Signed April 23, 2007--Memo to Counsel by Judge J. Frederick Motz.
This memo is in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment as to a surviving claim from a prior ruling.
The Court relied on the Fourth Circuit's establishment of a two-part test for determining whether under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d)(2) a new claim or defense relates back to the party's original complaint: (1) whether a factual nexus exists between the original pleading and the amendments; and (2) if such a factual nexus exists, whether defendant had notice of the amended claim and would not be prejudiced by its assertion. In the instant matter, although plaintiff's original and first amended complaints did not contain the specific allegations in a separate count, the allegations put defendant on notice of the claim now asserted. Further, defendant did not show any prejudice that would result from permitting assertion of the claim.
However, on the undisputed facts, plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law. Plaintiff asserted that had NABI declared the proper payments in the Customs declarations, the amount of Customs duties paid by NABI would have been higher. The flaw here is a hypothetical declaration that was never made and that would have been erroneous in light of the finding subsequently made by Customs that no Customs duties were due because the imported items were non-dutiable. This flaw is of the most fundamental nature because one of the four required elements of a False Claims Act claim is that a defendant's statement or conduct caused the government to pay or forfeit money due.
Defendant's motion granted.
The full Memorandum is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label pleadings. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pleadings. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Pendleton v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed April 13, 2007. Opinion by Judge Robert M. Bell.
Issue: Did a pleading asserting a claim for negligence against the State based upon abuse that the plaintiff suffered in a State licensed home sufficiently allege a duty on the part of the State where the complaint alleged that, "upon information and belief," the State "knew or should have known" of the perpetrator's propensity for violence?
Held: No. The Circuit Court's dismissal of the claim against the State defendants is affirmed. For a pleading to be sufficient in the context of a negligence action, it must allege “with certainty and definiteness” facts to show a duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff . Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law, to be decided by the court. Stating that, upon information and belief, a party knew or should have known about a third party’s alleged propensity for violence, without more, is not a sufficient factual allegation from which a duty may arise.
Facts: The plaintiff sued the State in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for negligence in connection with alleged sexual and physical abuse that the plaintiff suffered at the hands of his roommate while he was residing in a group home licensed by the State. The plaintiff alleged that, "upon information and belief," the State knew or should have known of the perpetrator's propensity for violence.
The plaintiff did not allege that the perpetrator had committed assaults prior to those alleged in the complaint, or that the State had knowledge of any sexual tendencies the perpetrator may have had or that he had a history of sexual assaults. The State moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that there was "no factual allegation as to the basis for the knowledge attributed to the State or that related why the State should have been aware of any deviant tendencies that [the perpetrator] may have had, or even that he, in fact, had such tendencies prior to the alleged incidents that occurred with the [plaintiff]. The Court stated that, "in simple situations involving an easily recognized breach of duty, a general averment of negligence following a simple statement of the defendant’s act or omission will be regarded as an ultimate fact; while in more complex situations where the breach of duty is not readily apparent, such an averment will be regarded as a mere legal conclusion.”
Finding that the situation presented by the complaint was not one "where the plaintiff’s right and the defendant’s [corresponding] duty are simple and easily perceived, or involve an easily recognized breach of duty," the Court affirmed the dismissal.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Issue: Did a pleading asserting a claim for negligence against the State based upon abuse that the plaintiff suffered in a State licensed home sufficiently allege a duty on the part of the State where the complaint alleged that, "upon information and belief," the State "knew or should have known" of the perpetrator's propensity for violence?
Held: No. The Circuit Court's dismissal of the claim against the State defendants is affirmed. For a pleading to be sufficient in the context of a negligence action, it must allege “with certainty and definiteness” facts to show a duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff . Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law, to be decided by the court. Stating that, upon information and belief, a party knew or should have known about a third party’s alleged propensity for violence, without more, is not a sufficient factual allegation from which a duty may arise.
Facts: The plaintiff sued the State in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for negligence in connection with alleged sexual and physical abuse that the plaintiff suffered at the hands of his roommate while he was residing in a group home licensed by the State. The plaintiff alleged that, "upon information and belief," the State knew or should have known of the perpetrator's propensity for violence.
