Filed May 2, 2007--Opinion by Judge James Kenney.
During a traffic stop, the trunk of a vehicle driven by Wilson was found to contain a suitcase packed with six and one-half pounds of marijuana. Wilson was found guilty in a bench trial of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and sentenced to two years imprisonment.
Prior to trial, Wilson moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana recovered from the trunk, and the denial of that motion is the subject of this appeal. The Court rewrote the presented question as follows: Does the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment of a vehicle, by itself, establish probable cause to search the vehicle's trunk under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment?
In considering a denial of a motion to suppress, the Court is limited to the record of the suppression hearing. Further, the appellate court will accept the version of the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party. As a question of law, the Court reviews de novo whether appellant's motion to suppress was properly denied.
The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that a warrant be secured prior to conducting a search. An exception to the warrant requirement is the "automobile exception," known as the "Carroll Doctrine." If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more. This Court has held that the odor of burnt marijuana, alone, affords probable cause to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle under the automobile exception. Further, many of the cases applying the Carroll doctrine have found probable cause to search the trunk of a motor vehicle based on evidence apparent to a police officer after a lawful search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. However, in this case, the search of the passenger compartment produced no additional evidence of the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. Wilson contends that, under the circumstances, any probable cause to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle based solely on the odor of burnt marijuana would not extend to the vehicle's trunk.
The Court reasoned that marijuana and other illegal drugs, by their very nature, can be stored almost anywhere within a vehicle. The location-specific principle that "probable cause must be tailored to specific compartments and containers within an automobile" does not apply when officers have only probable cause to believe that contraband is located somewhere within the vehicle, rather than in a specific compartment or container within the vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides probable cause to believe that additional marijuana is present elsewhere in the vehicle. To adopt Wilson's argument, the trunk or any other area outside of the passenger compartment would become a safe harbor for the transportation of drugs for both users and traffickers. Judgment Affirmed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label search and seizure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label search and seizure. Show all posts
Saturday, May 5, 2007
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Haley v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 21, 2007--Order by Judge Irma S. Raker, joined in all but Part III by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
Haley was convicted of robbery, second-degree assault, theft of property valued at $500 or more, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft of a motor vehicle.
The victim in this case ("Singer") testified at trial that, based on his belief that Haley was a woman in distress, stopped his car in the late night/early morning to help her. Once inside the car Haley propositioned him for sex, at which point Singer demanded Haley leave his car. Haley then threatened Singer with a knife demanding his money. Singer testified that he then ran from the car on noticing an approaching cab, and Haley drove off with Singer's car. Singer then called the police and, later that morning, identified Haley in a line up. Prior to that incident, Singer testified he had never met Haley.
Haley testified that he and Singer had been having a homosexual relationship off and on for over a year or so. On that particular evening, Haley began teasing Singer that he was going to tell Singer's son about their relationship. The conversation became serious because Haley stated he was tired of hiding in Singer's closet, literally, whenever his son and neighbors came by, and an argument ensued. Singer then stated he was going to catch a cab and ordered Haley to stop the car on noticing the approaching cab.
In an effort to demonstrate the ongoing relationship with Singer, Haley, during trial, described the outside of Singer's residence, the area surrounding the residence, items inside the residence, and Singer's dog. Over objection, the State was permitted to question Haley about when he relayed the information about his familiarity with Singer's house and dog to his defense counsel.
In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction holding that Haley's information was intended to be disclosed to third parties and, consequently, the attorney-client privilege was not breached. It seems that, prior to Haley discussing his defense with his counsel, he provided a report to "some lady." It is this testimony that this Court reviews for breach of attorney-client privilege.
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider two questions:
1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to information provided by a criminal defendant to his defense attorney that would later form the basis of his defense at trial because such information was "intended to be disclosed to a third party?"
2) Where the only description of the suspect involved in a carjacking is a "black female with long hair" wearing a mult-colored shirt," did the officer in this case have probable cause to arrest the petitioner, a black male with short hair, several hours later based primarily on the fact that he was wearing the same shirt?
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment, an appellate court considers only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the record developed at trial. The attorney-client privilege is well established and understood to be a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. In its analysis of privilege, the Court set out the elements as follows: (1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal adviser, (8) except that the protection may be waived. There is no legal distinction between the disclosure of [the contents] of a communication as distinguished from the fact that no such communication was ever made between the client and the attorney. The fact that a defendant testifies in his own behalf does not waive the privilege. Consequently, this Court held that the timing and the substance of Haley's communications to his defense counsel was, in fact, privileged communication.
