Filed April 13, 2007 – Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia
Derek Maurice Williamson sought review of the denial of a motion to suppress statements he made during the execution of a search warrant. During surveillance, police had observed him enter and leave the residence to be searched on numerous occasions. Based on their belief that Williamson was an occupant of the residence, after arriving to exercise a search warrant and seeing him leave the house, police stopped Williamson as he was about to enter his car. The police returned him to the house and detained him during the search. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court properly denied Williamson’s motion because the police had the authority to return Williamson to the house and detain him while the search was conducted.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label criminal law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criminal law. Show all posts
Friday, April 13, 2007
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Sykes v. Wicomico County (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not approved for publication)
Filed March 30, 2007 --Opinion by Judge Catherine Blake
Tyrone Sykes sued the defendants, Officers Phillips and Alessandrini for violations of federal and state law arising out of a scuffle during his arrest for criminal trespass in Salisbury, Maryland. In a Maryland district court trial, Sykes was found not guilty of the criminal trespass charge, after the judge found no probable cause for his arrest. The judge noted that under the common law one could resist reasonably in an unlawful arrest. In federal court Sykes alleged violations that included assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Sykes claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the defendants illegally searched his person after arresting him without a warrant. The court denied summary judgment on that claim because of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers had probable cause for the arrest. The court rejected summary judgment for the defendants based on qualified immunity because as stated by Syke’s version of the events, an arrest for trespass, and subsequent search, by the police without express authorization or prior agreement, and where the plaintiff articulates a plausibly legitimate reason for being on the premises, which has been acknowledged by the officer, is a constitutional violation.
Finding that the notice provisions of the Maryland Tort Claims Act do not implicate individual state employees, the court held that Sykes’s possible failure to comply with the MTCA would not bar his claim.
The defendants claimed that they were entitled to statutory immunity for the state law claims but the court rejected that as a basis for summary judgment because on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Sykes there was evidence sufficient for a jury to find actual malice, which would preclude qualified immunity. Analyzing the claims of excessive force during an arrest under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard and again taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court found a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether defendants used excessive force.
With respect to the assault and battery claims, the court noted that police officials are not responsible in inflicting injury on a person being arrested, unless the officer acts with malice or gross negligence. Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the police officers lacked probable cause in arresting Sykes for trespass, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sykes, the judge denied summary judgment on that basis because a jury could find malice in the defendants’ actions. On a similar reasoning, the court found summary judgment inappropriate as to the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution allegations.
The Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Tyrone Sykes sued the defendants, Officers Phillips and Alessandrini for violations of federal and state law arising out of a scuffle during his arrest for criminal trespass in Salisbury, Maryland. In a Maryland district court trial, Sykes was found not guilty of the criminal trespass charge, after the judge found no probable cause for his arrest. The judge noted that under the common law one could resist reasonably in an unlawful arrest. In federal court Sykes alleged violations that included assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Sykes claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the defendants illegally searched his person after arresting him without a warrant. The court denied summary judgment on that claim because of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers had probable cause for the arrest. The court rejected summary judgment for the defendants based on qualified immunity because as stated by Syke’s version of the events, an arrest for trespass, and subsequent search, by the police without express authorization or prior agreement, and where the plaintiff articulates a plausibly legitimate reason for being on the premises, which has been acknowledged by the officer, is a constitutional violation.
Finding that the notice provisions of the Maryland Tort Claims Act do not implicate individual state employees, the court held that Sykes’s possible failure to comply with the MTCA would not bar his claim.
The defendants claimed that they were entitled to statutory immunity for the state law claims but the court rejected that as a basis for summary judgment because on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Sykes there was evidence sufficient for a jury to find actual malice, which would preclude qualified immunity. Analyzing the claims of excessive force during an arrest under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard and again taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court found a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether defendants used excessive force.
With respect to the assault and battery claims, the court noted that police officials are not responsible in inflicting injury on a person being arrested, unless the officer acts with malice or gross negligence. Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether the police officers lacked probable cause in arresting Sykes for trespass, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sykes, the judge denied summary judgment on that basis because a jury could find malice in the defendants’ actions. On a similar reasoning, the court found summary judgment inappropriate as to the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution allegations.
The Opinion and Order are available in PDF.
Thursday, March 29, 2007
Jones v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 29, 2007—Opinion by Judge Sharer
Tyshawn Jones was convicted by a Washington County jury of first-degree felony murder, depraved heart second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and numerous other related and lesser included offenses. He appealed based on alleged error in allowing his statement into evidence; sufficiency of the evidence for the armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and first-degree felony murder convictions; and error in not polling the jury or hearkening the verdict before the jurors were discharged.
The court reversed the first-degree felony murder conviction, holding that the State did not establish a casual connection between the robbery of Victim A and the later shooting of Victim B. The Court remanded for a new trial on the other counts because the verdicts were not perfected by either a jury poll or the verdict being hearkened. The court noted that failure to poll the jury, absent a request, is not error as long as the verdict is hearkened. The Court ruled that a poll of the jury is a fully commensurable substitute for hearkening, which is of ancient origin, but in the absence of a request for a poll, hearkening is required. The Court nixed a recall and swearing of the same jurors weeks later as ineffective to cure the defect since once jurors are discharged and dispersed, they no longer constitute a jury.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Tyshawn Jones was convicted by a Washington County jury of first-degree felony murder, depraved heart second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and numerous other related and lesser included offenses. He appealed based on alleged error in allowing his statement into evidence; sufficiency of the evidence for the armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and first-degree felony murder convictions; and error in not polling the jury or hearkening the verdict before the jurors were discharged.
The court reversed the first-degree felony murder conviction, holding that the State did not establish a casual connection between the robbery of Victim A and the later shooting of Victim B. The Court remanded for a new trial on the other counts because the verdicts were not perfected by either a jury poll or the verdict being hearkened. The court noted that failure to poll the jury, absent a request, is not error as long as the verdict is hearkened. The Court ruled that a poll of the jury is a fully commensurable substitute for hearkening, which is of ancient origin, but in the absence of a request for a poll, hearkening is required. The Court nixed a recall and swearing of the same jurors weeks later as ineffective to cure the defect since once jurors are discharged and dispersed, they no longer constitute a jury.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, March 20, 2007
Thornton v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 20, 2007--Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene.
Petitioner seeks review of a Court of Special Appeals judgment affirming his conviction for murder in the second degree. Two questions were presented:
1. Did the intermediate appellate court and the trial judge correctly interpret and apply the mens rea element of the second-degree murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety?
2. Did the intermediate appellate court and the trial court correctly interpret and apply the law of imperfect self-defense?
Second degree murder does not require premeditation or deliberation. In order to convict the defendant of second degree murder, the burden is on the State to prove (1) that the conduct of the defendant caused the death of the victim; and (2) that the defendant engaged in the deadly conduct either with the intent to kill or with the intent to inflict serious bodily harm such that death would be the likely result.
To determine whether the trial judge and intermediate appellate court correctly interpreted and applied the intent element of second-degree murder, the Court reviewed the mens rea requirement, focusing on the definitions of murder, malice and grievous bodily harm, including the meaning of the phrase "that death would be the likely result." Where murder is predicated upon a theory of intent to commit grievous bodily harm, the intended harm must be grievous bodily harm and must be the legal equivalent of malice. Furthermore, in the context of a murder prosecution, intent to inflict grievous bodily harm means such harm that a reasonable person could or should know, under the circumstances, would likely result in death to the victim. Because the crime involves an unintentional killing, the defendant need not actually know that his conduct will result in the victim's death. The requisite mens rea is measured by an objective standard, i.e., could or should a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have foreseen that death would likely ensue as a result of his or her conduct. Thus, the likelihood requirement is no more than an objective standard used to circumscribe and clarify the elements of intent and malice.
Malice may be inferred from (1) an act by the accused sufficient to show an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or (2) an act the natural tendency of which would cause death or great bodily harm. In other words, the trier of fact may infer malice where the defendant acts without provocation, justification or excuse, and could or should have foreseen that the consequences of his or her conduct might result in death to another person. Malice may be either express or implied.
Intent has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows those consequences are substantially certain to result from his act. A general mens rea or intent includes those consequences which (a) represent the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of the likelihood of occurrence), or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire). By contrast, a specific intent requires more than the general intent to do the actus reus. An offense is murder depending on the results and the nature and extent of the injury or wrong actually intended.
Thus, the trier of fact may find the requisite intent for second-degree murder, even where the defendant did not intend to kill the victim, but did intend to inflict grievous bodily harm. Murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm type is, by definition, a specific intent crime, and the specific intent necessary for conviction is the intent to do serious bodily injury, that death would be the likely result.
In the instant case, the trial judge found that Petitioner did not possess a specific intent to kill his victim but did indicate that malice was implied. Yet, at no time did the trial judge state that Petitioner acted with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. Essentially, the trial judge reasoned that because Petitioner was responsible for his actions, he, therefore, must have known that his act would inflict serious bodily harm and that death would be a possible or probable consequence of that harm. The intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is a life-threatening state of mind. Thus, in order to convict Petitioner, the trier of fact was required to find that Petitioner's desire or purpose was to inflict such harm that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, could or should have anticipated that death would likely occur.
The trial judge erred by substituting the notion of responsibility for one's actions (the act of stabbing the victim in the leg) for knowledge that death would likely occur. Merely because Petitioner may be blameworthy, because of the consequences of his actions, does not mean that he either had a desire to bring about those results or that those results were probable. Essentially, the trial judge found that because Petitioner caused the injury from which death resulted, he was guilty of murder. This determination resulted in a presumption that Petitioner intended the consequences of his actions and a modification of the mens rea requirement for specific intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm. The trier of fact may draw inferences from the facts presented in the case but may not presume an element of the State's case.
