Decided February 14, 2007--Opinion by Chief Judge Benson Everett Legg (approved for publication)
Valderrama, a pro se litigant, sued Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. ("HTSI"), claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (retaliation, national origin discrimination and sex discrimination) and state law tort claims arising out of an alleged violation of her privacy. After extensive discovery, HTSI moved for summary judgment. The Court granted the motion and dismissed all counts of the complaint.
In order to maintain a Title VII action, a Maryland plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Typically, complainants use an EEOC form document to file a charge. Valderrama, however, did not use the EEOC form. Instead, she offered a copy of an EEOC Intake Questionnaire as evidence that she timely filed the necessary charge of discrimination.
The Court, noting that the 4th Circuit has never precisely ruled on whether such a questionnaire is sufficient to satisfy the timeliness requirement, compared the contents of Valderrama's questionnaire with the definition of a charge. Quoting EEOC regulations, the Court stated: "a charge should contain 'a clear and concise statement of facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices.' [Citation omitted.] At a minimum, the charge must be 'sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.'" If a document other than a charge meets this standard and is intended to trigger the machinery of Title VII enforcement, it will suffice to meet the timeliness requirement. Valderrama's allegations in the questionnaire that unidentified persons had made comments about her, however, were insufficient to constitute a timely charge.
The Court considered Valderrama's other claims, found them all lacking in factual support, and dismissed all of them, including the state law claims. The Court retained jurisdiction of the state law claims for the express purpose of dismissing them, noting that allowing the claims to be refiled in state court would be wasteful, "... because they would inevitably be dismissed as unfounded."
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label eeoc. Show all posts
Showing posts with label eeoc. Show all posts
Friday, February 16, 2007
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
E.E.O.C. v. EMS Innovations, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(Not Approved for Publication)
Decided February 12, 2007 - Memorandum Opinion by Judge Richard D. Bennett (not approved for publication)
EEOC brought a complaint against EMS Innovations, Inc. ("EMS"), alleging that EMS engaged in sexual harassment against at least six employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq.). EMS moved to dismiss, arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim because EMS was not an "employer" covered by Title VII and that the EEOC failed to plead its claim with sufficient specificity. Because EMS relied upon material outside the record to support its motion, the court treated the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Liability under Title VII only attaches to an "employer," being "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). EMS submitted unauthenticated personnel records with its motion to support the assertion that it employed fewer than 15 persons. It later filed affidavits with its reply to EEOC's opposition to the motion. Noting that so far there had been no opportunity for discovery in the case and that EEOC had requested an opportunity to conduct discovery, the court declined to grant summary judgment on this basis. The court also pointed out that unauthenticated records are not sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment and that EEOC had not had an opportunity to respond to the affidavits filed by EMS because they were filed with the reply and not with the original motion.
On the specificity issue, the court found that the Complaint "contain[ed] almost no facts." EEOC, however, had requested leave to file an amended complaint. Rather than dismissing the case, the court granted leave to amend with instructions to organize the amended complaint "by counts and to allege the relevant facts with sufficient particularity."
The full opinion is available in PDF.
EEOC brought a complaint against EMS Innovations, Inc. ("EMS"), alleging that EMS engaged in sexual harassment against at least six employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq.). EMS moved to dismiss, arguing that the Complaint failed to state a claim because EMS was not an "employer" covered by Title VII and that the EEOC failed to plead its claim with sufficient specificity. Because EMS relied upon material outside the record to support its motion, the court treated the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Liability under Title VII only attaches to an "employer," being "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). EMS submitted unauthenticated personnel records with its motion to support the assertion that it employed fewer than 15 persons. It later filed affidavits with its reply to EEOC's opposition to the motion. Noting that so far there had been no opportunity for discovery in the case and that EEOC had requested an opportunity to conduct discovery, the court declined to grant summary judgment on this basis. The court also pointed out that unauthenticated records are not sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment and that EEOC had not had an opportunity to respond to the affidavits filed by EMS because they were filed with the reply and not with the original motion.
On the specificity issue, the court found that the Complaint "contain[ed] almost no facts." EEOC, however, had requested leave to file an amended complaint. Rather than dismissing the case, the court granted leave to amend with instructions to organize the amended complaint "by counts and to allege the relevant facts with sufficient particularity."
