Signed April 30, 2007. Memorandum and Order by Judge J. Frederick Motz (not approved for publication).
In an action in which an employee ("Bruns") alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII by his employer, the Postal Service, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Bruns failed to respond to the motion, and the judge GRANTED the defendant's motion, finding that there was no dispute as to any material fact, that the record showed that the disciplinary action against Bruns (being sent home and given a seven day suspension) was taken as a reasonable response to Bruns having "acted inappropriately and in a threatening manner" toward his supervisor, and that Bruns was treated no more harshly than any other employee in his circumstances.
The Memorandum and Order are available in PDF format.
Showing posts with label Title VII. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Title VII. Show all posts
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Friday, March 30, 2007
McClintick v. Leavitt (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not approved for publication)
Signed March 26, 2007. Opinion and Order by Judge Richard D. Bennett.
Memorandum and Opinion granting summary judgment in part.
Held: 1) A federal employee can seek relief for employment discrimination only by asserting causes of action under Title VII.
2) Not being nominated for a discretionary merit-based award may constitute an adverse employment action actionable under Title VII if the plaintiff can show that such a determination represents a decision on permanent pay status.
Facts: Plaintiff, white male, worked for U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services. His direct supervisor was an African-American female. In 2004, the Plaintiff was not nominated for a so-called Quality Step Increase ("QSI"). QSI's are awards given for sustained performance of high quality that significantly exceeds an acceptable level of competence. The Plaintiff had been nominated to receive a QSI for 2003, and had received other merit-based awards, when he was previously supervised by a different supervisor, who was Caucasian.
The Plaintiff sued, alleging that he did not receive a QSI for 2004 because of racial discrimination and retaliation for filing an earlier discrimination charge. The Plaintiff alleged four causes of action: Count I - race discrimination (Title VII), Count II - race discrimination (§1981); Count III - retaliation for participating in protected activity (Title VII); Count IV - retaliation in violation of §1981.
The Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Counts II and IV because they were based upon §1981, a cause of action not available to Plaintiff, a federal employee. The Court denied the motion as to Counts I and III, finding that the Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.
A full copy of the opinion is available in PDF format.
Memorandum and Opinion granting summary judgment in part.
Held: 1) A federal employee can seek relief for employment discrimination only by asserting causes of action under Title VII.
2) Not being nominated for a discretionary merit-based award may constitute an adverse employment action actionable under Title VII if the plaintiff can show that such a determination represents a decision on permanent pay status.
Facts: Plaintiff, white male, worked for U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services. His direct supervisor was an African-American female. In 2004, the Plaintiff was not nominated for a so-called Quality Step Increase ("QSI"). QSI's are awards given for sustained performance of high quality that significantly exceeds an acceptable level of competence. The Plaintiff had been nominated to receive a QSI for 2003, and had received other merit-based awards, when he was previously supervised by a different supervisor, who was Caucasian.
The Plaintiff sued, alleging that he did not receive a QSI for 2004 because of racial discrimination and retaliation for filing an earlier discrimination charge. The Plaintiff alleged four causes of action: Count I - race discrimination (Title VII), Count II - race discrimination (§1981); Count III - retaliation for participating in protected activity (Title VII); Count IV - retaliation in violation of §1981.
The Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Counts II and IV because they were based upon §1981, a cause of action not available to Plaintiff, a federal employee. The Court denied the motion as to Counts I and III, finding that the Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.
A full copy of the opinion is available in PDF format.
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Elliott v. MD Dept of Human Resources (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not Approved for Publication)
Signed February 22, 2007. Memorandum Opinion and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake. (Not approved for publication)
Upon motion by the defendants for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII claims, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was GRANTED.
The plaintiff ("Elliott") is an African-American woman who was an assistant director in the Dorchester County Department of Social Services ("DCDSS") from 1997 through 2003. Beginning in 2000, her unit was subject to a number of personnel issues, including tension between Elliott and a number of her supervisees, some involving racially derogatory comments allegedly made outside of the workplace. Through a series of meetings and memoranda, the management at DCDSS attempted, with mixed success, to resolve these issues, including counseling Elliott on her management style and practices.
