Signed April 11, 2007. Memorandum Opinion by William D. Quarles, Jr. (Approved for publication).
Opinion granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Issues: Did a prior dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim bar litigation of the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract where the claim was based on the same alleged wrong and the parties to the suit were identical?
Did the statute of limitations or statutory qualified immunity bar the plaintiff's claim against his former employer for defamation arising in the context of providing a prospective employer a negative employment reference?
Held: Yes to both. The plaintiff's claim for breach of contract alleged the same wrong as his previous claim for discriminatory termination. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata applied. In addition, the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim for defamation where the claim was filed more than 1 year after the alleged wrong. Even if it did not, the qualified privilege set forth in Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. s. 5-423, precluded the plaintiff's claim, absent evidence of malice or intentional or reckless disclosure of false information.
Facts: Home Depot fired the plaintiff for falsely stating that he was properly licensed to operate a forklift. When the plaintiff subsequently applied for a job at Lowe's, Lowe's contacted Home Depot for a reference. A Home Depot employee allegedly told Lowe's that the plaintiff was fired for theft.
The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for for retaliatory and discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII and Maryland law. The court dismissed the claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Then the plaintiff filed suit, alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Home Depot removed the case to the U.S. District Court. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, restating the breach of contract claim and adding a defamation claim.
Home Depot moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim on the grounds that 1) the plaintiff was an "at will" employee, and 2) the doctrine of res judicata, arising from the prior dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), barred the claim. Home Depot moved for summary judgment on the defamation claim on grounds that 1) it was filed more than 1 year after the alleged wrong, and 2) the claim was barred by privilege under Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. s. 5-423.
Applying the elements of res judicata, the court found that 1) the earlier dismissal was an adjudication on the merits, 2) the two lawsuits "centered" on the same alleged wrong, and 3) the parties were identical. Accordingly, the court held that the doctrine of res judicata barred the plaintiff's breach of contract claim.
Turning to the defamation claim, the court found that the alleged defamation occurred more than 1 year before the filing of the complaint. As the statutory limitations period for defamation in Maryland is 1 year, the court held that the claim was barred.
The court further held that, even were the claim not barred by the statute of limitations, the qualified privilege afforded to employers under Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. s. 5-423 would bar the claim. The privilege bars claims against employers for giving good faith references to prospective employers. An employer is “presumed to be acting in good faith unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the employer: 1) acted with actual malice toward the employee or former employee; or 2) intentionally or recklessly disclosed false information about the employee or former employee.” The plaintiff offered no evidence supporting a finding of actual malice or intentional or reckless disclosure. Accordingly, the privilege barred his claim.
The Memorandum Opinion is available in PDF format.
Showing posts with label res judicata. Show all posts
Showing posts with label res judicata. Show all posts
Saturday, April 14, 2007
Frank v. Home Depot (U.S.D.C. Maryland)
Filed April 11, 2007—Opinion by Judge William Quarles
The District Court granted Home Depot’s motions for summary judgment of a suit by Charles Frank, a former employee, for breach of contract and defamation related to his termination and certain statements made by a Home Depot employee to Frank’s potential future employer.
Home Depot had terminated Frank because he falsely stated that he had been properly licensed to operate the forklift when his license had expired. Thereafter, Lowe’s allegedly failed to hire him because of defamatory statements made by a Home Depot employee to someone at Lowe’s.
This is the second suit brought by Frank against Home Depot. In the first, Frank sued pro se, alleging retaliatory and discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and wrongful discharge in violation of Maryland law. The Court had dismissed that suit for failure to state a claim.
The instant suit alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge was previously dismissed without prejudice and reinstated on an amended complaint that added the defamation claim. The Court determined that the first count was barred by res judicata, while the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations and, in any event, by a statutory and common law qualified privilege, citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423 and Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 56 (2001).
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
The District Court granted Home Depot’s motions for summary judgment of a suit by Charles Frank, a former employee, for breach of contract and defamation related to his termination and certain statements made by a Home Depot employee to Frank’s potential future employer.