Held that the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's interpretation and application of the intent element for the crime of second-degree murder. The qualification that "death would be the likely result" both circumscribes and clarifies the intent element of second degree murder of the type of consideration. Moreover, the panel majority did not acknowledge the difference between serious bodily harm in the context of murder and in the context of an assault. Second degree murder of the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is neither a strict liability crime nor a crime predicated upon a theory of negligence. Accordingly, the State must prove intent to injure the victim so severely that death would be the likely result even though the defendant did not intend that the victim die. In summary, the trial judge's mistaken conclusions of law, which modified the specific intent requirement and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Petitioner, warrants reversal of conviction for murder in the second degree and a remand of the case for a new trial. In light of this holding, the second question was not addressed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Petitioner seeks review of a Court of Special Appeals judgment affirming his conviction for murder in the second degree. Two questions were presented:
1. Did the intermediate appellate court and the trial judge correctly interpret and apply the mens rea element of the second-degree murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety?
2. Did the intermediate appellate court and the trial court correctly interpret and apply the law of imperfect self-defense?
Second degree murder does not require premeditation or deliberation. In order to convict the defendant of second degree murder, the burden is on the State to prove (1) that the conduct of the defendant caused the death of the victim; and (2) that the defendant engaged in the deadly conduct either with the intent to kill or with the intent to inflict serious bodily harm such that death would be the likely result.
To determine whether the trial judge and intermediate appellate court correctly interpreted and applied the intent element of second-degree murder, the Court reviewed the mens rea requirement, focusing on the definitions of murder, malice and grievous bodily harm, including the meaning of the phrase "that death would be the likely result." Where murder is predicated upon a theory of intent to commit grievous bodily harm, the intended harm must be grievous bodily harm and must be the legal equivalent of malice. Furthermore, in the context of a murder prosecution, intent to inflict grievous bodily harm means such harm that a reasonable person could or should know, under the circumstances, would likely result in death to the victim. Because the crime involves an unintentional killing, the defendant need not actually know that his conduct will result in the victim's death. The requisite mens rea is measured by an objective standard, i.e., could or should a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have foreseen that death would likely ensue as a result of his or her conduct. Thus, the likelihood requirement is no more than an objective standard used to circumscribe and clarify the elements of intent and malice.
Malice may be inferred from (1) an act by the accused sufficient to show an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or (2) an act the natural tendency of which would cause death or great bodily harm. In other words, the trier of fact may infer malice where the defendant acts without provocation, justification or excuse, and could or should have foreseen that the consequences of his or her conduct might result in death to another person. Malice may be either express or implied.
Intent has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows those consequences are substantially certain to result from his act. A general mens rea or intent includes those consequences which (a) represent the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of the likelihood of occurrence), or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire). By contrast, a specific intent requires more than the general intent to do the actus reus. An offense is murder depending on the results and the nature and extent of the injury or wrong actually intended.
Thus, the trier of fact may find the requisite intent for second-degree murder, even where the defendant did not intend to kill the victim, but did intend to inflict grievous bodily harm. Murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm type is, by definition, a specific intent crime, and the specific intent necessary for conviction is the intent to do serious bodily injury, that death would be the likely result.
In the instant case, the trial judge found that Petitioner did not possess a specific intent to kill his victim but did indicate that malice was implied. Yet, at no time did the trial judge state that Petitioner acted with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. Essentially, the trial judge reasoned that because Petitioner was responsible for his actions, he, therefore, must have known that his act would inflict serious bodily harm and that death would be a possible or probable consequence of that harm. The intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is a life-threatening state of mind. Thus, in order to convict Petitioner, the trier of fact was required to find that Petitioner's desire or purpose was to inflict such harm that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, could or should have anticipated that death would likely occur.
The trial judge erred by substituting the notion of responsibility for one's actions (the act of stabbing the victim in the leg) for knowledge that death would likely occur. Merely because Petitioner may be blameworthy, because of the consequences of his actions, does not mean that he either had a desire to bring about those results or that those results were probable. Essentially, the trial judge found that because Petitioner caused the injury from which death resulted, he was guilty of murder. This determination resulted in a presumption that Petitioner intended the consequences of his actions and a modification of the mens rea requirement for specific intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm. The trier of fact may draw inferences from the facts presented in the case but may not presume an element of the State's case.
Held that the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's interpretation and application of the intent element for the crime of second-degree murder. The qualification that "death would be the likely result" both circumscribes and clarifies the intent element of second degree murder of the type of consideration. Moreover, the panel majority did not acknowledge the difference between serious bodily harm in the context of murder and in the context of an assault. Second degree murder of the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is neither a strict liability crime nor a crime predicated upon a theory of negligence. Accordingly, the State must prove intent to injure the victim so severely that death would be the likely result even though the defendant did not intend that the victim die. In summary, the trial judge's mistaken conclusions of law, which modified the specific intent requirement and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Petitioner, warrants reversal of conviction for murder in the second degree and a remand of the case for a new trial. In light of this holding, the second question was not addressed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Pye v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 19, 2007–Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell.
This opinion resolves three cases: Teel v. State (No. 123), Womack v. State (No. 114), and Pye v. State (No. 113). With one exception, all three cases address essentially the same legal issue and involve essentially the same argument with respect to the merger of certain handgun related offenses. That issue is restated as follows:
"Whether the holding in Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 569 A.2d 684 (1990), that the offenses of carrying a handgun and possession of a firearm by a convicted person do not merge, is still viable even though, subsequent to that decision, the General Assembly increased the penalties associated with the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted person."
This Court held Frazier is still viable. The exception is the second issue, presented only in Pye:
"Did the trial judge err in denying Pye’s motion to dismiss and acquit by sentencing him to a five year no parole sentence for possession of a firearm by a person with a prior conviction under Article 27, § 449(e) where Pye previously had been convicted of a felony but not a crime of violence?"
Concluding that § 449(e) requires an individual to have been previously convicted of a crime or crimes that were both a felony and a crime of violence, the Court answered in the affirmative holding that the trial judge erred as a matter of law by denying Pye’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that count.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
This opinion resolves three cases: Teel v. State (No. 123), Womack v. State (No. 114), and Pye v. State (No. 113). With one exception, all three cases address essentially the same legal issue and involve essentially the same argument with respect to the merger of certain handgun related offenses. That issue is restated as follows:
"Whether the holding in Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 569 A.2d 684 (1990), that the offenses of carrying a handgun and possession of a firearm by a convicted person do not merge, is still viable even though, subsequent to that decision, the General Assembly increased the penalties associated with the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted person."
This Court held Frazier is still viable. The exception is the second issue, presented only in Pye:
"Did the trial judge err in denying Pye’s motion to dismiss and acquit by sentencing him to a five year no parole sentence for possession of a firearm by a person with a prior conviction under Article 27, § 449(e) where Pye previously had been convicted of a felony but not a crime of violence?"
Concluding that § 449(e) requires an individual to have been previously convicted of a crime or crimes that were both a felony and a crime of violence, the Court answered in the affirmative holding that the trial judge erred as a matter of law by denying Pye’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that count.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Knox v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 13, 2007. Opinion by Judge Peter B. Krauser.
On August 25, 2000, Derrick I. Knox was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant. In a search of Knox's pants pockets, the police found plastic bags filled with cocaine and marijuana and more than $1,500.00 in cash. Knox was subsequently charged in the Circuit Court of Wicomico County with possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
Knox failed to appear for arraignment in circuit court and a bench warrant for his arrest was issued. Knox was later arrested on the warrant but released on bail. Knox failed to appear for arraignment two more times on December 22, 2000 and January 5, 2001. On February 2, 2001, Charles J. Jannace, III, Esquire entered his appearance on behalf of Knox, waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. The State then served Jannace with a notice of its intent to seek "an enhanced punishment" because Knox was a subsequent offender. A jury trial was scheduled for March 20, 2001. Although Knox, again, failed to appear, Jannace did at which time the State informed the court and Jannace that Knox was '"as subsequent offender regarding [controlled dangerous substance] offenses ...."' Jannace then filed a motion to strike his appearance, which was granted.
At Knox's appearance in court, on July 13, 2001, he was unrepresented by counsel having signed a waiver stating he did not wish to be represented by the public defender. The court informed Knox of the charges against him and the maximum penalties. The court further cautioned Knox that the most serious charge could result in a sentence of 20 years and a fine of $25,000.00 and advised him of his right to a public defender and adding that if he failed to appear at trial without counsel, he could be found to have waived his right to counsel.
When Knox appeared for the trial on September 13, 2001, he was unrepresented by counsel. After questioning Knox about his efforts to obtain counsel and noting "Knox's repeated failure to appear for court proceedings and his failure to provide any 'significant information as to what efforts, if any, he ha[d] made to retain an attorney ... since March [20, 2001],' [], the circuit court found that Knox had waived his right to counsel by inaction. It then ordered the trial to proceed, indicating that Knox would have to represent himself." Following a bench trial, Knox was found guilty of all three charges.
At sentencing, the State introduced the "notice of intent" served on Jannace asserting the State's intention to seek "enhanced punishment." The notice was admitted into evidence without objection and the court sentenced Knox to a term of twenty years' imprisonment for possession of cocain with intent to distribute, suspending all but fifteen years of that sentence. Because of his subsequent offender status, ten of the unsuspended fifteen years would be mandatory and subject to limited possibility of parole.
The circuit court granted part of a petition for post-conviction relief filed by Knox, permitting him to seek appellate review of his contention that the circuit court erred in failing to advise him that he faced enhanced penalties as a subsequent offender before finding he had waived his right to counsel by inaction. Knox asserted that the court has violated Rule 4-215 which states, in part, that (a) At the defendant's first appearance in court without counsel, ... the court shall: (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any. Because he faced the enhanced penalty, Knox asserted that the court was required to advise him of the possible punishment, and, having failed to do so, the court could not then find that he had waived his right to counsel by inaction.
The Court of Special Appeals found that "Rule 4-215 does not require the court to advise an unrepresented accused at his first appearance in court without counsel of enhanced penalties that this status as a subsequent offender may portend, or at anytime thereafter, nor did the court violate that rule in determining that Knox had no meritorious reason for appearing without counsel." Further, the Court of Special Appeals found that the "mandatory penalties" provision of Rule 4-215 does not specify whether that includes penalties mandated by recidivist statutes.
