Solorzano v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed March 19, 2007--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.

Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George's County for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure an individual in an unlawful manner. He agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining counts of the indictment and to recommend to the trial court that the sentence not be greater than the upper limit of the recommended range established by the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines, in this case twelve to twenty years.

At trial, the State provided a factual basis upon which to accept the plea, followed by a colloquy between the court and appellant stating, in essence, that if appellant's pre-sentencing investigation warranted a greater sentence than the parties anticipated, appellant could, in fact, receive a greater sentence than twenty years. Appellant stated he understood and entered a plea of guilty. At sentencing, dialogue between the court and appellant restated the terms of the negotiation, and the court inquired whether the appellant understood he could receive up to a term of life imprisonment reasoning that " . . . the State has agreed not to recommend more than twenty years in this case but the Court is not bound to that recommendation and could in fact sentence up to life in prison." The court subsequently sentenced appellant to life in prison with all but fifty years suspended. The Court of Special Appeals denied timely motions by appellant seeking specific performance of the plea agreement and a motion to vacate his guilty plea.

Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law to be reviewed de novo according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty. Because plea agreements are similar to contracts, "contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement." The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record if it is in open court, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 4-242(c).

Rule 4-243(c)(1) makes clear that a trial court is under no obligation to accept any particular sentence agreed upon by the State and a defendant. However, Rule 4-243(c)(3) makes equally clear that if the trial judge approves a plea agreement, the trial court is required to fulfill the terms of that agreement if the defendant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance. Although the trial court indicated that it could sentence appellant to a term of incarceration greater than twenty years if the sentencing guidelines were greater than the recommendation, the court never indicated that if the agreement was within the guidelines that the sentence could be greater. The obvious interpretation of the judge's remarks is that if the guidelines were greater than twenty years, then and only then, the defendant could receive a greater sentence.

Therefore, this Court held that the trial court accepted the terms of the plea agreement, that appellant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance, and that as such, defendant was entitled to specific performance of the terms of that agreement.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Bramble v. Thomas (Ct. of Appeals)

Decided January 8, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.

Petitioner, a gravel and sand company, held a right of first refusal in a particular parcel of land ("the Property"). The Lanes, who were the landowners and were co-respondents to this action, received from the Thomases, likewise co-respondents, an offer to purchase the Property. Added by hand-written addendum to the offer was a "no mining" clause which purported to forbid mining on the Property. When Petitioner attempted to exercise its right of first refusal, it omitted from its "matching" offer this prohibition on mining.

After the Lanes refused to convey to either Petitioner or the Thomases, the Petitioners filed suit seeking specific performance. Both the Lanes and Petitioner moved for summary judgment. The Circuit Court declared, inter alia, that Petitioner's purported exercise of the right of first refusal was ineffectual because the exercise was not made "on the terms of the intended sale," to wit, the omission from its exercise of the "no mining" provision. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals opined in dicta regarding the nature of an option under Maryland law, but denied summary judgment due to an unresolved issue of fact, namely whether the "no mining" provision was added in bad faith in order to frustrate Petitioner's preemptive right in the Property.

The Court held that under Maryland contract law regarding good faith and fair dealing, a property owner may not insert into the triggering offer terms which it knows will be repugnant to the holder in order to discourage the exercise of a preemptive right including a right of first refusal. The Court found evidence in the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude bad faith by the Lanes or the Thomases through the insertion of the "no mining" provision as a "poison pill." Among the facts noted by the Court were:

1. The mining of adjacent property;


2. Ms. Thomas' status as a registered real estate agent and concomitant likely knowledge of such adjacent mining; and


3. The handwritten format of the "no mining" clause consistent with its possible after-the-fact insertion.
   

Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter to the Court of Special Appeals, with instructions to reverse and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

The full opinion is available here in PDF.