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Monday, January 29, 2007
Atkins v. Winchester Homes (Maryland U.S.D.C.) (not approved for publication)
Decided January 26, 2007. Memorandum and Order by Judge Catherine C. Blake. (Not approved for publication)
Atkins, a Maryland resident of Native American national origin, filed suit against Winchester (his former employer), Weyerhaeuser Company (Winchester's parent company) and three manager/supervisors, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981. All defendants moved to dismiss Atkins' amended complaint, raising both procedural and substantive arguments in support of their motions.
Atkins alleged that for years he had been subjected to daily racial harassment and that the manager/supervisors witnessed or knew of the harassment, but did nothing to prevent it. He also alleged that he was subjected to adverse actions on account of his national origin or in retaliation for asserting his civil rights. The alleged adverse actions included being called into a supervisor's office, being disciplined when a non-Native American peer was not, and ultimately being discharged.
Procedural Arguments: Atkins did not oppose Weyerhaeuser's motion, and the court dismissed all claims against Weyerhaeuser. In doing so, the court noted that Atkins did not adequately allege that Weyerhaeuser was his employer, stating that without "allegations of common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control, or degree of financial control, the mere fact of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to sustain" an action for discrimination.
Winchester argued that the Charge of Discrimination that Atkins filed with the EEOC lacked sufficient detail to be effective and that Atkins did not provide sufficient detail until after the 300 days for filing a charge had passed. The court pointed out that the "function of a charge is to initiate the investigatory and conciliatory procedures contemplated by Title VII." Here, the initial charge contained enough information for EEOC to begin its investigation. Moreover, EEOC regulations provide that later amendments to a charge relate back to the date of initial filing.
The manager/supervisors alleged that they were not properly served within the 120-day window provided by F.R.C.P. 4(m). Process was served on a co-worker and not on the individual defendants. The defendants, however, had actual knowledge of the suit and did not assert that they were prejudiced in any way by the failure to serve them individually. For that reason, the court liberally construed the rules and declined to dismiss the suit.
Substantive Arguments: Winchester challenged Atkins' claims of disparate treatment, retaliation and harassment/hostile work environment. The court found that neither being called into a meeting with a supervisor about allegations of discrimination nor a counseling session with a supervisor arose to the level of an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim of discrimination. Termination of employment, however, clearly was such an adverse action. As for retaliation, Atkins failed to plead sufficient facts showing that his protected activity was the cause of his termination, and too much time passed between the activity and his dismissal to establish a causal connection without such specifics. On the harassment/hostile work environment claims, the allegations that the manager/supervisors witnessed the acts harassment and that Atkins had made complaints about the acts were sufficient to impose liability on his employer.
Because Title VII does not authorize claims against individuals, the Title VII claims against the individual defendants were dismissed. In addition, the court dismissed all of the Section 1981 claims against the individual defendants, except the claims against the manager/supervisor who fired Atkins. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that the acts attributed to the other manager/supervisors did not rise to the level of adverse employment actions, but that termination of employment did. In addition, the court ruled that allegations that the manager/supervisors failed to investigate or to prevent harassment by Atkins' co-workers were not sufficient to impose liability under Section 1981.
The memorandum is available in PDF The order is also available in PDF
Atkins, a Maryland resident of Native American national origin, filed suit against Winchester (his former employer), Weyerhaeuser Company (Winchester's parent company) and three manager/supervisors, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §1981. All defendants moved to dismiss Atkins' amended complaint, raising both procedural and substantive arguments in support of their motions.
Atkins alleged that for years he had been subjected to daily racial harassment and that the manager/supervisors witnessed or knew of the harassment, but did nothing to prevent it. He also alleged that he was subjected to adverse actions on account of his national origin or in retaliation for asserting his civil rights. The alleged adverse actions included being called into a supervisor's office, being disciplined when a non-Native American peer was not, and ultimately being discharged.
Procedural Arguments: Atkins did not oppose Weyerhaeuser's motion, and the court dismissed all claims against Weyerhaeuser. In doing so, the court noted that Atkins did not adequately allege that Weyerhaeuser was his employer, stating that without "allegations of common management, interrelation of operations, centralized control, or degree of financial control, the mere fact of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to sustain" an action for discrimination.