The Court of Special Appeals noted that the "disclosure of sentencing peril that awaits a subsequent offender is specifically governed by Rule 4-245, not Rule 4-215." Rule 4-245 places the burden of disclosure of sentencing peril faced by the defendant on the State's Attorney, and requires that notice be given, not at his first appearance in court but at least 5 or 15 days before sentencing, depending on whether the charges are brought in district or circuit court. The Court of Special Appeals further noted that Rule 4-245 requires that notice of the State’s Attorney's intent to seek an enhance penalty "'shall be filed with the clerk and presented to the court' but only '[a]fter acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after conviction ...' Rule 4-245(d). The rule is emphatic: 'The allegation that the defendant is a subsequent offender is not an issue in the trial on the charging document and may not be disclosed to the trier of fact without the consent of the defendant, except as permitted' by the rule. Id." The Court of Special Appeals then found that the State fully complied with the notice requirements of Rule 4-245(c).
The Court of Special Appeals then reviewed the process by which the circuit court found that Knox had waived his right to counsel by inaction and found that the circuit court had not abused its discretion in finding that Knox's reasons for appearing without counsel were not meritorious. The Court of Special Appeals then distinguished the instant matter from Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179 (1993) and Gray v. State, 338 Md. 106 (1995).
Judgments affirmed.
This opinion is available in PDF.
On August 25, 2000, Derrick I. Knox was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant. In a search of Knox's pants pockets, the police found plastic bags filled with cocaine and marijuana and more than $1,500.00 in cash. Knox was subsequently charged in the Circuit Court of Wicomico County with possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
Knox failed to appear for arraignment in circuit court and a bench warrant for his arrest was issued. Knox was later arrested on the warrant but released on bail. Knox failed to appear for arraignment two more times on December 22, 2000 and January 5, 2001. On February 2, 2001, Charles J. Jannace, III, Esquire entered his appearance on behalf of Knox, waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. The State then served Jannace with a notice of its intent to seek "an enhanced punishment" because Knox was a subsequent offender. A jury trial was scheduled for March 20, 2001. Although Knox, again, failed to appear, Jannace did at which time the State informed the court and Jannace that Knox was '"as subsequent offender regarding [controlled dangerous substance] offenses ...."' Jannace then filed a motion to strike his appearance, which was granted.
At Knox's appearance in court, on July 13, 2001, he was unrepresented by counsel having signed a waiver stating he did not wish to be represented by the public defender. The court informed Knox of the charges against him and the maximum penalties. The court further cautioned Knox that the most serious charge could result in a sentence of 20 years and a fine of $25,000.00 and advised him of his right to a public defender and adding that if he failed to appear at trial without counsel, he could be found to have waived his right to counsel.
When Knox appeared for the trial on September 13, 2001, he was unrepresented by counsel. After questioning Knox about his efforts to obtain counsel and noting "Knox's repeated failure to appear for court proceedings and his failure to provide any 'significant information as to what efforts, if any, he ha[d] made to retain an attorney ... since March [20, 2001],' [], the circuit court found that Knox had waived his right to counsel by inaction. It then ordered the trial to proceed, indicating that Knox would have to represent himself." Following a bench trial, Knox was found guilty of all three charges.
At sentencing, the State introduced the "notice of intent" served on Jannace asserting the State's intention to seek "enhanced punishment." The notice was admitted into evidence without objection and the court sentenced Knox to a term of twenty years' imprisonment for possession of cocain with intent to distribute, suspending all but fifteen years of that sentence. Because of his subsequent offender status, ten of the unsuspended fifteen years would be mandatory and subject to limited possibility of parole.
The circuit court granted part of a petition for post-conviction relief filed by Knox, permitting him to seek appellate review of his contention that the circuit court erred in failing to advise him that he faced enhanced penalties as a subsequent offender before finding he had waived his right to counsel by inaction. Knox asserted that the court has violated Rule 4-215 which states, in part, that (a) At the defendant's first appearance in court without counsel, ... the court shall: (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any. Because he faced the enhanced penalty, Knox asserted that the court was required to advise him of the possible punishment, and, having failed to do so, the court could not then find that he had waived his right to counsel by inaction.
The Court of Special Appeals found that "Rule 4-215 does not require the court to advise an unrepresented accused at his first appearance in court without counsel of enhanced penalties that this status as a subsequent offender may portend, or at anytime thereafter, nor did the court violate that rule in determining that Knox had no meritorious reason for appearing without counsel." Further, the Court of Special Appeals found that the "mandatory penalties" provision of Rule 4-215 does not specify whether that includes penalties mandated by recidivist statutes.
The Court of Special Appeals noted that the "disclosure of sentencing peril that awaits a subsequent offender is specifically governed by Rule 4-245, not Rule 4-215." Rule 4-245 places the burden of disclosure of sentencing peril faced by the defendant on the State's Attorney, and requires that notice be given, not at his first appearance in court but at least 5 or 15 days before sentencing, depending on whether the charges are brought in district or circuit court. The Court of Special Appeals further noted that Rule 4-245 requires that notice of the State’s Attorney's intent to seek an enhance penalty "'shall be filed with the clerk and presented to the court' but only '[a]fter acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after conviction ...' Rule 4-245(d). The rule is emphatic: 'The allegation that the defendant is a subsequent offender is not an issue in the trial on the charging document and may not be disclosed to the trier of fact without the consent of the defendant, except as permitted' by the rule. Id." The Court of Special Appeals then found that the State fully complied with the notice requirements of Rule 4-245(c).
The Court of Special Appeals then reviewed the process by which the circuit court found that Knox had waived his right to counsel by inaction and found that the circuit court had not abused its discretion in finding that Knox's reasons for appearing without counsel were not meritorious. The Court of Special Appeals then distinguished the instant matter from Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179 (1993) and Gray v. State, 338 Md. 106 (1995).
Judgments affirmed.
This opinion is available in PDF.
Chaney v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 14, 2007. Opinion by Judge Alan M. Wilner (retired, specially asigned).
From the headnote of the opinion:
Following conviction of second degree assault, Chaney was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, all but five years of which were suspended in favor of supervised probation for five years. Among the conditions of probation were that Chaney pay restitution to the victim in the amont of $5,000 within 30 months after his release from prison and that he be employed full-time or a full-time student. At the sentencing hearing, Chaney was presented with, and signed, the probation order and separate judgment of restitution. Chaney timely appealed the conditions to probation.
After the appeal request, Chaney filed a motion for modification and reduction of sentence, complaining that there had been no request by the victim for restitution, and no evidentiary basis for the $5,000 judgment. Chaney's motion was denied, and no appeal was taken from that ruling. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, to consider whether the two conditions constituted an "illegal sentence" that may be corrected notwithstanding Chaney's failure to object to them in a timely manner in the trial court below.
The court noted that a defendant may file a motion to correct an illegal sentence even if 1) no objection was made when the sentence was imposed, 2) the defendant consented to it, or 3) the sentence was not timely challenged in direct appeal, but that the scope of the privilege is narrow, where the illegality inheres in the sentence itself. That is, either there has been no conviction warranting the sentence or the sentence is not a permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed, and therefore is intrinsically and subtantively unlawful.
The court found nothing intrinsically illegal about either condition here, even though Chaney argued that the conditions were inappropriate here because no evidentiary foundation was laid to support them. At best, this would require the court to vacate if the compaint was preserved for appellate review, or the court chooses to exercise its discretion under Rule 8-131(a) to consider issues not raised in or decided by the trial court. Here, Chaney had failed to appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion, but the court nonetheless decided to exercise its discretion and consider the restitution issue, because it was found to constitute plain error and transcended this case, potentially affecting hundreds of other cases, but not the employment condition, which could await the time Chaney is charged with violating that condition.
Restitution is provided for in Section 11-603 of the Criminal Proceedings Article, if as a direct result of the crime, the victim suffered specified items of damage set forth in subsection (a), and in subsection (b) the victim is presumed to have a right of restitution if the victim or the State requests restitution, and the court is presented with competent evidence of any specified item of damages. The court noted the facial ambiguity of the statute, calling it "at best, inartfully drawn," and was unwilling to read the first part without the conditions set forth in the second part, since restitution is part of a criminal sanction.
Consequently, the court held that as a matter of due process and Maryland criminal procedure, restitution may only be awarded if 1) the defendant is given reasonable notice that restitution is being sought and the amount, 2) the defendant is given a fair opportunity to defend against that request, and 3) there is sufficient admissible evidence to support the request, as to both the amount and relationship to the crime. The court noted that the statues and rules provide for the involvement of the victim in the process and provide a due process framework for consideration of these requirements. Here, in spite of the presence of the victim and compliance with those statutes and rules, no demand was made for restitution, and no evidence was submitted, so the $5,000 restitution figure "was pulled entirely out of thin air." Thus the court vacated the order of restitution.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
From the headnote of the opinion:
Before a restitution order is granted, Section 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article requires that the victim of the crime or the State request restitution and that competent evidence supporting the amount of the restitution order be presented to the trial court. In this case, because the record demonstrates that no request for restitution was made and no competent evidence was presented to support the amount of restitution, the restitution order must be vacated.
Following conviction of second degree assault, Chaney was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, all but five years of which were suspended in favor of supervised probation for five years. Among the conditions of probation were that Chaney pay restitution to the victim in the amont of $5,000 within 30 months after his release from prison and that he be employed full-time or a full-time student. At the sentencing hearing, Chaney was presented with, and signed, the probation order and separate judgment of restitution. Chaney timely appealed the conditions to probation.
After the appeal request, Chaney filed a motion for modification and reduction of sentence, complaining that there had been no request by the victim for restitution, and no evidentiary basis for the $5,000 judgment. Chaney's motion was denied, and no appeal was taken from that ruling. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, to consider whether the two conditions constituted an "illegal sentence" that may be corrected notwithstanding Chaney's failure to object to them in a timely manner in the trial court below.
The court noted that a defendant may file a motion to correct an illegal sentence even if 1) no objection was made when the sentence was imposed, 2) the defendant consented to it, or 3) the sentence was not timely challenged in direct appeal, but that the scope of the privilege is narrow, where the illegality inheres in the sentence itself. That is, either there has been no conviction warranting the sentence or the sentence is not a permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed, and therefore is intrinsically and subtantively unlawful.
