Filed: May 10, 2007—Opinion by Judge Irma Raker
Hildebrant sued Educational Service ("ETS") for malicious defamation and breach of contract after ETS concluded that Hildebrant had not followed mandatory testing procedures and canceled her test scores. According to Hildebrant, ETS breached its contract with her by failing to “"fairly and accurately report her leadership assessment scores" to the Montgomery County Board of Education. The Court of Special Appeals had earlier reversed summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings based on an affidavit by Hildebrant denying that she failed to follow testing procedures.
The Court of Appeals disagreed on the ground that an affidavit that presents a general, conclusory denial of misconduct is not sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a testing proctor acted in bad faith. The Court ruled that the trial judge was correct in granting summary judgment for ETS where Hildebrant acknowledged her acceptance of the contract with ETS and did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baker had acted in bad faith. The decision by the CSA was reversed with instructions to remand.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Showing posts with label Judge Raker Irma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Raker Irma. Show all posts
Thursday, May 10, 2007
Friday, April 13, 2007
Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Company, Inc. (ct. of Appeals)
Filed April 13, 2007 – Opinion by Judge Irma Raker
The Court of Appeals considered whether, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant whose hearing has been damaged as a result of his occupation is entitled to have hearing aids provided by his employer/insurer, even though he does not meet the criteria for monetary compensation under the Act. The Court held that the claimant is not eligible for medical benefits, i.e. hearing aids, unless he mets the criteria for eligibility for compensation under the Act.
Thus the Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, which had affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer/insurer.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
The Court of Appeals considered whether, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant whose hearing has been damaged as a result of his occupation is entitled to have hearing aids provided by his employer/insurer, even though he does not meet the criteria for monetary compensation under the Act. The Court held that the claimant is not eligible for medical benefits, i.e. hearing aids, unless he mets the criteria for eligibility for compensation under the Act.
Thus the Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, which had affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer/insurer.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Long (Ct of Appeals)
Filed April 3, 2007. Opinion signed by Judge Irma S. Raker.
In its entirety:
In its entirety:
Upon consideration of the Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent filed herein pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-772, it is this 3rd day of April, 2007,The Order is available in PDF format.
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that DIMONE G. LONG, be, and is hereby, disbarred by consent from the further practice of law in the State of Maryland effective immediately; and it is further,
ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the name of Dimone G. Long from the register of attorneys, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-772(d) shall certify that fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in this State.
Wednesday, March 21, 2007
Cochran v. Norkunas (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 20, 2007. Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.
Held: A letter of intent is not enforceable as a binding contract for the sale of real property where the letter indicates that a standard form contract would be delivered and specified how certain terms in that contract would be construed. This indicates a lack of intent by the parties to be bound by the letter.
A contract for the sale of real property is not enforceable where the offeree did not manifest acceptance of the contract by mailing or other action.
Facts: The dispute arose over the sale of residential real property. The Buyers tendered a letter of intent ("LOI") to purchase the property. Among other things, the LOI specified that the parties would execute a standard form Maryland Realtors contract. The Buyers then delivered a contract and addenda to the Seller to effect the transaction. The Seller signed the contract and addenda on the majority of the signature lines, but the Seller crossed out and did not sign certain contingency provisions. Ultimately, the Seller did not return the documents to the Buyers. Nor did she otherwise communicate to the Buyers that she had accepted their offer. The Seller simply retained the signed documents. After a week had passed, the Seller communicated to the Buyers that she was taking the property off the market.
The Buyers sued for specific performance of the LOI. During discovery, the Buyers learned that the Seller had privately signed the contract and most addenda. Upon learning this, the Buyers amended the complaint to request specific performance of the contract. The Buyers submitted affidavits stating that the changes the Seller had made to the proposed contract would have been acceptable to them.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment in favor of the Buyers, holding that the LOI and contract "signed by all parties constitute the contract in this case and together they constitute an enforceable contract of sale."