The DCDSS workplace experienced some significant racial tensions and incidents in 2003, leading ultimately to a series of visits from the Deputy Director of DHR's Office of Employment and Program Equity in order to conduct an investigation. He found in part that the employee morale was very low in Elliott's unit, in part due to Elliott's "heavy-handed" management style, and recommended that DCDSS management work with Elliott to improve her management skills. DCDSS management met with Elliott a number of times, and went through multiple drafts of a management action plan for Elliott to follow. Throughout the process, Elliott resisted the need for change, and late in 2003 her employment was terminated. Her responsibilities were reassigned to another member of DCDSS's management, who was also an African American woman.
After first unsuccessfully appealing her termination administratively, Elliott received a right to sue letter from the EEOC in 2005, and this suit followed, alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII and claiming DCDSS and DHR condoned a hostile work environment and discriminated and retaliated against her. DCDSS and DHR moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Under Title VII, when there is, as here, no direct evidence of employment discrimination, the claims are to be analyzed under the burden shifting test of McDonnell Douglass v. Green, first requiring the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. To do so here, the plaintiff must demonstrate she is a member of a protected class, she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and circumstances surrounding the employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent. If this is done, the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, whereupon the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the proferred nondiscriminatory reason is but a pretext for discrimination.
Defendants allege that Elliott cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination because her responsibilities were filled by another African American woman. Elliott countered that her position was in fact not filled, but her duties were just passed on to another employee, and thus did not fall under the 4th Circuit rule enunciated in Brown v. McLean. The judge agreed that it is not always necessary to show the position was filled by someone not in the protected class, but disagreed that the failure to fill the position necessarily demonstrated the necessary prima facie case of discrimination. Even assuming such a case had been made out, the judge found that Elliott had failed to provide evidence that the defendants' reasons for her firing were merely pretextual, and granted summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge count.
Elliott also claimed her termination was in retaliation for her complaints about discrimination suffered by her and other African American employees. To succeed, she must show see had engaged in protected activity, her employer had taken adverse employment action against her, and a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the employment action. Assuming Elliott had made out a prima facie case, she again had provided no evidence that the defendants' claimed nondiscriminatory reasons were merely pretextual, but rather that the adverse employment action was in direct response to Elliott's failure to cooperate in addressing the concerns with her management style.
Under the hostile work environment count, Elliott must show that the alleged harassment was unwelcome, based on race, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, and there was some basis for imposing liability on the employer. The harassment must be both objectively and subjectively severe and pervasive, looking to the totality of circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether to conduct was phyically threatening, humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perfomance. Here, the judge found the alleged incidents to be few in number, largely outside the workplace and none in her presence, and found Elliott had provided no support for the "subjective" component, that the harassment had interfered with her ability to perform her work or significantly affected her psychological well-being, and little support for holding her employer responsible, since DCDSS was not alleged to have conducted the harassment, but instead took measures to address the alleged harassment by others.
The Memorandum Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Upon motion by the defendants for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII claims, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was GRANTED.
The plaintiff ("Elliott") is an African-American woman who was an assistant director in the Dorchester County Department of Social Services ("DCDSS") from 1997 through 2003. Beginning in 2000, her unit was subject to a number of personnel issues, including tension between Elliott and a number of her supervisees, some involving racially derogatory comments allegedly made outside of the workplace. Through a series of meetings and memoranda, the management at DCDSS attempted, with mixed success, to resolve these issues, including counseling Elliott on her management style and practices.
The DCDSS workplace experienced some significant racial tensions and incidents in 2003, leading ultimately to a series of visits from the Deputy Director of DHR's Office of Employment and Program Equity in order to conduct an investigation. He found in part that the employee morale was very low in Elliott's unit, in part due to Elliott's "heavy-handed" management style, and recommended that DCDSS management work with Elliott to improve her management skills. DCDSS management met with Elliott a number of times, and went through multiple drafts of a management action plan for Elliott to follow. Throughout the process, Elliott resisted the need for change, and late in 2003 her employment was terminated. Her responsibilities were reassigned to another member of DCDSS's management, who was also an African American woman.
After first unsuccessfully appealing her termination administratively, Elliott received a right to sue letter from the EEOC in 2005, and this suit followed, alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII and claiming DCDSS and DHR condoned a hostile work environment and discriminated and retaliated against her. DCDSS and DHR moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Under Title VII, when there is, as here, no direct evidence of employment discrimination, the claims are to be analyzed under the burden shifting test of McDonnell Douglass v. Green, first requiring the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. To do so here, the plaintiff must demonstrate she is a member of a protected class, she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and circumstances surrounding the employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent. If this is done, the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, whereupon the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the proferred nondiscriminatory reason is but a pretext for discrimination.