The court found nothing intrinsically illegal about either condition here, even though Chaney argued that the conditions were inappropriate here because no evidentiary foundation was laid to support them. At best, this would require the court to vacate if the compaint was preserved for appellate review, or the court chooses to exercise its discretion under Rule 8-131(a) to consider issues not raised in or decided by the trial court. Here, Chaney had failed to appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion, but the court nonetheless decided to exercise its discretion and consider the restitution issue, because it was found to constitute plain error and transcended this case, potentially affecting hundreds of other cases, but not the employment condition, which could await the time Chaney is charged with violating that condition.
Restitution is provided for in Section 11-603 of the Criminal Proceedings Article, if as a direct result of the crime, the victim suffered specified items of damage set forth in subsection (a), and in subsection (b) the victim is presumed to have a right of restitution if the victim or the State requests restitution, and the court is presented with competent evidence of any specified item of damages. The court noted the facial ambiguity of the statute, calling it "at best, inartfully drawn," and was unwilling to read the first part without the conditions set forth in the second part, since restitution is part of a criminal sanction.
Consequently, the court held that as a matter of due process and Maryland criminal procedure, restitution may only be awarded if 1) the defendant is given reasonable notice that restitution is being sought and the amount, 2) the defendant is given a fair opportunity to defend against that request, and 3) there is sufficient admissible evidence to support the request, as to both the amount and relationship to the crime. The court noted that the statues and rules provide for the involvement of the victim in the process and provide a due process framework for consideration of these requirements. Here, in spite of the presence of the victim and compliance with those statutes and rules, no demand was made for restitution, and no evidence was submitted, so the $5,000 restitution figure "was pulled entirely out of thin air." Thus the court vacated the order of restitution.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Robey v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 14, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Glenn Harrell
Robey was convicted of second-degree assault and reckless endangerment and sentenced to three years imprisonment, all of which was suspended, and ordered restitution in an amount to be determined by the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation. The Division arrived at the figure of $42,260.75. During a separate restitution hearing, the Circuit Court required Robey to pay $42,342.74 in restitution. Robey unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Special Appeals, and subsequently challenged the amount of his restitution order in the Circuit Court with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence on the theory that Md. Code (2001), Crim. Proc. Article, §11-604(b) prohibits a restitution order in an amount exceeding $10,000. The Circuit Court denied Robey’s motion and Robey appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that court could hear the case, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari, on its own motion, to consider Robey’s contention that the $10,000 statutory limit on restitution orders applies to adult defendants as well as child defendants and respondents and their parents.
The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of Crim. Proc., §11-604(b) precluded Robey’s interpretation because the thrust of the relevant subsection and the surrounding subsections deals exclusively with child defendants or respondents and their parents. Examining legislative intent, the Court noted that the predecessor statute from which §11-604(b) was derived also focused exclusively on restitution as applied to child defendants or respondents and their parents, and a subsequent revision further verified that the General Assembly did not intend to include adult defendants within the purview of the limit on restitution orders.
The Court further noted that its interpretation of the statute was consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of restitution as directed towards children in the juvenile justice system and that the limit prevented young offenders from being saddled with an insurmountable debt, which would frustrate the goals of rehabilitation.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Robey was convicted of second-degree assault and reckless endangerment and sentenced to three years imprisonment, all of which was suspended, and ordered restitution in an amount to be determined by the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation. The Division arrived at the figure of $42,260.75. During a separate restitution hearing, the Circuit Court required Robey to pay $42,342.74 in restitution. Robey unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Special Appeals, and subsequently challenged the amount of his restitution order in the Circuit Court with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence on the theory that Md. Code (2001), Crim. Proc. Article, §11-604(b) prohibits a restitution order in an amount exceeding $10,000. The Circuit Court denied Robey’s motion and Robey appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that court could hear the case, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari, on its own motion, to consider Robey’s contention that the $10,000 statutory limit on restitution orders applies to adult defendants as well as child defendants and respondents and their parents.
The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of Crim. Proc., §11-604(b) precluded Robey’s interpretation because the thrust of the relevant subsection and the surrounding subsections deals exclusively with child defendants or respondents and their parents. Examining legislative intent, the Court noted that the predecessor statute from which §11-604(b) was derived also focused exclusively on restitution as applied to child defendants or respondents and their parents, and a subsequent revision further verified that the General Assembly did not intend to include adult defendants within the purview of the limit on restitution orders.
The Court further noted that its interpretation of the statute was consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of restitution as directed towards children in the juvenile justice system and that the limit prevented young offenders from being saddled with an insurmountable debt, which would frustrate the goals of rehabilitation.
The opinion is available in PDF.
In Re: Ondrel M. (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 12, 2007. Opinion by Judge Patrick L. Woodward.
Conviction on a charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in juvenile court was AFFIRMED.
This case resulted from a high-speed car chase, during which five police cruisers were damaged and all windows broken out before the car, in which Ondrel was a front seat passenger, was stopped. During the process of removing the keys, the arresting officer smelled an aroma of marijuana, and the subsequent search discovered and tests confirmed small quantities of the drug behind the driver's seat.
At trial, Ondrel was found to have been in possession of marijuana and thus was guilty of a delinquent act, and found to be a child in need of guidance, treatment or rehabilitation.
On appeal, Ondrel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, since there was no testimony that he was in direct possession of the drug. After reviewing the relevant cases, and in particular the Larocca case, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the court found the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision beyond a reasonable doubt, given Ondrel's proximity to the drugs, the fact that the drugs were not hidden, that he did not have ownership of the vehicle, and that there was evidence of the mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs by the occupants.
The court similarly dealt with Ondrel's challenge to the admission of testimony of the arresting police officer that he had smelled marijuana in the car, even though the officer was not qualified as a trained drug identification expert. Consistent with many prior cases, the court noted that "[a} witness need only to have encountered the smoking of marijuana in daily life to be able to recognize the odor." In this case the officer had been previously exposed to the smell of marijuana in training, and that exposure did not require him to qualify to testify as an expert but did allow him to properly testify as a layperson.
The opinion and order are available in PDF format.
Conviction on a charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in juvenile court was AFFIRMED.
This case resulted from a high-speed car chase, during which five police cruisers were damaged and all windows broken out before the car, in which Ondrel was a front seat passenger, was stopped. During the process of removing the keys, the arresting officer smelled an aroma of marijuana, and the subsequent search discovered and tests confirmed small quantities of the drug behind the driver's seat.
At trial, Ondrel was found to have been in possession of marijuana and thus was guilty of a delinquent act, and found to be a child in need of guidance, treatment or rehabilitation.
On appeal, Ondrel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, since there was no testimony that he was in direct possession of the drug. After reviewing the relevant cases, and in particular the Larocca case, and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the court found the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision beyond a reasonable doubt, given Ondrel's proximity to the drugs, the fact that the drugs were not hidden, that he did not have ownership of the vehicle, and that there was evidence of the mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs by the occupants.
The court similarly dealt with Ondrel's challenge to the admission of testimony of the arresting police officer that he had smelled marijuana in the car, even though the officer was not qualified as a trained drug identification expert. Consistent with many prior cases, the court noted that "[a} witness need only to have encountered the smoking of marijuana in daily life to be able to recognize the odor." In this case the officer had been previously exposed to the smell of marijuana in training, and that exposure did not require him to qualify to testify as an expert but did allow him to properly testify as a layperson.
The opinion and order are available in PDF format.
Friday, March 9, 2007
Williams v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 8, 2007– Opinion by Judge James R. Eyler.
Appellant was convicted in a non-jury trial by the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County on three counts of failure to return a rental vehicle. On appeal, Appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the court erroneously interpreted the statute as not requiring the requisite mens rea.
Appellant was convicted for violating C.L. § 7-205(a), which provides:
"A person who leases or rents a motor vehicle under an agreement to return the motor vehicle at the end of the leasing or rental period may not abandon the motor vehicle or refuse or wilfully neglect to return it."
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute requires proof that (1) he rented the vehicles under an agreement to return them at the end of the rental period, and (2) he abandoned, refused to return, or wilfully neglected to return the vehicles. Appellant argues that the State failed to produce legally sufficient evidence to support a finding as to the requisite mens rea, and the court treated the charges as strict liability offenses, thus applying the wrong legal standard.
The relevant language in the statute provides that a lessee may not "abandon" a vehicle or "refuse" or "willfully neglect" to return it. Focusing on the plain language of the statute, both parties agree that it does not create a strict liability offense and some form of scienter is required. The ordinary, dictionary definition of the terms "abandon," "refuse," and "willfully neglect" all involve knowing and voluntary conduct. Section 7-205 requires a general intent, i.e., that the acts of abandonment, refusal or willful neglect be done knowingly and voluntarily with actual knowledge of the circumstances. It does not require an intent beyond that just stated. Absent evidence that Appellant, and not one of his employees, was in physical possession of the vehicles at the end of the rental periods, the trial court, acting as trier of fact, would have had to resort to pure speculation to determine whether Appellant acted intentionally when he failed to return the vehicles.
The evidence in this case was legally insufficient to support a finding of abandonment, and no such finding was made. However, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding with respect to the other two modalities. Refusal requires an intent not to comply. The word neglect, standing alone, indicates the omission of a duty through inadvertence or inability. The term willful neglect requires a knowing disregard of the duty to return. "Refusal" and "willful neglect" substantially overlap, both requiring a knowing and voluntary disregard of a duty, and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Appellant refused or willfully neglected to return the vehicles. The evidence permitted an inference that Appellant had the ability to return the vehicles, that he had actual knowledge that the vehicles were overdue, that he had a duty to return them, and that he possessed the requisite mens rea.
Even though the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the convictions, the Court vacated the judgments because the circuit court erroneously did not regard scienter as an element of the crime.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Appellant was convicted in a non-jury trial by the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County on three counts of failure to return a rental vehicle. On appeal, Appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the court erroneously interpreted the statute as not requiring the requisite mens rea.
Appellant was convicted for violating C.L. § 7-205(a), which provides:
"A person who leases or rents a motor vehicle under an agreement to return the motor vehicle at the end of the leasing or rental period may not abandon the motor vehicle or refuse or wilfully neglect to return it."