Winchester argued that the Charge of Discrimination that Atkins filed with the EEOC lacked sufficient detail to be effective and that Atkins did not provide sufficient detail until after the 300 days for filing a charge had passed. The court pointed out that the "function of a charge is to initiate the investigatory and conciliatory procedures contemplated by Title VII." Here, the initial charge contained enough information for EEOC to begin its investigation. Moreover, EEOC regulations provide that later amendments to a charge relate back to the date of initial filing.
The manager/supervisors alleged that they were not properly served within the 120-day window provided by F.R.C.P. 4(m). Process was served on a co-worker and not on the individual defendants. The defendants, however, had actual knowledge of the suit and did not assert that they were prejudiced in any way by the failure to serve them individually. For that reason, the court liberally construed the rules and declined to dismiss the suit.
Substantive Arguments: Winchester challenged Atkins' claims of disparate treatment, retaliation and harassment/hostile work environment. The court found that neither being called into a meeting with a supervisor about allegations of discrimination nor a counseling session with a supervisor arose to the level of an adverse employment action sufficient to support a claim of discrimination. Termination of employment, however, clearly was such an adverse action. As for retaliation, Atkins failed to plead sufficient facts showing that his protected activity was the cause of his termination, and too much time passed between the activity and his dismissal to establish a causal connection without such specifics. On the harassment/hostile work environment claims, the allegations that the manager/supervisors witnessed the acts harassment and that Atkins had made complaints about the acts were sufficient to impose liability on his employer.
Because Title VII does not authorize claims against individuals, the Title VII claims against the individual defendants were dismissed. In addition, the court dismissed all of the Section 1981 claims against the individual defendants, except the claims against the manager/supervisor who fired Atkins. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that the acts attributed to the other manager/supervisors did not rise to the level of adverse employment actions, but that termination of employment did. In addition, the court ruled that allegations that the manager/supervisors failed to investigate or to prevent harassment by Atkins' co-workers were not sufficient to impose liability under Section 1981.
The memorandum is available in PDF The order is also available in PDF
Thursday, January 11, 2007
Rodriguez v. Gutierrez (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Decided December 29, 2006--Opinion by Judge Catherine C. Blake (not approved for publication)
Pro se complaint against Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce alleging discrimination based on race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq.
The Plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that: 1) the conduct in question was unwelcome, 2) the harassment was based on race, 3) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment, and 4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. The Court dismissed this claim because the Plaintiff did not allege that her harassment was based on race, and because her alleged harassment was not sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment.
The Plaintiff did allege that her supervisor made alleged statements that she did not like Mexicans and did not want the Plaintiff to speak Spanish. However, these incidents occurred in 1998 or 1999. The Plaintiff did not contact an EEO counselor about the events until six or seven years later. She was required to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of an alleged discriminatory act. Thus, her claim was time-barred.
While a claim alleging a hostile work environment claim will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice, the supervisor's statements are not properly linked to the other, timely acts of discrimination and harassment alleged by the Plaintiff for several reasons:
Pro se complaint against Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce alleging discrimination based on race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq.
The Plaintiff alleged a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that: 1) the conduct in question was unwelcome, 2) the harassment was based on race, 3) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment, and 4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. The Court dismissed this claim because the Plaintiff did not allege that her harassment was based on race, and because her alleged harassment was not sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment.
The Plaintiff did allege that her supervisor made alleged statements that she did not like Mexicans and did not want the Plaintiff to speak Spanish. However, these incidents occurred in 1998 or 1999. The Plaintiff did not contact an EEO counselor about the events until six or seven years later. She was required to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of an alleged discriminatory act. Thus, her claim was time-barred.