Defendants allege that Elliott cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination because her responsibilities were filled by another African American woman. Elliott countered that her position was in fact not filled, but her duties were just passed on to another employee, and thus did not fall under the 4th Circuit rule enunciated in Brown v. McLean. The judge agreed that it is not always necessary to show the position was filled by someone not in the protected class, but disagreed that the failure to fill the position necessarily demonstrated the necessary prima facie case of discrimination. Even assuming such a case had been made out, the judge found that Elliott had failed to provide evidence that the defendants' reasons for her firing were merely pretextual, and granted summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge count.
Elliott also claimed her termination was in retaliation for her complaints about discrimination suffered by her and other African American employees. To succeed, she must show see had engaged in protected activity, her employer had taken adverse employment action against her, and a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the employment action. Assuming Elliott had made out a prima facie case, she again had provided no evidence that the defendants' claimed nondiscriminatory reasons were merely pretextual, but rather that the adverse employment action was in direct response to Elliott's failure to cooperate in addressing the concerns with her management style.
Under the hostile work environment count, Elliott must show that the alleged harassment was unwelcome, based on race, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, and there was some basis for imposing liability on the employer. The harassment must be both objectively and subjectively severe and pervasive, looking to the totality of circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether to conduct was phyically threatening, humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perfomance. Here, the judge found the alleged incidents to be few in number, largely outside the workplace and none in her presence, and found Elliott had provided no support for the "subjective" component, that the harassment had interfered with her ability to perform her work or significantly affected her psychological well-being, and little support for holding her employer responsible, since DCDSS was not alleged to have conducted the harassment, but instead took measures to address the alleged harassment by others.
The Memorandum Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Saturday, February 24, 2007
McGrath-Malott v. State of Maryland (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not Approved for Publication)
Signed February 23, 2007. Memorandum opinion by Judge Richard D. Bennett. (Not approved for publication.)
The plaintiff ("McGrath-Malott") was formerly a deputy sheriff for Washington County, and had brought an employment discrimination suit against the State of Maryland ("the State"), the Washington County Board of County Commissioners ("the County"), the Washington County Sheriff's Office ("the Sheriff's Office") and the Washington County Sheriff ("the Sheriff") in his individual and official capacities, alleging violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and claiming wrongful discharge, based upon alleged sexual advances and comments made by the Sheriff and subsequent adverse employment actions.
After being transferred against her wishes in April, 2003, McGrath-Malott was placed on sick leave due to a temporary mental health condition and remained on leave through that summer. In July, 2003, she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging gender discrimination, and in August 2003 the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, having been unable to determine whether discrimination had taken place.
In September 2003, having exhausted all sick leave, McGrath-Malott requested a temporary modified work assignment or leave without pay, and in October 2003 she was first placed on leave without pay, then her employment was terminated after she had exhausted all available vacation, sick and FMLA leave and had not indicated when, if ever, she would be able to return to work. In January 2005, McGrath-Malott filed an amended charge with the EEOC, which found reasonable cause to believe the Sheriff's Office had violated Title VII but was unable to reach a resolution with the Sheriff's Office. This suit followed in April 2006. The County, the State and the Sheriff each filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
McGrath-Malott first argued that, because the defendants had attached documents to their briefs, the motions to dismiss must be treated as ones for summary judgment instead, as noted in Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc. The judge noted that, in the Fourth Circuit per Am. Chiropractic v. Trigon Healthcare, there is an exception if the documents were integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and the plaintiff does not challenge its authenticity. Here, though some of the documents submitted met the Am. Chiropractic test, others did not, so defendants' motions to dismiss would be treated instead as motions for summary judgment.
The County moved to dismiss based on its allegation that both the Sheriff and McGrath-Malott were employees of the State, and not the County. After reviewing settled law on the matter, the judge agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all counts.
The Sheriff's Office had not filed a motion to dismiss, but the State had noted in its brief that the Sheriff's Office was in fact not a legal entity, and thus could not be sued. The judge agreed, and dismissed all counts against the Sheriff's Office.
The State moved to dismiss all counts, while the Sheriff had moved to dismiss only the Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation counts and the abusive discharge count. The judge granted summary judgment on the Title VII counts in favor of the Sheriff in his individual capacity, but allowed the case to proceed against the Sheriff in his official capacity.