The Court of Special Appeals reversed. A copy of the opinion is available here. The CSA concluded that the LOI did not indicate that the parties had reached final agreement at the time the LOI was signed. Second, the CSA held that the Seller did not accept the contract, even though she signed the documents, because the Seller did not mail the signed contract to the Buyers so as to communicate her acceptance.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court held that a manifestation of mutual assent is an essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract. Upon reviewing the LOI, the Court concluded that a reasonable person would have understood the LOI to mean that a formal contract offer was to follow the letter of intent. The Court found that the plain language of the document indicated that the parties intended to finalize the sale through a standard form Maryland Realtors contract. Accordingly, the Court held that the LOI was the type of preliminary "agreement to agree" generally held to be unenforceable in Maryland.
Regarding enforcement of the executed but undelivered sales contract, the Court held that the Seller had not manifested acceptance of the terms of the agreement. The Court rejected the Buyers' argument that execution of a document in private, without delivery of the document or other manifestation of assent was sufficient. Rather, the Court held that notice of acceptance must be communicated to the counter-party in some way. In the case at hand, the Seller had not communicated her acceptance.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the opinion of the CSA overturning the judgment of the Circuit Court in favor of the Buyers.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Held: A letter of intent is not enforceable as a binding contract for the sale of real property where the letter indicates that a standard form contract would be delivered and specified how certain terms in that contract would be construed. This indicates a lack of intent by the parties to be bound by the letter.
A contract for the sale of real property is not enforceable where the offeree did not manifest acceptance of the contract by mailing or other action.
Facts: The dispute arose over the sale of residential real property. The Buyers tendered a letter of intent ("LOI") to purchase the property. Among other things, the LOI specified that the parties would execute a standard form Maryland Realtors contract. The Buyers then delivered a contract and addenda to the Seller to effect the transaction. The Seller signed the contract and addenda on the majority of the signature lines, but the Seller crossed out and did not sign certain contingency provisions. Ultimately, the Seller did not return the documents to the Buyers. Nor did she otherwise communicate to the Buyers that she had accepted their offer. The Seller simply retained the signed documents. After a week had passed, the Seller communicated to the Buyers that she was taking the property off the market.
The Buyers sued for specific performance of the LOI. During discovery, the Buyers learned that the Seller had privately signed the contract and most addenda. Upon learning this, the Buyers amended the complaint to request specific performance of the contract. The Buyers submitted affidavits stating that the changes the Seller had made to the proposed contract would have been acceptable to them.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment in favor of the Buyers, holding that the LOI and contract "signed by all parties constitute the contract in this case and together they constitute an enforceable contract of sale."
The Court of Special Appeals reversed. A copy of the opinion is available here. The CSA concluded that the LOI did not indicate that the parties had reached final agreement at the time the LOI was signed. Second, the CSA held that the Seller did not accept the contract, even though she signed the documents, because the Seller did not mail the signed contract to the Buyers so as to communicate her acceptance.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court held that a manifestation of mutual assent is an essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract. Upon reviewing the LOI, the Court concluded that a reasonable person would have understood the LOI to mean that a formal contract offer was to follow the letter of intent. The Court found that the plain language of the document indicated that the parties intended to finalize the sale through a standard form Maryland Realtors contract. Accordingly, the Court held that the LOI was the type of preliminary "agreement to agree" generally held to be unenforceable in Maryland.
Regarding enforcement of the executed but undelivered sales contract, the Court held that the Seller had not manifested acceptance of the terms of the agreement. The Court rejected the Buyers' argument that execution of a document in private, without delivery of the document or other manifestation of assent was sufficient. Rather, the Court held that notice of acceptance must be communicated to the counter-party in some way. In the case at hand, the Seller had not communicated her acceptance.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the opinion of the CSA overturning the judgment of the Circuit Court in favor of the Buyers.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, March 20, 2007
Flores v. Bell, et al. (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 20, 2007–Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.
