Filed May 2, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.
Maddox, individually and as parent of her minor children, presents the following questions:
(1) Because the plaintiffs' expert witness died, leaving them with no expert to testify, should the plaintiffs have been permitted to substitute an expert?
(2) Because the plaintiffs complied with the scheduling order, did the circuit court abuse its discretion in striking their original expert witness?
The Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion in striking one of Maddox's other expert witnesses ("Wald") because of a lack of strict compliance with the scheduling order. Accordingly, there was no need to reach the question of whether, upon learning of the death of Maddox's other expert witness ("Hauf"), the circuit court abused its discretion in not allowing Maddox to substitute the earlier stricken expert for the deceased expert.
The Court reasoned that, while it is true that the Maryland Rules of Procedure are to be strictly followed, the discovery rules in particular are to be liberally construed in order to effectuate their purpose. Maddox maintained that they had met the "substantial compliance" or "good faith and earnest effort" test because Wald was named two weeks before the scheduling order deadline and his report was provided to opposing counsel immediately as soon as it was available; 34 days after the deadline but well in advance of trial and prior to the closing of discovery. Further, Wald was made available for deposition and was, in fact, deposed over two full months prior to trial and prior to the date established in the scheduling order for completion of all discovery. Maddox argued that, because Wald was deposed well in advance of trial, Stone was not deprived of the ability to prepare a proper defense.
The governing principle is that the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court. The more draconian sanctions of dismissing a claim or precluding the evidence necessary to support a claim are normally reserved for persistent and deliberate violations that actually cause some prejudice. The scheduling order is not meant to function as a statute of limitations, and good faith substantial compliance with the scheduling order is ordinarily sufficient to forestay a case-ending sanction. Accordingly, although the decision of whether to exclude a key witness because of a party's failure to meet the deadlines in a scheduling order is generally committed to the discretion of the trial court, the imposition of such a draconian sanction must be supported by circumstances that warrant the exercise of the court's discretion in such a manner -- the trial record must contain an analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances that resulted in the exercise of the judge's discretion and not simply some applied predetermined position.
This opinion is not to say that trial counsel and litigants are free to treat scheduling orders as mere suggestions or imprecise guidelines for trial preparation. Scheduling orders must be given respect as orders of the circuit court, and the court may, under appropriate circumstances, impose sanctions upon parties who fail to comply with the deadlines in scheduling orders.
The full Opinion Available in PDF.
Showing posts with label Judge Meredith Timothy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Meredith Timothy. Show all posts
Saturday, May 5, 2007
Friday, March 30, 2007
Livingston v. Naylor (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 30, 2007 Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith
Livingston appealed from an order denying his motion to dismiss a writ of garnishment of his wages. Naylor had obtained a money judgment against Livingston in North Carolina and then enrolled that judgment in Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. As a resident of North Carolina, Livingston argued that the Maryland court did not have an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. The Court of Special Appeals held that there were sufficient contacts for jurisdiction over Livingston and Maryland courts could garnish Livingston’s property in Maryland, including compensation he earned from Marriott for services Livingston rendered in Maryland. Due process, however, would not permit garnishment in Maryland of compensation Livingston earned for services rendered wholly outside of Maryland when the garnishment order was based solely on the fact that Livingston’s employer does business in Maryland.
Livingston appealed from an order denying his motion to dismiss a writ of garnishment of his wages. Naylor had obtained a money judgment against Livingston in North Carolina and then enrolled that judgment in Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. As a resident of North Carolina, Livingston argued that the Maryland court did not have an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. The Court of Special Appeals held that there were sufficient contacts for jurisdiction over Livingston and Maryland courts could garnish Livingston’s property in Maryland, including compensation he earned from Marriott for services Livingston rendered in Maryland. Due process, however, would not permit garnishment in Maryland of compensation Livingston earned for services rendered wholly outside of Maryland when the garnishment order was based solely on the fact that Livingston’s employer does business in Maryland.
Friday, March 9, 2007
Addison v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed March 8, 2007. Opinion by Judge Timothy E. Meredith.