Since McGrath-Malott had not presented any direct evidence of employment discrimination, the judge noted that she must satisfy the three-step burden-shifting test by first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, then the defendants must produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions, whereupon the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons were but a pretext. McGraff-Malot claimed she was not promoted, not given the same leave as her male colleagues, and was eventually fired. Although the motivation for these actions was not clear from the record, there were clearly genuine issues of material fact, and the judge denied the State's and the Sheriff's motions on the disparate treatment claims.
The judge then found that, even though McGrath-Malott had not specifically used the terms "hostile environment" or "sexual harassment" in her EEOC filings, she had included sufficient factual references to the harassment and retaliation, and thus she had exhausted her administrative remedies before filing suit on both the hostile work environment and retaliation claims.
The State moved to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against it, since it was not a "person" under the meaning of the statute. The judge agreed, and granted summary judgment to the State on that count.
On the Maryland Declaration of Rights and wrongful discharge counts, the judge found that the State and the Sheriff had immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, making McGrath-Malott's failure to follow the requirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act moot, and granted summary judgment in favor of the State and the Sheriff on those counts.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
The plaintiff ("McGrath-Malott") was formerly a deputy sheriff for Washington County, and had brought an employment discrimination suit against the State of Maryland ("the State"), the Washington County Board of County Commissioners ("the County"), the Washington County Sheriff's Office ("the Sheriff's Office") and the Washington County Sheriff ("the Sheriff") in his individual and official capacities, alleging violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and claiming wrongful discharge, based upon alleged sexual advances and comments made by the Sheriff and subsequent adverse employment actions.
After being transferred against her wishes in April, 2003, McGrath-Malott was placed on sick leave due to a temporary mental health condition and remained on leave through that summer. In July, 2003, she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging gender discrimination, and in August 2003 the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, having been unable to determine whether discrimination had taken place.
In September 2003, having exhausted all sick leave, McGrath-Malott requested a temporary modified work assignment or leave without pay, and in October 2003 she was first placed on leave without pay, then her employment was terminated after she had exhausted all available vacation, sick and FMLA leave and had not indicated when, if ever, she would be able to return to work. In January 2005, McGrath-Malott filed an amended charge with the EEOC, which found reasonable cause to believe the Sheriff's Office had violated Title VII but was unable to reach a resolution with the Sheriff's Office. This suit followed in April 2006. The County, the State and the Sheriff each filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
McGrath-Malott first argued that, because the defendants had attached documents to their briefs, the motions to dismiss must be treated as ones for summary judgment instead, as noted in Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc. The judge noted that, in the Fourth Circuit per Am. Chiropractic v. Trigon Healthcare, there is an exception if the documents were integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and the plaintiff does not challenge its authenticity. Here, though some of the documents submitted met the Am. Chiropractic test, others did not, so defendants' motions to dismiss would be treated instead as motions for summary judgment.
The County moved to dismiss based on its allegation that both the Sheriff and McGrath-Malott were employees of the State, and not the County. After reviewing settled law on the matter, the judge agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all counts.
The Sheriff's Office had not filed a motion to dismiss, but the State had noted in its brief that the Sheriff's Office was in fact not a legal entity, and thus could not be sued. The judge agreed, and dismissed all counts against the Sheriff's Office.
The State moved to dismiss all counts, while the Sheriff had moved to dismiss only the Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation counts and the abusive discharge count. The judge granted summary judgment on the Title VII counts in favor of the Sheriff in his individual capacity, but allowed the case to proceed against the Sheriff in his official capacity.
Since McGrath-Malott had not presented any direct evidence of employment discrimination, the judge noted that she must satisfy the three-step burden-shifting test by first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, then the defendants must produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions, whereupon the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons were but a pretext. McGraff-Malot claimed she was not promoted, not given the same leave as her male colleagues, and was eventually fired. Although the motivation for these actions was not clear from the record, there were clearly genuine issues of material fact, and the judge denied the State's and the Sheriff's motions on the disparate treatment claims.
The judge then found that, even though McGrath-Malott had not specifically used the terms "hostile environment" or "sexual harassment" in her EEOC filings, she had included sufficient factual references to the harassment and retaliation, and thus she had exhausted her administrative remedies before filing suit on both the hostile work environment and retaliation claims.
The State moved to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against it, since it was not a "person" under the meaning of the statute. The judge agreed, and granted summary judgment to the State on that count.
