Thornton v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed March 20, 2007--Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene.

Petitioner seeks review of a Court of Special Appeals judgment affirming his conviction for murder in the second degree. Two questions were presented:

1. Did the intermediate appellate court and the trial judge correctly interpret and apply the mens rea element of the second-degree murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety?

2. Did the intermediate appellate court and the trial court correctly interpret and apply the law of imperfect self-defense?

Second degree murder does not require premeditation or deliberation. In order to convict the defendant of second degree murder, the burden is on the State to prove (1) that the conduct of the defendant caused the death of the victim; and (2) that the defendant engaged in the deadly conduct either with the intent to kill or with the intent to inflict serious bodily harm such that death would be the likely result.

To determine whether the trial judge and intermediate appellate court correctly interpreted and applied the intent element of second-degree murder, the Court reviewed the mens rea requirement, focusing on the definitions of murder, malice and grievous bodily harm, including the meaning of the phrase "that death would be the likely result." Where murder is predicated upon a theory of intent to commit grievous bodily harm, the intended harm must be grievous bodily harm and must be the legal equivalent of malice. Furthermore, in the context of a murder prosecution, intent to inflict grievous bodily harm means such harm that a reasonable person could or should know, under the circumstances, would likely result in death to the victim. Because the crime involves an unintentional killing, the defendant need not actually know that his conduct will result in the victim's death. The requisite mens rea is measured by an objective standard, i.e., could or should a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have foreseen that death would likely ensue as a result of his or her conduct. Thus, the likelihood requirement is no more than an objective standard used to circumscribe and clarify the elements of intent and malice.

Malice may be inferred from (1) an act by the accused sufficient to show an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or (2) an act the natural tendency of which would cause death or great bodily harm. In other words, the trier of fact may infer malice where the defendant acts without provocation, justification or excuse, and could or should have foreseen that the consequences of his or her conduct might result in death to another person. Malice may be either express or implied.

Intent has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows those consequences are substantially certain to result from his act. A general mens rea or intent includes those consequences which (a) represent the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of the likelihood of occurrence), or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire). By contrast, a specific intent requires more than the general intent to do the actus reus. An offense is murder depending on the results and the nature and extent of the injury or wrong actually intended.

Thus, the trier of fact may find the requisite intent for second-degree murder, even where the defendant did not intend to kill the victim, but did intend to inflict grievous bodily harm. Murder of the intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm type is, by definition, a specific intent crime, and the specific intent necessary for conviction is the intent to do serious bodily injury, that death would be the likely result.

In the instant case, the trial judge found that Petitioner did not possess a specific intent to kill his victim but did indicate that malice was implied. Yet, at no time did the trial judge state that Petitioner acted with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. Essentially, the trial judge reasoned that because Petitioner was responsible for his actions, he, therefore, must have known that his act would inflict serious bodily harm and that death would be a possible or probable consequence of that harm. The intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is a life-threatening state of mind. Thus, in order to convict Petitioner, the trier of fact was required to find that Petitioner's desire or purpose was to inflict such harm that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, could or should have anticipated that death would likely occur.

The trial judge erred by substituting the notion of responsibility for one's actions (the act of stabbing the victim in the leg) for knowledge that death would likely occur. Merely because Petitioner may be blameworthy, because of the consequences of his actions, does not mean that he either had a desire to bring about those results or that those results were probable. Essentially, the trial judge found that because Petitioner caused the injury from which death resulted, he was guilty of murder. This determination resulted in a presumption that Petitioner intended the consequences of his actions and a modification of the mens rea requirement for specific intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm. The trier of fact may draw inferences from the facts presented in the case but may not presume an element of the State's case.

Held that the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's interpretation and application of the intent element for the crime of second-degree murder. The qualification that "death would be the likely result" both circumscribes and clarifies the intent element of second degree murder of the type of consideration. Moreover, the panel majority did not acknowledge the difference between serious bodily harm in the context of murder and in the context of an assault. Second degree murder of the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm is neither a strict liability crime nor a crime predicated upon a theory of negligence. Accordingly, the State must prove intent to injure the victim so severely that death would be the likely result even though the defendant did not intend that the victim die. In summary, the trial judge's mistaken conclusions of law, which modified the specific intent requirement and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Petitioner, warrants reversal of conviction for murder in the second degree and a remand of the case for a new trial. In light of this holding, the second question was not addressed.

The full opinion is available in PDF.