From an appeal of a pretrial order denying the defendant's motion for an ex parte hearing regarding pretrial use and disclosure of confidential records he had previously subpoenaed and reviewed in the trial court's chambers, the Court of Special Appeals granted the State's motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal, on the grounds that the ruling below was not immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.
On trial in Montgomery County for various counts of sexual offense and sexual abuse, Addison sought certain educational and health records for the alleged victim from the local public schools and the local Department of Health and Human Services, which request was opposed by those entities on privacy and confidentiality grounds. The trial court ordered that the requested records be made available for inspection in chambers by counsel for Addison, but prohibited any use or disclosure of them pending further court order.
After inspection of the materials, Addison's counsel moved to be heard ex parte on the justification for pretrial use by Addison of some of the materials, arguing that such proffers would require the disclosure of defense strategy and work product, and therefore should not be shared with the prosecution because, if shared, the disclosure would violate Addison's due process rights, the right not to self-incriminate and the right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial judge denied the motion, and Addison appealed.
The Court noted that, as a general principle, ex parte communication between one party and the judge are disfavored, except as permitted by law, with explicit restrictions on both judges and attorneys to avoid engaging in such. Addison had argued that the requested ex parte hearing was expressly authorized by law, even with no Maryland case or statute on point, by virtue of cases in other jurisdictions. The Court noted that such cases were distinguishable from the case at hand, since most involved hearings to determine whether an indigent defendant was entitled to payment by the state for expert psychiatric testimony, but did not decide the issue, since the case at hand was resolved on other grounds.
To be appealable, an order or judgment must ordinarily be final. Under Maryland law, there are only three limited exceptions to the final judgment requirement, the first being appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute, the second being immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602, and the final being appeals allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine. Here, there was no claim that either of the first two applied, so if allowable, this appeal must qualify under the final exception.
To satisfy the collateral order doctrine, four elements must be found to exist. The order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue, be completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The Court noted that, in Maryland, the four elements are very strictly applied and interlocutory appeals sustained only in extraordinary circumstances. In the St. Joseph case, the scope of the collateral order doctrine had been limited to one very unusual situation, involving trial court orders permitting the deposition of high government decision makers.
The Court found none of the exceptions to apply in this case, noting that if Addison's arguments were adopted, many discovery disputes would be entitled to interlocutory appeal, a result counter to the stated formulation of the collateral order doctrine under Maryland law. Thus, the prosecution's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted, without resolving the ex parte hearing issue.
The opinion is available in PDF.
From an appeal of a pretrial order denying the defendant's motion for an ex parte hearing regarding pretrial use and disclosure of confidential records he had previously subpoenaed and reviewed in the trial court's chambers, the Court of Special Appeals granted the State's motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal, on the grounds that the ruling below was not immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.
On trial in Montgomery County for various counts of sexual offense and sexual abuse, Addison sought certain educational and health records for the alleged victim from the local public schools and the local Department of Health and Human Services, which request was opposed by those entities on privacy and confidentiality grounds. The trial court ordered that the requested records be made available for inspection in chambers by counsel for Addison, but prohibited any use or disclosure of them pending further court order.
After inspection of the materials, Addison's counsel moved to be heard ex parte on the justification for pretrial use by Addison of some of the materials, arguing that such proffers would require the disclosure of defense strategy and work product, and therefore should not be shared with the prosecution because, if shared, the disclosure would violate Addison's due process rights, the right not to self-incriminate and the right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial judge denied the motion, and Addison appealed.
The Court noted that, as a general principle, ex parte communication between one party and the judge are disfavored, except as permitted by law, with explicit restrictions on both judges and attorneys to avoid engaging in such. Addison had argued that the requested ex parte hearing was expressly authorized by law, even with no Maryland case or statute on point, by virtue of cases in other jurisdictions. The Court noted that such cases were distinguishable from the case at hand, since most involved hearings to determine whether an indigent defendant was entitled to payment by the state for expert psychiatric testimony, but did not decide the issue, since the case at hand was resolved on other grounds.