On the Maryland Declaration of Rights and wrongful discharge counts, the judge found that the State and the Sheriff had immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, making McGrath-Malott's failure to follow the requirements of the Maryland Tort Claims Act moot, and granted summary judgment in favor of the State and the Sheriff on those counts.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Friday, February 16, 2007
Valderrama v. Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Approved for publication)
Decided February 14, 2007--Opinion by Chief Judge Benson Everett Legg (approved for publication)
Valderrama, a pro se litigant, sued Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. ("HTSI"), claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (retaliation, national origin discrimination and sex discrimination) and state law tort claims arising out of an alleged violation of her privacy. After extensive discovery, HTSI moved for summary judgment. The Court granted the motion and dismissed all counts of the complaint.
In order to maintain a Title VII action, a Maryland plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Typically, complainants use an EEOC form document to file a charge. Valderrama, however, did not use the EEOC form. Instead, she offered a copy of an EEOC Intake Questionnaire as evidence that she timely filed the necessary charge of discrimination.
The Court, noting that the 4th Circuit has never precisely ruled on whether such a questionnaire is sufficient to satisfy the timeliness requirement, compared the contents of Valderrama's questionnaire with the definition of a charge. Quoting EEOC regulations, the Court stated: "a charge should contain 'a clear and concise statement of facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices.' [Citation omitted.] At a minimum, the charge must be 'sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.'" If a document other than a charge meets this standard and is intended to trigger the machinery of Title VII enforcement, it will suffice to meet the timeliness requirement. Valderrama's allegations in the questionnaire that unidentified persons had made comments about her, however, were insufficient to constitute a timely charge.
The Court considered Valderrama's other claims, found them all lacking in factual support, and dismissed all of them, including the state law claims. The Court retained jurisdiction of the state law claims for the express purpose of dismissing them, noting that allowing the claims to be refiled in state court would be wasteful, "... because they would inevitably be dismissed as unfounded."
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Valderrama, a pro se litigant, sued Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. ("HTSI"), claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (retaliation, national origin discrimination and sex discrimination) and state law tort claims arising out of an alleged violation of her privacy. After extensive discovery, HTSI moved for summary judgment. The Court granted the motion and dismissed all counts of the complaint.
In order to maintain a Title VII action, a Maryland plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Typically, complainants use an EEOC form document to file a charge. Valderrama, however, did not use the EEOC form. Instead, she offered a copy of an EEOC Intake Questionnaire as evidence that she timely filed the necessary charge of discrimination.
The Court, noting that the 4th Circuit has never precisely ruled on whether such a questionnaire is sufficient to satisfy the timeliness requirement, compared the contents of Valderrama's questionnaire with the definition of a charge. Quoting EEOC regulations, the Court stated: "a charge should contain 'a clear and concise statement of facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices.' [Citation omitted.] At a minimum, the charge must be 'sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.'" If a document other than a charge meets this standard and is intended to trigger the machinery of Title VII enforcement, it will suffice to meet the timeliness requirement. Valderrama's allegations in the questionnaire that unidentified persons had made comments about her, however, were insufficient to constitute a timely charge.
The Court considered Valderrama's other claims, found them all lacking in factual support, and dismissed all of them, including the state law claims. The Court retained jurisdiction of the state law claims for the express purpose of dismissing them, noting that allowing the claims to be refiled in state court would be wasteful, "... because they would inevitably be dismissed as unfounded."
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
Takacs v. Fiore (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Approved for Publication)
Signed February 8, 2007. Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake. Approved for publication.
In her complaint, the plaintiff ("Takacs") alleged sexual harassment by one of the owners of the winery (the "Winery") where she had been employed as salesroom manager, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and violation of Title VII, and seeking damages against the owners ("Fiore"), the Winery, and the professional employer organization ("PEO") handling the Winery's human resources responsibilities. Fiore sought summary judgment on the IIED count, and the Winery and PEO sought summary judgment on the Title VII claims.
To prevail on the IIED claim, the judge noted that Takacs must be able to establish 1) conduct that is intentional or reckless, 2) conduct that is extreme and outrageous, 3) a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and 4) that the emotional distress must be severe. The judge assumed without deciding that the first three elements could be met, but was unconvinced that the fourth element was satisfied, in light of the fact that Takacs was able to continue to work, and did not allege she was unable to function on a daily basis, and consequently granted dismissal of the IIED count.
