Flores v. Bell, et al. (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed March 20, 2007–Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.

Mr. and Mrs. Bell filed an action for negligence against Mr. Flores, alleging that Flores negligently caused injury to Mr. Bell in an automobile accident. The issue concerns a stipulation entered into by the parties before the trial began and the impact this stipulation had on questions submitted by the trial court for consideration by the jury. After a seven-day jury trial, the Bells were awarded $5,329 in damages, from which they appealed. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

Prior to the original trial, counsel for both sides orally agreed to stipulate that Flores was liable for the automobile accident. The stipulation was neither reduced to writing nor formally placed on the record. At the close of the Bell's case, after the jury had been excused from the room and after Flores’ counsel announced his intention to make a motion, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether the Bells had proven Flores was driving the vehicle that hit the Bells. The Bells’ counsel raised the issue of the stipulation, while Flores’ counsel clarified that they only admitted responsibility for the damages if the damages were causally proven to have related from the accident. The court reserved ruling on Flores’ Motion for Judgment and informed counsel that a question would be included on the verdict sheet asking the jury to determine whether Flores was the driver of the vehicle that collided with the Bells.

This Court granted Flores’ petition for a writ of certiorari to primarily address the following question (the second question was not addressed in light of the Court’s holding on the first question):

"On review of the trial court’s decision to reserve ruling on a motion for judgment and submit an issue to the jury, can the Court of Special Appeals vacate a jury’s verdict when, if it was error, it was harmless?"

The Court noted that the special verdict sheet required that the jury provide a separate answer to the driver-identification question. The jury's verdict to this question was in favor of the Bells and, even if submitting the question to the jury was error because the issue had been resolved by stipulation, there is nothing in the record, other than the verdict itself, to suggest that the question distracted the jury from reaching a fair and proper verdict on the question of damages. The question did not prejudice the Bells, and the Court of Special Appeals judgment vacating jury verdict was reversed.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Hunter v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed March 16, 2007--Opinion by Judge Dale Cathell (JJ Battaglia and Harrell dissenting).

Appellant was convicted of one count of first degree burglary, for which he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In a writ of certiorari, the petitioner presented two questions for review:

1) In a criminal trial, is it error for the judge to allow the prosecutor to ask the defendant whether the police witnesses were lying?

2) If the answer to the preceding question is yes, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the error was harmless, particularly where the underlying facts were contested, the jury sent out notes suggesting that they were struggling with some of the factual issues, and the prosecutor's closing argument augmented the prejudicial effect of the error?

In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded to a witness' testimony are solely within the province of a jury. Generally, the rule is that it is error for the court to permit to go the jury a statement, belief, or opinion of another person to the effect that a witness is telling the truth or lying. Therefore, it is the well established law of this State that issues of credibility and the appropriate weight to give to a witness's testimony are for the jury, and it is impermissible, as a matter of law, for a witness to give an opinion on the credibility of another witness.

At trial, petitioner was asked five "were-they-lying" questions. These questions were impermissible as a matter of law because they encroached on the province of the jury by asking the petitioner to judge the credibility of the detectives and weigh their testimony, i.e., he was asked: "And the detective was lying?" The questions also asked petitioner to stand in place of the jury by resolving contested facts. Moreover, the questions were overly argumentative. They created the risk that the jury might conclude that, in order to acquit petitioner, it would have to find that the police officers lied. The questions were further unfair because it is possible that neither the petitioner nor the police officers deliberately misrepresented the truth. These questions forced petitioner to choose between answering in a way that would allow the jury to draw the inference that he was lying or taking the risk of alienating the jury by accusing the police officers of lying. Therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask petitioner "were-they-lying" questions. When prosecutors ask "were-they-lying" questions, especially when they ask them of a defendant, they, almost always, will risk reversal.

Once error is established, the burden is on the State to show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the possible prejudicial effect of the "were-they-lying" questions is demonstrated by the number and combination of the questions themselves, the repeated emphasis on them during the State's closing argument, and, most importantly, the jury's behavior during its deliberations. During deliberation, the jury sent four notes to the trial court, which could have been related to concerns the jury had about the truthfulness of petitioner's testimony. Consequently, the Court is unable to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury was not effected by the "were-they-lying" questions. Therefore, the trial court's error in allowing the questions was not harmless.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Fields v. State (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed December 8, 2006--Opinion by Judge Irma Raker.

Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's nickname, "Sat Dog," which was displayed on a television monitor above a bowling lane, was not hearsay. Even if the court erred with respect to the evidentiary issue, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court did not reach the hearsay issue.

The full opinion is available in WordPerfect and PDF.