Showing posts with label evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label evidence. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 8, 2007
Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co. (U.S.D.C. MD)
Filed May 4, 2007--Opinion by Judge Paul Grimm
In an action brought to enforce a private arbitrator’s award for damage to a yacht, the court determined that the motion by the boat owners was properly considered as a motion to modify the award under the Federal Arbitration Act, while the motion by the insurance company sought to enforce the award rather than have it increased as requested by the boat owners. The court denied both motions without prejudice because counsel for both sides had failed to establish the authenticity of their exhibits, to resolve potential hearsay issues, to comply with the original writing rule, and to demonstrate the absence of unfair prejudice to the extent that their exhibits were inadmissible.
In its 101 page opinion, the court dedicated at least 90 pages to providing extensive and detailed analysis and guidance on the interrelated evidentiary issues governing the admissibility of electronically stored evidence (ESI), including: analysis under Rule 104, relevance under Rule 401, authentication as required by Rule 901(a), effect of hearsay as defined by Rule 801 and any applicable exceptions, consideration of the form of the ESI being offered under the original writing rule and the admissibility of any secondary evidence to prove its content, and the probative value of the ESI considering potential unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified by Rule 403.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
In an action brought to enforce a private arbitrator’s award for damage to a yacht, the court determined that the motion by the boat owners was properly considered as a motion to modify the award under the Federal Arbitration Act, while the motion by the insurance company sought to enforce the award rather than have it increased as requested by the boat owners. The court denied both motions without prejudice because counsel for both sides had failed to establish the authenticity of their exhibits, to resolve potential hearsay issues, to comply with the original writing rule, and to demonstrate the absence of unfair prejudice to the extent that their exhibits were inadmissible.
In its 101 page opinion, the court dedicated at least 90 pages to providing extensive and detailed analysis and guidance on the interrelated evidentiary issues governing the admissibility of electronically stored evidence (ESI), including: analysis under Rule 104, relevance under Rule 401, authentication as required by Rule 901(a), effect of hearsay as defined by Rule 801 and any applicable exceptions, consideration of the form of the ESI being offered under the original writing rule and the admissibility of any secondary evidence to prove its content, and the probative value of the ESI considering potential unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified by Rule 403.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Labels:
arbitration,
evidence,
hearsay,
insurance,
Judge Grimm Paul
Friday, April 13, 2007
Williamson v. State (Court of Appeals)
Filed April 13, 2007 – Opinion by Judge Lynne Battaglia
Derek Maurice Williamson sought review of the denial of a motion to suppress statements he made during the execution of a search warrant. During surveillance, police had observed him enter and leave the residence to be searched on numerous occasions. Based on their belief that Williamson was an occupant of the residence, after arriving to exercise a search warrant and seeing him leave the house, police stopped Williamson as he was about to enter his car. The police returned him to the house and detained him during the search. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court properly denied Williamson’s motion because the police had the authority to return Williamson to the house and detain him while the search was conducted.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Derek Maurice Williamson sought review of the denial of a motion to suppress statements he made during the execution of a search warrant. During surveillance, police had observed him enter and leave the residence to be searched on numerous occasions. Based on their belief that Williamson was an occupant of the residence, after arriving to exercise a search warrant and seeing him leave the house, police stopped Williamson as he was about to enter his car. The police returned him to the house and detained him during the search. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court properly denied Williamson’s motion because the police had the authority to return Williamson to the house and detain him while the search was conducted.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Sunday, April 1, 2007
Palm v. Wausau Benefits, Inc. (U.S.D.C. Maryland)(Not approved for publication)
Filed March 26, 2007—Opinion by Judge Andre Davis
Plaintiff Anthony Palm, a beneficiary under a group long term disability income policy sponsored by his former employer, sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et. seq., to challenge a denial of benefits.
The Court considered it undisputed that Palm suffered from numerous impairments, including chronic lumbalgia, acute chronic lumbosacral paravertebral muscle spasm, bilaterally, and degenerative dessication with dorsal disc bulging at L4 - 5, L5 - S1 and C5 - 6, that are, collectively, disabling. On the ultimate issue, however, of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Palm was "totally disabled" from working in "any occupation," the Court determined that a physician’s opinion that Palm cannot perform sedentary or light duty work was rather conclusory and wholly undercut by other evidence in the record, including surveillance videos of Palm engaged in physical activity inconsistent with his claims.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court found that Palm failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is "totally disabled" within the definition of the relevant policy. At best, the Court said, the evidence was in equipoise (and parenthetically added that it was not), but in any event Palm failed to satisfy his burden to show “total disability” under the Policy.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Plaintiff Anthony Palm, a beneficiary under a group long term disability income policy sponsored by his former employer, sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et. seq., to challenge a denial of benefits.
The Court considered it undisputed that Palm suffered from numerous impairments, including chronic lumbalgia, acute chronic lumbosacral paravertebral muscle spasm, bilaterally, and degenerative dessication with dorsal disc bulging at L4 - 5, L5 - S1 and C5 - 6, that are, collectively, disabling. On the ultimate issue, however, of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Palm was "totally disabled" from working in "any occupation," the Court determined that a physician’s opinion that Palm cannot perform sedentary or light duty work was rather conclusory and wholly undercut by other evidence in the record, including surveillance videos of Palm engaged in physical activity inconsistent with his claims.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court found that Palm failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is "totally disabled" within the definition of the relevant policy. At best, the Court said, the evidence was in equipoise (and parenthetically added that it was not), but in any event Palm failed to satisfy his burden to show “total disability” under the Policy.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Labels:
ERISA,
evidence,
insurance,
Judge Davis Andre,
summary judgment
Friday, March 30, 2007
MALDONADO v. MILLSTONE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Not approved for publication)
Decided February 23, 2007—Opinion by Judge William Connelly
Plaintiff Maldonado alleged that Defendants caused injuries to him through the negligent failure to provide safe maintenance of a material hoist, failure to use reasonable care to discover and correct unsafe conditions on the material hoist, and failure to adequately warn of a hazardous and dangerous condition which Defendants knew or should have known existed. In considering defense motions for summary judgment, the Court struck Plaintiff’s expert report because it lacked an affidavit verifying its authenticity. The Court also found inadmissible an unsworn memorandum from an NSA safety specialist.
Because this case concerned the malfunction of complex machinery, the Court determined that the Plaintiff was precluded from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur and without expert testimony the Plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case. The Court added that even if the expert's opinion letter was admissible, it would not create a genuine issue of material fact because it was based on the inadmissible NSA memorandum and the expert himself had never examined the material hoist. Therefore the Court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
Plaintiff Maldonado alleged that Defendants caused injuries to him through the negligent failure to provide safe maintenance of a material hoist, failure to use reasonable care to discover and correct unsafe conditions on the material hoist, and failure to adequately warn of a hazardous and dangerous condition which Defendants knew or should have known existed. In considering defense motions for summary judgment, the Court struck Plaintiff’s expert report because it lacked an affidavit verifying its authenticity. The Court also found inadmissible an unsworn memorandum from an NSA safety specialist.
Because this case concerned the malfunction of complex machinery, the Court determined that the Plaintiff was precluded from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur and without expert testimony the Plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case. The Court added that even if the expert's opinion letter was admissible, it would not create a genuine issue of material fact because it was based on the inadmissible NSA memorandum and the expert himself had never examined the material hoist. Therefore the Court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
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