The second question goes to whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Haley given the description of the suspect as a "black female with long hair" wearing a "multi-colored shirt." In considering whether probable cause existed, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge, factoring in the variables of the information leading to police action, the environment, the police purpose, and the suspect's conduct. A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Even though Haley did not match the description, per se, the Court was pursuaded by the fact that the arresting officer, after getting confirmation that the car he was following was indeed the subject of the carjacking, personally observed Haley during the commission of the crime and then again when he executed the arrest. Thus, the particularity of the description of the offender was based on first-person observation. Consequently, this Court held there were sufficient facts on the record to justify reasonable grounds for belief by the officer that Haley was associated with the carjacking.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Haley was convicted of robbery, second-degree assault, theft of property valued at $500 or more, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft of a motor vehicle.
The victim in this case ("Singer") testified at trial that, based on his belief that Haley was a woman in distress, stopped his car in the late night/early morning to help her. Once inside the car Haley propositioned him for sex, at which point Singer demanded Haley leave his car. Haley then threatened Singer with a knife demanding his money. Singer testified that he then ran from the car on noticing an approaching cab, and Haley drove off with Singer's car. Singer then called the police and, later that morning, identified Haley in a line up. Prior to that incident, Singer testified he had never met Haley.
Haley testified that he and Singer had been having a homosexual relationship off and on for over a year or so. On that particular evening, Haley began teasing Singer that he was going to tell Singer's son about their relationship. The conversation became serious because Haley stated he was tired of hiding in Singer's closet, literally, whenever his son and neighbors came by, and an argument ensued. Singer then stated he was going to catch a cab and ordered Haley to stop the car on noticing the approaching cab.
In an effort to demonstrate the ongoing relationship with Singer, Haley, during trial, described the outside of Singer's residence, the area surrounding the residence, items inside the residence, and Singer's dog. Over objection, the State was permitted to question Haley about when he relayed the information about his familiarity with Singer's house and dog to his defense counsel.
In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction holding that Haley's information was intended to be disclosed to third parties and, consequently, the attorney-client privilege was not breached. It seems that, prior to Haley discussing his defense with his counsel, he provided a report to "some lady." It is this testimony that this Court reviews for breach of attorney-client privilege.
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider two questions:
1) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to information provided by a criminal defendant to his defense attorney that would later form the basis of his defense at trial because such information was "intended to be disclosed to a third party?"
2) Where the only description of the suspect involved in a carjacking is a "black female with long hair" wearing a mult-colored shirt," did the officer in this case have probable cause to arrest the petitioner, a black male with short hair, several hours later based primarily on the fact that he was wearing the same shirt?
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment, an appellate court considers only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the record developed at trial. The attorney-client privilege is well established and understood to be a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. In its analysis of privilege, the Court set out the elements as follows: (1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal adviser, (8) except that the protection may be waived. There is no legal distinction between the disclosure of [the contents] of a communication as distinguished from the fact that no such communication was ever made between the client and the attorney. The fact that a defendant testifies in his own behalf does not waive the privilege. Consequently, this Court held that the timing and the substance of Haley's communications to his defense counsel was, in fact, privileged communication.
The second question goes to whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Haley given the description of the suspect as a "black female with long hair" wearing a "multi-colored shirt." In considering whether probable cause existed, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge, factoring in the variables of the information leading to police action, the environment, the police purpose, and the suspect's conduct. A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Even though Haley did not match the description, per se, the Court was pursuaded by the fact that the arresting officer, after getting confirmation that the car he was following was indeed the subject of the carjacking, personally observed Haley during the commission of the crime and then again when he executed the arrest. Thus, the particularity of the description of the offender was based on first-person observation. Consequently, this Court held there were sufficient facts on the record to justify reasonable grounds for belief by the officer that Haley was associated with the carjacking.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Monday, March 12, 2007
Massey v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 7, 2007--Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Sharer.
Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of cocaine following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Appellant noted this appeal after his motion for a new trial and to correct an illegal sentence was denied, raising four issues:
1) Whether the suppression court erred in denying Massey's motion to suppress.
2) Whether the trial court erred by not directing the State to provide the defense with a witness's report.
3) Whether the trial court erred by considering evidence outside the record.
4) Whether the trial court erred in accepting Massey's jury trial waiver.
In limited review of the disposition of the motion to suppress, the Court considered de novo evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this instance the State.
