State v. Williams (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed February 8, 2007—Opinion by Judge Clayton Green

Charles Williams was convicted in a bench trial of aiding and abetting Anthony Henderson and Cheryl Gains in the attempted robbery of a Citgo station in Baltimore County. The trial judge found Williams guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon (Count 1); attempted robbery (Count 2); assault in the first degree (Count 3); attempted theft (Count 4); use of a handgun in the commission of a felony (Count 6); and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence (Count 7). Williams was acquitted of wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun (Count 5) and two counts of possession of a firearm (Counts 8 and 9).

Williams was convicted as a principal in the second degree to those crimes, in part, because he drove Henderson and Gaines to and from the station where the crimes took place. The Court of Special Appeals found the guilty verdicts inconsistent with the acquittal for wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun because Williams could not have used the handgun if he did not first possess it. The trial judge neither acknowledged the inconsistencies offered nor offered any justification to explain how Williams was not in joint constructive possession of the handgun used in the crime.

The Court of Special Appeals compared the “use” of a handgun to the “possession” and determined that the Legislature intended “use” to be something more than “possession” – an active, rather than a passive operation or employment of a handgun. The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that there existed no evidence that Williams actually possessed the handgun but noted that his convictions were not based on his actual use of the handgun; they were based on Henderson’s use of the handgun and William’s complicity in Henderson’s actions. The court explained that before Williams could use the gun he had to have possessed it, and the trial court failed to explain that inconsistency. As such, the Court of Special Appeals reversed Williams’ convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault in the first degree, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and a felony. It affirmed all the other verdicts and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for new sentencing.

Upon the State’s writ of certiorari, this Court reasoned that verdicts are inconsistent if they are “lacking consistency; not compatible with another fact or claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (8th ed. 1999). Inconsistent verdicts in jury trials are permissible in criminal cases; however, inconsistent verdicts of guilty and not guilty by a trial judge at a nonjury trial are not ordinarily permitted. When a trial judge renders inconsistent verdicts, the remedy is to reverse or vacate the verdict entered on the inconsistent guilty verdict. Where, however, there is an apparent inconsistency in the verdicts at a nonjury trial, but where the trial judge on the record satisfactorily explains the apparent inconsistency, the guilty verdict may stand. If there is only an apparent inconsistency which in substance disappears upon review of the trial court’s explanation, the guilty verdict will not be vacated.

The Court agreed with the State’s distinctions between misdemeanors and felonies in the application of the law of accessoryship in Maryland, but disagreed that those differences render the verdicts inconsistent, as a matter of law, in this case. The Court established that the common law doctrine of accessoryship is applicable to felonies only and outlined the differences:

A principal in the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent. A principal in the second degree is one who is guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive. A principal in the second degree differs from an accessory before the fact because an accessory before the fact is one who is guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof, without having been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration. Lastly, an accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the other’s guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment. These differences are not applicable to misdemeanors because, in Maryland, the principles of accessoryship apply only to felonies; as to misdemeanors, all participants in a crime are considered principals.

In accordance with these definitions and case law, the Court concluded that Williams must have possessed the handgun before he could use it. Because Williams embraced the entire criminal enterprise, it was inconsistent for the trial judge to conclude that Williams used the handgun but did not actually or constructively possess that gun. The judge, further, failed to adequately explain how Williams was not in possession of the handgun while traveling to the Citgo station but nonetheless embraced all of the other crimes committed in furtherance of the attempted armed robbery. Consequently, the convictions for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault in the first degree, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and a felony must be reversed.

The full opinion is available in PDF.