Mr. and Mrs. Bell filed an action for negligence against Mr. Flores, alleging that Flores negligently caused injury to Mr. Bell in an automobile accident. The issue concerns a stipulation entered into by the parties before the trial began and the impact this stipulation had on questions submitted by the trial court for consideration by the jury. After a seven-day jury trial, the Bells were awarded $5,329 in damages, from which they appealed. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
Prior to the original trial, counsel for both sides orally agreed to stipulate that Flores was liable for the automobile accident. The stipulation was neither reduced to writing nor formally placed on the record. At the close of the Bell's case, after the jury had been excused from the room and after Flores’ counsel announced his intention to make a motion, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether the Bells had proven Flores was driving the vehicle that hit the Bells. The Bells’ counsel raised the issue of the stipulation, while Flores’ counsel clarified that they only admitted responsibility for the damages if the damages were causally proven to have related from the accident. The court reserved ruling on Flores’ Motion for Judgment and informed counsel that a question would be included on the verdict sheet asking the jury to determine whether Flores was the driver of the vehicle that collided with the Bells.
This Court granted Flores’ petition for a writ of certiorari to primarily address the following question (the second question was not addressed in light of the Court’s holding on the first question):
"On review of the trial court’s decision to reserve ruling on a motion for judgment and submit an issue to the jury, can the Court of Special Appeals vacate a jury’s verdict when, if it was error, it was harmless?"
The Court noted that the special verdict sheet required that the jury provide a separate answer to the driver-identification question. The jury's verdict to this question was in favor of the Bells and, even if submitting the question to the jury was error because the issue had been resolved by stipulation, there is nothing in the record, other than the verdict itself, to suggest that the question distracted the jury from reaching a fair and proper verdict on the question of damages. The question did not prejudice the Bells, and the Court of Special Appeals judgment vacating jury verdict was reversed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Mr. and Mrs. Bell filed an action for negligence against Mr. Flores, alleging that Flores negligently caused injury to Mr. Bell in an automobile accident. The issue concerns a stipulation entered into by the parties before the trial began and the impact this stipulation had on questions submitted by the trial court for consideration by the jury. After a seven-day jury trial, the Bells were awarded $5,329 in damages, from which they appealed. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
Prior to the original trial, counsel for both sides orally agreed to stipulate that Flores was liable for the automobile accident. The stipulation was neither reduced to writing nor formally placed on the record. At the close of the Bell's case, after the jury had been excused from the room and after Flores’ counsel announced his intention to make a motion, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether the Bells had proven Flores was driving the vehicle that hit the Bells. The Bells’ counsel raised the issue of the stipulation, while Flores’ counsel clarified that they only admitted responsibility for the damages if the damages were causally proven to have related from the accident. The court reserved ruling on Flores’ Motion for Judgment and informed counsel that a question would be included on the verdict sheet asking the jury to determine whether Flores was the driver of the vehicle that collided with the Bells.
This Court granted Flores’ petition for a writ of certiorari to primarily address the following question (the second question was not addressed in light of the Court’s holding on the first question):
"On review of the trial court’s decision to reserve ruling on a motion for judgment and submit an issue to the jury, can the Court of Special Appeals vacate a jury’s verdict when, if it was error, it was harmless?"
The Court noted that the special verdict sheet required that the jury provide a separate answer to the driver-identification question. The jury's verdict to this question was in favor of the Bells and, even if submitting the question to the jury was error because the issue had been resolved by stipulation, there is nothing in the record, other than the verdict itself, to suggest that the question distracted the jury from reaching a fair and proper verdict on the question of damages. The question did not prejudice the Bells, and the Court of Special Appeals judgment vacating jury verdict was reversed.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Monday, March 19, 2007
Solorzano v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 19, 2007--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.
Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George's County for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure an individual in an unlawful manner. He agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining counts of the indictment and to recommend to the trial court that the sentence not be greater than the upper limit of the recommended range established by the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines, in this case twelve to twenty years.
