Filed April 10, 2007 --Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene
The parents of a child killed in an automobile accident when the driver fell asleep sued for benefits, pursuant to two policies of insurance issued to them by Erie Insurance Exchange. The Court of Appeals held that, in a breach of contract action for benefits, pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured provisions of an automobile insurance contract executed in Maryland, what the parents were "entitled to recover" was determined by Delaware substantive law because the law of the situs of the accident controlled the tort aspects of the claim, including questions of liability and damages raised in an uninsured motorist claim.
Prior to filing the contract action, the parents had settled the underlying tort claim against the underinsured tortfeasor. Because Erie approved the settlement with the tortfeasor, the Court noted that Erie was bound by that settlement and, therefore, liability was not at issue. The Court also concluded that Maryland's public policy exception to the doctrine of lex loci delicti does not require the application of Maryland's statutory cap on non-economic damages or application of Maryland's contributory negligence principles.
The opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label torts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label torts. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Morgan State University v. Walker (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 15, 2007--Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene.
Ms. Walker instituted a personal injury action against MSU, arguing they were negligent for their failure to remove snow from a parking lot which resulted in Ms. Walker fracturing her leg when she fell on the ice. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined that despite MSU's negligence, as a matter of law, Ms. Walker assumed the risk of her injuries and granted summary judgment in favor of MSU. The Court of Special Appeals reversed in an unreported opinion, holding that the voluntariness of Ms. Walker's action was a jury question. This Court concluded that when Ms. Walker walked across the parking lot with knowledge that the lot was covered with ice and snow, she assumed the risk of her injuries, as a matter of law, under the circumstances. Further, in an assumption of the risk analysis, the defendant's or a third party's negligence is irrelevant.
The voluntariness of conduct in an assumption of risk analysis is measured by an objective standard. Ms. Walker's testimony indicated she was aware of the icy conditions and clearly appreciated the danger of walking on the ice. Further, Ms. Walker's motivation to walk across the ice would be considered involuntary only if she lacked the free will to avoid the situation. The fact that no other reasonable alternative path was available does not reduce the free will standard. Ms. Walker's purpose of walking across the ice was to visit her daughter. As soon as she realized the parking lot was covered in ice, she made the free-will choice to continue with her visit, park her car, and walk across the ice. Because the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that Ms. Walker knowingly and voluntarily walked across the icy parking lot, the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of MSU.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Ms. Walker instituted a personal injury action against MSU, arguing they were negligent for their failure to remove snow from a parking lot which resulted in Ms. Walker fracturing her leg when she fell on the ice. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined that despite MSU's negligence, as a matter of law, Ms. Walker assumed the risk of her injuries and granted summary judgment in favor of MSU. The Court of Special Appeals reversed in an unreported opinion, holding that the voluntariness of Ms. Walker's action was a jury question. This Court concluded that when Ms. Walker walked across the parking lot with knowledge that the lot was covered with ice and snow, she assumed the risk of her injuries, as a matter of law, under the circumstances. Further, in an assumption of the risk analysis, the defendant's or a third party's negligence is irrelevant.
The voluntariness of conduct in an assumption of risk analysis is measured by an objective standard. Ms. Walker's testimony indicated she was aware of the icy conditions and clearly appreciated the danger of walking on the ice. Further, Ms. Walker's motivation to walk across the ice would be considered involuntary only if she lacked the free will to avoid the situation. The fact that no other reasonable alternative path was available does not reduce the free will standard. Ms. Walker's purpose of walking across the ice was to visit her daughter. As soon as she realized the parking lot was covered in ice, she made the free-will choice to continue with her visit, park her car, and walk across the ice. Because the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that Ms. Walker knowingly and voluntarily walked across the icy parking lot, the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of MSU.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Conyers v. Dept of the Army (Maryland U.S.D.C.)(not approved for publication)
Filed January 16, 2007 –Opinion by Judge J. Frederick Motz (not approved for publication)
In an action arising from an accident in 2002, in which Plaintiff Conyers was severely burned while cooking dinner in the Army housing assigned to his family, the Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against the United States. The United States moved to dismiss, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The Court noted that the Defendant may have had knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition (the absence of a fire extinguisher) and it was at least arguably foreseeable that the lack of an available fire extinguisher in the apartment would make the consequences of a cooking fire more serious. The Court found lacking, however, any allegation that Defendant retained control over the apartment in which Plaintiff and his wife lived. Thus the Court found no basis under Maryland law for a finding that Defendant owed any duty to Plaintiff to provide him with a fire extinguisher. Having found that Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff, the Court held that the Plaintiff's claim therefore failed as a matter of law.
In a footnote, the Court thanked the attorney it had appointed, James S. Zavakos, for the highly professional services he rendered to the Plaintiff and to the court. Although the Plaintiff originally instituted this action pro se, the Court appointed Mr. Zavakos to represent the Plaintiff because of the extremely unfortunate nature of the accident, the extent of the injuries the Plaintiff sustained, and the closeness of the legal issues.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order appears here.
In an action arising from an accident in 2002, in which Plaintiff Conyers was severely burned while cooking dinner in the Army housing assigned to his family, the Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against the United States. The United States moved to dismiss, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The Court noted that the Defendant may have had knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition (the absence of a fire extinguisher) and it was at least arguably foreseeable that the lack of an available fire extinguisher in the apartment would make the consequences of a cooking fire more serious. The Court found lacking, however, any allegation that Defendant retained control over the apartment in which Plaintiff and his wife lived. Thus the Court found no basis under Maryland law for a finding that Defendant owed any duty to Plaintiff to provide him with a fire extinguisher. Having found that Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff, the Court held that the Plaintiff's claim therefore failed as a matter of law.
In a footnote, the Court thanked the attorney it had appointed, James S. Zavakos, for the highly professional services he rendered to the Plaintiff and to the court. Although the Plaintiff originally instituted this action pro se, the Court appointed Mr. Zavakos to represent the Plaintiff because of the extremely unfortunate nature of the accident, the extent of the injuries the Plaintiff sustained, and the closeness of the legal issues.
The full opinion is available in PDF. The order appears here.
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