The plaintiff did not allege that the perpetrator had committed assaults prior to those alleged in the complaint, or that the State had knowledge of any sexual tendencies the perpetrator may have had or that he had a history of sexual assaults. The State moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that there was "no factual allegation as to the basis for the knowledge attributed to the State or that related why the State should have been aware of any deviant tendencies that [the perpetrator] may have had, or even that he, in fact, had such tendencies prior to the alleged incidents that occurred with the [plaintiff]. The Court stated that, "in simple situations involving an easily recognized breach of duty, a general averment of negligence following a simple statement of the defendant’s act or omission will be regarded as an ultimate fact; while in more complex situations where the breach of duty is not readily apparent, such an averment will be regarded as a mere legal conclusion.”
Finding that the situation presented by the complaint was not one "where the plaintiff’s right and the defendant’s [corresponding] duty are simple and easily perceived, or involve an easily recognized breach of duty," the Court affirmed the dismissal.
The opinion is available in PDF format.
Saturday, April 14, 2007
Semtek International v. Lockheed Martin (Balt. City Circuit Court, Bus. And Tech. Ct.)
Filed April 12, 2007—Opinion by Judge Albert J. Matricciani
Prior Proceedings:
Semtek sought to amend its complaint shortly before a trial in 2003 in order to add additional allegations and two new causes of action under Massachusetts law. The Court granted Lockheed’s motion to strike the amended complaint, with the modification that permitted Semtek to allege additional facts relating to intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, which was the single count before the Court for trial. At the close of Semtek's case, the Court granted Lockheed’s moved for judgment under Md. Rule 2-519. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but remanded to the Circuit Court to consider the two additional Massachusetts causes of action that Semtek had tried to insert in the stricken amended complaint. On remand, Semtek engaged new counsel and filed a second amended complaint, which Lockheed moved to strike or dismiss.
Memorandum Opinion:
The Court denied the motion to strike the second amended complaint but granted with prejudice the motion to dismiss it. The Court found that the factual allegations were expanded significantly in the second amended complaint but the causes of action were the same as those asserted by Semtek in its first amended complaint. Because those were the causes of action the Court of Special Appeals had directed the Court to consider on remand, it would not strike the second amended complaint.
The Court determined, however, that the Court of Special Appeals had already conclusively determined that Lockheed had not interfered with Semtek’s prospective economic advantage and had not engaged in other tortuous conduct that had been alleged. Applying those conclusions as the law of the case, the Court determined that even with the additional allegations of the second amended complaint, Semtek’s claims under the Massachusetts causes of action could not withstand a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. The Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
Prior Proceedings:
Semtek sought to amend its complaint shortly before a trial in 2003 in order to add additional allegations and two new causes of action under Massachusetts law. The Court granted Lockheed’s motion to strike the amended complaint, with the modification that permitted Semtek to allege additional facts relating to intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, which was the single count before the Court for trial. At the close of Semtek's case, the Court granted Lockheed’s moved for judgment under Md. Rule 2-519. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but remanded to the Circuit Court to consider the two additional Massachusetts causes of action that Semtek had tried to insert in the stricken amended complaint. On remand, Semtek engaged new counsel and filed a second amended complaint, which Lockheed moved to strike or dismiss.
Memorandum Opinion:
The Court denied the motion to strike the second amended complaint but granted with prejudice the motion to dismiss it. The Court found that the factual allegations were expanded significantly in the second amended complaint but the causes of action were the same as those asserted by Semtek in its first amended complaint. Because those were the causes of action the Court of Special Appeals had directed the Court to consider on remand, it would not strike the second amended complaint.