At trial, the State provided a factual basis upon which to accept the plea, followed by a colloquy between the court and appellant stating, in essence, that if appellant's pre-sentencing investigation warranted a greater sentence than the parties anticipated, appellant could, in fact, receive a greater sentence than twenty years. Appellant stated he understood and entered a plea of guilty. At sentencing, dialogue between the court and appellant restated the terms of the negotiation, and the court inquired whether the appellant understood he could receive up to a term of life imprisonment reasoning that " . . . the State has agreed not to recommend more than twenty years in this case but the Court is not bound to that recommendation and could in fact sentence up to life in prison." The court subsequently sentenced appellant to life in prison with all but fifty years suspended. The Court of Special Appeals denied timely motions by appellant seeking specific performance of the plea agreement and a motion to vacate his guilty plea.
Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law to be reviewed de novo according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty. Because plea agreements are similar to contracts, "contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement." The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record if it is in open court, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 4-242(c).
Rule 4-243(c)(1) makes clear that a trial court is under no obligation to accept any particular sentence agreed upon by the State and a defendant. However, Rule 4-243(c)(3) makes equally clear that if the trial judge approves a plea agreement, the trial court is required to fulfill the terms of that agreement if the defendant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance. Although the trial court indicated that it could sentence appellant to a term of incarceration greater than twenty years if the sentencing guidelines were greater than the recommendation, the court never indicated that if the agreement was within the guidelines that the sentence could be greater. The obvious interpretation of the judge's remarks is that if the guidelines were greater than twenty years, then and only then, the defendant could receive a greater sentence.
Therefore, this Court held that the trial court accepted the terms of the plea agreement, that appellant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance, and that as such, defendant was entitled to specific performance of the terms of that agreement.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George's County for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure an individual in an unlawful manner. He agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining counts of the indictment and to recommend to the trial court that the sentence not be greater than the upper limit of the recommended range established by the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines, in this case twelve to twenty years.
At trial, the State provided a factual basis upon which to accept the plea, followed by a colloquy between the court and appellant stating, in essence, that if appellant's pre-sentencing investigation warranted a greater sentence than the parties anticipated, appellant could, in fact, receive a greater sentence than twenty years. Appellant stated he understood and entered a plea of guilty. At sentencing, dialogue between the court and appellant restated the terms of the negotiation, and the court inquired whether the appellant understood he could receive up to a term of life imprisonment reasoning that " . . . the State has agreed not to recommend more than twenty years in this case but the Court is not bound to that recommendation and could in fact sentence up to life in prison." The court subsequently sentenced appellant to life in prison with all but fifty years suspended. The Court of Special Appeals denied timely motions by appellant seeking specific performance of the plea agreement and a motion to vacate his guilty plea.
Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law to be reviewed de novo according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty. Because plea agreements are similar to contracts, "contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement." The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record if it is in open court, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. Rule 4-242(c).
Rule 4-243(c)(1) makes clear that a trial court is under no obligation to accept any particular sentence agreed upon by the State and a defendant. However, Rule 4-243(c)(3) makes equally clear that if the trial judge approves a plea agreement, the trial court is required to fulfill the terms of that agreement if the defendant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance. Although the trial court indicated that it could sentence appellant to a term of incarceration greater than twenty years if the sentencing guidelines were greater than the recommendation, the court never indicated that if the agreement was within the guidelines that the sentence could be greater. The obvious interpretation of the judge's remarks is that if the guidelines were greater than twenty years, then and only then, the defendant could receive a greater sentence.
Therefore, this Court held that the trial court accepted the terms of the plea agreement, that appellant pled guilty in reliance on the court's acceptance, and that as such, defendant was entitled to specific performance of the terms of that agreement.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Friday, March 16, 2007
Thomas v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed on March 16, 2007. Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.
From the headnotes by the court:
"CRIMINAL LAW – PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS – DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS –
SANCTIONS: Under Maryland Rule 4-263, the trial court possesses discretion to impose appropriate sanctions for discovery violations; the proper focus and inquiry in determining the proper sanctions is whether the petitioner was prejudiced, and if so, whether he was entitled to have the evidence excluded.