Takoma Griffith was arrested as a result of a narcotics investigation at the Delmarva Inn. In his post-arrest interview, he telephoned and arranged for Massey to drive down from Delaware and come to the room to deliver crack cocaine. Seated next to him during the call, Griffith's arresting officer could hear partial voices on the other end of the call but admitted he could not identify the person to whom Griffith was speaking. Griffith confirmed Massey's identity from a photograph officers printed from the Delaware Criminal Justice Information System computer, and when Massey arrived at the Inn officers took him into custody and seized 3.9 grams of crack cocaine from his person and an additional 3.1 grams from his automobile. Massey now asserts that the suppression court erred in concluding that Griffith was trustworthy and takes issue with the rationale that Griffith was known to the police and was motivated to cooperate.
The Court reasoned that Griffith was neither a confidential informant, an anonymous tipster, nor an innocent civilian. Rather, he was caught red-handed, and the fact that he was interviewed "face-to-face" by police strengthens the reliability of his information. The basis of Griffith's knowledge was easily established because his information was grounded on his past conduct with Massey and by the events as they unfolded in police presence. The reliability of his information was confirmed by corroboration of details by the police, and his veracity was enhanced by the fact that he provided the information with police under circumstances that would make his information more likely to be true -- face-to-face after his arrest.
At issue in the second question was whether the officer who found the crack cocaine in Massey's automobile should have been permitted to testify even though the State failed to provide, through discovery, any report that he may prepared. During cross-examination, the officer stated that he believed he had prepared a report but had not used it to prepare his testimony and did not bring a copy to court. The Court concluded that the State had the obligation under Maryland Rule 4-263 to provide any such reports during discovery and made no effort to assuage the issue by providing relevant information. The State should have affirmatively advised the trial court that such report either did or did not exist or, if the State was likewise uncertain, ought to have sought from the court the opportunity to clarify whether such report was made. It is not for the witness to declare that the report was not used for his testimony; whether the report is useful to the defense is up to the defendant. As such, the trial court had an affirmative duty to ascertain whether the officer's report indeed existed and, if so, to ensure that it was available for review. Conviction vacated and remanded for new trial.
Third, Massey refers to the two seized baggies of cocaine. Massey's objection to the admission of the laboratory analysis of the baggie seized from his person was sustained, and admission was precluded as a discovery sanction against the State. Nonetheless, the arresting officer made reference to the baggie during his testimony, and the court engaged in a colloquy as to the significance of the difference in the weights of the two baggies (intent to distribute as opposed to personal use). Massey now argues that the trial court erred in permitting the discussion of the first baggie even though the laboratory analysis was excluded. In other words, Massey argues that the court took into account the total amount of cocaine seized from him in reaching its verdict of possession with intent to distribute, and that the possession of only 3.1 grams (the amount found in the second baggie) is insufficient to infer such an intent. While the trial judge was aware of what evidence had been admitted and what was not in the record, his decision demonstrates that the substance from the first baggie played some part in the finding that Massey had possessed cocaine in sufficient quantity to indicate the intent to distribute. Notwithtanding that there is sufficient evidence of possession with intent to distribute based solely on the possession of 3.1 grams of cocaine, the Court was unable to conclude that the trial judge ignored the persistent references to the other baggie. As such, this conviction was also vacated and remanded.
Finally, Massey asserts that the trial court made no finding that his waiver of his right to a trial by jury was intelligently and voluntarily made. This Court, however, found satisfaction that the waiver procedure was adequate and in compliance with Md. Rule 4-246.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of cocaine following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Appellant noted this appeal after his motion for a new trial and to correct an illegal sentence was denied, raising four issues:
1) Whether the suppression court erred in denying Massey's motion to suppress.
2) Whether the trial court erred by not directing the State to provide the defense with a witness's report.
3) Whether the trial court erred by considering evidence outside the record.
4) Whether the trial court erred in accepting Massey's jury trial waiver.
In limited review of the disposition of the motion to suppress, the Court considered de novo evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this instance the State.
Takoma Griffith was arrested as a result of a narcotics investigation at the Delmarva Inn. In his post-arrest interview, he telephoned and arranged for Massey to drive down from Delaware and come to the room to deliver crack cocaine. Seated next to him during the call, Griffith's arresting officer could hear partial voices on the other end of the call but admitted he could not identify the person to whom Griffith was speaking. Griffith confirmed Massey's identity from a photograph officers printed from the Delaware Criminal Justice Information System computer, and when Massey arrived at the Inn officers took him into custody and seized 3.9 grams of crack cocaine from his person and an additional 3.1 grams from his automobile. Massey now asserts that the suppression court erred in concluding that Griffith was trustworthy and takes issue with the rationale that Griffith was known to the police and was motivated to cooperate.
