Prince George County v. Ray's Used Cars (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed May 4, 2003--Opinion by Judge John Eldridge.

This case concerns a challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance establishing the minimum lot size of 25,000 square feet for used motor vehicle, mobile home or camping trailer sales lots. The dispositive issue in the case, however, is whether the ordinance's challengers were first required to invoke and exhaust administrative remedies. The petitioner, Prince George's County, argues that a judicial determination of the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance is premature because the respondent used car dealers failed to invoke and exhaust their administrative remedies. The respondents claim that pursuit and exhaustion of administrative remedies were not required in this case and that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates due process and equal protection principles.

The Court held that the respondent used car dealers were required to invoke and exhaust administrative remedies prior to obtaining judicial review.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Swam v. Upper Chesapeake Medical Center (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed March 16, 2007 -- Opinion by Judge John Eldridge (Judges Cathell and Harrell Concur)

The Court of Appeals held that the general statute of limitations did not bar a claim initially filed in the wrong forum, the Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office ("Health Care Office"), and subsequently filed in the appropriate forum, the Circuit Court for Harford County. Plaintiffs-appellants, Mary C. Swam and Scott Swam, filed a claim with the Health Care Office for alleged personal injury resulting from an abandoned hypodermic syringe on the premises of Upper Chesapeake Medical Center, Inc. Although Swam’s injury was not a medical injury within the meaning of the Health Claims Act and thus was not properly filed with the Health Care Office, the Court held that the claim was not time-barred even though it was not filed in the circuit court until after the general statute of limitations had run. According to the Court, the policy supporting the tolling exception rule was satisfied by the ambiguity regarding the appropriate forum for a medically-related claim and basic fairness to the parties. The Court noted that Upper Chesapeake would suffer no unfairness because it already had notice of the claim prior to the expiration of the limitations period.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Cathell expressly disavowed any holding that an action begun in an executive branch agency could toll the running of a statute of limitations applicable to judicial branch proceedings. Judge Cathell would reach the same result based on holding that Upper Chesapeake waived the defense of limitations by not raising it prior to or in its answer. Judge Harrell joined in the concurring opinion.

The opinion can be found in PDF here.

Lloyd v. General Motors (Ct. of Appeals)

Issued February 8, 2007 -- Opinion by Chief Judge Robert M. Bell -- Concurring Opinion by Judge John C. Eldridge

From the Court's headnote beginning its lengthy opinion:

Even in the absence of actual personal injury, economic loss, the cost to fix the defect alleged, is recoverable where it is also alleged that such defect has caused, in other cases, serious bodily injury and, thus, constitutes an unreasonable risk of death or serious injury.

Petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd ("Lloyd") were the representative plaintiffs for a class action on behalf of designated purchasers of vehicles with certain types of front seats installed. They sought to recover from the respondents the cost of repairing and/or replacing the front seats in each class vehicle. Lloyd alleged that the seats were unsafe because they would allegedly collapse rearward in moderate and severe rear-impact collisions. None of the petitioners or any putative class members alleged that he or she had experienced personal injury as a result of the mechanical failure that caused the alleged defect.

In its Amended Complaint, Petitioners alleged seven causes of action:

1. negligence
2. strict liability
3. implied warranty of merchantability
4. "negligent failure to disclose, failure to warn, concealment and misrepresentation" ("negligent misrepresentation")
5. fraudulent concealment and intentional failure to warn
6. unfair or deceptive trade practices
7. civil conspiracy

The core issue examined by the court in responding to the Respondent's Motion for Dismiss for failure to state a claim was whether the risk of harm that has not yet occurred was sufficient to sustain a legal claim for each of the counts in the Amended Complaint, in particular those in tort. After a review of Maryland precedent, the Court of Appeals held that the facts alleged, if proven at trial, would satisfy each of the severity and probability "prongs" of the test for economic loss recovery in tort from Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. 519, 533:

"Thus, if the possible injury is extraordinarily severe, i.e., multiple deaths, we do not require the probability of the injury occurring to be as high as we would require if the injury threatened were less severe, i.e. a broken leg or damage to property. Likewise, if the probability of the injury occurring is extraordinarily high, we do not require the injury to be as severe as we would if the probability of the injury were lower."

This precedent, driven by policy concern balancing a skeptical eye toward mere speculative damages against the policy of averting harms either reasonably foreseeable or severe, led the Court to uphold in turn each of the seven counts in Lloyd's Amended Complaint.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge noted his agreement with the holding and reasoning of the Court's opinion, but maintained his agreement today with his support of the dissenting opinion in the Morris case and one other precedent cited in the opinion, in which cases Judge Eldridge had previously dissented as an active member of the Court.

The full texts of both the opinion of the Court and Judge Eldridge's concurring opinion are available here in PDF.