On the Title VII count against the Winery, the judge noted that it appeared that Takacs had not established that the Winery was subject to Title VII, in light of the Winery's claim that it had too few employees to meet the EEOC's numerosity requirement, but the judge provided Takacs an opportunity to clarify whether her position was that certain individuals were in fact to be counted as employees, thereby bringing the Winery under EEOC jurisdiction.
On the Title VII count against PEO, PEO challenged its alleged status as the "employer" of Takacs. The judge noted that PEO might be held liable under either "joint employer" or "integrated employer" theories, discounting the former and viewing the latter as more likely, but finding it unnecessary to determine the question, since Takacs had failed to satisfy the imputability prong of the four-part test for a hostile workplace, in that the harasser was not an employee of or controlled by PEO, and PEO was unaware of the harassment. Further, Takacs did not allege that PEO's policies regarding sexual harassment complaints were unreasonable or dispute that she had been advised of those policies, and the judge therefore granted summary judgment in favor of PEO on the Title VII count.
This opinion and order are available in PDF.
In her complaint, the plaintiff ("Takacs") alleged sexual harassment by one of the owners of the winery (the "Winery") where she had been employed as salesroom manager, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and violation of Title VII, and seeking damages against the owners ("Fiore"), the Winery, and the professional employer organization ("PEO") handling the Winery's human resources responsibilities. Fiore sought summary judgment on the IIED count, and the Winery and PEO sought summary judgment on the Title VII claims.
To prevail on the IIED claim, the judge noted that Takacs must be able to establish 1) conduct that is intentional or reckless, 2) conduct that is extreme and outrageous, 3) a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and 4) that the emotional distress must be severe. The judge assumed without deciding that the first three elements could be met, but was unconvinced that the fourth element was satisfied, in light of the fact that Takacs was able to continue to work, and did not allege she was unable to function on a daily basis, and consequently granted dismissal of the IIED count.
On the Title VII count against the Winery, the judge noted that it appeared that Takacs had not established that the Winery was subject to Title VII, in light of the Winery's claim that it had too few employees to meet the EEOC's numerosity requirement, but the judge provided Takacs an opportunity to clarify whether her position was that certain individuals were in fact to be counted as employees, thereby bringing the Winery under EEOC jurisdiction.
On the Title VII count against PEO, PEO challenged its alleged status as the "employer" of Takacs. The judge noted that PEO might be held liable under either "joint employer" or "integrated employer" theories, discounting the former and viewing the latter as more likely, but finding it unnecessary to determine the question, since Takacs had failed to satisfy the imputability prong of the four-part test for a hostile workplace, in that the harasser was not an employee of or controlled by PEO, and PEO was unaware of the harassment. Further, Takacs did not allege that PEO's policies regarding sexual harassment complaints were unreasonable or dispute that she had been advised of those policies, and the judge therefore granted summary judgment in favor of PEO on the Title VII count.
This opinion and order are available in PDF.
Monday, January 29, 2007
Atkins v. Winchester Homes (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (not approved for publication)
Decided January 26, 2007. Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake. (Not approved for publication)
Atkins, a Maryland resident of Native American national origin, filed suit against Winchester (his former employer), Weyerhaeuser Company (Winchester's parent company) and three manager/supervisors, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981. All defendants moved to dismiss Atkins' amended complaint, raising both procedural and substantive arguments in support of their motions.
Atkins alleged that for years he had been subjected to daily racial harassment and that the manager/supervisors witnessed or knew of the harassment, but did nothing to prevent it. He also alleged that he was subjected to adverse actions on account of his national origin or in retaliation for asserting his civil rights. The alleged adverse actions included being called into a supervisor's office, being disciplined when a non-Native American peer was not, and ultimately being discharged.
Procedural Arguments: Atkins did not oppose Weyerhaeuser's motion, and the court dismissed all claims against Weyerhaeuser. In doing so, the court noted that Atkins did not adequately allege that Weyerhaeuser was his employer, stating that without "allegations of common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control, or degree of financial control, the mere fact of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to sustain" an action for discrimination.
Winchester argued that the Charge of Discrimination that Atkins filed with the EEOC lacked sufficient detail to be effective and that Atkins did not provide sufficient detail until after the 300 days for filing a charge had passed. The court pointed out that the "function of a charge is to initiate the investigatory and conciliatory procedures contemplated by Title VII." Here, the initial charge contained enough information for EEOC to begin its investigation. Moreover, EEOC regulations provide that later amendments to a charge relate back to the date of initial filing.