Home Depot had terminated Frank because he falsely stated that he had been properly licensed to operate the forklift when his license had expired. Thereafter, Lowe’s allegedly failed to hire him because of defamatory statements made by a Home Depot employee to someone at Lowe’s.
This is the second suit brought by Frank against Home Depot. In the first, Frank sued pro se, alleging retaliatory and discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and wrongful discharge in violation of Maryland law. The Court had dismissed that suit for failure to state a claim.
The instant suit alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge was previously dismissed without prejudice and reinstated on an amended complaint that added the defamation claim. The Court determined that the first count was barred by res judicata, while the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations and, in any event, by a statutory and common law qualified privilege, citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423 and Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 56 (2001).
The opinion and order are available in PDF.
Sunday, January 7, 2007
Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Philbrick (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated January 3, 2007, by Judge J. Frederick Motz (not approved for publication)
In a brief letter memorandum, Judge Motz awarded a "hat trick" to the defendants, finding three separate grounds for dismissal of this case, which involved challenges by a mine owner/operator to the Maryland Dewatering Act.
The first grounds raised were based on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, claiming that the earlier Maryland case of Maryland Aggregates Ass'n, Inc. v. State of Maryland resolved or could have resolved the issues in this case. For res judicata claims, the federal courts are to apply the law of the state in which the prior case was heard, in this case Maryland. The court found that two of the requisite elements were not in dispute, namely that there was a final judgment on the merits and the parties were the same, and after some consideration found the final element, that the claims were substantially similar (though the court noted that, had the other bases for dismissal proved unavailing, he might have considered certifying the question to the Maryland Court of Appeals for resolution).
The second ground was that the plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law, in that the Dewatering Act did not deprive the plaintiff of any property right in requiring the dewatering mine operator to pay for new wells for adjacent landowners presumptively affected by the dewatering operation, and the plaintiff had failed to identify any "property interest" that the state has invaded.
The third ground was a claim that the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris precluded the federal court from interfering with an ongoing state proceeding which involved important state interests and provided an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claims advanced in the federal suit. Here, the plaintiff had admittedly failed to appeal the result of a Maryland administrative proceeding that had denied its claims, and thus voluntarily gave up the right to resolve those matters in the Maryland courts). The judge also found an important, substantial and vital state interest, even though the Fourth Circuit has not yet specifically identified regulation of water use for Younger purposes, finding at least an analogy to zoning and regulation of land use which have long been held to justify federal abstention.
The full opinion is available in PDF, as is the order.
In a brief letter memorandum, Judge Motz awarded a "hat trick" to the defendants, finding three separate grounds for dismissal of this case, which involved challenges by a mine owner/operator to the Maryland Dewatering Act.
The first grounds raised were based on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, claiming that the earlier Maryland case of Maryland Aggregates Ass'n, Inc. v. State of Maryland resolved or could have resolved the issues in this case. For res judicata claims, the federal courts are to apply the law of the state in which the prior case was heard, in this case Maryland. The court found that two of the requisite elements were not in dispute, namely that there was a final judgment on the merits and the parties were the same, and after some consideration found the final element, that the claims were substantially similar (though the court noted that, had the other bases for dismissal proved unavailing, he might have considered certifying the question to the Maryland Court of Appeals for resolution).
The second ground was that the plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law, in that the Dewatering Act did not deprive the plaintiff of any property right in requiring the dewatering mine operator to pay for new wells for adjacent landowners presumptively affected by the dewatering operation, and the plaintiff had failed to identify any "property interest" that the state has invaded.
The third ground was a claim that the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris precluded the federal court from interfering with an ongoing state proceeding which involved important state interests and provided an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claims advanced in the federal suit. Here, the plaintiff had admittedly failed to appeal the result of a Maryland administrative proceeding that had denied its claims, and thus voluntarily gave up the right to resolve those matters in the Maryland courts). The judge also found an important, substantial and vital state interest, even though the Fourth Circuit has not yet specifically identified regulation of water use for Younger purposes, finding at least an analogy to zoning and regulation of land use which have long been held to justify federal abstention.
The full opinion is available in PDF, as is the order.
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