on the brother's right to consent to the search.
Finally, with respect to the waiver of the jury trial, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but suggested a litany of questions to be asked to ensure that a waiver is knowing and voluntary.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
A police officer conducting covert narcotics surveillance observed the Appellant hide a bag between the screen and entry doors of a Baltimore City rowhouse, and engage in other suspicious behavior which seemed to suggest that illicit drugs were being sold. The police officer opened the screen door, searched the bag, discovered it contained heroin, and promptly arrested the Appellant.
While arrest was in progress, a second man arrived on the scene who identified himself as the Appellant's brother, and indicated that the Appellant lived with him. According to the police officer, this second man gave him permission to search the house, at which time other drugs were discovered in plain view. In the circuit court, the Appellant's motion to suppress the seized drugs was denied, the case proceeded on a not guilty/agreed statement of facts. The Appellant was found guilty and appealed.
On appeal, the Appellant raised two issues: first, that the circuit court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; and second, that the circuit court failed to determine that the Appellant's jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court's guilty verdict was affirmed.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found behind the screen door, because it found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area, as opposed to any area behind the entry door. In affirming the circuit court on this point, the Court of Special Appeals characterized this ruling as a finding of fact which was not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found in the house, because (a) it resolved in favor of the police officer a conflict in testimony between the police officer and the Appellant's brother regarding the circumstances under which consent was given; and (b) it found that the brother did have authority to consent to search house, because Appellant and his brother had mutual use of the area searched. Again the Court of Special Appeals affirmed because the circuit court was in the best position to resolve conflicts in testimony, and it was correct as a matter of law on the brother's right to consent to the search.
Finally, with respect to the waiver of the jury trial, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but suggested a litany of questions to be asked to ensure that a waiver is knowing and voluntary.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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