Filed May 12, 2007--Opinion and Order by Judge Andre M. Davis.
This is an action brought pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in respect to the manner in which defendants, state educational officials and their agents and designees, operate the statewide system of track and field competition in Maryland.
Paralyzed from below her waist, McFadden uses a wheelchair for mobility and, by all accounts, is a world class and Olympic wheelchair racer competing in several events. She contends that defendants unlawfully discriminate against her, as a student athlete who uses a wheelchair, because their rules and protocols for assigning team points in statewide track and field competition preclude her from earning points for her team. She, therefore, seeks a preliminary injunction forbidding defendants from declining to award her one point for the successful completion of her events at the 2007 Spring Tournament.
Based in part on a February 2007 report, a plan for 12 wheelchair racing events were added to the 2007 Spring Tournament. Each wheeler may compete in up to four events, the same limit applicable to non-wheelers. The plan provides that all of the wheelchair races will be conducted on a statewide basis rather than on a class basis. In other words, the 188 secondary schools in Maryland are divided into four classes based on the number of students attending a school. Except in wheelchair race events, a student/team competes only against students in their class. Wheelchair racers (there are only three in the state) compete as a "class" without earning points for his or her team. Defendants defend their decision to assign no team points for the wheelchair races as fully consistent with policy regarding "new team events." When a "new team event" is added to state-sanctioned tournaments, the results of such event do not earn team points in the determination of team championship until high schools representing at least 40% of the jurisdictions in a particular class participate in that event during the regular and post season.
Before a preliminary injunction will issue, four factors must be evaluated: (1) the likelihood of irreperable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied; (2) the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the requested relief is granted; (3) the likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. The Court found an extraordinarily close balance of harms between McFadden and the defendants.
However, the Court reasoned, based on the third factor, that the likelihood of McFadden's success on the merits of her claims is sufficiently attenuated that the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction was not justified. McFadden's claims were brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, for which success requires establishment of a prima facie case by showing that (1) she has a disability, (2) she is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service program or activity, and (3) she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of such service, program or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of her disability. The Court found McFadden satisifed the first two elements. However, McFadden expressly agreed that, at the bottom, this is a discrimination case. As to the likelihood of success on the merits, therefore, the dispositive issue is whether McFadden will be able to show at trial that she is being treated less favorably on account of her disability, i.e., whether the constraints on McFadden's ability to earn points for her team differ in any material, legally cognizable way from the constraints on the opportunity of similarly situated students. That answer was "no."
The essence of unlawful discrimination is disparate treatment of two similarly situated individuals on the basis of a prohibited characteristic. As mentioned above, defendants award team points only when schools representing 40% of the students in a particular class participate in any event. Thus, given the limited participation in wheelchair racing at the statewide competiton (again, there are three), McFadden is treated no differently than is any student at any school who participates in any event with insufficient participation. Even though Howard County is the only jurisdiction offering varsity wheelchair racing, and even though only two schools in Howard County have competitors in wheelchair racing, defendants will count all of Howard County's 12 secondary schools toward the 40% minimum needed to elevate wheelchair racing to an event for which team points are awarded.
In sum, it is not likely that, upon a full review of the merits of McFadden's claims, the court will be pursuaded that it is discriminatory under the disability rights statutes for defendants to maintain a difference in the opportunity of wheelchair racers, in contrast to non-wheelchair racers, to earn points for teams, where all but a small number of teams are significantly under-represented in the distinct class of competitors of which McFadden is the sole member: wheelers. Accordingly, McFadden's request for preliminary injunction does not satisfy the long-standing criteria applicable to such efforts and the motion is denied.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label Americans with Disabilities Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Americans with Disabilities Act. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 16, 2007
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Rose v. Visiting Nurse Association of Maryland, LLC (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (Not Approved for Publication)
Filed April 26, 2007--Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake. Not approved for publication.
Plaintiff filed this action alleging Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her chronic anxiety in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff suffers from chronic anxiety, particularly when she drives over bridges and beltways. At the outset of her employment as a home hospice worker, she was assigned routes that did not require such travel. However, she was ultimately transferred to a route which required the type of travel that exacerbated her anxiety. Her physician wrote a recommendation that she temporarily confine her driving to city streets, to which Defendant responded by placing her on a leave of absence, until the restriction was lifted, due to a lack of accommodating substitute routes. With no activity by Plaintiff for over one year, she was terminated.
The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment reasoning that Plaintiff did not have a disability within the meaning of those statutes. A plaintiff asserting a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act must demonstrate that she had a disability according to those terms. Those statutes define a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. Plaintiff argued that her anxiety substantially limited her in the major life activity of working. The phrase "substantially limits" sets a threshold that excludes minor impairments from coverage under the ADA. An impairment substantially limits an employee's ability to work only where that employee is unable to work in a broad class of jobs. In other words, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. In the Fourth Circuit, an employee must demonstrate that because of her impairment, she was "generally foreclosed" from jobs utilizing her skills.
In the instant action, Plaintiff's evidence consisted solely of her health care provider's diagnoses. Such reports fall short of demonstrating disability within the meaning of the statutes. Plaintiff, further, was not disabled because all other evidence showed she could have used her skills to work elsewhere, e.g., a hospital, nursing home, or hospice.
Finally, Defendant did not regard Plaintiff as disabled. An employer regards an employee as disabled only where it erroneously believes that either the employee has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or that the employee's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Where the major life activity is working, the employer must perceive the employee "to be significantly restricted in [her] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." There was no evidence here that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as substantially limited in her ability to work. Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's impairment, without more, does not indicate that the company regarded her as disabled. Additionally, the fact that Defendant viewed Plaintiff as incapable of performing one aspect of her job - driving to certain locations - does not mean that she was regarded as disabled.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Plaintiff filed this action alleging Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her chronic anxiety in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff suffers from chronic anxiety, particularly when she drives over bridges and beltways. At the outset of her employment as a home hospice worker, she was assigned routes that did not require such travel. However, she was ultimately transferred to a route which required the type of travel that exacerbated her anxiety. Her physician wrote a recommendation that she temporarily confine her driving to city streets, to which Defendant responded by placing her on a leave of absence, until the restriction was lifted, due to a lack of accommodating substitute routes. With no activity by Plaintiff for over one year, she was terminated.
The Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment reasoning that Plaintiff did not have a disability within the meaning of those statutes. A plaintiff asserting a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act must demonstrate that she had a disability according to those terms. Those statutes define a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. Plaintiff argued that her anxiety substantially limited her in the major life activity of working. The phrase "substantially limits" sets a threshold that excludes minor impairments from coverage under the ADA. An impairment substantially limits an employee's ability to work only where that employee is unable to work in a broad class of jobs. In other words, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. In the Fourth Circuit, an employee must demonstrate that because of her impairment, she was "generally foreclosed" from jobs utilizing her skills.
In the instant action, Plaintiff's evidence consisted solely of her health care provider's diagnoses. Such reports fall short of demonstrating disability within the meaning of the statutes. Plaintiff, further, was not disabled because all other evidence showed she could have used her skills to work elsewhere, e.g., a hospital, nursing home, or hospice.
Finally, Defendant did not regard Plaintiff as disabled. An employer regards an employee as disabled only where it erroneously believes that either the employee has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or that the employee's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Where the major life activity is working, the employer must perceive the employee "to be significantly restricted in [her] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." There was no evidence here that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as substantially limited in her ability to work. Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's impairment, without more, does not indicate that the company regarded her as disabled. Additionally, the fact that Defendant viewed Plaintiff as incapable of performing one aspect of her job - driving to certain locations - does not mean that she was regarded as disabled.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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