The Court reasoned that Griffith was neither a confidential informant, an anonymous tipster, nor an innocent civilian. Rather, he was caught red-handed, and the fact that he was interviewed "face-to-face" by police strengthens the reliability of his information. The basis of Griffith's knowledge was easily established because his information was grounded on his past conduct with Massey and by the events as they unfolded in police presence. The reliability of his information was confirmed by corroboration of details by the police, and his veracity was enhanced by the fact that he provided the information with police under circumstances that would make his information more likely to be true -- face-to-face after his arrest.
At issue in the second question was whether the officer who found the crack cocaine in Massey's automobile should have been permitted to testify even though the State failed to provide, through discovery, any report that he may prepared. During cross-examination, the officer stated that he believed he had prepared a report but had not used it to prepare his testimony and did not bring a copy to court. The Court concluded that the State had the obligation under Maryland Rule 4-263 to provide any such reports during discovery and made no effort to assuage the issue by providing relevant information. The State should have affirmatively advised the trial court that such report either did or did not exist or, if the State was likewise uncertain, ought to have sought from the court the opportunity to clarify whether such report was made. It is not for the witness to declare that the report was not used for his testimony; whether the report is useful to the defense is up to the defendant. As such, the trial court had an affirmative duty to ascertain whether the officer's report indeed existed and, if so, to ensure that it was available for review. Conviction vacated and remanded for new trial.
Third, Massey refers to the two seized baggies of cocaine. Massey's objection to the admission of the laboratory analysis of the baggie seized from his person was sustained, and admission was precluded as a discovery sanction against the State. Nonetheless, the arresting officer made reference to the baggie during his testimony, and the court engaged in a colloquy as to the significance of the difference in the weights of the two baggies (intent to distribute as opposed to personal use). Massey now argues that the trial court erred in permitting the discussion of the first baggie even though the laboratory analysis was excluded. In other words, Massey argues that the court took into account the total amount of cocaine seized from him in reaching its verdict of possession with intent to distribute, and that the possession of only 3.1 grams (the amount found in the second baggie) is insufficient to infer such an intent. While the trial judge was aware of what evidence had been admitted and what was not in the record, his decision demonstrates that the substance from the first baggie played some part in the finding that Massey had possessed cocaine in sufficient quantity to indicate the intent to distribute. Notwithtanding that there is sufficient evidence of possession with intent to distribute based solely on the possession of 3.1 grams of cocaine, the Court was unable to conclude that the trial judge ignored the persistent references to the other baggie. As such, this conviction was also vacated and remanded.
Finally, Massey asserts that the trial court made no finding that his waiver of his right to a trial by jury was intelligently and voluntarily made. This Court, however, found satisfaction that the waiver procedure was adequate and in compliance with Md. Rule 4-246.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Cox v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed February 8, 2007–Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene.
Petitioner sought to suppress a baggie of marijuana seized after police had obtained information about Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant subsequent to an arguably illegal stop. The two issues to review were (1) whether a police encounter, in which a uniformed officer approached Petitioner on the street claiming that he "loosely fit" the description of the perpetrator of a recent string of robberies, asked Petitioner for identification, and ran a check on his identification, constituted an illegal stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether a police officer’s subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant represented an intervening circumstance, such that if the stop were illegal the arrest on the warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop.
The Court focused on three factors: (1) the Temporal Proximity Factor, (2) the Intervening Event Factor, and (3) the Flagrancy of the Police Conduct Factor.
The Temporal Proximity Factor suggests that the greater the time lapse between the illegality and discovery of evidence, the greater the chance that the taint has been purged. In this case, there existed a mere two minutes between the illegal stop and the discovery of the marijuana. However, since the temporal proximity factor has been labeled ambiguous and the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, the court focused on the other two factors.
An Intervening Circumstance is an event that breaks the causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence. In this case, the officers discovered the baggie of marijuana after the police learned of Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant, stood Petitioner up from the curb and arrested him pursuant to that warrant. The police did not ask Petitioner to sit on the ground until after the radio alert of the outstanding warrant. Although Petitioner may have discarded the baggie while he was seated on the ground, that fact is not dispositive to the Court’s analysis or holding.
The final factor is the Flagrancy of the Police Misconduct. The Court found nothing in the record indicating the police acted in bad faith. Once the officer discovered the outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, he "gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search [Petitioner]." Furthermore, merely because the officer’s stop of Petitioner was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.