CRIMINAL LAW – PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS – DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS –
SANCTIONS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude evidence of consciousness of guilt.
CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT: The State satisfied the evidentiary foundation for the admissibility of evidence of consciousness of guilt."
(synopsis to follow)
The opinion is available in PDF.
From the headnotes by the court:
"CRIMINAL LAW – PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS – DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS –
SANCTIONS: Under Maryland Rule 4-263, the trial court possesses discretion to impose appropriate sanctions for discovery violations; the proper focus and inquiry in determining the proper sanctions is whether the petitioner was prejudiced, and if so, whether he was entitled to have the evidence excluded.
CRIMINAL LAW – PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS – DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS –
SANCTIONS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude evidence of consciousness of guilt.
CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT: The State satisfied the evidentiary foundation for the admissibility of evidence of consciousness of guilt."
(synopsis to follow)
The opinion is available in PDF.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commision of Maryland v. Tatelbaum (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed March 12, 2007. Per curium order signed by Judge Ira S. Raker.
In its entirety:
This per curium order is available in PDF format.
In its entirety:
ORDER
The Court having considered the petitioner for disciplinary action, the responses filed thereto and the oral argument of the parties in the above captioned case, it is this 12th day of March, 2007,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the petition for disciplinary or remedial action be, and it is hereby, granted, and CHARLES M. TATELBAUM, the respondent, shall be suspended, nunc pro tunc, from the practice of law in the State of Maryland for ninety (90) days, the period of suspension to coincide and run concurrent with the ninety (90) day suspension imposed by the Supreme Court of Florida dating from March 8, 2006 to June 6, 2006 , and it is further
ORDERED that the Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-71 5(C).
This per curium order is available in PDF format.
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pasierb (Ct. of Appeals)
Signed February 23, 2007 - Order by Judge Irma S. Raker.
Upon consideration of a Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the respondent be disbarred by consent from the further practice of law in Maryland, and that the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall strike him from the register of attorneys and certify same to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State.
The Order is available in PDF format.
Upon consideration of a Joint Petition for Disbarment by Consent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the respondent be disbarred by consent from the further practice of law in Maryland, and that the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall strike him from the register of attorneys and certify same to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the Clerks of all judicial tribunals in the State.
The Order is available in PDF format.
Thursday, February 8, 2007
Brown v. State of Maryland (Ct. of Appeals)
Issued February 6, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge Irma Raker. Joined in Judgment Only by Judges Lynne Battaglia and Clayton Greene. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Robert Bell.
Randy Paul Brown ("Brown") arrived at someone else's residence while the police were conducting a search pursuant to a valid warrant. By the time Brown had arrived, police had alrady discovered controlled dangerous substances on the property and had made some arrests incident thereto.
The police detained and searched Brown and discovered marijuana. There was some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily entered the home or was "escorted" in. There was also some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily admitted to the police that he was carrying marijuana on his person before he was searched. The marijuana that the police found formed the basis for Brown's conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
Brown moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana based on an illegal search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied his motion, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the opinions of the two lower courts.
Held: Factual determinations of the trial Court are extended great deference by appellate courts, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Legal determinations are reviewed de novo.
There are three categories of police contacts with individuals: (1) consensual (least intrusive-no justification required); (2) detentions (mid-level intrusive - police must have articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime); (3) arrest (most intrusive - police must have probable cause). In this case, Brown was detained. The "clear rule" is that "'police may always detain persons found that the premises named in a search warrant, provided (i) the warrant authorizes a 'search for contraband' and (ii) the persons detained are 'occupants.'" (citations omitted). The Court determined that the term "occupant" includes all people "except for persons who clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and to clearly present no potential danger." Quoting Cotton v. State. In this case, Brown was properly considered an "occupant," and his detention was proper.
Judge Robert Bell dissented and incorporated the rationale from the dissent in Cotton v. State.