The manager/supervisors alleged that they were not properly served within the 120-day window provided by F.R.C.P. 4(m). Process was served on a co-worker and not on the individual defendants. The defendants, however, had actual knowledge of the suit and did not assert that they were prejudiced in any way by the failure to serve them individually. For that reason, the court liberally construed the rules and declined to dismiss the suit.
Substantive Arguments: Winchester challenged Atkins' claims of disparate treatment, retaliation and harassment/hostile work environment. The court found that neither being called into a meeting with a supervisor about allegations of discrimination nor a counseling session with a supervisor arose to the level of an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim of discrimination. Termination of employment, however, clearly was such an adverse action. As for retaliation, Atkins failed to plead sufficient facts showing that his protected activity was the cause of his termination, and too much time passed between the activity and his dismissal to establish a causal connection without such specifics. On the harassment/hostile work environment claims, the allegations that the manager/supervisors witnessed the acts harassment and that Atkins had made complaints about the acts were sufficient to impose liability on his employer.
Because Title VII does not authorize claims against individuals, the Title VII claims against the individual defendants were dismissed. In addition, the court dismissed all of the Section 1981 claims against the individual defendants, except the claims against the manager/supervisor who fired Atkins. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that the acts attributed to the other manager/supervisors did not rise to the level of adverse employment actions, but that termination of employment did. In addition, the court ruled that allegations that the manager/supervisors failed to investigate or to prevent harassment by Atkins' co-workers were not sufficient to impose liability under Section 1981.
The memorandum is available in PDF The order is also available in PDF
Atkins, a Maryland resident of Native American national origin, filed suit against Winchester (his former employer), Weyerhaeuser Company (Winchester's parent company) and three manager/supervisors, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981. All defendants moved to dismiss Atkins' amended complaint, raising both procedural and substantive arguments in support of their motions.
Atkins alleged that for years he had been subjected to daily racial harassment and that the manager/supervisors witnessed or knew of the harassment, but did nothing to prevent it. He also alleged that he was subjected to adverse actions on account of his national origin or in retaliation for asserting his civil rights. The alleged adverse actions included being called into a supervisor's office, being disciplined when a non-Native American peer was not, and ultimately being discharged.
Procedural Arguments: Atkins did not oppose Weyerhaeuser's motion, and the court dismissed all claims against Weyerhaeuser. In doing so, the court noted that Atkins did not adequately allege that Weyerhaeuser was his employer, stating that without "allegations of common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control, or degree of financial control, the mere fact of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to sustain" an action for discrimination.
Winchester argued that the Charge of Discrimination that Atkins filed with the EEOC lacked sufficient detail to be effective and that Atkins did not provide sufficient detail until after the 300 days for filing a charge had passed. The court pointed out that the "function of a charge is to initiate the investigatory and conciliatory procedures contemplated by Title VII." Here, the initial charge contained enough information for EEOC to begin its investigation. Moreover, EEOC regulations provide that later amendments to a charge relate back to the date of initial filing.
The manager/supervisors alleged that they were not properly served within the 120-day window provided by F.R.C.P. 4(m). Process was served on a co-worker and not on the individual defendants. The defendants, however, had actual knowledge of the suit and did not assert that they were prejudiced in any way by the failure to serve them individually. For that reason, the court liberally construed the rules and declined to dismiss the suit.
Substantive Arguments: Winchester challenged Atkins' claims of disparate treatment, retaliation and harassment/hostile work environment. The court found that neither being called into a meeting with a supervisor about allegations of discrimination nor a counseling session with a supervisor arose to the level of an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim of discrimination. Termination of employment, however, clearly was such an adverse action. As for retaliation, Atkins failed to plead sufficient facts showing that his protected activity was the cause of his termination, and too much time passed between the activity and his dismissal to establish a causal connection without such specifics. On the harassment/hostile work environment claims, the allegations that the manager/supervisors witnessed the acts harassment and that Atkins had made complaints about the acts were sufficient to impose liability on his employer.
Because Title VII does not authorize claims against individuals, the Title VII claims against the individual defendants were dismissed. In addition, the court dismissed all of the Section 1981 claims against the individual defendants, except the claims against the manager/supervisor who fired Atkins. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that the acts attributed to the other manager/supervisors did not rise to the level of adverse employment actions, but that termination of employment did. In addition, the court ruled that allegations that the manager/supervisors failed to investigate or to prevent harassment by Atkins' co-workers were not sufficient to impose liability under Section 1981.