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute requires proof that (1) he rented the vehicles under an agreement to return them at the end of the rental period, and (2) he abandoned, refused to return, or wilfully neglected to return the vehicles. Appellant argues that the State failed to produce legally sufficient evidence to support a finding as to the requisite mens rea, and the court treated the charges as strict liability offenses, thus applying the wrong legal standard.
The relevant language in the statute provides that a lessee may not "abandon" a vehicle or "refuse" or "willfully neglect" to return it. Focusing on the plain language of the statute, both parties agree that it does not create a strict liability offense and some form of scienter is required. The ordinary, dictionary definition of the terms "abandon," "refuse," and "willfully neglect" all involve knowing and voluntary conduct. Section 7-205 requires a general intent, i.e., that the acts of abandonment, refusal or willful neglect be done knowingly and voluntarily with actual knowledge of the circumstances. It does not require an intent beyond that just stated. Absent evidence that Appellant, and not one of his employees, was in physical possession of the vehicles at the end of the rental periods, the trial court, acting as trier of fact, would have had to resort to pure speculation to determine whether Appellant acted intentionally when he failed to return the vehicles.
The evidence in this case was legally insufficient to support a finding of abandonment, and no such finding was made. However, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding with respect to the other two modalities. Refusal requires an intent not to comply. The word neglect, standing alone, indicates the omission of a duty through inadvertence or inability. The term willful neglect requires a knowing disregard of the duty to return. "Refusal" and "willful neglect" substantially overlap, both requiring a knowing and voluntary disregard of a duty, and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Appellant refused or willfully neglected to return the vehicles. The evidence permitted an inference that Appellant had the ability to return the vehicles, that he had actual knowledge that the vehicles were overdue, that he had a duty to return them, and that he possessed the requisite mens rea.
Even though the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the convictions, the Court vacated the judgments because the circuit court erroneously did not regard scienter as an element of the crime.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, March 8, 2007
Harris v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 7, 2007. Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Sharer.
Chester Harris was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of automobile manslaughter and related offenses. Although he did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence, he raised three issues on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court properly accepted the jury’s verdict where the record does not show that the jury was sworn.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting defense counsel’s closing argument.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographic evidence.
Following jury selection, the court assigned a forelady but then, anticipating a suppression motion, excused the jury through lunch. The trial transcript shows no indication that the jury was ever sworn in upon their return. There is conflicting authority on whether the failure to administer the jury oath is a jurisdictional defect that nullifies the verdict. However, as no Maryland authority was found, the Court relied on the strong presumption that judges and court clerks . . . properly perform their duties, and such presumption also applies to the trial court’s duty to be certain that the jury was sworn. The Court held that, while the record was not sufficient to establish conclusively that the jury was sworn, they were satisfied with the court’s references to its recollection of the swearing of the jury, and Harris’ failure to offer evidence to the contrary result in Harris having failed to carry his burden of persuasion.
Harris next complains that the trial court erred in restricting his summation relating to the reliability of eyewitness testimony. In summation, defense counsel undertook an attack on the reliability of eyewitness testimony. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objections to the attack, warning defense counsel that he could not refer to other cases. Although defense counsel protested that he was not referring to another specific case, the trial court found that his closing argument referred to other cases "indirectly" and ordered counsel to avoid such references. This Court found that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in limiting even inferential references to unrelated cases and circumstances.
Finally, Harris challenged three photographs of the victim at the scene which were admitted into evidence, arguing that the photographs were unduly prejudicial because they provoked an emotional response. The Court reasoned that photographs may be relevant and possess probative value even though they often illustrate something that has already been presented in testimony. Further, the Court held the trial judge engaged in the appropriate balancing in admitting the photos, as the photos were illustrative of the graphic testimony presented by the responding firefighter/paramedic.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Chester Harris was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of automobile manslaughter and related offenses. Although he did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence, he raised three issues on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court properly accepted the jury’s verdict where the record does not show that the jury was sworn.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting defense counsel’s closing argument.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographic evidence.
Following jury selection, the court assigned a forelady but then, anticipating a suppression motion, excused the jury through lunch. The trial transcript shows no indication that the jury was ever sworn in upon their return. There is conflicting authority on whether the failure to administer the jury oath is a jurisdictional defect that nullifies the verdict. However, as no Maryland authority was found, the Court relied on the strong presumption that judges and court clerks . . . properly perform their duties, and such presumption also applies to the trial court’s duty to be certain that the jury was sworn. The Court held that, while the record was not sufficient to establish conclusively that the jury was sworn, they were satisfied with the court’s references to its recollection of the swearing of the jury, and Harris’ failure to offer evidence to the contrary result in Harris having failed to carry his burden of persuasion.
Harris next complains that the trial court erred in restricting his summation relating to the reliability of eyewitness testimony. In summation, defense counsel undertook an attack on the reliability of eyewitness testimony. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objections to the attack, warning defense counsel that he could not refer to other cases. Although defense counsel protested that he was not referring to another specific case, the trial court found that his closing argument referred to other cases "indirectly" and ordered counsel to avoid such references. This Court found that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in limiting even inferential references to unrelated cases and circumstances.
Finally, Harris challenged three photographs of the victim at the scene which were admitted into evidence, arguing that the photographs were unduly prejudicial because they provoked an emotional response. The Court reasoned that photographs may be relevant and possess probative value even though they often illustrate something that has already been presented in testimony. Further, the Court held the trial judge engaged in the appropriate balancing in admitting the photos, as the photos were illustrative of the graphic testimony presented by the responding firefighter/paramedic.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Saturday, February 10, 2007
Cathcart v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed February 9, 2007—Opinion by Judge Alan Wilner
Robin Cathcart was convicted by a jury of first degree assault and false imprisonment after brutally beating his former girlfriend and thereafter precluding her from leaving her apartment to seek medical assistance. For the first degree assault, the court imposed a sentence of ten years. For the common law offense of false imprisonment, the court sentenced Cathcart to life imprisonment, consecutive to the ten year sentence for assault, with all but ten years suspended. No period of probation was imposed with respect to the suspended part of the life sentence.
Cathcart appealed arguing that, under the circumstances of the case, the imposition of a life sentence for the common law offense of false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate and therefore illegal. Noting that the maximum sentence in Maryland for kidnapping – an aggravated form of false imprisonment – was only thirty years and that the permissible sentence for false imprisonment in other States ranged from six months to ten years, he complained that holding the victim in her apartment for up to three hours was grossly disproportionate and therefore cruel and unusual.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the sentence was effectively one of ten years, rather than life, given the fact that no period of probation was imposed with respect to the suspended part of the life sentence and that Cathcart could therefore never serve more than ten years on that sentence. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment reasoning that, under the circumstances, a sentence of ten years for false imprisonment was not unconstitutionally disproportionate.
In his petition for certiorari, Cathcart maintained that a sentence of life imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended with no probation, constituted an illegal sentence, but the nature of his complaint differed. Carthcart argued that, in the absence of a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence, the effect of the sentence, as articulated and when considered together with the ten year sentence for assault, is to preclude any parole consideration for the entire duration of the twenty years. Because the term of confinement includes a life sentence, parole eligibility is calculated on each sentence separately and then aggregated. Because first degree assault is a crime of violence, he must serve five years before he becomes eligible for parole on that sentence (the greater of one-half of the sentence imposed for the violent crime or one-fourth of the aggregate sentence.) If the sentence imposed for false imprisonment is treated as a life sentence, even though all but ten years is suspended, he would have to serve at least 15 years before he becomes eligible for parole on that sentence. That alone would make the entire part of the false imprisonment sentence ordered executed by the court immune from parole. Further, when the 5 year minimum on the assault is aggregated with the 15 year minimum on the false imprisonment, under the structure of the Circuit Court, he would not be eligible for parole for 20 years and that, as a result, the entire 20 year aggregate sentence he received would be a non-parolable one. Cathcart argued that the sentence was illegal on two fronts, (1) it is cruel and unusual to impose a non-parolable sentence of 15 years for false imprisonment, and (2) by precluding the prospect of parole in the absence of any authorizing statute, the court has effectively intruded upon the discretion of the Parole Commission, thereby exercising an Executive function in violation of the separation of powers principle enunciated in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
As there was no challenge to the 10 year sentence imposed for first degree assault, the Court focused on the sentence for false imprisonment and set forth the options available in sentencing a defendant for a crime that carries a prison sentence. The court may
(1) impose a sentence up to the maximum term allowed and, by stating no contrary ruling, implicitly direct that the entire sentence be executed; (2) suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions that the court considers proper. This section provides two options: the court may defer the actual imposition of a sentence in favor of probation, or it may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of all of it in favor of the probation. In either event, so long as the probation is not revoked, the defendant will not be incarcerated at all. If the probation is revoked, the court may then proceed either to impose the sentence that it had deferred or direct execution of all or any part that it had previously imposed but suspended; (3) impose a sentence for a specified time and provide that a lesser time be served in confinement or suspend the remainder of the sentence and order probation for a time. If the court chooses the latter approach, it must impose the full sentence it intends to impose; and (4) impose a sentence of custodial confinement or imprisonment as a condition of probation. The split sentence option may be used in connection with a life sentence; however, there must be a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence.
Failure to impose a period of probation does not necessarily make the sentence illegal but simply precludes it from having the status of a split sentence under CP § 6-222. Because the effect of the omission is to limit the period of incarceration to the unsuspended part of the sentence, that becomes, in law, the effective sentence. If the court has chosen not to impose a period of probation and thereby limited the period of incarceration to the unsuspended portion of the sentence, the effect of remanding the case for it to do so would be tantamount to allowing it to increase the sentence from that fixed number of years to a life sentence, and our jurisdiction does not allow for that. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the Circuit Court to amend the sentence imposed on the false imprisonment conviction to imprisonment for 10 years, consecutive to the sentence imposed on the first degree assault conviction.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Robin Cathcart was convicted by a jury of first degree assault and false imprisonment after brutally beating his former girlfriend and thereafter precluding her from leaving her apartment to seek medical assistance. For the first degree assault, the court imposed a sentence of ten years. For the common law offense of false imprisonment, the court sentenced Cathcart to life imprisonment, consecutive to the ten year sentence for assault, with all but ten years suspended. No period of probation was imposed with respect to the suspended part of the life sentence.
