Showing posts with label jurisdiction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jurisdiction. Show all posts
Sunday, April 1, 2007
City of Annapolis v. Bowen et al. (Ct. of Special Appeals)
Decided March 30, 2007—Opinion by Judge Peter Krauser
Retired firefighters and police officers sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the City of Annapolis (“City”) to increase their pension payments in tandem with reclassification of the positions of their active-duty counterparts. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County agreed that Annapolis City Code § 3.36.150A1 required that the retirees receive pension increases commensurate with wage increases received by active-duty personnel. The City appealed, contending that pension increases under ACC § 3.36.150A1 were limited to cost-of-living adjustments.
The retirees first argued that Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article barred the City’s appeal. Reasoning that circuit court had been exercising mandamus jurisdiction below, the Court of Special Appeals found that it had jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal.
On the merits, the retirees argued that their interpretation of ACC § 3.36.150A1 was supported by “similar legislation” in DC. The “similar” DC provision contains an explicit “equalization provision” granting retired police officers and firefighters increases in their pension when active-duty counterparts receive wage increases. The Court of Special Appeals held that the DC provision was not a cost-of-living provision like ACC § 3.36.150A1, and was in fact created to compensate for the absence of such a provision in DC. Thus the Court reversed the lower court’s decision.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Retired firefighters and police officers sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the City of Annapolis (“City”) to increase their pension payments in tandem with reclassification of the positions of their active-duty counterparts. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County agreed that Annapolis City Code § 3.36.150A1 required that the retirees receive pension increases commensurate with wage increases received by active-duty personnel. The City appealed, contending that pension increases under ACC § 3.36.150A1 were limited to cost-of-living adjustments.
The retirees first argued that Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article barred the City’s appeal. Reasoning that circuit court had been exercising mandamus jurisdiction below, the Court of Special Appeals found that it had jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal.
On the merits, the retirees argued that their interpretation of ACC § 3.36.150A1 was supported by “similar legislation” in DC. The “similar” DC provision contains an explicit “equalization provision” granting retired police officers and firefighters increases in their pension when active-duty counterparts receive wage increases. The Court of Special Appeals held that the DC provision was not a cost-of-living provision like ACC § 3.36.150A1, and was in fact created to compensate for the absence of such a provision in DC. Thus the Court reversed the lower court’s decision.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, December 15, 2006
Barsh v. State of Maryland Central Collection Unit (In re David V. Barsh, Sr.) (Maryland U.S. Bankr. Ct.)
Decided December 12, 2006--Opinion by Chief Judge Duncan W. Keir.
Where the issue of non-dischargeability is presented by application of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2),(4), (6), and (15) and for cases commenced prior to October 17, 2005, the federal court having jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability issue. The exclusive jurisdiction arises by operation of the effect of 11 U.S.C. §523(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007. If a complaint is not timely filed, the debt is discharged. After the closing of the bankruptcy case, the state court having jurisdiction over an action for the affected debt, has concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether or not that debt was dischargeable, or non-dischargeable and consequently was, or was not discharged by the discharge injunction granted in the bankruptcy case.
A debtor, faced with a post-discharge collection action by a creditor can seek to remove that state action to the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1452 and/or commence an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy court seeking a restraining order against the creditor on the basis that the actions being taken by the creditor violate the discharge injunction. If the debtor does neither but instead permits the state court to determine the dischargeability other than pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2), (4), (6), and for pre-BAPCPA cases (15), the question may be preclusively determined by final order of the state court.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Where the issue of non-dischargeability is presented by application of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2),(4), (6), and (15) and for cases commenced prior to October 17, 2005, the federal court having jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability issue. The exclusive jurisdiction arises by operation of the effect of 11 U.S.C. §523(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007. If a complaint is not timely filed, the debt is discharged. After the closing of the bankruptcy case, the state court having jurisdiction over an action for the affected debt, has concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether or not that debt was dischargeable, or non-dischargeable and consequently was, or was not discharged by the discharge injunction granted in the bankruptcy case.
A debtor, faced with a post-discharge collection action by a creditor can seek to remove that state action to the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1452 and/or commence an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy court seeking a restraining order against the creditor on the basis that the actions being taken by the creditor violate the discharge injunction. If the debtor does neither but instead permits the state court to determine the dischargeability other than pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2), (4), (6), and for pre-BAPCPA cases (15), the question may be preclusively determined by final order of the state court.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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