The Court determined, however, that the Court of Special Appeals had already conclusively determined that Lockheed had not interfered with Semtek’s prospective economic advantage and had not engaged in other tortuous conduct that had been alleged. Applying those conclusions as the law of the case, the Court determined that even with the additional allegations of the second amended complaint, Semtek’s claims under the Massachusetts causes of action could not withstand a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. The Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Conyers v. Dept of the Army (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Filed January 16, 2007 –Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Motz (not approved for publication)
In an action arising from an accident in 2002, in which Plaintiff Conyers was severely burned while cooking dinner in the Army housing assigned to his family, the Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against the United States. The United States moved to dismiss, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The Court noted that the Defendant may have had knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition (the absence of a fire extinguisher) and it was at least arguably foreseeable that the lack of an available fire extinguisher in the apartment would make the consequences of a cooking fire more serious. The Court found lacking, however, any allegation that Defendant retained control over the apartment in which Plaintiff and his wife lived. Thus the Court found no basis under Maryland law for a finding that Defendant owed any duty to Plaintiff to provide him with a fire extinguisher. Having found that Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff, the Court held that the Plaintiff's claim therefore failed as a matter of law.
In a footnote, the Court thanked the attorney it had appointed, James S. Zavakos, for the highly professional services he rendered to the Plaintiff and to the court. Although the Plaintiff originally instituted this action pro se, the Court appointed Mr. Zavakos to represent the Plaintiff because of the extremely unfortunate nature of the accident, the extent of the injuries the Plaintiff sustained, and the closeness of the legal issues.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order appears here.
In an action arising from an accident in 2002, in which Plaintiff Conyers was severely burned while cooking dinner in the Army housing assigned to his family, the Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against the United States. The United States moved to dismiss, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The Court noted that the Defendant may have had knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition (the absence of a fire extinguisher) and it was at least arguably foreseeable that the lack of an available fire extinguisher in the apartment would make the consequences of a cooking fire more serious. The Court found lacking, however, any allegation that Defendant retained control over the apartment in which Plaintiff and his wife lived. Thus the Court found no basis under Maryland law for a finding that Defendant owed any duty to Plaintiff to provide him with a fire extinguisher. Having found that Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff, the Court held that the Plaintiff's claim therefore failed as a matter of law.
In a footnote, the Court thanked the attorney it had appointed, James S. Zavakos, for the highly professional services he rendered to the Plaintiff and to the court. Although the Plaintiff originally instituted this action pro se, the Court appointed Mr. Zavakos to represent the Plaintiff because of the extremely unfortunate nature of the accident, the extent of the injuries the Plaintiff sustained, and the closeness of the legal issues.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order appears here.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
Hart v. Winter (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Decided December 21, 2006--Opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (not approved for publication)
Plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint of discrimination with the EEOC alleging he was denied the position of Executive Housekeeping Officer due to racial discrimination and reprisal for having previously filed an equal employment opportunity complaint. Plaintiff received his EEOC decision on October 20, 2004 finding no discrimination and advising him that he had 90 days after receipt of the decision to file a civil action. Plaintiff affirmed receipt of the EEOC letter by October 24, 2004.
On February 17, 2005, the EEOC issued an errata letter to the plaintiff stating in its entirety:
On January 27, 2005, 94 days after the initial limitations period began, the plaintiff filed his appeal. The civil action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Defendant filed an a motion to dismiss for untimeliness, a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia transferred the case on May 8, 2006 to the U.S. District Court for Maryland, stating that it was for the Maryland Court to decide whether plaintiff's case was timely filed.
Plaintiff argued that his complaint was timely filed because the EEOC reissued its final decision via the February 17, 2005, errata letter. However, the language the plaintiff relied on specified "the applicable filing period for complainant to request reconsideration begins to run five days after February 17[,2005]." However, the 90 day limitation period to file suit in federal court beings to run after receipt of a final EEOC decision.
The Court found that, had the plaintiff requested reconsideration, his limitations period to file an appeal in the district court would have restarted once the EEOC issued its decision on his request for reconsideration. Because the plaintiff did not exercise his right to request a reconsideration, the errata notice had no impact on the limitations period to file a judicial appeal. The appeal was thus filed untimely.
Equitable tolling is not appropriate here because the EEOC decision on October 20 adequately advised plaintiff of his right to bring suit in federal court. The reissued decision could not have misled plaintiff during the initial 90 day period because it was not issued until long after the period elapsed and, in fact, after plaintiff filed suit.
Plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint of discrimination with the EEOC alleging he was denied the position of Executive Housekeeping Officer due to racial discrimination and reprisal for having previously filed an equal employment opportunity complaint. Plaintiff received his EEOC decision on October 20, 2004 finding no discrimination and advising him that he had 90 days after receipt of the decision to file a civil action. Plaintiff affirmed receipt of the EEOC letter by October 24, 2004.
