In Re: Roneika S. (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed April 3, 2007--Opinion by Judge Mary Ellen Barbera.

The issue is what a petition alleging juvenile delinquency must contain as a factual basis to support the allegation. The issue implicates the requirements of notice embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the specific dictates of Maryland Code § 3-8A-13 and Maryland Rule 11-103.

The State filed a juvenile delinquent petition alleging that Roneika made a false statement to a police officer, in response to which Roneika filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition did not sufficiently allege the facts supporting the charged delinquent act; specifically, the petition failed to include a "to wit" clause indicating the specific false statements.The Circuit Court for St. Mary's County decided that the brief description in the charging document was unsatisfactory. Roneika knew she was charged with making a false statement but did not know what statement the State claimed was false, preventing her from properly preparing for trial. Additionally, the lack of a specific statement did not protect Roneika from a future prosecution for the same offense because, again, the specific content of the statement was not set forth.

On appeal, Roneika interposed the preliminary argument that the State’s appeal should be dismissed because the State sought relief – reinstatement of the delinquency petition and an adjudicatory hearing – which would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy principles preclude, among other things, further trial proceedings after an acquittal or equivalent adjudication on the merits in favor of the accused. Roneika’s argument was based on the premise that the juvenile judge granted her motion to dismiss for reasons of legal insufficiency of the evidence. This Court held that argument failed because, based on discussion among the court and counsel that preceded the ruling, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it believed it to be legally inadequate on its face. Because the court’s dismissal was not substantively an acquittal, jeopardy did not attach to that decision.

In the matter of whether the juvenile court erred or abused its discretion when it dismissed the delinquency petition, this Court held that juveniles are entitled to fair notice under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The protections afforded a criminal defendant to be informed of the accusation against him must apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.

Finally, the Court held that the delinquency petition passed muster under the Due Process Clause, Article 21, C.J. § 3-8A-13, and Rule 11-103(c). Reasoning that the technical details required of common law pleading have been relaxed and little factual detail, beyond a statement of the essential elements of the offense, e.g., the precise manner and means of committing the offense, generally is required in the charging document. The offense of making a false statement to police contains no element that is cast in such generic terms as would embrace a variety of conduct. The petition not only set forth the elements of the charged offense but also set forth the date and place of the alleged act, the officer to whom Roneika made the statements, and the names of witnesses. The question of whether the petition could have been more factually particular is not the question. Rather, the question is whether the petition was legally sufficient and this Court reasoned that it was.

The opinion is available in PDF.