Cathcart appealed arguing that, under the circumstances of the case, the imposition of a life sentence for the common law offense of false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate and therefore illegal. Noting that the maximum sentence in Maryland for kidnapping – an aggravated form of false imprisonment – was only thirty years and that the permissible sentence for false imprisonment in other States ranged from six months to ten years, he complained that holding the victim in her apartment for up to three hours was grossly disproportionate and therefore cruel and unusual.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the sentence was effectively one of ten years, rather than life, given the fact that no period of probation was imposed with respect to the suspended part of the life sentence and that Cathcart could therefore never serve more than ten years on that sentence. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment reasoning that, under the circumstances, a sentence of ten years for false imprisonment was not unconstitutionally disproportionate.
In his petition for certiorari, Cathcart maintained that a sentence of life imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended with no probation, constituted an illegal sentence, but the nature of his complaint differed. Carthcart argued that, in the absence of a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence, the effect of the sentence, as articulated and when considered together with the ten year sentence for assault, is to preclude any parole consideration for the entire duration of the twenty years. Because the term of confinement includes a life sentence, parole eligibility is calculated on each sentence separately and then aggregated. Because first degree assault is a crime of violence, he must serve five years before he becomes eligible for parole on that sentence (the greater of one-half of the sentence imposed for the violent crime or one-fourth of the aggregate sentence.) If the sentence imposed for false imprisonment is treated as a life sentence, even though all but ten years is suspended, he would have to serve at least 15 years before he becomes eligible for parole on that sentence. That alone would make the entire part of the false imprisonment sentence ordered executed by the court immune from parole. Further, when the 5 year minimum on the assault is aggregated with the 15 year minimum on the false imprisonment, under the structure of the Circuit Court, he would not be eligible for parole for 20 years and that, as a result, the entire 20 year aggregate sentence he received would be a non-parolable one. Cathcart argued that the sentence was illegal on two fronts, (1) it is cruel and unusual to impose a non-parolable sentence of 15 years for false imprisonment, and (2) by precluding the prospect of parole in the absence of any authorizing statute, the court has effectively intruded upon the discretion of the Parole Commission, thereby exercising an Executive function in violation of the separation of powers principle enunciated in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
As there was no challenge to the 10 year sentence imposed for first degree assault, the Court focused on the sentence for false imprisonment and set forth the options available in sentencing a defendant for a crime that carries a prison sentence. The court may
(1) impose a sentence up to the maximum term allowed and, by stating no contrary ruling, implicitly direct that the entire sentence be executed; (2) suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions that the court considers proper. This section provides two options: the court may defer the actual imposition of a sentence in favor of probation, or it may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of all of it in favor of the probation. In either event, so long as the probation is not revoked, the defendant will not be incarcerated at all. If the probation is revoked, the court may then proceed either to impose the sentence that it had deferred or direct execution of all or any part that it had previously imposed but suspended; (3) impose a sentence for a specified time and provide that a lesser time be served in confinement or suspend the remainder of the sentence and order probation for a time. If the court chooses the latter approach, it must impose the full sentence it intends to impose; and (4) impose a sentence of custodial confinement or imprisonment as a condition of probation. The split sentence option may be used in connection with a life sentence; however, there must be a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence.
Failure to impose a period of probation does not necessarily make the sentence illegal but simply precludes it from having the status of a split sentence under CP § 6-222. Because the effect of the omission is to limit the period of incarceration to the unsuspended part of the sentence, that becomes, in law, the effective sentence. If the court has chosen not to impose a period of probation and thereby limited the period of incarceration to the unsuspended portion of the sentence, the effect of remanding the case for it to do so would be tantamount to allowing it to increase the sentence from that fixed number of years to a life sentence, and our jurisdiction does not allow for that. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the Circuit Court to amend the sentence imposed on the false imprisonment conviction to imprisonment for 10 years, consecutive to the sentence imposed on the first degree assault conviction.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
State v. Williams (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed February 8, 2007—Opinion by Judge Clayton Green
Charles Williams was convicted in a bench trial of aiding and abetting Anthony Henderson and Cheryl Gains in the attempted robbery of a Citgo station in Baltimore County. The trial judge found Williams guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon (Count 1); attempted robbery (Count 2); assault in the first degree (Count 3); attempted theft (Count 4); use of a handgun in the commission of a felony (Count 6); and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence (Count 7). Williams was acquitted of wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun (Count 5) and two counts of possession of a firearm (Counts 8 and 9).
Williams was convicted as a principal in the second degree to those crimes, in part, because he drove Henderson and Gaines to and from the station where the crimes took place. The Court of Special Appeals found the guilty verdicts inconsistent with the acquittal for wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun because Williams could not have used the handgun if he did not first possess it. The trial judge neither acknowledged the inconsistencies offered nor offered any justification to explain how Williams was not in joint constructive possession of the handgun used in the crime.
The Court of Special Appeals compared the “use” of a handgun to the “possession” and determined that the Legislature intended “use” to be something more than “possession” – an active, rather than a passive operation or employment of a handgun. The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that there existed no evidence that Williams actually possessed the handgun but noted that his convictions were not based on his actual use of the handgun; they were based on Henderson’s use of the handgun and William’s complicity in Henderson’s actions. The court explained that before Williams could use the gun he had to have possessed it, and the trial court failed to explain that inconsistency. As such, the Court of Special Appeals reversed Williams’ convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault in the first degree, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and a felony. It affirmed all the other verdicts and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for new sentencing.
Upon the State’s writ of certiorari, this Court reasoned that verdicts are inconsistent if they are “lacking consistency; not compatible with another fact or claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (8th ed. 1999). Inconsistent verdicts in jury trials are permissible in criminal cases; however, inconsistent verdicts of guilty and not guilty by a trial judge at a nonjury trial are not ordinarily permitted. When a trial judge renders inconsistent verdicts, the remedy is to reverse or vacate the verdict entered on the inconsistent guilty verdict. Where, however, there is an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts at a nonjury trial, but where the trial judge on the record satisfactorily explains the apparent inconsistency, the guilty verdict may stand. If there is only an apparent inconsistency which in substance disappears upon review of the trial court’s explanation, the guilty verdict will not be vacated.
The Court agreed with the State’s distinctions between misdemeanors and felonies in the application of the law of accessoryship in Maryland, but disagreed that those differences render the verdicts inconsistent, as a matter of law, in this case. The Court established that the common law doctrine of accessoryship is applicable to felonies only and outlined the differences:
A principal in the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent. A principal in the second degree is one who is guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive. A principal in the second degree differs from an accessory before the fact because an accessory before the fact is one who is guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof, without having been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration. Lastly, an accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the other’s guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment. These differences are not applicable to misdemeanors because, in Maryland, the principles of accessoryship apply only to felonies; as to misdemeanors, all participants in a crime are considered principals.
In accordance with these definitions and case law, the Court concluded that Williams must have possessed the handgun before he could use it. Because Williams embraced the entire criminal enterprise, it was inconsistent for the trial judge to conclude that Williams used the handgun but did not actually or constructively possess that gun. The judge, further, failed to adequately explain how Williams was not in possession of the handgun while traveling to the Citgo station but nonetheless embraced all of the other crimes committed in furtherance of the attempted armed robbery. Consequently, the convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault in the first degree, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and a felony must be reversed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Charles Williams was convicted in a bench trial of aiding and abetting Anthony Henderson and Cheryl Gains in the attempted robbery of a Citgo station in Baltimore County. The trial judge found Williams guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon (Count 1); attempted robbery (Count 2); assault in the first degree (Count 3); attempted theft (Count 4); use of a handgun in the commission of a felony (Count 6); and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence (Count 7). Williams was acquitted of wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun (Count 5) and two counts of possession of a firearm (Counts 8 and 9).
Williams was convicted as a principal in the second degree to those crimes, in part, because he drove Henderson and Gaines to and from the station where the crimes took place. The Court of Special Appeals found the guilty verdicts inconsistent with the acquittal for wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun because Williams could not have used the handgun if he did not first possess it. The trial judge neither acknowledged the inconsistencies offered nor offered any justification to explain how Williams was not in joint constructive possession of the handgun used in the crime.
The Court of Special Appeals compared the “use” of a handgun to the “possession” and determined that the Legislature intended “use” to be something more than “possession” – an active, rather than a passive operation or employment of a handgun. The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that there existed no evidence that Williams actually possessed the handgun but noted that his convictions were not based on his actual use of the handgun; they were based on Henderson’s use of the handgun and William’s complicity in Henderson’s actions. The court explained that before Williams could use the gun he had to have possessed it, and the trial court failed to explain that inconsistency. As such, the Court of Special Appeals reversed Williams’ convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault in the first degree, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and a felony. It affirmed all the other verdicts and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for new sentencing.
Upon the State’s writ of certiorari, this Court reasoned that verdicts are inconsistent if they are “lacking consistency; not compatible with another fact or claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (8th ed. 1999). Inconsistent verdicts in jury trials are permissible in criminal cases; however, inconsistent verdicts of guilty and not guilty by a trial judge at a nonjury trial are not ordinarily permitted. When a trial judge renders inconsistent verdicts, the remedy is to reverse or vacate the verdict entered on the inconsistent guilty verdict. Where, however, there is an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts at a nonjury trial, but where the trial judge on the record satisfactorily explains the apparent inconsistency, the guilty verdict may stand. If there is only an apparent inconsistency which in substance disappears upon review of the trial court’s explanation, the guilty verdict will not be vacated.
The Court agreed with the State’s distinctions between misdemeanors and felonies in the application of the law of accessoryship in Maryland, but disagreed that those differences render the verdicts inconsistent, as a matter of law, in this case. The Court established that the common law doctrine of accessoryship is applicable to felonies only and outlined the differences:
A principal in the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent. A principal in the second degree is one who is guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive. A principal in the second degree differs from an accessory before the fact because an accessory before the fact is one who is guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof, without having been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration. Lastly, an accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the other’s guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment. These differences are not applicable to misdemeanors because, in Maryland, the principles of accessoryship apply only to felonies; as to misdemeanors, all participants in a crime are considered principals.