The memorandum is available in PDF The order is also available in PDF
Saturday, January 20, 2007
Toulan v. DAP Products, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Signed January 17, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Plaintiff Toulan brought suit against her employer, DAP Products, Inc. ("DAP"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Upon consideration of DAP's motion for summary judgment, the judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case.
Toulan had alleged discrimination based upon her race (Caucasian), national origin (American) and gender (female) while working under a male supervisor of Asian Indian descent. Toulan's problems began in 2004 during a reorganization of her workplace, when she was assigned to work under the supervisor by the Vice President of Technology, also an Asian Indian male. Her initial objections were because her supervisor had the same job title, Chemist II, but Toulan and her supervisor did not work well together, and after a month she was reassigned to another supervisor. Toulan subsequently received several disciplinary warnings and negative comments, and was temporarily reassigned to another location, returning a few months later. Toulin continued to receive pay raises, and was not demoted or otherwise penalized in spite of the disciplinary actions.
Upon consideration, the judge found no direct evidence of employment discrimination, nor had Toulan established a prima facie case (a showing that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 4) circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent) sufficient to shift the burden to DAP to prove a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged discrimination, in that no sufficient adverse employment action was alleged.
Toulan's wage discrimination claims under Title VII and EPA also fell short, since her evidence did not amount to a showing that she received lower pay than her male co-workers for performing work substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions, since there was little evidence to support the similarity of, and evidence of a number of key differences between, the compared positions, and the ranges of compensation for male and female co-workers were co-extensive.
Toulan was also found to have failed to establish retaliatory action by DAP (in temporarily reassigning her to a less desirable location, giving her warnings and negative evaluations, requiring her to use unpaid leave after her paid leave was exhausted, and creating a hostile work environment), either by again failing to establish adverse employment actions even under the more relaxed standards applied to claims of retaliatory action, or by failing to rebut DAP's proffered non-discriminatory basis for those actions when found.
In concluding, the judge acknowledged that Toulan may have been correct in claiming the terms, conditions and privileged of her employment differed from other co-workers, but found that that such differences arose from personality differences rather than discrimination, and declined to sit as a "super-personnel department", citing Beall v. Abbott Labs.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Plaintiff Toulan brought suit against her employer, DAP Products, Inc. ("DAP"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Upon consideration of DAP's motion for summary judgment, the judge entered judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case.
Toulan had alleged discrimination based upon her race (Caucasian), national origin (American) and gender (female) while working under a male supervisor of Asian Indian descent. Toulan's problems began in 2004 during a reorganization of her workplace, when she was assigned to work under the supervisor by the Vice President of Technology, also an Asian Indian male. Her initial objections were because her supervisor had the same job title, Chemist II, but Toulan and her supervisor did not work well together, and after a month she was reassigned to another supervisor. Toulan subsequently received several disciplinary warnings and negative comments, and was temporarily reassigned to another location, returning a few months later. Toulin continued to receive pay raises, and was not demoted or otherwise penalized in spite of the disciplinary actions.
Upon consideration, the judge found no direct evidence of employment discrimination, nor had Toulan established a prima facie case (a showing that 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was performing her duties in a satisfactory manner, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 4) circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action support an inference of discriminatory intent) sufficient to shift the burden to DAP to prove a non-discriminatory basis for the alleged discrimination, in that no sufficient adverse employment action was alleged.
Toulan's wage discrimination claims under Title VII and EPA also fell short, since her evidence did not amount to a showing that she received lower pay than her male co-workers for performing work substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions, since there was little evidence to support the similarity of, and evidence of a number of key differences between, the compared positions, and the ranges of compensation for male and female co-workers were co-extensive.
Toulan was also found to have failed to establish retaliatory action by DAP (in temporarily reassigning her to a less desirable location, giving her warnings and negative evaluations, requiring her to use unpaid leave after her paid leave was exhausted, and creating a hostile work environment), either by again failing to establish adverse employment actions even under the more relaxed standards applied to claims of retaliatory action, or by failing to rebut DAP's proffered non-discriminatory basis for those actions when found.
In concluding, the judge acknowledged that Toulan may have been correct in claiming the terms, conditions and privileged of her employment differed from other co-workers, but found that that such differences arose from personality differences rather than discrimination, and declined to sit as a "super-personnel department", citing Beall v. Abbott Labs.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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