Holding:
Assuming arguendo that the police encounter constituted an illegal stop, the ultimate question is more appropriate: whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence. The police officer’s discovery of an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest pursuant thereto represents an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of what appears to be an illegal stop.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Petitioner sought to suppress a baggie of marijuana seized after police had obtained information about Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant subsequent to an arguably illegal stop. The two issues to review were (1) whether a police encounter, in which a uniformed officer approached Petitioner on the street claiming that he "loosely fit" the description of the perpetrator of a recent string of robberies, asked Petitioner for identification, and ran a check on his identification, constituted an illegal stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether a police officer’s subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant represented an intervening circumstance, such that if the stop were illegal the arrest on the warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop.
The Court focused on three factors: (1) the Temporal Proximity Factor, (2) the Intervening Event Factor, and (3) the Flagrancy of the Police Conduct Factor.
The Temporal Proximity Factor suggests that the greater the time lapse between the illegality and discovery of evidence, the greater the chance that the taint has been purged. In this case, there existed a mere two minutes between the illegal stop and the discovery of the marijuana. However, since the temporal proximity factor has been labeled ambiguous and the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, the court focused on the other two factors.
An Intervening Circumstance is an event that breaks the causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence. In this case, the officers discovered the baggie of marijuana after the police learned of Petitioner’s outstanding arrest warrant, stood Petitioner up from the curb and arrested him pursuant to that warrant. The police did not ask Petitioner to sit on the ground until after the radio alert of the outstanding warrant. Although Petitioner may have discarded the baggie while he was seated on the ground, that fact is not dispositive to the Court’s analysis or holding.
The final factor is the Flagrancy of the Police Misconduct. The Court found nothing in the record indicating the police acted in bad faith. Once the officer discovered the outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, he "gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search [Petitioner]." Furthermore, merely because the officer’s stop of Petitioner was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.
Holding:
Assuming arguendo that the police encounter constituted an illegal stop, the ultimate question is more appropriate: whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence. The police officer’s discovery of an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest pursuant thereto represents an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of what appears to be an illegal stop.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Brown v. State of Maryland (Ct. of Appeals)
Issued February 6, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Irma Raker. Joined in Judgment Only by Judges Lynne Battaglia and Clayton Greene. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Robert Bell.
Randy Paul Brown ("Brown") arrived at someone else's residence while the police were conducting a search pursuant to a valid warrant. By the time Brown had arrived, police had alrady discovered controlled dangerous substances on the property and had made some arrests incident thereto.
The police detained and searched Brown and discovered marijuana. There was some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily entered the home or was "escorted" in. There was also some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily admitted to the police that he was carrying marijuana on his person before he was searched. The marijuana that the police found formed the basis for Brown's conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
Brown moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana based on an illegal search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied his motion, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the opinions of the two lower courts.
Held: Factual determinations of the trial Court are extended great deference by appellate courts, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Legal determinations are reviewed de novo.
There are three categories of police contacts with individuals: (1) consensual (least intrusive-no justification required); (2) detentions (mid-level intrusive - police must have articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime); (3) arrest (most intrusive - police must have probable cause). In this case, Brown was detained. The "clear rule" is that "'police may always detain persons found that the premises named in a search warrant, provided (i) the warrant authorizes a 'search for contraband' and (ii) the persons detained are 'occupants.'" (citations omitted). The Court determined that the term "occupant" includes all people "except for persons who clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and to clearly present no potential danger." Quoting Cotton v. State. In this case, Brown was properly considered an "occupant," and his detention was proper.
Judge Robert Bell dissented and incorporated the rationale from the dissent in Cotton v. State.
Randy Paul Brown ("Brown") arrived at someone else's residence while the police were conducting a search pursuant to a valid warrant. By the time Brown had arrived, police had alrady discovered controlled dangerous substances on the property and had made some arrests incident thereto.
The police detained and searched Brown and discovered marijuana. There was some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily entered the home or was "escorted" in. There was also some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily admitted to the police that he was carrying marijuana on his person before he was searched. The marijuana that the police found formed the basis for Brown's conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
Brown moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana based on an illegal search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied his motion, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the opinions of the two lower courts.
Held: Factual determinations of the trial Court are extended great deference by appellate courts, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Legal determinations are reviewed de novo.