To be appealable, an order or judgment must ordinarily be final. Under Maryland law, there are only three limited exceptions to the final judgment requirement, the first being appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute, the second being immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602, and the final being appeals allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine. Here, there was no claim that either of the first two applied, so if allowable, this appeal must qualify under the final exception.
To satisfy the collateral order doctrine, four elements must be found to exist. The order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue, be completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The Court noted that, in Maryland, the four elements are very strictly applied and interlocutory appeals sustained only in extraordinary circumstances. In the St. Joseph case, the scope of the collateral order doctrine had been limited to one very unusual situation, involving trial court orders permitting the deposition of high government decision makers.
The Court found none of the exceptions to apply in this case, noting that if Addison's arguments were adopted, many discovery disputes would be entitled to interlocutory appeal, a result counter to the stated formulation of the collateral order doctrine under Maryland law. Thus, the prosecution's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted, without resolving the ex parte hearing issue.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Oxedine v. SLM Capital Corp. (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed: January 30, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.
In the Supreme Court of the State of New York, SLM Capital Corporation, appellee, obtained a default judgment against Willie and Joan Oxendine, appellants, for $332,845.02. SLM recorded the foreign judgment against the Oxendines in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The Oxendines moved to vacate entry of the foreign judgment, and, in support of their motion, argued that the State of New York did not have sufficient contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.
The circuit court ruled that the Oxendines had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue in the New York proceedings. Relying on Dixon v. Keeneland Associates, Inc., 91 Md. App. 308, the lower court stated that, under Dixon, "the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes a party from attacking a decree on jurisdictional grounds [in] the courts of a sister state where the party was afforded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues."
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. It contrasted Dixon, in which the Maryland resident had actually litigated the jurisdictional issues in the out-of-state court, with the present case, where the issue of personal jurisdiction over the Oxendines was not even brought up, much less "fully adjudicated" in the foreign court.
Overruling the lower court's finding that the issue of personal jurisdiction was waived by the Oxendines' failure to participate in the New York proceedings, the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to allow the circuit court to take evidence and inquire into whether the New York court had a sufficient basis to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the Oxendines, under the principles enunciated in International Shoe. It further instructed the circuit court that, if it finds that the State of New York did not have a sufficient basis to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the Oxendines, it must vacate the entry of the SLM judgment.
The full opinion is available in PDF here.
In the Supreme Court of the State of New York, SLM Capital Corporation, appellee, obtained a default judgment against Willie and Joan Oxendine, appellants, for $332,845.02. SLM recorded the foreign judgment against the Oxendines in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The Oxendines moved to vacate entry of the foreign judgment, and, in support of their motion, argued that the State of New York did not have sufficient contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.
The circuit court ruled that the Oxendines had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue in the New York proceedings. Relying on Dixon v. Keeneland Associates, Inc., 91 Md. App. 308, the lower court stated that, under Dixon, "the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes a party from attacking a decree on jurisdictional grounds [in] the courts of a sister state where the party was afforded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues."
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. It contrasted Dixon, in which the Maryland resident had actually litigated the jurisdictional issues in the out-of-state court, with the present case, where the issue of personal jurisdiction over the Oxendines was not even brought up, much less "fully adjudicated" in the foreign court.
Overruling the lower court's finding that the issue of personal jurisdiction was waived by the Oxendines' failure to participate in the New York proceedings, the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to allow the circuit court to take evidence and inquire into whether the New York court had a sufficient basis to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the Oxendines, under the principles enunciated in International Shoe. It further instructed the circuit court that, if it finds that the State of New York did not have a sufficient basis to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the Oxendines, it must vacate the entry of the SLM judgment.
The full opinion is available in PDF here.
Thursday, January 4, 2007
Prince George's County v. Fraternal Order of Police (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Filed January 4, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.
