Signed March 13, 2007. Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication).
On consideration of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by the defendant ("Levin"), and the opposition to that motion by the plaintiff ("Weistock"), or in the alternative Weistock's motion to transfer the venue, the judge TRANSFERRED the case to the Northern District of Illinois.
This case arose from the allegedly negligent treatment received by Weistock's husband from Levin in the course of what proved to be fatal lung cancer. Weistock and her husband had been referred to Levin, who practiced in Illinois, for a second opinion. Opting to receive treatment form Levin, Weistock's husband traveled to and received all treatments in Illinois. Eventually, Weistock's husband succumbed to kidney failure, which Weistock claimed was a result of the cancer treatments administered by Levin without due and proper regard to the patient's preexisting condition.
Weistock brought suit in Maryland state court, and Levin had the case removed to federal court on diversity basis. On motion to add Weistock's children to the suit, Levin opposed for lack of personal jurisdiction in Maryland. Weistock claimed personal jurisdiction did exist in Maryland, or in the alternative requested that the venue be transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.
Noting that, when personal jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, grounds for jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction may exist where the claim is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the state, or general jurisdiction may exist when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are continuous and systematic. Weistock met the first test required under Maryland law, citing injury arising under a Maryland statute, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 6-103(b)(1). Weistock was unable to allege at least minimum contacts between Levin and Maryland to support constitutionally reasonable jurisdiction, though, since all activities took place in Illinois, Levin had made no effort to attract patients from Maryland, and the largely passive Web site and the national television ads run by Levin were not sufficient to support even the lower general jurisdiction standard.
Rather than dismiss, though, the judge found that interests of justice compelled transfer of the case to the proper venue, where all the allegedly tortious actions took place.
The Memorandum and Order are available in PDF format.
Showing posts with label venue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label venue. Show all posts
Friday, March 16, 2007
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Howard University v. Watkins (Maryland U.S.D.C) (Not approved for publication)
Signed March 12, 2007. Memorandum opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (not approved for publication)
Upon consideration of the defendant Howard University's motions to dismiss or in the alternative to transfer, the judge deferred consideration of the grounds raised for dismissal and instead GRANTED the defendant's motion to transfer this case to the U.S.D.C. for the District of Columbia.
Watkins was an employee of and an Acting Dean for the plaintiff, Howard University ("Howard"). Allegedly as a result of Watkins' actions and failure to inform Howard about those actions, Howard was forced to settle an employment discrimination claim made by another employee for a total of $253,000, and sought compensation from Watkins for those damages. Jurisdiction was based on diversity, since Watkins was a resident of Maryland while Howard was located in the District of Columbia ("DC"). Watkins moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, or for transfer to the District Court for DC.
The judge noted that although Watkins had raised a "host of issues challenging various aspects of the complaint," the motion to transfer presented a clear basis for deferring consideration of those issues until the forum non conveniens issue was resolved.
After reviewing the underlying principles, the judge found the threshold issue, whether the case might have been filed in the alternate jurisdiction, to have been met, since the plaintiff was located there, all the relevant events had occurred there including the suit that resulted in the claimed damages, and that the law of DC would apply. The judge next considered whether the relative inconvenience to the parties and witnesses and the promotion of the interests of justice would support or oppose the requested move. The factors to be considered are 1) the weight accorded the plaintiff's choice of venue, 2) witness convenience and access, 3) convenience of the parties, and 4) the interests of justice.
Little weight was accorded to Howard's choice of forum, since none of the events occurred there and Maryland had no connection to the matter at hand other than being Watkins' state of residence. Similarly, witness convenience and access favored transfer since all events and most witnesses were tied to DC, but only slightly since Maryland was physically so close. Convenience of the parties weighed in favor of transfer, since only Watkins was a resident in Maryland, and she had requested the transfer. Finally, the interests of justice weighed strongly in favor of transfer, since matters would be resolved under DC law, the prior case had been filed there, and there is a strong public interest in having local matters resolved locally. The judge further noted that there would be no undue delay, since the case is in its early stages, and consequently ordered the transfer of the matter to the District Court for DC.
The memorandum opinion is available in PDF format.
Upon consideration of the defendant Howard University's motions to dismiss or in the alternative to transfer, the judge deferred consideration of the grounds raised for dismissal and instead GRANTED the defendant's motion to transfer this case to the U.S.D.C. for the District of Columbia.
Watkins was an employee of and an Acting Dean for the plaintiff, Howard University ("Howard"). Allegedly as a result of Watkins' actions and failure to inform Howard about those actions, Howard was forced to settle an employment discrimination claim made by another employee for a total of $253,000, and sought compensation from Watkins for those damages. Jurisdiction was based on diversity, since Watkins was a resident of Maryland while Howard was located in the District of Columbia ("DC"). Watkins moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, or for transfer to the District Court for DC.
The judge noted that although Watkins had raised a "host of issues challenging various aspects of the complaint," the motion to transfer presented a clear basis for deferring consideration of those issues until the forum non conveniens issue was resolved.
After reviewing the underlying principles, the judge found the threshold issue, whether the case might have been filed in the alternate jurisdiction, to have been met, since the plaintiff was located there, all the relevant events had occurred there including the suit that resulted in the claimed damages, and that the law of DC would apply. The judge next considered whether the relative inconvenience to the parties and witnesses and the promotion of the interests of justice would support or oppose the requested move. The factors to be considered are 1) the weight accorded the plaintiff's choice of venue, 2) witness convenience and access, 3) convenience of the parties, and 4) the interests of justice.