There are three categories of police contacts with individuals: (1) consensual (least intrusive-no justification required); (2) detentions (mid-level intrusive - police must have articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime); (3) arrest (most intrusive - police must have probable cause). In this case, Brown was detained. The "clear rule" is that "'police may always detain persons found that the premises named in a search warrant, provided (i) the warrant authorizes a 'search for contraband' and (ii) the persons detained are 'occupants.'" (citations omitted). The Court determined that the term "occupant" includes all people "except for persons who clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and to clearly present no potential danger." Quoting Cotton v. State. In this case, Brown was properly considered an "occupant," and his detention was proper.
Judge Robert Bell dissented and incorporated the rationale from the dissent in Cotton v. State.
Full opinion is available in PDF.
Saturday, January 6, 2007
Jones v. Murphy (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Signed January 4, 2007 -- Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake.
This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.
The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.
For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.
By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
This case involves a proposed class action suit brought on behalf of eight named plaintiffs, bringing constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment) against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("City") and the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") (collectively the "City defendants") and current and former wardens ("Wardens") of the Central Booking and Intake Center ("CBIC") (collectively the "State defendants") for alleged mistreatment (strip searches and "over detention") of people arrested and taken to CBIC for booking and processing. Motions before the court were the City defendants' motion to dismiss, the State defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' motion to deny the State defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively to permit discovery. The motions were considered on the briefs without a hearing.
The plaintiffs proposed five classes: 1) suspicionless strip search class, 2) non-private strip search class, 3) equal protection strip search class (males searched, females not), 4) underwear strip search class (males searched, females not), and 5) over detention class (held unreasonable time before presentment). The plaintiffs' theories were that the CBIC has both a policy and practice of unconstitutional strip searches and over detentions, that the State defendants were liable for establishing and being indifferent to those policies and practices, and that the City defendants, knowing of such unconstitutional policies and practices, continued to transport arrestees to CBIC rather than seek alternative dispositions.
For the consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, testing instead the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims. The judge had little difficulty finding that both the strip search and over detention claims against the State defendants were not subject to dismissal, and had little more difficulty rejecting the challenge to the claims against the Wardens based on a lack of supervisor liability or qualified immunity, or the plaintiffs' standing to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief. Claims against one of the Wardens were dismissed, though, since none of the currently named plaintiffs was detained during his tenure.
By contrast, the City defendants fared much better. The judge found that the plaintiffs in effect sought to bring claims against the City defendants under the theory of "entrustment liability," which has neither been adopted nor rejected in the Fourth Circuit, though it has been adopted in other circuits. Where adopted, entrustment liability can be imposed when a municipal body maintains a policy of entrusting arrestees to a jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional treatment those persons will face upon their confinement. The judge found it unnecessary to consider the entrustment liability claim, though, since to impose entrustment liability, the charged party must have had the authority to choose an alternate facility. Here, the City defendants had no choice, since they were not legally permitted to maintain their own facility, and the possibility of alternative dispositions (such as by citation) did not track against the proposed groups, and even if it did, would involve unwarranted judicial assessment of discretionary law enforcement. Thus, the judge found it unnecessary to consider the validity of an entrustment liability claim under Fourth Circuit law.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
Johnson v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided December 26, 2006 -- Opinion by Judge Paul E. Alpert, Concurring Opinion by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.
Appellant sought to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and supporting documentation authorizing a search of the residence, car and person of both Appellant and an unidentified third party, on the grounds that the State did not provide Appellant an opportunity to inspect that warrant with respect to the third party. The trial court refused to exclude such evidence and the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court, noting that:
1) Appellant had no standing to challenge on constitutional or other ground the validity of warrant against the third party;
2) The State had an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of confidential informants, an interest conceded by the Appellant;
3) Appellant had not requested an in camera review of redacted version of the warrant materials for the purpose of obtaining of possible exculpatory evidence;
4) Appellant had not preserved the issue in prior proceedings of whether the application for the warrant for the unidentified person may have tainted the warrant application for the search of Appellant's person and property; and
5) The State did not call or intend to call the unidentified person as a witness against the Defendant, and therefore the material was not discoverable under Rule 4-263(c)(2).
Chief Judge Murphy noted in a brief concurring opinion that the case at bar did not present the issues of the use of the warrant material for the unidentified person for cross-examination purposes or for proving a tainted warrant application by the strategic misinformation or omissions by an affiant to produce the illusion of probable cause.
The full opinions are available in WPD and PDF.