While a claim alleging a hostile work environment claim will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice, the supervisor's statements are not properly linked to the other, timely acts of discrimination and harassment alleged by the Plaintiff for several reasons:
[The supervisor] allegedly told [the Plaintiff] that she didn't like Mexicans in 1998-1999, and [the Plaintiff] did not begin to suffer the alleged harassment from co-workers until 2003. In the time period between 1999 and 2003, [the Plaintiff] alleges no harassment occurred. Second, [the supervisor's] harassment occurred while she was supervising [the Plaintiff] in CTMS, while [the Plaintiff's] co-workers allegedly harassed her while she was working in SASB. Although [the Plaintiff] directly worked with [the supervisor] in CTMS, [the supervisor] was not [the Plaintiff's] direct supervisor while [she] worked in SASB, and [the Plaintiff] does not allege that she worked on a regular basis with [the supervisor] in SASB. Third, there is no allegation that [the supervisor's] statements are related in any way to [the Plaintiff's] co-workers' harassment. . . .Thus, [the supervisor's] 1998-1999 statements are not part of the same "unlawful employment practice" alleged against [the] co-workers, and are time-barred.The claim was dismissed without leave to amend.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order is available here.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
Hart v. Winter (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Decided December 21, 2006--Opinion by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (not approved for publication)
Plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint of discrimination with the EEOC alleging he was denied the position of Executive Housekeeping Officer due to racial discrimination and reprisal for having previously filed an equal employment opportunity complaint. Plaintiff received his EEOC decision on October 20, 2004 finding no discrimination and advising him that he had 90 days after receipt of the decision to file a civil action. Plaintiff affirmed receipt of the EEOC letter by October 24, 2004.
On February 17, 2005, the EEOC issued an errata letter to the plaintiff stating in its entirety:
On January 27, 2005, 94 days after the initial limitations period began, the plaintiff filed his appeal. The civil action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Defendant filed an a motion to dismiss for untimeliness, a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia transferred the case on May 8, 2006 to the U.S. District Court for Maryland, stating that it was for the Maryland Court to decide whether plaintiff's case was timely filed.
Plaintiff argued that his complaint was timely filed because the EEOC reissued its final decision via the February 17, 2005, errata letter. However, the language the plaintiff relied on specified "the applicable filing period for complainant to request reconsideration begins to run five days after February 17[,2005]." However, the 90 day limitation period to file suit in federal court beings to run after receipt of a final EEOC decision.
The Court found that, had the plaintiff requested reconsideration, his limitations period to file an appeal in the district court would have restarted once the EEOC issued its decision on his request for reconsideration. Because the plaintiff did not exercise his right to request a reconsideration, the errata notice had no impact on the limitations period to file a judicial appeal. The appeal was thus filed untimely.
Equitable tolling is not appropriate here because the EEOC decision on October 20 adequately advised plaintiff of his right to bring suit in federal court. The reissued decision could not have misled plaintiff during the initial 90 day period because it was not issued until long after the period elapsed and, in fact, after plaintiff filed suit.
Plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint of discrimination with the EEOC alleging he was denied the position of Executive Housekeeping Officer due to racial discrimination and reprisal for having previously filed an equal employment opportunity complaint. Plaintiff received his EEOC decision on October 20, 2004 finding no discrimination and advising him that he had 90 days after receipt of the decision to file a civil action. Plaintiff affirmed receipt of the EEOC letter by October 24, 2004.
On February 17, 2005, the EEOC issued an errata letter to the plaintiff stating in its entirety:
The above captioned decision did not correctly list all of complainant's rights on appeal. A new decision with the corrected language, including complainant's right to request reconsideration, is attached. Please note that the applicable filing period for complainant to request reconsideration begins to run five days after receipt of this revision.The decision attached to the errata notice was dated October 20, 2004, the same date as the original decision.
This correction in no way alters the substantive findings of the decision.
On January 27, 2005, 94 days after the initial limitations period began, the plaintiff filed his appeal. The civil action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Defendant filed an a motion to dismiss for untimeliness, a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia transferred the case on May 8, 2006 to the U.S. District Court for Maryland, stating that it was for the Maryland Court to decide whether plaintiff's case was timely filed.
Plaintiff argued that his complaint was timely filed because the EEOC reissued its final decision via the February 17, 2005, errata letter. However, the language the plaintiff relied on specified "the applicable filing period for complainant to request reconsideration begins to run five days after February 17[,2005]." However, the 90 day limitation period to file suit in federal court beings to run after receipt of a final EEOC decision.
The Court found that, had the plaintiff requested reconsideration, his limitations period to file an appeal in the district court would have restarted once the EEOC issued its decision on his request for reconsideration. Because the plaintiff did not exercise his right to request a reconsideration, the errata notice had no impact on the limitations period to file a judicial appeal. The appeal was thus filed untimely.
Equitable tolling is not appropriate here because the EEOC decision on October 20 adequately advised plaintiff of his right to bring suit in federal court. The reissued decision could not have misled plaintiff during the initial 90 day period because it was not issued until long after the period elapsed and, in fact, after plaintiff filed suit.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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