In 2004, the P.G. County Chief of Police established a new promotion policy, based on the "Rule of 3," wherein promotions would be an officer selected by the Chief from among the top three eligible candidates, rather than promoting the top scoring candidate as had been the previous practice. The local FOP chapter ("FOP 89") filed a grievance, claiming a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The appeal was denied by the Labor Commissioner. FOP 89 then filed a request for arbitration of the denial, and in March of 2005 the arbitrator found a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, required the promotion of the highest candidate on the eligibility list, and ordered the retroactive promotion of any officer passed over by out-of-order promotions.
Prince George's County (the "County") petitioned the local Circuit Court to vacate the arbitration award; the Circuit Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, whereupon the County appealed.
On its own, the Court of Special Appeals (the "Court") raised the issue of mootness, since the collective bargaining agreement at issue had expired in 2005, thus rendering the matter at issue moot. The Court noted an exception to the rule that courts are not to decide academic or moot questions where there is no longer an existing controversy, if there is a public benefit to be derived from deciding a matter of important public interest raised, for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future. The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here had subsequently been renegotiated, and that the County had resisted a clarification of the section at issue urged by FOP 89 and instead the existing language had been continued. Thus, the Court found justification to address the issues raised, even though moot in this case.
The Court had little difficulty finding that arbitration was required in this case, noting that arbitration is a favored remedy, and that in the case of ambiguity over the scope of matters subject to arbitration, the arbitrator and not the courts should initially determine the matter. Upon review, the Court found the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Turning to the arbitration award itself, the Court noted that mere errors of law or fact would not ordinarily justify vacating or refusing to enforce an arbitration award, but only if the award is base on fraud, misconduct. bias, prejudice, corruption or lack of good faith on the part of the arbitrator, or if the award is contrary to a clear public policy, or if beyond the scope of the issues submitted or failing to consider all matters submitted, or to correct a mistake of form such as an evident miscalculation of figures. The Court found nothing to support the contention that the award was a mistake so gross as to work a manifest injustice or contained a palpable mistake of law or fact, or that the arbitrator's decision was completely irrational. Contrary to the County's contention that provisions of county law supersede, interpret, or limit the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that the terms of such collective bargaining agreements are explicitly incorporated into and supersede inconsistent provisions of the county law.
Although the technical ruling of the Court was a dismissal on the basis of mootness, after considering the merits of the issues raised the Court upheld the arbitration award on all counts.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
In 2004, the P.G. County Chief of Police established a new promotion policy, based on the "Rule of 3," wherein promotions would be an officer selected by the Chief from among the top three eligible candidates, rather than promoting the top scoring candidate as had been the previous practice. The local FOP chapter ("FOP 89") filed a grievance, claiming a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The appeal was denied by the Labor Commissioner. FOP 89 then filed a request for arbitration of the denial, and in March of 2005 the arbitrator found a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, required the promotion of the highest candidate on the eligibility list, and ordered the retroactive promotion of any officer passed over by out-of-order promotions.
Prince George's County (the "County") petitioned the local Circuit Court to vacate the arbitration award; the Circuit Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, whereupon the County appealed.
On its own, the Court of Special Appeals (the "Court") raised the issue of mootness, since the collective bargaining agreement at issue had expired in 2005, thus rendering the matter at issue moot. The Court noted an exception to the rule that courts are not to decide academic or moot questions where there is no longer an existing controversy, if there is a public benefit to be derived from deciding a matter of important public interest raised, for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future. The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here had subsequently been renegotiated, and that the County had resisted a clarification of the section at issue urged by FOP 89 and instead the existing language had been continued. Thus, the Court found justification to address the issues raised, even though moot in this case.