Appellant sought to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and supporting documentation authorizing a search of the residence, car and person of both Appellant and an unidentified third party, on the grounds that the State did not provide Appellant an opportunity to inspect that warrant with respect to the third party. The trial court refused to exclude such evidence and the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court, noting that:
1) Appellant had no standing to challenge on constitutional or other ground the validity of warrant against the third party;
2) The State had an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of confidential informants, an interest conceded by the Appellant;
3) Appellant had not requested an in camera review of redacted version of the warrant materials for the purpose of obtaining of possible exculpatory evidence;
4) Appellant had not preserved the issue in prior proceedings of whether the application for the warrant for the unidentified person may have tainted the warrant application for the search of Appellant's person and property; and
5) The State did not call or intend to call the unidentified person as a witness against the Defendant, and therefore the material was not discoverable under Rule 4-263(c)(2).
Chief Judge Murphy noted in a brief concurring opinion that the case at bar did not present the issues of the use of the warrant material for the unidentified person for cross-examination purposes or for proving a tainted warrant application by the strategic misinformation or omissions by an affiant to produce the illusion of probable cause.
The full opinions are available in WPD and PDF.
Daniels v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided December 26, 2006 -- Opinion by Judge Arrie W. Davis
Police in Frederick County, Maryland informed the police of Martinsburg, West Virginia:
1) That a van driven by Appellant at the time of a stop in West Virginia fit the description of a vehicle at the scene of a double homicide on a Maryland street;
2) That Appellant's former boyfriend had advised Maryland authorities that Appellant had said that he (the former boyfriend) would never again see one of the victims, a five year-old; and
3) That Appellant's father in Martinsburg owned a vehicle fitting the approximate description of homicide scene van.
The Martinsburg police located a vehicle in Martinsburg fitting the description of the van at the homicide scene and confirmed as belonging to Appellant's father. When they observed the vehicle driving away, the Martinsburg police executed a stop of the vehicle, detained the vehicle on the street to obtain a search warrant for the contents of the vehicle pursuant to West Virginia law and procedure, and advised Appellant – the driver – after conducting a search of her person that she was free to leave during its detention.
The Court of Special Appeals upheld the lower court ruling that the Martinsburg police had ample probable cause to execute a stop of the van pending a search warrant application for its contents, based on the information provided by Maryland law enforcement.
Maryland law enforcement agents provided very substantial material assistance to the Martinsburg police in executing the search warrant in West Virginia. The lower court noted local direct supervision of the Maryland officers and the officers' role as the source of the information giving rise to probable cause to obtain the warrant itself. Rejecting Appellant's argument that the Maryland officers lacked territorial jurisdiction in West Virginia or probable cause as private citizens to participate in the execution of the search warrant, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the validity of the Maryland officers' participation in the search within the "color of [their] office."
Appellant claimed that the failure of West Virginia authorities to make a presentment of her to a magistrate for approximately eight hours constituted unnecessary delay and therefore an unlawful detention, invalidating as coerced a written statement that she made after being advised of her Miranda rights. The Court of Special Appeals held that the delay was not the result of deliberate collusion between Maryland and West Virginia to defeat Appellant's access to a magistrate and that within 9 hours of her arrest, Appellant did appear before a magistrate. Accordingly, the applicable Maryland statutes and rules governing deadlines for prompt presentment did not apply to Appellant's out-of-state arrest and the Court of Special Appeals accordingly upheld as not clearly erroneous the lower court's finding that Appellant's statement was not coerced and therefore was admissible.
The full opinion is available in WPD and in PDF.
Police in Frederick County, Maryland informed the police of Martinsburg, West Virginia:
1) That a van driven by Appellant at the time of a stop in West Virginia fit the description of a vehicle at the scene of a double homicide on a Maryland street;
2) That Appellant's former boyfriend had advised Maryland authorities that Appellant had said that he (the former boyfriend) would never again see one of the victims, a five year-old; and
3) That Appellant's father in Martinsburg owned a vehicle fitting the approximate description of homicide scene van.
The Martinsburg police located a vehicle in Martinsburg fitting the description of the van at the homicide scene and confirmed as belonging to Appellant's father. When they observed the vehicle driving away, the Martinsburg police executed a stop of the vehicle, detained the vehicle on the street to obtain a search warrant for the contents of the vehicle pursuant to West Virginia law and procedure, and advised Appellant – the driver – after conducting a search of her person that she was free to leave during its detention.
The Court of Special Appeals upheld the lower court ruling that the Martinsburg police had ample probable cause to execute a stop of the van pending a search warrant application for its contents, based on the information provided by Maryland law enforcement.