Little weight was accorded to Howard's choice of forum, since none of the events occurred there and Maryland had no connection to the matter at hand other than being Watkins' state of residence. Similarly, witness convenience and access favored transfer since all events and most witnesses were tied to DC, but only slightly since Maryland was physically so close. Convenience of the parties weighed in favor of transfer, since only Watkins was a resident in Maryland, and she had requested the transfer. Finally, the interests of justice weighed strongly in favor of transfer, since matters would be resolved under DC law, the prior case had been filed there, and there is a strong public interest in having local matters resolved locally. The judge further noted that there would be no undue delay, since the case is in its early stages, and consequently ordered the transfer of the matter to the District Court for DC.
The memorandum opinion is available in PDF format.
Friday, February 9, 2007
Piven v. Comcast Corp. (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed February 9, 2007 - Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner.
Issue: Venue - improper joinder. In an action for trespass to land located in the county where the action is brought, is it permissible to join an action for a separate trespass to land located entirely in a different county, when the two parcels are not contiguous or under common ownership and have no other connection with each other.
Held: No. A cause of action for trespass to land is a "local action" which must be brought in the county where the property lies.
The Plaintiffs, separate owners of two land parcels, one in Baltimore County and one in Baltimore City, filed a complaint in Baltimore County against Comcast for trespass. The plaintiffs complained that the defendant had run cable across their land without permission. The plaintiffs sought certification as a class. Before class certification was granted, the defendant moved to dismiss, challenging the plaintiffs' choice of venue. The defendant argued that, as a local action, a claim for trespass must be brought in the county where the property is located.
As no class had been certified, the circuit court treated the claim as involving only the named plaintiffs. The court concluded that a cause of action for trespass must be brought in the county in which the property lies, and that a claim for trespass to property in one county may not properly be joined with a proceeding in another county. Accordingly, the court dismissed without prejudice.
The circuit court warned the plaintiffs not to join the same actions in one case in Baltimore County a second time or the case would be dismissed. The plaintiffs did not follow this advice. Instead, they refiled a nearly identical complaint, which the circuit court then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
Relying upon CJP §§ 6-203, the Court held that venue in an action of trespass to land is in the county where all or any portion of “the subject matter of the action” is located. The Court held that the property was the subject matter.
To avoid this result, the plaintiffs made two arguments for an exception. First, they argued that the properties were not separate "subject matters," but part of an aggregate subject matter comprising all of the properties of the putative class members. Therefore, venue should lie in any county in which such land could be found. Second, they argued that their other causes of action, for unjust enrichment and to quiet title, arising from the trespass, were not local actions and may be brought in any county.
The Court rejected these arguments. In doing so, it explicated the historical difference between "local" actions, which must be brought where the subject matter is located, and "transitory" actions, which may be brought wherever the defendant works, lives, or has a principal office. Ultimately, it concluded that all of the claims arose out of the trespass and that courts will look to substance, rather than labels, in making determinations about venue.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court then noted that normally, transfer of the offending claim to the proper venue would be the normal remedy. The Court noted, however, that the plaintiffs had been given that option by the circuit court, but they had rejected it by refiling the claims together. Accordingly, the Court said that it found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's dismissing the action with prejudice.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Issue: Venue - improper joinder. In an action for trespass to land located in the county where the action is brought, is it permissible to join an action for a separate trespass to land located entirely in a different county, when the two parcels are not contiguous or under common ownership and have no other connection with each other.
Held: No. A cause of action for trespass to land is a "local action" which must be brought in the county where the property lies.
The Plaintiffs, separate owners of two land parcels, one in Baltimore County and one in Baltimore City, filed a complaint in Baltimore County against Comcast for trespass. The plaintiffs complained that the defendant had run cable across their land without permission. The plaintiffs sought certification as a class. Before class certification was granted, the defendant moved to dismiss, challenging the plaintiffs' choice of venue. The defendant argued that, as a local action, a claim for trespass must be brought in the county where the property is located.
As no class had been certified, the circuit court treated the claim as involving only the named plaintiffs. The court concluded that a cause of action for trespass must be brought in the county in which the property lies, and that a claim for trespass to property in one county may not properly be joined with a proceeding in another county. Accordingly, the court dismissed without prejudice.
The circuit court warned the plaintiffs not to join the same actions in one case in Baltimore County a second time or the case would be dismissed. The plaintiffs did not follow this advice. Instead, they refiled a nearly identical complaint, which the circuit court then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
Relying upon CJP §§ 6-203, the Court held that venue in an action of trespass to land is in the county where all or any portion of “the subject matter of the action” is located. The Court held that the property was the subject matter.
To avoid this result, the plaintiffs made two arguments for an exception. First, they argued that the properties were not separate "subject matters," but part of an aggregate subject matter comprising all of the properties of the putative class members. Therefore, venue should lie in any county in which such land could be found. Second, they argued that their other causes of action, for unjust enrichment and to quiet title, arising from the trespass, were not local actions and may be brought in any county.
The Court rejected these arguments. In doing so, it explicated the historical difference between "local" actions, which must be brought where the subject matter is located, and "transitory" actions, which may be brought wherever the defendant works, lives, or has a principal office. Ultimately, it concluded that all of the claims arose out of the trespass and that courts will look to substance, rather than labels, in making determinations about venue.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court then noted that normally, transfer of the offending claim to the proper venue would be the normal remedy. The Court noted, however, that the plaintiffs had been given that option by the circuit court, but they had rejected it by refiling the claims together. Accordingly, the Court said that it found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's dismissing the action with prejudice.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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