On February 17, 2005, the EEOC issued an errata letter to the plaintiff stating in its entirety:
The above captioned decision did not correctly list all of complainant's rights on appeal. A new decision with the corrected language, including complainant's right to request reconsideration, is attached. Please note that the applicable filing period for complainant to request reconsideration begins to run five days after receipt of this revision.The decision attached to the errata notice was dated October 20, 2004, the same date as the original decision.
This correction in no way alters the substantive findings of the decision.
On January 27, 2005, 94 days after the initial limitations period began, the plaintiff filed his appeal. The civil action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Defendant filed an a motion to dismiss for untimeliness, a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia transferred the case on May 8, 2006 to the U.S. District Court for Maryland, stating that it was for the Maryland Court to decide whether plaintiff's case was timely filed.
Plaintiff argued that his complaint was timely filed because the EEOC reissued its final decision via the February 17, 2005, errata letter. However, the language the plaintiff relied on specified "the applicable filing period for complainant to request reconsideration begins to run five days after February 17[,2005]." However, the 90 day limitation period to file suit in federal court beings to run after receipt of a final EEOC decision.
The Court found that, had the plaintiff requested reconsideration, his limitations period to file an appeal in the district court would have restarted once the EEOC issued its decision on his request for reconsideration. Because the plaintiff did not exercise his right to request a reconsideration, the errata notice had no impact on the limitations period to file a judicial appeal. The appeal was thus filed untimely.
Equitable tolling is not appropriate here because the EEOC decision on October 20 adequately advised plaintiff of his right to bring suit in federal court. The reissued decision could not have misled plaintiff during the initial 90 day period because it was not issued until long after the period elapsed and, in fact, after plaintiff filed suit.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Akzenta Paneele + Profile GmbH v. Unilin Flooring N.C. LLC (Maryland U.S.D.C.)
Decided December 12, 2006--Opinion by Judge William D. Quarles, Jr.
Patent-owner Akzenta filed suit against Unilin for infringing its patent. Akzenta later amended its complaint to allege infringement of a newly-issued continuation of the first patent. In answering the amended complaint, Defendant Unilin asserted unenforcability due to inequitable conduct as to the second patent and, allegedly for the first time, also as to the first patent. In its inequitable conduct defense, Unilin argued that Akzenta prosecuted the patents without disclosing information suggesting prior use, which would bear on patentability to the PTO.
Akzenta submitted both patents at issue to the PTO for reexamination and moved to stay the litigation pending reexamination of the patents. It also moved to strike portions of Unilin's answer to Akzenta's amended complaint.
The Court denied the stay based on a likelihood of prejudice to Unilin, given that no other factors weighed heavily in favor of or against granting a stay and Akzenta failed to demonstrate that it would suffer any hardship without one. Although Unilin should have sought leave of court to amend the answer as it did, the Court declined to strike any part of the amended answer given the close relationship between the two patents at issue and the Court’s broad discretion in granting leave to amend.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Patent-owner Akzenta filed suit against Unilin for infringing its patent. Akzenta later amended its complaint to allege infringement of a newly-issued continuation of the first patent. In answering the amended complaint, Defendant Unilin asserted unenforcability due to inequitable conduct as to the second patent and, allegedly for the first time, also as to the first patent. In its inequitable conduct defense, Unilin argued that Akzenta prosecuted the patents without disclosing information suggesting prior use, which would bear on patentability to the PTO.
Akzenta submitted both patents at issue to the PTO for reexamination and moved to stay the litigation pending reexamination of the patents. It also moved to strike portions of Unilin's answer to Akzenta's amended complaint.
The Court denied the stay based on a likelihood of prejudice to Unilin, given that no other factors weighed heavily in favor of or against granting a stay and Akzenta failed to demonstrate that it would suffer any hardship without one. Although Unilin should have sought leave of court to amend the answer as it did, the Court declined to strike any part of the amended answer given the close relationship between the two patents at issue and the Court’s broad discretion in granting leave to amend.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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