Maryland law enforcement agents provided very substantial material assistance to the Martinsburg police in executing the search warrant in West Virginia. The lower court noted local direct supervision of the Maryland officers and the officers' role as the source of the information giving rise to probable cause to obtain the warrant itself. Rejecting Appellant's argument that the Maryland officers lacked territorial jurisdiction in West Virginia or probable cause as private citizens to participate in the execution of the search warrant, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the validity of the Maryland officers' participation in the search within the "color of [their] office."
Appellant claimed that the failure of West Virginia authorities to make a presentment of her to a magistrate for approximately eight hours constituted unnecessary delay and therefore an unlawful detention, invalidating as coerced a written statement that she made after being advised of her Miranda rights. The Court of Special Appeals held that the delay was not the result of deliberate collusion between Maryland and West Virginia to defeat Appellant's access to a magistrate and that within 9 hours of her arrest, Appellant did appear before a magistrate. Accordingly, the applicable Maryland statutes and rules governing deadlines for prompt presentment did not apply to Appellant's out-of-state arrest and the Court of Special Appeals accordingly upheld as not clearly erroneous the lower court's finding that Appellant's statement was not coerced and therefore was admissible.
The full opinion is available in WPD and in PDF.
Thursday, December 14, 2006
U.S. v. Coley (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Decided December 13, 2006--Chief Judge Benson Everett Legg.
Fourth Amendment, motion to suppress evidence. Defendant contended that a gun found as a result of a pursuit by Baltimore City detectives should not be admitted into evidence because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The defendant, when stopped by police officers, began to run. He was then taken into custody. After he was taken into custody, one of the police officers reported that he saw the defendant throw something away during the chase. Further investigation resulted in the recovery of a handgun. The defendant claimed that (i) the officers acted without probable cause when taking him into custody, (ii) that the seizure of the gun was the result of that arrest and was thus the fruit of an illegal seizure.
The Court found that because defendant ran from the detectives, he did not submit to police authority and, therefore, there was no seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Since there was no seizure, the gun Defendant dropped during the pursuit was abandoned property and would be admitted as evidence.
Fourth Amendment, motion to suppress evidence. Defendant contended that a gun found as a result of a pursuit by Baltimore City detectives should not be admitted into evidence because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The defendant, when stopped by police officers, began to run. He was then taken into custody. After he was taken into custody, one of the police officers reported that he saw the defendant throw something away during the chase. Further investigation resulted in the recovery of a handgun. The defendant claimed that (i) the officers acted without probable cause when taking him into custody, (ii) that the seizure of the gun was the result of that arrest and was thus the fruit of an illegal seizure.
The Court found that because defendant ran from the detectives, he did not submit to police authority and, therefore, there was no seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Since there was no seizure, the gun Defendant dropped during the pursuit was abandoned property and would be admitted as evidence.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, December 8, 2006
Purnell v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed December 4, 2006--Opinion by Judge Arrie W.Davis.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455–56, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2861–62 (1981); Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615, 617-18, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2129 (2004); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305-06, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. ed. 2d 408 (1999); Although Maryland has yet to extend the Belton/Thornton bright–line specifically to the search of items belonging to a passenger situated several feet from the vehicle arguably outside of the Chimel [v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969)] reach, who is neither under arrest or suspected of criminal activity at the time of the search and who neither poses a threat to the officer's safety or is capable of destroying evidence, in light of the holding in Thornton, that "Belton allows police to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both 'occupants' and 'recent occupants,'" and "In any event, while an arrestee's status as a "recent occupant" may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search, it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him," the motions court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss evidence of cocaine retrieved from twelve individualized baggies within small recyclable grocery bag located in appellant's coat that was on the rear passenger side seat of vehicle.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455–56, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2861–62 (1981); Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615, 617-18, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2129 (2004); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305-06, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. ed. 2d 408 (1999); Although Maryland has yet to extend the Belton/Thornton bright–line specifically to the search of items belonging to a passenger situated several feet from the vehicle arguably outside of the Chimel [v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969)] reach, who is neither under arrest or suspected of criminal activity at the time of the search and who neither poses a threat to the officer's safety or is capable of destroying evidence, in light of the holding in Thornton, that "Belton allows police to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both 'occupants' and 'recent occupants,'" and "In any event, while an arrestee's status as a "recent occupant" may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search, it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him," the motions court properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss evidence of cocaine retrieved from twelve individualized baggies within small recyclable grocery bag located in appellant's coat that was on the rear passenger side seat of vehicle.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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