The Court had little difficulty finding that arbitration was required in this case, noting that arbitration is a favored remedy, and that in the case of ambiguity over the scope of matters subject to arbitration, the arbitrator and not the courts should initially determine the matter. Upon review, the Court found the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Turning to the arbitration award itself, the Court noted that mere errors of law or fact would not ordinarily justify vacating or refusing to enforce an arbitration award, but only if the award is base on fraud, misconduct. bias, prejudice, corruption or lack of good faith on the part of the arbitrator, or if the award is contrary to a clear public policy, or if beyond the scope of the issues submitted or failing to consider all matters submitted, or to correct a mistake of form such as an evident miscalculation of figures. The Court found nothing to support the contention that the award was a mistake so gross as to work a manifest injustice or contained a palpable mistake of law or fact, or that the arbitrator's decision was completely irrational. Contrary to the County's contention that provisions of county law supersede, interpret, or limit the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that the terms of such collective bargaining agreements are explicitly incorporated into and supersede inconsistent provisions of the county law.
Although the technical ruling of the Court was a dismissal on the basis of mootness, after considering the merits of the issues raised the Court upheld the arbitration award on all counts.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Tuesday, January 2, 2007
Christian v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided January 2, 2007--Opinion by Judge Timothy Meredith.
A police officer conducting covert narcotics surveillance observed the Appellant hide a bag between the screen and entry doors of a Baltimore City rowhouse, and engage in other suspicious behavior which seemed to suggest that illicit drugs were being sold. The police officer opened the screen door, searched the bag, discovered it contained heroin, and promptly arrested the Appellant.
While arrest was in progress, a second man arrived on the scene who identified himself as the Appellant's brother, and indicated that the Appellant lived with him. According to the police officer, this second man gave him permission to search the house, at which time other drugs were discovered in plain view. In the circuit court, the Appellant's motion to suppress the seized drugs was denied, the case proceeded on a not guilty/agreed statement of facts. The Appellant was found guilty and appealed.
On appeal, the Appellant raised two issues: first, that the circuit court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; and second, that the circuit court failed to determine that the Appellant's jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court's guilty verdict was affirmed.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found behind the screen door, because it found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area, as opposed to any area behind the entry door. In affirming the circuit court on this point, the Court of Special Appeals characterized this ruling as a finding of fact which was not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found in the house, because (a) it resolved in favor of the police officer a conflict in testimony between the police officer and the Appellant's brother regarding the circumstances under which consent was given; and (b) it found that the brother did have authority to consent to search house, because Appellant and his brother had mutual use of the area searched. Again the Court of Special Appeals affirmed because the circuit court was in the best position to resolve conflicts in testimony, and it was correct as a matter of law on the brother's right to consent to the search.
Finally, with respect to the waiver of the jury trial, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but suggested a litany of questions to be asked to ensure that a waiver is knowing and voluntary.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
A police officer conducting covert narcotics surveillance observed the Appellant hide a bag between the screen and entry doors of a Baltimore City rowhouse, and engage in other suspicious behavior which seemed to suggest that illicit drugs were being sold. The police officer opened the screen door, searched the bag, discovered it contained heroin, and promptly arrested the Appellant.
While arrest was in progress, a second man arrived on the scene who identified himself as the Appellant's brother, and indicated that the Appellant lived with him. According to the police officer, this second man gave him permission to search the house, at which time other drugs were discovered in plain view. In the circuit court, the Appellant's motion to suppress the seized drugs was denied, the case proceeded on a not guilty/agreed statement of facts. The Appellant was found guilty and appealed.
On appeal, the Appellant raised two issues: first, that the circuit court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; and second, that the circuit court failed to determine that the Appellant's jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court's guilty verdict was affirmed.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found behind the screen door, because it found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area, as opposed to any area behind the entry door. In affirming the circuit court on this point, the Court of Special Appeals characterized this ruling as a finding of fact which was not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court denied the Appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found in the house, because (a) it resolved in favor of the police officer a conflict in testimony between the police officer and the Appellant's brother regarding the circumstances under which consent was given; and (b) it found that the brother did have authority to consent to search house, because Appellant and his brother had mutual use of the area searched. Again the Court of Special Appeals affirmed because the circuit court was in the best position to resolve conflicts in testimony, and it was correct as a matter of law on the brother's right to consent to the search.
Finally, with respect to the waiver of the jury trial, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but suggested a litany of questions to be asked to ensure that a waiver is knowing and voluntary.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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