In accordance with these definitions and case law, the Court concluded that Williams must have possessed the handgun before he could use it. Because Williams embraced the entire criminal enterprise, it was inconsistent for the trial judge to conclude that Williams used the handgun but did not actually or constructively possess that gun. The judge, further, failed to adequately explain how Williams was not in possession of the handgun while traveling to the Citgo station but nonetheless embraced all of the other crimes committed in furtherance of the attempted armed robbery. Consequently, the convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault in the first degree, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and a felony must be reversed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, February 2, 2007
Fields v. State and Colkley v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed February 2, 2007. Opinion by Judge Arrie W. Davis.
From the official headnote of the case:
The opinion is available in PDF format.
From the official headnote of the case:
MARYLAND RULE 4-326(D); DENICOLIS v. STATE, 378 MD. 646 (2003); MORA v. STATE, 355 MD. 639 (1999); COMMUNICATIONS BY COURT WITH JURY; THE STATE FAILED TO SHOULDER ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT COURT PROPERLY INFORMED APPELLANTS THAT THE JURY HAD SUBMITTED A NOTE MARKED AS EXHIBIT #4 MAKING INQUIRY ABOUT EXPERT BALLISTICS TESTIMONY PROBATIVE OF THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF CRIMINAL AGENCY OR THAT THE HANDLING OF THE NOTE, WHICH NEITHER THE COURT NOR COUNSEL RECALLED, COMPORTED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF MD. RULE 4-326; THE INEXPLICABLE CIRCUMSTANCES CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR; ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE COURT NEVER TOOK ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE NOTE, APPELLANTS WERE NEVERTHELESS DENIED THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND, MOREOVER, THE JURY WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH AN ANSWER TO ITS INQUIRY TO WHICH IT WAS ENTITLED; SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; IN LIGHT OF PRECEDENT REGARDING WEIGHING OF FACTORS IN DETERMINATION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
State v. Garnett (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed February 2, 2007. Opinion by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.
From the official headnote of the case:
On consideration, the court concluded that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude raising the illegal sentence issue, since the Court of Appeals in Garnett I had noted the issue had not been before it. Further, the court rejected the State's claim that recent legislative changes to the Victim's Rights Act had effectively overruled the holding in Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264 (1983), finding that no sentence of restitution should have been imposed on Garnett, concluding that the illegal sentence of restitution was appropriately corrected, and affirming the judgment.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
From the official headnote of the case:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE; MOTION TO CORRECTThe procedural history of the case was set forth in the previous trip to the Court of Appeals (in Garnett I) and was not repeated in this opinion, other than to note that in Garnett I, the order of restitution entered against Garnett was a penal sanction to which she was subject, despite a finding of guilty but not criminally responsible. As such, it was not subject to discharge in bankruptcy, and the State's motion to allow garnishment should have been allowed. On remand, Garnett sought to dismiss the garnishment motion, claiming the restitution order was illegal because she was found guilty but not criminally responsible and could not be held to account for the crimes for which she was convicted. The circuit court granted Garnett's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
ILLEGAL SENTENCE: Although Md. Rule 4-345(a) does not entitle a defendant to relitigate an “illegal sentence” issue actually decided by the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals, that rule would be meaningless if the law of the case doctrine were extended to sentences that could have been -- but were not -- challenged as illegal at the time an appellant filed his or her first appellate brief. The law of the case doctrine therefore prohibits a defendant from attempting to once again present an “illegal sentence” argument that has been presented to and rejected by an appellate court.
On consideration, the court concluded that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude raising the illegal sentence issue, since the Court of Appeals in Garnett I had noted the issue had not been before it. Further, the court rejected the State's claim that recent legislative changes to the Victim's Rights Act had effectively overruled the holding in Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264 (1983), finding that no sentence of restitution should have been imposed on Garnett, concluding that the illegal sentence of restitution was appropriately corrected, and affirming the judgment.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
Wednesday, January 31, 2007
Jones v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed January 30, 2007. Opinion by Judge Deborah S. Eyler.
Defendant/appellant Jones appealed his conviction in Baltimore County of first-degree sexual offense, second-degree sexual offense, sodomy, and second-degree assault. On appeal, Jones challenged his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in rejecting his territorial jurisdiction argument as a matter of law, instead of submitting the issue to the jury, and in ruling the evidence was legally sufficient to establish a proper chain of custody for the DNA evidence.
Somewhere around midnight in early December, 1998, the victim went to a bar on Liberty Road in Baltimore County. After drinking heavily and passing out after falling outside, she was abducted from the bar's parking lot into the back seat of a car. Although she couldn't describe her assailant, she recalled being beaten and sodomized in the back seat, while a driver in the front seat drove the car, sometimes at high speed. When she began to throw up, the assailant dragged her out of the car. She then passed out again or fell asleep, and woke up some time later to find herself in Leakin Park in Baltimore City, dressed only in shirt and socks, some four or five hours after her abduction. She was taken to Mercy Medical Center, where a SAFE (Sexual Assault Forensics Examination) nurse performed an examination, and took an anal swab sample from the victim.
When after two months no viable suspect had been found, the case was closed by the Baltimore County police. Then, in 2004, DNA evidence from the swabs was sent to an independent lab for analysis. The results matched Jones' records in the State's DNA database, and he was indicted in early 2006.
At trial, the victim had not been able to testify as to her location during the period of her abduction, other than the beginning point in Baltimore County and the end point in Baltimore City, and couldn't rule out the possibility that she had been in the District of Columbia or Virginia when the assaults had actually taken place. At the end of the trial, the defense moved to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The judge denied the motion, finding that the jury could make a reasonable inference from the testimony that the assault had in fact taken place in Maryland. Counsel for defense failed to request a jury instruction on territorial jurisdiction, but did mention in closing argument the lack of certainty of location as one element leading to reasonable doubt.
The Court noted that in Maryland, territorial jurisdiction is not an element of the offense, but must be raised as an affirmative defense based on evidence presented at trial. The Court distinguished the case at hand from the earlier cases of West v. State, Painter v. State, State v. Butler and McDonald v. State, finding that unlike the earlier cases, the issue of territorial jurisdiction had not been preserved for appellate review by the failure to request a jury instruction, and in any event the evidence here did not generate a genuine dispute of fact, at most raising a mere possibility or speculation that the crime might not have been committed on Maryland.
The Court then considered the evidence at trial on the issue of chain of custody of the DNA material, and found that it was sufficient to show by a reasonable probability that the DNA sample had not been tampered with, notwithstanding some missing details that did not indicate tampering or contamination. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments against Jones.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
Defendant/appellant Jones appealed his conviction in Baltimore County of first-degree sexual offense, second-degree sexual offense, sodomy, and second-degree assault. On appeal, Jones challenged his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in rejecting his territorial jurisdiction argument as a matter of law, instead of submitting the issue to the jury, and in ruling the evidence was legally sufficient to establish a proper chain of custody for the DNA evidence.
Somewhere around midnight in early December, 1998, the victim went to a bar on Liberty Road in Baltimore County. After drinking heavily and passing out after falling outside, she was abducted from the bar's parking lot into the back seat of a car. Although she couldn't describe her assailant, she recalled being beaten and sodomized in the back seat, while a driver in the front seat drove the car, sometimes at high speed. When she began to throw up, the assailant dragged her out of the car. She then passed out again or fell asleep, and woke up some time later to find herself in Leakin Park in Baltimore City, dressed only in shirt and socks, some four or five hours after her abduction. She was taken to Mercy Medical Center, where a SAFE (Sexual Assault Forensics Examination) nurse performed an examination, and took an anal swab sample from the victim.
When after two months no viable suspect had been found, the case was closed by the Baltimore County police. Then, in 2004, DNA evidence from the swabs was sent to an independent lab for analysis. The results matched Jones' records in the State's DNA database, and he was indicted in early 2006.
At trial, the victim had not been able to testify as to her location during the period of her abduction, other than the beginning point in Baltimore County and the end point in Baltimore City, and couldn't rule out the possibility that she had been in the District of Columbia or Virginia when the assaults had actually taken place. At the end of the trial, the defense moved to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The judge denied the motion, finding that the jury could make a reasonable inference from the testimony that the assault had in fact taken place in Maryland. Counsel for defense failed to request a jury instruction on territorial jurisdiction, but did mention in closing argument the lack of certainty of location as one element leading to reasonable doubt.
The Court noted that in Maryland, territorial jurisdiction is not an element of the offense, but must be raised as an affirmative defense based on evidence presented at trial. The Court distinguished the case at hand from the earlier cases of West v. State, Painter v. State, State v. Butler and McDonald v. State, finding that unlike the earlier cases, the issue of territorial jurisdiction had not been preserved for appellate review by the failure to request a jury instruction, and in any event the evidence here did not generate a genuine dispute of fact, at most raising a mere possibility or speculation that the crime might not have been committed on Maryland.
The Court then considered the evidence at trial on the issue of chain of custody of the DNA material, and found that it was sufficient to show by a reasonable probability that the DNA sample had not been tampered with, notwithstanding some missing details that did not indicate tampering or contamination. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments against Jones.
This opinion is available in PDF format.
Thursday, January 25, 2007
Price v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided January 25, 2007--Opinion by Judge James R. Eyler
Price was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm under sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to a drug trafficking crime. The court sentenced Price to eight years imprisonment on the heroin possession, a consecutive eight years imprisonment on the cocaine possession, two years concurrent on the marijuana possession, and another twelve years imprisonment consecutive on the possession of a firearm conviction.
Four issues were raised on appeal:
1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Price's convictions;
2) Whether the court erred by refusing to ask an impaneled juror, who was later dismissed, whether he had discussed the reason for his dismissal with any of the other jurors;
3) Whether the court erred by doubling Price’s sentences for all three drug possession convictions pursuant to Maryland Code (2002 Repl. Vol.) §5-905 of the Criminal Law ("C.L.") Article;
4) Whether the court erred by allowing the jury to convict Price of possession of a handgun in connection with trafficking, and acquit him of all other drug trafficking charges.
Held:
1) To support a conviction for the offense of simple possession, the evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited drugs in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that the accused exercised some restraining or directing influence over it. Additionally, the accused, in order to be found guilty, must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance and referred to the following factors to determine the issue of possession:
(i) proximity between the Defendant and the contraband, (ii) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of Defendant, (iii) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or (iv) the presence or circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.
