Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Correia (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed April 30, 2007. Opinion by Judge James P. Salmon.

Issue: Does the owner-operator of an elevator owe its passengers the same "highest degree of care" owed by common carrier to passengers?

Held: Yes. The jury's verdict is affirmed. The 1906 precedent set in Belvedere Building Co. v. Bryan still stands: the owner-operator of an elevator owes its passengers the same duty as a common carrier - the highest degree of care practicable under the circumstances.

Facts: The plaintiff was injured on an elevator owned and operated by Johns Hopkins when it came to a sudden stop because of a mechanical defect. At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence that showed that, in the six months prior to the accident, Johns Hopkins had received thirty-two complaints about the elevator. At the conclusion of the case, the trial court instructed the jury that the owner of elevators "is bound to exercise the highest degree of care and skill and diligence . . . practicable under the circumstances to guard against injury to
individuals riding on those elevators." The trial court based its instruction upon case law that was decided over 100 years before, affirmed in the 1930's, and not addressed since.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and Johns Hopkins appealed. Johns Hopkins contended that the trial court's instruction was erroneous. Johns Hopkins argued that the owner of an elevator owes a passenger the same duty that a property owner owes an invitee, i.e., the duty to use reasonable care to see that the portion of the property that the invitee is expected to use is safe. Not the heightened duty of a common carrier.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Scherer Tax Service, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed March 14, 2007. Opinion by Judge James P. Salmon.

In an appeal from a decision below that an unemployment insurance claimant had "good cause" under Section 8-1005(a)(2) of the Employment Article to reject a full-time, suitable but seasonal (lasting only twelve weeks) offer of employment, the Court of Appeals REVERSED and REMANDED to the Board of Appeals for entry of an order consistent with the opinion.

The appellant ("STS") had employed a full-time receptionist ("Long") during the 2004 tax season, but laid her off at the end of the season. In early 2005, Long began receiving unemployment compensation. Less than two weeks later, STS offered Long her old job back, which was full-time employment, at a higher pay, but limited to the duration of the "tax season" of approximately 12 weeks. Long rejected the offer, opting to continue to look for long-term full-time employment instead.

In February, STS notified the appellee ("DLLR") of Long's refusal, and in May a DLLR claims specialist determined that STS had failed to timely notify DLLR, and thus Long was not disqualified to receive unemployment benefits. STS appealed, and in June a DLLR hearing examiner ruled that STS had timely notified DLLR, but that Long had good cause to reject STS's offer, was able, available and actively seeking work, and thus remained eligible to receive benefits. STS appealed to the Board of Appeals, which after a brief remand to take additional evidence concerning the duration and extent of Long's job search, affirmed the "good cause" determination and eligibility. STS then filed two petitions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, both of which were rejected, and this appeal followed.

Noting the deference due to the agency's construction of the statute that it administers and that it may not reject the Board's finding unless it was wrong as a matter of law, the court then discussed the history and purpose of the unemployment compensation statute.

The phrase "good cause" is not defined in the statute or in the statutes of neighboring states, and the DLLR hearing examiner and Board of Appeals had both relied on the Board's earlier decision in Gallagher v. Goodfriend Temporaries. DLLR admitted that Gallagher was not on all fours with the instant case, and the court found DLLR had read Gallagher far too broadly, being a case where the employment offered was sporadic and at less than half the previous salary.

The court also noted that DLLR had not claimed the employment offered was unsuitable. Unlike cases in other states, Long's unemployment period had extended for over four months, advising against a finding of "good cause" that might otherwise be found had the unemployment been brief. In examining those cases, the court found that a claimant must offer her services unequivocally, whether the employment offered is temporary or permanent. Consequently, the court held that an ordinary reasonable individual would not have turned down the offer of seasonal empoyment made by STS, since the duties were identical to her last employment and the pay greater, and therefore found the Board had erred in not disqualifying Long.

This opinion is available in PDF format.

Singfield v. State (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Decided December 29, 2006 -- Opinion by Judge James P. Salmon.

Appellant appealed on three separate grounds his criminal conviction for murder with a handgun, the first such ground being the trial court's refusal of a voir dire question on the issue of juror prejudice or bias on the basis of the specific charge of murder with a handgun.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court had not adequately addressed the issue of charge-specific bias by granting questions related to whether each juror:

1) had been the "victim of a weapon's charge" [sic] or a weapon's crime or had someone in the family who was accused of a weapon's crime; and

2) had any reason whatsoever . . . that would affect his or her ability to render a fair and impartial decision.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected arguments from the State that no charge-specific voir dire question should issue for a murder with a handgun charge in the manner required in prior Maryland decisions for charges involving certain sex offense or controlled dangerous substance charges. The Court of Special Appeals further noted that Appellant faced other lesser included homicide charges involving imperfect self-defense claims, and that the denied voir dire question was germane to those charges as well.

The Court of Special Appeals accordingly reversed the conviction and remanded the case for retrial on that ground, and did not address Appellant's other grounds.

The full opinion is available in WPD and PDF.