Randy Paul Brown ("Brown") arrived at someone else's residence while the police were conducting a search pursuant to a valid warrant. By the time Brown had arrived, police had alrady discovered controlled dangerous substances on the property and had made some arrests incident thereto.
The police detained and searched Brown and discovered marijuana. There was some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily entered the home or was "escorted" in. There was also some discrepancy as to whether Brown voluntarily admitted to the police that he was carrying marijuana on his person before he was searched. The marijuana that the police found formed the basis for Brown's conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
Brown moved to suppress evidence of the marijuana based on an illegal search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied his motion, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the opinions of the two lower courts.
Held: Factual determinations of the trial Court are extended great deference by appellate courts, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Legal determinations are reviewed de novo.
There are three categories of police contacts with individuals: (1) consensual (least intrusive-no justification required); (2) detentions (mid-level intrusive - police must have articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime); (3) arrest (most intrusive - police must have probable cause). In this case, Brown was detained. The "clear rule" is that "'police may always detain persons found that the premises named in a search warrant, provided (i) the warrant authorizes a 'search for contraband' and (ii) the persons detained are 'occupants.'" (citations omitted). The Court determined that the term "occupant" includes all people "except for persons who clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and to clearly present no potential danger." Quoting Cotton v. State. In this case, Brown was properly considered an "occupant," and his detention was proper.
Judge Robert Bell dissented and incorporated the rationale from the dissent in Cotton v. State.
Full opinion is available in PDF.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Hill v. Knapp (Ct. of Appeals)
Decided January 6, 2007—Opinion by Judge Irma Raker
The appellant, Christopher Hill, was injured when a load of plywood dropped on him from a forklift while he was working on a pier in Baltimore. Hill filed a state common law negligence action against the forklift operator, appellee Daniel Knapp. On the primary issue of whether the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. §§901-950), preempts a state tort claim for damages by a longshoreman against a co-employee in the “twilight zone,” the Court of Appeals held that the federal act preempts such a claim.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
The appellant, Christopher Hill, was injured when a load of plywood dropped on him from a forklift while he was working on a pier in Baltimore. Hill filed a state common law negligence action against the forklift operator, appellee Daniel Knapp. On the primary issue of whether the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. §§901-950), preempts a state tort claim for damages by a longshoreman against a co-employee in the “twilight zone,” the Court of Appeals held that the federal act preempts such a claim.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
Saturday, January 13, 2007
State v. Borchardt (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed January 12, 2007--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker. Dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Robert Bell in which Judge Lynne Battaglia joins, in part, and in which Judge Clayton Greene, Jr., joins, in part.
The Defendant had been convicted of two counts of murder and robbery with a deadly weapon and had been sentenced to death. His conviction had been sustained on appeal. However, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted a Petition for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2005 Cum. Supp.), §7-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article. The Circuit Court concluded that the Defendant was denied effe ctive assistance of counsel in the sentencing proceeding.
The Court of Appeals held, in essence, that various decisions by the Defendant's counsel at the sentencing proceeding not to present certain evidence were expressions of reasonably sound trial strategy. In dissent, Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Battaglia, argued that the various decisions made by Defendant's trial counsel were not "fully informed."
Also, before the Circuit Court, the Defendant alleged, on the basis of Dr. Raymond Paternoster's study entitled "An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s Death Sentencing System With Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction" (the "Paternoster Study"), that the Maryland death penalty permits the arbitrary and capricious selection of capital defendants in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This issue was not considered by the Circuit Court.
The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred and should have considered questions arising under the Paternoster Study. However, the Court also concluded that the Defendant's claim was without merit because he "makes no claim whatsoever that there is any specific evidence of discrimination in his case." Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Greene, argued that:
The Defendant had been convicted of two counts of murder and robbery with a deadly weapon and had been sentenced to death. His conviction had been sustained on appeal. However, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted a Petition for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2005 Cum. Supp.), §7-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article. The Circuit Court concluded that the Defendant was denied effe ctive assistance of counsel in the sentencing proceeding.