The evidence adduced at trial consisted mainly of testimony of the police officers who were conducting surveillance. From this testimony, the court found, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Price was in close proximity and had knowledge of the presence of the drugs, inferred that Price was participating in the sale and that the gun and money thrown by Price were instruments related to the sale of the drugs. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Price's possession convictions.
2) A note left by juror number 4 for the judge indicated concern by the juror of potential reprisal given that he resided within close proximity to the neighborhood where Price was arrested. Prior to dismissal of the juror, Defense argued that the juror should be questioned as to whether he explained his dismissal to other jurors, potentially tainting the jury. The court found that, on several occasions, the jurors had been admonished not to discuss the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the juror without further inquiry as to whether he had discussed with anyone his reasons for wanting to be dismissed.
3) The State contends that C.L. §5-905 authorized the court to double Price's sentences because of his status as a repeat offender. Price countered that doubling his sentences is explicitly limited to one count only. The court found the language of §5-905 ambiguous; that the language of the statute does not make clear whether an enhanced penalty can be imposed on each and every count arising out of a single course of conduct, or whether an enhanced penalty can only be imposed on one count of a multi-count charging document based on a single course of conduct. Relying on Diaz v. State, the rule of lenity applied and required vacating Price's sentences.
4) The court noted that although unexplained, inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge cannot stand, inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are generally tolerated under Maryland law. At the appellate level, the court will review such inconsistent verdicts where real prejudice is shown and the verdicts may be attributable to errors in the jury charge.
The jury, without finding Price guilty of one of the drug trafficking offenses, found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug trafficking. Price conceded that the jury instructions were correct and the court decided not to disturb the jury’s verdict.
A copy of the opinion is available in PDF.
Price was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm under sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to a drug trafficking crime. The court sentenced Price to eight years imprisonment on the heroin possession, a consecutive eight years imprisonment on the cocaine possession, two years concurrent on the marijuana possession, and another twelve years imprisonment consecutive on the possession of a firearm conviction.
Four issues were raised on appeal:
1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Price's convictions;
2) Whether the court erred by refusing to ask an impaneled juror, who was later dismissed, whether he had discussed the reason for his dismissal with any of the other jurors;
3) Whether the court erred by doubling Price’s sentences for all three drug possession convictions pursuant to Maryland Code (2002 Repl. Vol.) §5-905 of the Criminal Law ("C.L.") Article;
4) Whether the court erred by allowing the jury to convict Price of possession of a handgun in connection with trafficking, and acquit him of all other drug trafficking charges.
Held:
1) To support a conviction for the offense of simple possession, the evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited drugs in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that the accused exercised some restraining or directing influence over it. Additionally, the accused, in order to be found guilty, must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the substance and referred to the following factors to determine the issue of possession:
(i) proximity between the Defendant and the contraband, (ii) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of Defendant, (iii) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or (iv) the presence or circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.
The evidence adduced at trial consisted mainly of testimony of the police officers who were conducting surveillance. From this testimony, the court found, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Price was in close proximity and had knowledge of the presence of the drugs, inferred that Price was participating in the sale and that the gun and money thrown by Price were instruments related to the sale of the drugs. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Price's possession convictions.
2) A note left by juror number 4 for the judge indicated concern by the juror of potential reprisal given that he resided within close proximity to the neighborhood where Price was arrested. Prior to dismissal of the juror, Defense argued that the juror should be questioned as to whether he explained his dismissal to other jurors, potentially tainting the jury. The court found that, on several occasions, the jurors had been admonished not to discuss the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the juror without further inquiry as to whether he had discussed with anyone his reasons for wanting to be dismissed.
3) The State contends that C.L. §5-905 authorized the court to double Price's sentences because of his status as a repeat offender. Price countered that doubling his sentences is explicitly limited to one count only. The court found the language of §5-905 ambiguous; that the language of the statute does not make clear whether an enhanced penalty can be imposed on each and every count arising out of a single course of conduct, or whether an enhanced penalty can only be imposed on one count of a multi-count charging document based on a single course of conduct. Relying on Diaz v. State, the rule of lenity applied and required vacating Price's sentences.
4) The court noted that although unexplained, inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge cannot stand, inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are generally tolerated under Maryland law. At the appellate level, the court will review such inconsistent verdicts where real prejudice is shown and the verdicts may be attributable to errors in the jury charge.
The jury, without finding Price guilty of one of the drug trafficking offenses, found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a nexus to drug trafficking. Price conceded that the jury instructions were correct and the court decided not to disturb the jury’s verdict.
A copy of the opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Spry v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Decided January 16, 2007—Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia, dissent by Chief Judge Robert Bell.
Petitioner, George Junior Spry, sought review following the affirmance by the Court of Special Appeals of his conviction for failure to obey a police officer's reasonable and lawful order to prevent a disturbance to the public peace, in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002). Spry was convicted after he had been arrested pursuant to a warrant secured on the day following the disturbance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a police officer does not have to arrest an individual immediately after the first disobedience of a lawful order made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace to initiate prosecution under Section 10-201 (c)(3).
Chief Judge Bell dissented. In Judge Bell's view, the object of the statute is the prevention of a disturbance of the public peace, and when the arrest is made both the threat to the public peace and the willful failure to obey the order made in pursuance of abating it must still persist. Judge Bell considers that the offense was not committed where the defendant complies and there is no threat to the public peace. The record showed that the petitioner complied with the officer's order, albeit belatedly and accompanied by profanity and a disrespectful attitude. Judge Bell opined that the use of profanity and the failure to show what an officer may regard as proper respect are not the elements of the offense, and thus can not, and should not, be the basis for his conviction.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Petitioner, George Junior Spry, sought review following the affirmance by the Court of Special Appeals of his conviction for failure to obey a police officer's reasonable and lawful order to prevent a disturbance to the public peace, in violation of Section 10-201 (c)(3) of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002). Spry was convicted after he had been arrested pursuant to a warrant secured on the day following the disturbance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a police officer does not have to arrest an individual immediately after the first disobedience of a lawful order made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace to initiate prosecution under Section 10-201 (c)(3).
Chief Judge Bell dissented. In Judge Bell's view, the object of the statute is the prevention of a disturbance of the public peace, and when the arrest is made both the threat to the public peace and the willful failure to obey the order made in pursuance of abating it must still persist. Judge Bell considers that the offense was not committed where the defendant complies and there is no threat to the public peace. The record showed that the petitioner complied with the officer's order, albeit belatedly and accompanied by profanity and a disrespectful attitude. Judge Bell opined that the use of profanity and the failure to show what an officer may regard as proper respect are not the elements of the offense, and thus can not, and should not, be the basis for his conviction.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, December 29, 2006
Singfield v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided December 29, 2006 -- Opinion by Judge James P. Salmon.
Appellant appealed on three separate grounds his criminal conviction for murder with a handgun, the first such ground being the trial court's refusal of a voir dire question on the issue of juror prejudice or bias on the basis of the specific charge of murder with a handgun.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court had not adequately addressed the issue of charge-specific bias by granting questions related to whether each juror:
1) had been the "victim of a weapon's charge" [sic] or a weapon's crime or had someone in the family who was accused of a weapon's crime; and
2) had any reason whatsoever . . . that would affect his or her ability to render a fair and impartial decision.
The Court of Special Appeals rejected arguments from the State that no charge-specific voir dire question should issue for a murder with a handgun charge in the manner required in prior Maryland decisions for charges involving certain sex offense or controlled dangerous substance charges. The Court of Special Appeals further noted that Appellant faced other lesser included homicide charges involving imperfect self-defense claims, and that the denied voir dire question was germane to those charges as well.
The Court of Special Appeals accordingly reversed the conviction and remanded the case for retrial on that ground, and did not address Appellant's other grounds.
The full opinion is available in WPD and PDF.
Appellant appealed on three separate grounds his criminal conviction for murder with a handgun, the first such ground being the trial court's refusal of a voir dire question on the issue of juror prejudice or bias on the basis of the specific charge of murder with a handgun.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court had not adequately addressed the issue of charge-specific bias by granting questions related to whether each juror:
1) had been the "victim of a weapon's charge" [sic] or a weapon's crime or had someone in the family who was accused of a weapon's crime; and
2) had any reason whatsoever . . . that would affect his or her ability to render a fair and impartial decision.
The Court of Special Appeals rejected arguments from the State that no charge-specific voir dire question should issue for a murder with a handgun charge in the manner required in prior Maryland decisions for charges involving certain sex offense or controlled dangerous substance charges. The Court of Special Appeals further noted that Appellant faced other lesser included homicide charges involving imperfect self-defense claims, and that the denied voir dire question was germane to those charges as well.
The Court of Special Appeals accordingly reversed the conviction and remanded the case for retrial on that ground, and did not address Appellant's other grounds.
The full opinion is available in WPD and PDF.
Friday, December 8, 2006
Cottman v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 8, 2006--Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene, Jr.
Criminal Law – Proceedings – Appeals – Effect of New Trial – Mootness – Where a criminal defendant, after conviction and sentence, files a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but is granted a new trial before the appellate opinion is filed, the appellate court may be required to dismiss the appeal. The trial court retains fundamental jurisdiction to grant a new trial, despite the pending appeal, but the effect of granting a new trial, ordinarily, renders the appeal moot. In the instant case, the Court of Special Appeals erred, as a matter of law, in failing to dismiss the appeal where the subject matter of the appeal was moot and that court was unable to review the propriety of the order granting the new trial.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Criminal Law – Proceedings – Appeals – Effect of New Trial – Mootness – Where a criminal defendant, after conviction and sentence, files a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but is granted a new trial before the appellate opinion is filed, the appellate court may be required to dismiss the appeal. The trial court retains fundamental jurisdiction to grant a new trial, despite the pending appeal, but the effect of granting a new trial, ordinarily, renders the appeal moot. In the instant case, the Court of Special Appeals erred, as a matter of law, in failing to dismiss the appeal where the subject matter of the appeal was moot and that court was unable to review the propriety of the order granting the new trial.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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