The Court of Appeals held, in essence, that various decisions by the Defendant's counsel at the sentencing proceeding not to present certain evidence were expressions of reasonably sound trial strategy. In dissent, Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Battaglia, argued that the various decisions made by Defendant's trial counsel were not "fully informed."
Also, before the Circuit Court, the Defendant alleged, on the basis of Dr. Raymond Paternoster's study entitled "An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s Death Sentencing System With Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction" (the "Paternoster Study"), that the Maryland death penalty permits the arbitrary and capricious selection of capital defendants in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This issue was not considered by the Circuit Court.
The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred and should have considered questions arising under the Paternoster Study. However, the Court also concluded that the Defendant's claim was without merit because he "makes no claim whatsoever that there is any specific evidence of discrimination in his case." Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Greene, argued that:
The simple fact is that [the Defendant] is asserting a claim that he was selectively prosecuted in violation of his constitutional rights,and that this affected his conviction.
Additionally, and more important, an adequate presentation of specific evidence of discrimination by the defendant cannot occur without adequate discovery from the State. It follows, then, that until an adequate presentation of specific evidence of discrimination is heard, the merits cannot be decided; to do so would be premature. The Paternoster study illustrates that death-eligible defendants in Baltimore County are more likely to receive a sentence of death than in any other county. This study alone satisfies the [U.S. v.] Armstrong standard, justifying further discovery.
The opinion and dissent are available in PDF.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
Goldberg v. Boone (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 12, 2006--Opinion by Judge Lynn A. Battaglia. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Irma Raker in which Chief Judge Robert M. Bell and Judge Clayton Greene, Jr., join.
Petitioner, Seth M. Goldberg, M.D., sought review of the Court of Special Appeals' judgment determining that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County erred in submitting an informed consent instruction to the jury because physicians in Maryland do not have a duty to inform their patients that there are other, more experienced surgeons in the region, but that the error did not warrant a new trial on the issue of negligence. Dr. Goldberg also sought review of the intermediate appellate court's conclusion that the cross-examination questions regarding one of the D.C. snipers asked of one of Dr. Goldberg's expert witnesses was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial on the sole issue of damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, concluding that, although the line of questioning about the sniper case was improper, its prejudicial effects did not transcend the trial judge's curative measures so as to warrant a new trial. The Court also determined that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the issue of informed consent because whether a reasonable person, in Mr. Boone's position, would have deemed the fact that there were other, more experienced surgeons in the region as material to the decision whether to risk having the revisionary mastoidectomy undertaken by Dr. Goldberg was a factual issue for the jury to determine.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Petitioner, Seth M. Goldberg, M.D., sought review of the Court of Special Appeals' judgment determining that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County erred in submitting an informed consent instruction to the jury because physicians in Maryland do not have a duty to inform their patients that there are other, more experienced surgeons in the region, but that the error did not warrant a new trial on the issue of negligence. Dr. Goldberg also sought review of the intermediate appellate court's conclusion that the cross-examination questions regarding one of the D.C. snipers asked of one of Dr. Goldberg's expert witnesses was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial on the sole issue of damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, concluding that, although the line of questioning about the sniper case was improper, its prejudicial effects did not transcend the trial judge's curative measures so as to warrant a new trial. The Court also determined that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the issue of informed consent because whether a reasonable person, in Mr. Boone's position, would have deemed the fact that there were other, more experienced surgeons in the region as material to the decision whether to risk having the revisionary mastoidectomy undertaken by Dr. Goldberg was a factual issue for the jury to determine.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Friday, December 8, 2006
Fields v. State (Ct. of Appeals)
Filed December 8, 2006--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's nickname, "Sat Dog," which was displayed on a television monitor above a bowling lane, was not hearsay. Even if the court erred with respect to the evidentiary issue, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court did not reach the hearsay issue.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's nickname, "Sat Dog," which was displayed on a television monitor above a bowling lane, was not hearsay. Even if the court erred with respect to the evidentiary issue, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court did not reach the hearsay issue.
The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.
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